Tour de Force: From State-Based to Non-State Internal Fighting by Benz, Sophia
  
TOUR de FORCE: 
From State‐Based to Non‐State Internal Fighting 
 
 
Dissertation 
zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades 
der Wirtschafts‐ und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Fakultät 
der Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen 
 
 
vorgelegt von 
Sophia Benz 
aus Tübingen 
 
 
 
 
 
Tübingen 
2014 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tag der mündlichen Prüfung:   29.06.2015 
Dekan:         Professor Dr. rer.soc. Josef Schmid 
1. Gutachter:        Prof. Dr. Andreas Hasenclever 
2. Gutachter:        Prof. Dr. Sven Chojnacki 
Contents
1. Introduction 8
I. Old Wars 1
2. Conventional Inter-State Wars: Modern, Total and Cold Warfare 3
3. Conventional Intra-State Wars: Greed and Grievance Conﬂicts 13
3.1. Explaining Grievance Rebellions: The Deprived Actor Model . . . . . . . . 13
3.2. Explaining Greed Rebellions: The Rational Actor Model . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.3. Summary of Major Empirical Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
II. The Concept of New Wars 35
4. The Political Context of New Warfare 37
5. The Dimensions of New Warfare 51
5.1. The Nature and Quantity of Actors in New Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
5.2. Individual Motives and New War Economies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
5.3. The Strategy of New Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
5.4. The Duration of New Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
6. Interim Summary I: The Theoretical Concept of New Wars 71
7. Non-State vs. State-Based Internal Armed Conﬂicts 75
8. Non-State Internal Fighting vs. Terrorism 83
9. Critical Discussion of the Concept of New Wars 87
III. Reﬁning the Concept of New Wars 109
10. Explaining Violence Against Civilians in Non-State Conﬂicts 111
10.1. Weinstein’s Structuralist Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
10.2. Kalyvas’ Mechanism of Contestation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
1
Contents
10.3. Summary of Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
11. Explaining Military Deaths in Non-State Conﬂicts 147
11.1. Summary of Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
12. Interim Summary II: Beyond the Concept of New Wars 151
IV. Data 167
13. Data on Internal Fighting and Armed Actors 169
13.1. The “New List of Wars”/“Consolidated List of Wars” . . . . . . . . . . . 169
13.2. The “Non-State Conﬂict Dataset” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
14. Data on the Intensity of Internal Fighting 181
15. Data on the Duration of Internal Fighting 189
16. Data on Conﬂict Resources 193
17. Data on the Political Context of Internal Fighting 205
18. Interim Summary III: The Master-File 229
V. Hypotheses 235
VI. Analyses 245
19. Methods of Analysis 247
20. Descriptive Analysis 249
20.1. The Incidence and Signiﬁcance of Non-State Wars . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
20.2. The Incidence and Signiﬁcance of Non-State Conﬂicts . . . . . . . . . . . 259
20.3. The Incidence and Signiﬁcance of Non-State Conﬂict Episodes . . . . . . 276
21. Interim Summary IV: Main Results of the Descriptive Analysis 287
22. Comparative Analysis 291
22.1. Comparison of the Quantity and Nature of Actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291
22.2. Comparison of the Role of Conﬂict Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296
22.3. Comparison of the Scale and Nature of Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 311
22.4. Comparison of the Duration of Fighting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 324
22.5. Comparison of the Political Context of Fighting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327
23. Interim Summary V: Main Results of the Comparative Analysis 337
2
Contents
24. Multiple Regression Look-Out 339
24.1. Multiple Regression Results Concerning the Associative Hypotheses . . . 344
24.2. Multiple Regression Results on the Incidence and Nature of Non-State Fight-
ing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357
25. Interim Summary VI: Main Results of the Multiple Regression Analysis 363
Conclusion 373
VII. Appendices 377
A. The New vs. the Consolidated List of Wars 379
B. List of Non-State Wars, 1946–2009 381
C. Hypotheses 383
D. Codebook, Data Sources and Measures 385
D.1. Codebook Master-File . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 385
D.2. Variables and Data Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 398
E. Descriptive Statistics 405
F. Pairwise Correlation Matrix of State Weakness Measures 411
G. Signiﬁcance of Regression Results 413
H. Hypotheses, Tests and Overall Outcome 419
Glossary 423
Bibliography 425
3

List of Figures
5.1. Use of Child Soldiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
5.2. The Context and Dimensions of New Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
10.1. Theoretical Possibilities of Rebel Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
10.2. Mechanism 1 Explaining Civilian Abuse in Internal Conﬂict . . . . . . . 142
10.3. Mechanism 2 & 3 Explaining Civilian Abuse in Internal Conﬂict . . . . . 143
10.4. Mechanism 4 Explaining Civilian Abuse in Internal Conﬂict . . . . . . . 145
10.5. Mechanism 5 Explaining Civilian Abuse in Internal Conﬂict . . . . . . . 145
11.1. Mechanism 6 Explaining Military Deaths in Internal Conﬂict . . . . . . . 149
11.2. Mechanism 7 Explaining Military Deaths in Internal Conﬂict . . . . . . . 149
11.3. Mechanism 8 Explaining Military Deaths in Internal Conﬂict . . . . . . . 150
11.4. Mechanism 9 Explaining Military Deaths in Internal Conﬂict . . . . . . . 150
11.5. Mechanism 10 Explaining Military Deaths in Internal Conﬂict . . . . . . 150
20.1. Share of Non-State Wars in All Annually Ongoing Wars . . . . . . . . . . 250
20.2. Number of Annually Ongoing Wars and Aﬀected Countries . . . . . . . . 251
20.3. Numbers of Annually Ongoing Wars and Aﬀected Countries in sub-Saharan
Africa and in Central and South Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
20.4. Avg. Regional Shares (1946–1988 vs. 1989–2009) in All Annually Ongoing
Wars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254
20.5. Inner-Regional Shares of Non-State Wars in all Annually Ongoing Wars . 256
20.6. Regional Shares in the Number of All Annually Ongoing State-Based Wars 257
20.7. Number of New Outbreaks of Conﬂict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
20.8. Share of Non-State Conﬂicts in All New Outbreaks of Conﬂict . . . . . . 261
20.9. Number of Annually Ongoing Conﬂicts and Aﬀected Countries . . . . . . 262
20.10. Number of Annually Ongoing Conﬂicts by Region . . . . . . . . . . . . 264
20.11. Number of Annually Ongoing Non-State Conﬂicts by Region . . . . . . 265
20.12. Regional Shares in All Annually Ongoing Non-State Conﬂicts . . . . . . 266
20.13. Post-Cold War Avg. Regional Shares in All Annually Ongoing Non-State
Conﬂicts and Aﬀected Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267
20.14. Post-Cold War Avg. Regional Shares in All Annually Ongoing Non-State
Conﬂicts and Aﬀected Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268
20.15. Number of Annually Ongoing State-Based Conﬂicts by Region . . . . . 269
20.16. Regional Shares in All Annually Ongoing State-Based Conﬂicts . . . . . 270
5
List of Figures
20.17. Post-Cold War Avg. Regional Shares in All Annually Ongoing State-Based
Conﬂicts and Aﬀected Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271
20.18. Share of Non-State Conﬂicts in All Annually Ongoing Conﬂicts . . . . . 274
20.19. Inner-Regional Shares of Non-State Conﬂicts in All Annually Ongoing Con-
ﬂicts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275
20.20. Post-Cold War Avg. Regional Shares in All Annually Ongoing Conﬂict
Episodes (by Type) and Aﬀected Countries, PRIO regional coding . . . 277
20.21. Post-Cold War Avg. Regional Shares in All Annually Ongoing Conﬂict
Episodes (by Type) and Aﬀected Countries, UCDP regional coding . . . 278
20.22. Regional Shares in All Annually Ongoing Non-State Conﬂict Episodes . 279
20.23. Regional Shares in All Annually Ongoing State-Based Conﬂict Episodes 280
20.24. Number of All Annually Ongoing Conﬂict Episodes and Aﬀected Countries 281
20.25. Post-Cold War Numbers of All Annually Ongoing Conﬂict Episodes and
Aﬀected Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282
20.26. Share of Non-State Conﬂict Episodes in All Annually Ongoing Conﬂict
Episodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283
20.27. Inner-Regional Shares of Non-State Conﬂict Episodes in All Annually On-
going Conﬂict Episodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284
20.28. Number of Annually Ongoing Conﬂict Episodes by Region . . . . . . . . 285
22.1. Outliers in the Number of Involved Actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292
22.2. Post-Cold War Avg. Regional Shares in All Battle-Deaths . . . . . . . . . 313
22.3. Avg. Annual Number of Battle-Deaths from Conﬂict by Region . . . . . 314
22.4. Deadliness of State-Based vs. Non-State Conﬂicts . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315
22.5. Battle-Deaths from/per Conﬂict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317
22.6. Battle-Deaths from/per Non-State Conﬂict by Region . . . . . . . . . . . 318
6
List of Tables
4.1. State Weakness and Types of Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
7.1. Ideal Types of Intra-State Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
10.1. A Typology of Mass Political Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
22.1. Ranking of Countries by the Deadliness of Fighting . . . . . . . . . . . . 321
22.2. Correlation Matrix of State Weakness Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 328
22.3. Countries with the Greatest Discrepancy between State Legitimacy and Ef-
fectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331
25.1. Accepted and Rejected Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 365
B.1. List of Non-State Wars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 382
C.1. Overview of Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 383
D.1. Overview of Fragility Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 404
E.1. Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 409
F.1. Pairwise Correlation Matrix of State Weakness Measures . . . . . . . . . . 411
G.1. Regression Results of the Baseline Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 414
G.2. Regression Results of All Reﬁned Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 415
G.3. Regression Results in Numbers of the Final Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . 416
G.4. Regression Results in Numbers of the Final Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . 417
G.5. Regression Results in Numbers of the Final Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . 418
H.1. Overview of Hypotheses, Tests and Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 420
H.2. Overview of Hypotheses, Tests and Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 421
7
“[T]hose who live where states have failed must choose whether to be wealthy or secure;
without being willing to ﬁght, they cannot be both. The formation of militias midst
diamond ﬁelds is thus emblematic of the way in which people must live when states fail.”
Robert H. Bates (2008). When Things Fell Apart: State Failure in Late-Century Africa.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 139
1. Introduction
For about two decades, peace and conﬂict research has been discussing the emergence
of “New Wars”.1 It has been argued that especially the end of the Cold War and increas-
ing globalization resulted in signiﬁcant changes in the incidence and nature of internal
warfare. According to the advocates of the concept, New Wars emerge in weak states
and diﬀer from “old” inter-state wars as well as from conventional intra-state wars in
the nature and number of involved actors, their motives and modes of ﬁnancing war-
fare, the applied strategies and the duration of ﬁghting. More speciﬁcally, advocates of
the concept identify a privatization, demilitarization or internationalization of actors,
an economization of motives, a brutalization of violent strategies and prolonging war-
fare (Kaldor 1999, pp. 6 sqq., 69 sqq.; Kaldor 2006a; Münkler 2006, p. 134). However,
they admit that new and old wars in fact share certain characteristics. For example,
Münkler (2006) emphasizes that a privatization and demilitarization of warfare as well
as asymmetric ﬁghting have already been observed in the past. What constitutes the
fundamental novelty of New Wars is rather the coincidence of these three changes (Mün-
kler 2006, pp. 134 sq., 142 sq.; Kaldor 2007, pp. 2 sq.). Accordingly, New Wars are not
fundamentally “new” but characterized by a speciﬁc combination of values of already
known parameters or dimensions of warfare. Therefore, reference to the occurrence of
single aspects of New Warfare (e.g. the importance of non-state actors or massive vio-
lence against civilians) in certain old wars does not shatter the concept of New Wars.
Instead, the above mentioned global theses on the changing nature of internal armed
conﬂict require large-N empirical testing based on data with extensive temporal and
geographical coverage.
1For a summary of this discussion see Brzoska (2004).
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Nevertheless, the recent discussion of the concept of New Wars generally remained
a theoretical debate merely supported by case-study evidence or evidence from com-
parative case-study designs.2 Systematic tests of deduced hypotheses have not been
conducted. On the other hand, many quantitative large-N studies tested at least some
aspects of the concept, yet without explicitly referring to the concept of New Wars.3
Although Melander et al. (2006) and Melander et al. (2009) rely on the concept of New
Wars for their theoretical arguments, their quantitative analyses remain limited to a sin-
gle dimension of New Warfare (the quantity and quality of violence). Most importantly,
however, even these authors who explicitly aim to test the concept of New Wars, resort
to conﬂict data that do not include or only incompletely cover New Wars: Their analy-
ses are based on conventional conﬂict data that do not capture wars between non-state
actors, taking place in a context of complete or partial state failure or within states that
lack international recognition.
In order to close this gap, Sven Chojnacki and his colleagues from the Free University
of Berlin engaged in a unique data experiment. They published a “New List of Wars”
that in its latest (and for the time being last) version covers worldwide incidences of
warfare between 1946 and 2009. For data collection, the authors relied on existing
and well-accepted quantitative data sets. However, they added the missing category of
“sub-state wars”, in the following also referred to as new, non-conventional or non-state
internal wars. In contrast to conventional civil wars where the state constitutes one
party to the conﬂict, non-conventional internal wars are mainly characterized by their
non-state or sub-state nature. I rely on these and similar data (the “Non-State Conﬂict
Dataset” compiled by the Conﬂict Data Program of the University of Uppsala in Sweden,
UCDP) to uncover whether the incidence and the signiﬁcance of non-conventional (non-
state) internal ﬁghting are indeed increasing, to investigate whether non-conventional
(non-state) ﬁghting tends to occur in more fragile states where certain conﬂict resources
are produced more often, whether it lasts signiﬁcantly longer than conventional (state-
based) internal ﬁghting and whether it is carried out by a signiﬁcantly larger number of
violent actors whose nature (e.g. their level of organization) also diﬀers as well as the
kind of violence they apply.
For the ﬁrst time, this study links the theoretical discussion of the concept of New
Wars with recently published large-N quantitative data sets that measure the inci-
dence, the context and the nature of internal ﬁghting. The empirical analysis reaches
beyond a single or comparative case study design and does not systematically ex-
clude non-conventional (non-state or sub-state) internal ﬁghting. Intensive warfare and
low intensity armed conﬂicts are equally covered. As demanded by Kahl and Teusch
2See e.g. Heupel (2005); Heupel and Zangl (2004); Heupel and Zangl (2010); Schlichte (2002); Schlichte
(2006a); Schlichte (2006b); Kalyvas (2001); Ellis (2003).
3Examples are Collier and Hoeﬄer (2004), Lujala, N. P. Gleditsch, et al. (2005) and Lujala (2005) on
the role of conﬂict resources, Fearon (2004) and Buhaug et al. (2005) on the duration of warfare or
Lacina and N. P. Gleditsch (2005), Lacina (2006) and Lacina, Russett, et al. (2006) on the brutality
of ﬁghting. The latter refer to the concept of New Wars only casually.
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(2004, pp. 384, 385, 400), Heupel and Zangl (2004, p. 349), and Zangl and Zürn (2003,
pp. 182–187), this study contrasts non-conventional with conventional intra-state (in-
stead of inter-state) wars and conﬂicts. This comparison not only captures every case
of non-state and state-based internal ﬁghting but all dimensions of the concept of New
Wars which at the same time are general dimensions of internal ﬁghting. If appropriate
and if data are available, additional levels of analysis are taken into consideration. For
most of its parts, the empirical analysis not only covers the conﬂict and the war level,
but also the actor level, the conﬂict-episode level and the country level. This allows one
to study the robustness of eﬀects across levels of analysis. The results of the empiri-
cal analysis challenge the outcome of existing quantitative studies on the incidence and
nature of contemporary internal warfare while the prospects and limits of systematic
empirical tests of the concept of New Wars are also discussed. In addition, this study
aims to theoretically reﬁne the concept of New Wars by identifying mechanisms that
link a privatization of violent actors, the availability of (certain) conﬂict resources and
worsening levels of state weakness with changes in the nature, intensity and duration of
ﬁghting. This is especially demanding because so far the theoretical discussion of New
Wars lacks a clear understanding of the meaning of the concept, its dimensions and, most
importantly, an understanding of how these dimensions relate to each other. The focus
on the nature of internal ﬁghting also contributes to the State of the Art as variance in
the intensity or duration comparatively rarely constitutes the dependent variable. In the
past, conﬂict research focused on great power or inter-state wars instead of intra-state
warfare while contemporary civil wars research oftentimes deals with the incidence (i.e.
changes in the proportion of countries at war in every given year) or the causes instead
of the nature of internal ﬁghting.
This study is composed of six parts. The ﬁrst theoretical part describes “old wars”,
i.e. conventional inter-state as well as conventional intra-state wars. Because old inter-
state wars are becoming a “relict of the past”, the focus soon shifts to the latter kind
(so-called greed or grievance rebellions). This type of internal armed conﬂict had been
dominating warfare at least since the end of World War II. However, within the post-
Cold War era, advocates of the concept of New Wars believe they observe the emergence
and increasing importance of a new type of internal warfare which is described within
the second theoretical part of this study. Chapters 4 and 5 which clarify the context and
dimensions of New Wars are followed by an interim summary of the original theoretical
concept in chapter 6. Because New Wars are often confounded with other kinds of
organized violence, chapter 7 summarizes the major similarities and diﬀerences between
conventional (state-based) internal armed conﬂicts (especially greed rebellions) on the
one hand and non-conventional (non-state) armed conﬂicts on the other. Likewise,
chapter 8 brieﬂy distinguishes non-conventional (non-state) internal armed ﬁghting from
terrorism. The second theoretical part of this study closes with a critical discussion of
both the concept of New Wars and the State of the Art in chapter 9. So far, especially
a clear understanding is missing of how the single dimensions of New Warfare interact
with each other. The third theoretical part of this study therefore aims to provide a
reﬁnement of the concept by identifying respective mechanisms.
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More speciﬁcally, I ask in how far diﬀerences between conventional and non-conventional
internal armed conﬂicts in terms of the nature and number of violent actors, their mo-
tives and their political context can explain diﬀerences in the nature of applied violence
(in the level of civilian abuse as discussed in chapter 10) as well as variance in the scale
of violence (in the number of battle-related military deaths as discussed in chapter 11).
The third theoretical part again concludes with an interim summary of the reﬁned theo-
retical concept (chapter 12). The fourth part introduces and critically discusses data sets
that are now available to measure the incidence, the context and the various dimensions
of non-state and state-based internal ﬁghting (chapters 13 to 17). The data used in the
upcoming analyses (the ﬁnal “Master-File”) are presented in chapter 18. The ﬁfth part
provides an overview of the hypotheses that are tested within the sixth analytical part.
Chapter 19 contains some information on the methods of analysis before I present the
results of the descriptive analysis (chapters 20 and 21), of the bivariate cross-sectional
comparative analysis (chapters 22 and 23) and of the multiple regression analysis (chap-
ter 24). Given the abundance of presented data and levels of analysis that are covered
by the models, the ﬁnal summary of the main empirical ﬁndings (chapter 25) focuses on
the unambiguous outcomes. Overall, I ﬁnd that non-state internal ﬁghting indeed diﬀers
from state-based internal ﬁghting – sometimes as proposed by the concept of New Wars.
At times, however, the diﬀerences in the context and the nature of these sub-types of
internal armed conﬂict are less pronounced or even contrary to the expectations of the
concept.
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Part I.
Old Wars
1

2. Conventional Inter-State Wars: Modern,
Total and Cold Warfare
Mary Kaldor (2005, p. 2) uses the term “Old War” to refer to an “idealized version”
of inter-state warfare that characterized Europe between the late 17th and the 20th
century. She distinguishes the following types of old warfare: the early modern wars
fought during the 17th and 18th century, the modern wars of the 19th century, the total
wars of the early 20th century and the Cold War during the late 20th century (Kaldor
2007, p. 16). For about three hundred years prior to 1945 such wars between states had
been the most frequent form of violent conﬂict (Mason 2009, p. 64). Others state that
organized armed violence only began with the rise of nation-states and the underlying
political problems within or between them (Tilly 1990, p. 67; Snow 1996; Kaldor 2005,
p. 2; Kaldor 2004; Kaldor 2001).
Prior to the formation of states, the bearing of arms was a privilege of the nobility.
In the feudal system and in the system of the city states, military service had been
performed by vassals as a duty to the lord or by the armed citizenry as a duty to the city.
In the late fourteenth century, the age of the condottieri, this system of personal duty
was rationalized, systematized and replaced by the impersonal relationship of purchase
and barter. Warfare became a business, a service performed for money by mercenaries.
Because ﬁghting wars paid well, this practice found parallels and persisted for instance
in the Landsknecht system in Germany during the Thirty Years’ War, in the Swiss
“Reisla¨ufer”, who were greatly valued as mercenary soldiers throughout Europe from the
ﬁfteenth to the nineteenth century or in the use of soldiers of fortune to establish colonies
by the East India Company during the eighteenth century (Münkler 2005, pp. 51 sq.).
Because mercenaries had little incentive to risk their lives for a temporary client,
they developed a kind of warfare that mainly involved strategic maneuvering rather
than open and decisive battles. They avoided mutual slaughter which would have put
thair lives at risk and undermined their interest in long term employment. Instead,
these armies operated by cutting each other’s lines of supply so to force their opponent
to capitulate. Ransoms which could be earned by capturing enemy oﬃcers and soldiers
were also a highly desirable bonus. “If the ransom was paid, the enemy could be released
and the war could start all over again” (Münkler 2003, p. 13). Although this leads
to the expectation of rather low numbers of battle-related military death, the civilian
population and the nobles who employed the mercenaries nevertheless suﬀered. First
3
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of all, in ﬁnancial terms because they constantly had to raise funds through taxes but
seldom saw their objectives achieved. Secondly, because the civilian population was only
spared from violence if regular pay was provided. Otherwise, the mercenaries switched
to an “uncivilized form of warfare against the population involving pillage and plunder,
setting ﬁre to farmsteads and villages, killing the men and raping the women” (Münkler
2003, p. 14). Other “robber hordes” found it diﬃcult to seize castles and walled cities
and, instead of engaging in armed encounter with the enemy, devastated the countryside
and burned villages and farms. Warfare during the Middle Ages and, in part, the
early modern period, is therefore better described as “expeditions against the enemy’s
estates and possessions” (Münkler 2005, p. 35). Mercenaries are also accused of having
deliberately prolonged warfare in order to keep their pay. Oftentimes, they turned their
mind to the next contract before the old one had expired. Finally, mercenary armies were
usually disbanded after wars for the winter and therefore unreliable. Thus, monarchs
started to replace them by standing armies (Münkler 2005, p. 53).
During the 17th and 18th century, warfare already involved partly professional armies
ﬁnanced through either borrowing or the starting regularization of taxation (Kaldor
1999, pp. 13–15). Early modern wars associated with the growing power of the absolutist
state and are described as “state-building” or “dynastic conﬂicts” fought to consolidate
borders. However, these wars were still carried out “prudently, in order to conserve
professional forces. There was a tendency to avoid battle, defensive sieges were preferred
to oﬀensive assaults; campaigns were halted for the winter and strategic retreats were
frequent” (Kaldor 2007, p. 25). This changed signiﬁcantly with the further statization
of warfare which was largely brought about by innovations in military technology and
revolutions in tactics (Münkler 2005, p. 56). Especially the introduction of heavy artillery
was decisive in shifting from defensive to oﬀensive strategies, from wars of devastation to
wars of conquest.1 Soon, only armies that possessed a highly drilled infantry, a cavalry
and a modern park of artillery could engage in successful military campaigns.2 Success
increasingly became a matter of combination of all three types of weaponry (Münkler
2005, p. 54). This and the development of ever larger standing armies made war an
increasingly expensive business. “In the end, such wars could be fought only by states
which, on the basis of tax revenue [. . . ] were able to deploy suﬃcient funds for a long
period of time” (Münkler 2005, p. 54). In order to ﬁnance their standing armies, states
further extended administration, taxation and borrowing. In addition, war oﬃces were
established to organize and improve the eﬃciency of expenditure (Kaldor 1999, p. 18).
1“Although it is true that late-medieval warfare had already used the cannon, improved casting tech-
niques now made it possible to increase the rate of ﬁre and the size of the load, while new kinds of gun
carriage made artillery more mobile and [. . . ] capable of being eﬀectively deployed in siege warfare
and on the battleﬁeld. [. . . ] In this way, the oﬀensive won back strategic weight from the defensive:
victories in the grand style became possible, and [. . . ] the previously preferred war of devastation
became less signiﬁcant than war of conquest. [. . . ] To conduct a war of conquest, a commander [. . . ]
needed reasonably disciplined troops” (Münkler 2005, p. 58).
2Münkler (2005, p. 60) notes that the development of a highly drilled line of infantry in Europe con-
tributed to the reliable separation of combatants from non-combatants since “anyone who had not
spent years in training to be a soldier was of no use in large-scale warfare”.
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Standing armed forces under the control of the state became a decisive characteristic
of the modern wars during the 19th century. The establishment of standing armies was
an integral part of the monopolization of legitimate violence intrinsic to the modern
nation-state (Kaldor 2007, p. 19). With the help of these armies and through warfare,
states eliminated internal and external competitors and established their monopoly of
organized violence within their territory. Nationalism, which Kaldor (2006a, p. 4) deﬁnes
as “the idea that we are a community against another nation”, was built up in war. States
not only became responsible for the protection of borders against other states but also
for upholding the rule of law within the state (Kaldor 2001; Kaldor 2004). This “job
of the state [. . . ] to defend territory against others [. . . ] gave the state its legitimacy”
(Kaldor 2005, p. 2). In other words: “states made wars and wars made states” (Tilly
1990, p. 67).
State interest became the legitimate justiﬁcation for war. While earlier wars (e.g.
fought by the Vikings, Cossacks or Mongols) are referred to as “autonomous activity
devoid of any conscious connection to politics” or a “pre-Clausewitzian style of war”, the
“Clausewitzian style of war” which emerged with the rise of the European states became
“a continuation of politics by other means” that could not “be divorced from politics for
a single moment any more” (Snow 1996). The notion of war as state activity was later
codiﬁed in the law of war. In order to distinguish it from crime, war was deﬁned as waged
by sovereign states. Rules about what constitutes legitimate warfare also developed. The
Declaration of Paris (1856) regulated maritime commerce in wartimes while the Geneva
Convention (1864), the St. Petersburg Declaration (1868), the Hague Conferences (1899
and 1907) or the London Conference (1908) regulated the conduct of warfare. These
treaties deﬁned the concept of “military necessity”, they identiﬁed weapons and tactics
that do not conform with this concept and they regulated the treatment of prisoners,
of sick and wounded people and of non-combatants. Because it was “comprehensively
institutionalized” through all these legal regulations, inter-state warfare was “the most
developed form of symmetrical warfare” (Münkler 2005, p. 25). The convention also
emerged that war was declared and concluded in accordance with rules. Old warfare
therefore had a precise deﬁnition in time, beginning with the declaration of war and
ending with the peace settlement. Finally, the law of war deﬁned soldiers as the only
personnel licensed to engage in armed violence on behalf of the state. Consequently,
soldiers had to be carefully registered and controlled and uniforms were introduced to
distinguish them from the civilian population. This is remarkable because between the
fall of the Roman Empire and the late Middle Ages a variety of actors (e.g. the Church,
city-states, barons or barbarian tribes) relied on individual warriors (like knights), citizen
militias, privateers or highwaymen to ﬁght their battles (Kaldor 2007, p. 18). With
the rise of nation-states, the establishment of specialized, professional and standing
state forces and with the development of the respective treaties “claims of just cause
by non-state actors could no longer be pursued through violent means” (Kaldor 2007,
p. 19). Private forms of protection and warfare were literally outlawed, “open markets in
violence” were closed and “independent expressions of corporate military organization
were eliminated” (Münkler 2005, pp. 41, 55). Of course, the ever rising costs of the
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military apparatus during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (due to the rising size
of armies, the need for constant training of the infantry over long periods and the need
for exercises to harmonize the deployment of the three diﬀerent arms) also made war too
expensive and less attractive for the private sector. War and preparations for war were
disconnected from the logic of capital amortization and transferred to the direct authority
of the state. The warlords of early modern history gradually disappeared (Münkler
2003, p. 14). At least ever increasing costs of warfare prompted war entrepreneurs to
shift their business: “[W]hoever wanted to turn a proﬁt no longer raised mercenary
troops but sold guns and other supplies to standing armies or else created factories to
meet the ever-growing demand for weapons” (Münkler 2005, p. 61). By now, warfare
had been gradually brought back under direct political and legal sway. As a result
hostilities became shorter because both sides were now interested in a quick and decisive
outcome. This development, however, was also associated with a dramatic intensiﬁcation
of violence on the battleﬁelds. At least the civilian population was largely spared from
violence and destruction because “[w]ar of this kind was a war of soldiers against soldiers”
(Münkler 2003, p. 14).
Kaldor (2007, p. 21) and Münkler (2005, p. 41) both note that the process of monop-
olization of violence which eliminated private mercenaries and established professional
forces subservient to the state was by no means fast, smooth or uninterrupted. Nor did
it take place at the same time or in the same way in every European state.3 At its end,
however, sharp distinctions between the legitimate bearer of arms, the non-combatant
3The development of a symmetrical warfare system and the emergence of territorial states were inter-
rupted by the Thirty Years War that took place on the territory of the German Reich from 1618 to
1648. At that time a “backsliding into forms of warfare that had already been overcome” and that
in many regard resembled New Warfare could be observed (Münkler 2005, p. 41). The Thirty Years
War was characterized by the use of force “- at times principally – against the civilian population.
It began with plunder and threats of pillage to extort the money required to pay and supply the
troops, but there were more and more cases where often starving soldiers banded together in groups
of irregulars to seize the few available resources. It is true that major battles became more frequent in
the course of the war, but none of them brought a deﬁnite military outcome”. Strategies of economic
exhaustion were increasingly pursued instead of military defeat, small skirmishes and expeditions,
plundering and extortion, ambushes and massacres characterized warfare. Commanders increasingly
lost control of their troops. Soldiers turned into “marauding ruﬃans who plundered and murdered
their way across the land [. . . ]. [T]roops [. . . ], not having received any pay, [. . . ] gave free rein
to greed and blood lust” (Münkler 2005, pp. 42 sq.). This led to the emergence of a war economy
that was structurally similar to the New War Economies. “War itself became part of an economic
life” and “autonomous of any political directives”. Prospect for private proﬁt drew in “an estimated
1,500 small-scale and large-scale military entrepreneurs” who organized mercenary forces, “paid less
heed to their client’s instructions than to interests of their own” and can be considered the “main
actors” in this war (Münkler 2005, pp. 45, 49). Besides state loans, there were no national reserves
derived from tax revenue which otherwise deﬁne the length and intensity of warfare. New reserves
from abroad, the constant ﬂow of gold and silver from the New World and the emergence of world
economic ties since the discovery of America also contributed to the long duration of warfare (Mün-
kler 2005, p. 45). Even if religious-ideological factors fanned the ﬂames they were not the true or only
cause of warfare. Instead, the Thirty Years War was mostly driven by greed and power ambitions
(Münkler 2005, pp. 48 sq.). Finally, the Thirty Years War also took place in weak states – at a time
when the process of statization was not yet complete (Münkler 2005, p. 49).
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or the criminal, between the permissible violence of acts of war and criminal violence,
between the civil and the military, between public and private and between internal
and external were established (Kaldor 2007, pp. 21 sq.; Kaldor 2001; Münkler 2005,
pp. 38–41). Münkler (2005, p. 38) adds that the territorial demarcations of states made
it possible to distinguish between war and peace since any unpermitted crossing of a
border is a violation of the peace and may become a reason for war. Back then, warfare
meant war between armed and uniformed state forces that fought for state interest ac-
cording to certain rules. Success or progress in warfare was measured by the movement
of armies, the success of military campaigns and the military control of territory. This
is reﬂected in the two main theories of warfare that developed during the 19th and 20th
century: Attrition and Manoeuvre Theory. According to the former, victory is achieved
by wearing down the enemy by imposing a higher casualty or attrition rate. Victory
is a matter of sheer size of relative resources (i.e. military strength, but also a larger
population and bigger economy). According to the latter, Manoeuvre Theory, a military
victory is achieved through preemptive surprise attacks, the movement and positioning
of one’s own troops in locally superior numbers to break through enemy lines and ﬁnally
demoralize the enemy into surrender (Collins 2009, pp. 18, 20). The success of strategies
based on these two theories, which were initially described by Clausewitz in his book
“On War”4, depends on a superiority of either defensive or oﬀensive forces and on the
readiness to use this overwhelming military power. Both strategies tend towards a high
concentration of forces in space and time (Kaldor 2007, pp. 24 sq.; Münkler 2005, p. 65).
Warfare was transformed from devastation of the enemy’s land to military resolution in
a great battle. “[F]orces met on the battleﬁeld to clear away all outstanding problems
and issues at a single stroke and for a long time into the future” (Münkler 2005, p. 37).
Thus, battle became the decisive encounter in old warfare, with an ever-increasing em-
phasis on scale and mobility, a growing importance of alliances and an increasing need
for rational organization and scientiﬁc doctrine to manage large conglomerations of force
(Kaldor 2006a, p. 3; Kaldor 2006b, p. 1; Kaldor 2005, p. 2; Kaldor 1999, p. 24; Kaldor
2007, p. 26).
The vision of warfare depicted by Attrition and Manoeuvre Theory was brought closer
to reality by several advances in industrial technology that could be applied to the
military ﬁeld. “Particularly important was the development of the railway and the
telegraph, which enabled much greater and faster mobilization of armies” (Kaldor 2007,
p. 25). Out of this extension of the state activity into the industrial sphere the so-
called military-industrial complex emerged – a key feature of the 20th century wars. It
was then that “Old Wars reached their apex” (Kaldor 2005, p. 3). Especially the two
World Wars at the beginning and in the middle of the 20th century mobilized enormous
national energies both to ﬁght and support ﬁghting through the production of arms
and necessities. Because in these total wars the public sphere tried to incorporate the
4This book was unﬁnished at Clausewitz’s death but later published, e.g. by N. Trübner in London
in 1873 (translation by J.J.Graham). The text is online available at http://www.clausewitz.com/
readings/OnWar1873/TOC.htm (visited on 2014-02-21) .
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whole of society, the distinction between public and private was eliminated.5 Total
wars were national and ideological conﬂicts that were fought by coalitions of states or
even empires. The military technologies of the early modern wars (ﬁrearms, defensive
manoevres and sieges) had given way to massive ﬁrepower, the use of tanks and aircrafts.
Mass production, mass politics, mass communications, mass armies and mass destruction
characterized these wars. In World War I, economic targets were considered legitimate
military targets. Even the indiscriminate bombing of civilians during World War II was
justiﬁed by allied forces on the grounds of breaking enemy morale (Kaldor 2007, p. 27).
Therefore, the distinction between the military and the civil, between the combatant
and the non-combatant started to break down again.6 The, “application of science and
technology to killing” and “the increased mobilization capacities of states” resulted in
destruction on an unimaginable scale. “Some 35 million people were killed in World
War I and 50 million people in World War II [. . . ] [H]alf of those killed were civilians”
(Kaldor 2005, p. 3).
This trauma of the World Wars was not without its consequences. It “ushered in a
new age in international law” (Münkler 2005, p. 70). The idea of war as an “illegitimate
instrument of policy” (except in the case of self-defense) gained acceptance. This was
codiﬁed in The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 and reinforced by the UN Charter and the
Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, in which German and Japanese leaders were prosecuted
for “planning an aggressive war” (Kaldor 2007, p. 29). These normative developments
might at least partly explain why since 1945 there have been very few inter-state wars.
In addition, ever-increasing costs of warfare (e.g. for logistics and to equip troops with
modern weapons) combined with ever-diminishing improvements in performance and a
more and more vulnerable and problem-prone military apparatus (Münkler 2003, p. 8).
“[P]roblems of mobilization, inﬂexibility and risks of attrition have been magniﬁed in
the Cold War and post-Cold War period” (Kaldor 2007, p. 30). This resulted in a dimin-
ishing utility of wars. The increasing vulnerability of the modern industrial and service
society certainly contributed to this perception (Münkler 2006, p. 135). Especially the
development of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, meant “the log-
ical endpoint of the technological trajectory of modern warfare” and rendered a major
military operation almost prohibitive – except against a clearly inferior enemy. Conse-
quently, alliances were rigidiﬁed and the distinction between what is internal and what
5“The First World War mobilized all the resources of industry and recruited large numbers of civilians
for the arms sector, which, if it had not functioned smoothly, would have brought the war machine
at the front to a standstill. Workers producing arms became semi-combatants, so that there was
no longer such a clear distinction between participants and non-participants in war” (Münkler 2005,
p. 70).
6“[T]he Wehrmacht’s war of plunder and annihilation, especially in the East, the partisan war in Russia
and the Balkans, and ﬁnally the strategic bombing of German cities by the Western Allies eﬀected
the dividing line between combatants and non-combatants that had until then been largely respected.
[. . . ] Even after 1945 the dividing line could no longer be reliably established: the nuclear stalemate
between the two superpowers [. . . ] ultimately rested upon each side taking hostage of the other’s
civilian population, with the help of strategic bombers and intercontinental missiles” (Münkler 2005,
p. 70).
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is external started to erode, too (Kaldor 1999, pp. 27 sq.; Kaldor 2007, p. 30). By now
it had become apparent that states could not ﬁght wars unilaterally anymore (Kaldor
2007, pp. 30 sq.).
To nevertheless justify the ever-continuing arms race and the threat of mass destruc-
tion, the Cold War was again presented as an ideological struggle between good against
evil. The justiﬁcation of war in terms of state interest which had anyways become hollow
in light of the massive killing of people in total warfare “gave rise to a new concept of
the political that extended beyond the state to blocs of nations” (Kaldor 2005, pp. 25,
3). Both blocs or parties to the conﬂict maintained large standing armies that were
highly disciplined, hierarchically organized and technology intensive (Kaldor 2001). The
revolution in electronics further improved the lethality and accuracy of munitions which
strengthened the role of the scientiﬁc-military elite, of professional armies and of the
military-industrial complex. Kaldor (2007, p. 32) therefore describes the Cold War as
a phenomenon “that kept alive the idea of [old] war while avoiding its reality”, that
sustained “a kind of war psychosis based on the theory of deterrence which is best en-
capsulated in the slogan ‘War is Peace”’ in Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four”. The Cold
War logic of deterrence and superpower intervention rather restrained open warfare in
the few remaining cases of inter-state conﬂict (India vs. Pakistan, Greece vs. Turkey
or Israel vs. the Arab states). An exception was the Iran-Iraq war “which lasted for
eight years and could be waged unilaterally because of the availability of oil revenues”
(Kaldor 2007, p. 31).
In summary, old warfare evolved from the early modern wars during the 17th and
18th century, the modern wars during the 19th century and the total wars of the early
20th century to the “imagined” Cold War of the late 20th century. Throughout the
centuries, changes can be observed in the reasons for warfare, the nature of the involved
polities, the military forces, strategies and techniques and in the kinds of war economies.
Initially, old wars were fought between absolute states, later between sovereign nation-
states and ﬁnally among coalitions of states, empires or blocs. Only partly-professional
armies were replaced by entirely professional, standing armed forces and ﬁnally mass
armies. While initially these forces used ﬁrearms, defensive manoevres and sieges as their
military technique, industrial and technical innovations brought about new instruments
of warfare. Massive ﬁrepower, tanks and aircrafts were the weapons and technologies
of choice in total warfare, followed by the application of electronic technology and the
development of weapons of mass destruction, even nuclear weapons, during the Cold War
era. Both, changes in the type of army involved and changes in the military technique,
associate with the increasing importance of the scientiﬁc-military elite. The goals of
old warfare evolved from reasons of state (the consolidation of borders) to increasingly
national and ideological reasons during the Cold War era. Finally, in early modern
warfare the war economies were characterized by a slowly starting regularization of
taxation and borrowing. Administration and bureaucratization further expanded up
to the evolution of a mobilization economy in total warfare and the emergence of a
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military-industrial complex during the Cold War era7. However despite these changes or
expansions over time, all types of old warfare were “recognizably the same phenomenon:
a construction of the centralized, ‘rationalized’, hierarchically ordered, territorialized
modern state” (Kaldor 2007, p. 17). This admittedly stylized description of old wars
points to their inter-state nature and the fact that they were fought according to certain
rules by increasingly professional, large and uniformed armed forces for state interest.
With only a few exceptions, old wars from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth
century were of rather short duration (Münkler 2005, p. 11). This kind of warfare in which
success meant the military control of territory and battle was the decisive encounter
characterized Europe for centuries.
Throughout the last decades, the ratiﬁcation of law on inter-state warfare as well as
the experience of two very destructive World Wars contributed to a decreasing signiﬁ-
cance of this kind of warfare. Most importantly, however, during the Cold War era the
superpowers avoided any direct, military confrontation due to the deterrent eﬀect of nu-
clear weapons. They kept alive only the idea of war while avoiding its reality. Because
the post-World War II period was the longest time span without a war between the
major European powers the American historian Gaddis (1987) even labeled this period
“the long peace”. This term, however, masks the fact that the long peace was conﬁned
largely to the European continent and North America while “the member nations of
Europe did their ﬁghting elsewhere” (Mason 2009, p. 66). Both the United States and
the Soviet Union intervened in internal, anti-colonial revolts in Third World countries.
They provided direct or indirect support to “friendly” governments faced with insurgent
challenges or to insurgents challenging “hostile” regimes. These “proxy wars” between
a state and a non-state group outside ones own territory (e.g. in Vietnam, Afghanistan,
Nicaragua or Angola) are referred to as “extra-systemic armed conﬂicts”, “colonial”
or “imperial” wars (UCDP/PRIO 2007, p. 10). Because these ideological battles were
fought in faraway countries “where the rights and wrongs of the situation were not self-
evident”, the superpowers developed strategies largely based on air power that could
be applied without risking the loss of their soldiers’ lives (Kaldor 1999, p. 26; Kaldor
2007, pp. 28 sq.). Nevertheless, countless soldiers and civilians were killed.8 Oftentimes,
violent battle did not stop or even intensiﬁed after the end of the Cold War and the
retreat of the superpowers. The same phenomenon was observed after the withdrawal
of former colonial powers from countries like Angola. Intra-state wars which erupted
in the wake of de-colonialisation and continued for decades were simply explained by
reference to processes of “belated state-building” (Chojnacki 2004, p. 1). This terminol-
ogy reﬂects the “continuing dominance of a classical Western view of war [which] may
have caused Europeans until quite recently to overlook certain types of armed conﬂict
occurring outside their own continent that did not ﬁt their deﬁnition of wars, or to view
these conﬂicts uniquely through the prism of the Cold War” (Ellis 2003, p. 31).
7See Kaldor 2007, table 2.1 on p. 16.
8Leitenberg (2003, pp. 8 sq.) estimates that within the 20th century “various colonial wars resulted in
approximately 1.5 million deaths”. This number includes civilian deaths and deaths due to starvation,
etc.
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It can be safely concluded that despite the long peace “there were always rebellions,
colonial wars or guerrilla wars, both in Europe and elsewhere, which were sometimes
given the description of ‘irregular warfare’ or else not called wars at all” (Kaldor 2007,
p. 17). Between 1945 and 1990 these wars and conﬂicts had resulted in approximately
40 million direct and indirect deaths in developing countries.9 In fact, conventional
civil wars emerged as the dominant type of warfare during the post-World War II and
Cold War era. These armed conﬂicts were not fought between but within states10 and,
in this regard, resemble New Wars and Conﬂicts. The following section describes such
conventional civil wars in more detail. Afterwards, this kind of intra-state armed conﬂict
will be compared with New Wars and Conﬂicts which some believe to be the dominant
type of warfare in the post-Cold War era.
9McNamara 1991 cited in Leitenberg (2003, p. 4, fn 12).
10Intra-state or internal armed conﬂicts are deﬁned as armed battle “between the government of a state
and one or more internal opposition group(s) without intervention from other states”. In cases where
intervention from other states (secondary parties) on one or both sides can be observed, the UCDP
and the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) speak of “internationalized internal armed conﬂicts”
(UCDP/PRIO 2007, p. 10).
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3. Conventional Intra-State Wars: Greed
and Grievance Conﬂicts
Intra-state warfare is generally understood as violent ﬁghting within an internationally
recognized nation-state as opposed to warfare between two or more states. In the follow-
ing, intra-state warfare will be divided into two sub-categories. The ﬁrst sub-category
comprises conventional internal armed conﬂicts as mentioned above. These have been
referred to as either grievance rebellions (i.e. ethnic or ideological revolutionary or seces-
sionist conﬂicts) or greed rebellions (also known as resources wars). Conventional civil
wars and conﬂicts, whether greed or grievance-based, share an important feature: they
are fought between government forces and one or several internal opposition groups. In
order to explain such conventional (state-based) internal armed conﬂicts two theoretical
models of civil war and revolution are available: Deprived Actor Models and Rational
Actor Models (Mason 2009). Both models emerged out of the question of what moti-
vates rebels to engage in political violence and after the end of the Cold War replaced
the dominant Western view of state-based warfare by an inner perspective.1 The second
sub-category of intra-state warfare comprises non-conventional internal armed conﬂicts
which I later narrowly deﬁne as entirely non-state or sub-state battle, e.g. between war-
lords. This kind of internal armed conﬂict is well described by the concept of New Wars
which I will introduce in more detail below.
3.1. Explaining Grievance Rebellions: The Deprived Actor
Model
According to Deprived Actor Models, diﬀerent dimensions of deprivation and inequality
(e.g. the experience of poverty, oppression or discrimination) motivate individuals to join
a rebellion and therefore lead to the outbreak of violence. The greater the inequality and
deprivation in terms of economic well-being and/or political rights suﬀered by citizens,
the more likely the outbreak of a so-called grievance rebellion.
1Others divide the existing schools of thought slightly diﬀerently. For instance, Humphreys and Wein-
stein (2006b) and Humphreys and Weinstein (2008) diﬀerentiate Deprived Actor Models (explaining
the outbreak of grievance rebellions) from models that focus on the constraints to collective action
(explaining the outbreak of greed rebellions) from models that stress the threat of social sanctions as
a primary source of motivation for rebellion.
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Snow (1996) argues that grievances which resulted in the outbreak of violent conﬂict
especially prevailed within the post-colonial context of the developing world. In these
countries, decolonization failed because there was hardly any attempt to create a pos-
itive sense of primary political loyalty to the state before independence. In originally
multinational states, where boundaries had been drawn arbitrarily by colonial powers,
public loyalty was more clearly identiﬁed with pre-colonial sources of nationality. Af-
ter independence, ethnically, historically or tribally deﬁned groups started competing
for political power, often at the expense of other groups. “When independence was
achieved, newly independent states were fairly often economically but not politically
uniﬁed. In some cases it might have made sense to break colonial units into political
entities that more accurately reﬂected previous realities or ethnic habitation, but such
division conﬂicted with the economic infrastructure inherited from the colonial expe-
rience” (Snow 1996, p. 29). Beside this absent sense of national unity or inclusionary
nationalism, Snow (1996) identiﬁes a lack of national preparation for self-rule or self-
governance and a shortage of competent and honest leaders. “Independence created a
political landscape in newly sovereign states in which the rules were not clearly delin-
eated nor the political actors schooled or experienced in manipulating the reins of power”
(Snow 1996, p. 28). Although most of the newly independent countries adopted political
forms that were democratic and usually based on some modiﬁcation of the constitution
of the former colonizer, the political elite and the population in most cases lacked the
sophistication to master and operate a democratic system (Snow 1996, p. 28). According
to the author, the most common problems were inadequate experience at governing, an
underestimation of the depth of problems at hand and inadequate resources to deal with
the problems that citizens expected to be solved (Snow 1996, p. 32). Thus, when disil-
lusionment began, the tendency was even more to blame other national groups, retreat
to one’s own group and engage in power struggles. Snow (1996) names this a “crisis of
authority and legitimacy” and summarizes that “in situations in which there is a lack of
legitimacy because of the absence of shared values, the basis of authority is necessarily
the imposition of authority or coercion” (Snow 1996, p. 35). Because newly independent
governments often desired a military force as a symbol of strength and modernity, in
many cases military leaders were ready to seize power.2 Trained and schooled in the
West, they considered themselves the most competent actors within the polity. How-
ever, the military was often dominated by one tribal, ethnic or national group and, when
faced with severe political problems, military leaders often turned repressive.
Countries emerging from colonial domination were not only politically ill-prepared
for self-rule but also almost universally poorer than they had been during the colonial
experience. In addition to being underdeveloped, their economies were often skewed
toward serving the purpose of the colonial ruler. “Their economies remained heavily
dominated by subsistence agriculture, natural-resource extraction and possibly a bit of
2This led to the fact that “from the beginning of the 1970s to the end of the 1980s, in more than 30
percent of the observations, Africa’s heads of state came from the armed forces” (Bates 2008, p. 21).
In this study, the overall sample comprises 46 African countries over a period of twenty years. One
observation therefore refers to one country-year (Bates 2008, p. 33, fn 2).
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cottage industry” (Snow 1996, p. 50). Thus, economic deprivation, the unequal distribu-
tion of resources and income, political malfeasance, illegitimacy, corruption, despotism,
incompetence of the regime, its cronyism and the suppression of one or more groups by
the government on an ethnic, religious or other basis were common features in newly
independent countries.
Münkler (2005, p. 7) agrees that wars in the late 20th and early 21st century became
endemic mainly in regions where a major empire held sway and then fell apart. Although
newly independent states emerged, “the great majority [. . . ] proved to be weak and
incapable of withstanding much pressure. These parts of the world have not seen the
emergence of robust state forms similar to those in Europe. There can no longer be any
doubt that many processes of state formation in the Third World, or in the periphery
of the First and Second World, have been a failure”. Main reasons for this state failure
were the lack of incorruptible political elites “who view the state apparatus as a source
of tasks and duties rather than a vehicle for personal enrichment” and the “juxtaposition
of desperate poverty and immeasurable riches” which he refers to as “potential wealth”.
According to Deprived Actor Models, the above described grievances not only provide
the motivation for individuals to join a rebellion but also aﬀect the recruitment costs.
Rebel recruits are drawn from the poor because the opportunity costs of participating
in violent uprisings are lower for the poor. Thus, the more unequal a society the more
likely the rebels will succeed in mobilizing a viable rebel movement because the larger
the pool of poor people from which they can recruit (Collier and Hoeﬄer 2004).
Within the sub-group of grievance rebellions ethnically motivated conﬂicts can be
distinguished from ideological conﬂicts. In ideological civil wars rebels usually ﬁght
bad governance and extreme inequality in terms of the distribution of land, wealth,
income or political power. Support for the revolutionist movement is mobilized around
shared class identity and communities among often landless or land-poor segments of
society.3 Contrary to this, support in ethnic conﬂicts is mobilized around shared ethnic
identity though the goal (to overthrow the existing regime and replace it with a new
one) remains the same. Because ethnicity and class coincide very often, rebel leaders can
mobilize support by framing grievances not just as a matter of deprivation but of ethnic
discrimination.4 Alternatively, grievance rebellions can be divided in revolutionary vs.
3Such peasant-based insurgencies that escalated to civil warfare happened for instance in El Salvador,
Nicaragua, Guatemala, Peru, Cambodia, Nepal and the Philippines.
4This diﬀerentiation of ethnic from ideological conﬂicts mostly covers what Humphreys and Weinstein
(2006b, pp. 8–10) or Humphreys and Weinstein (2008, p. 440) call the three variants of the basic
grievance argument according to which violence against the state arises from alienation from main-
stream political processes (which results in the inability to express personal dislocation and frustration
through other, non-violent channels), from class diﬀerences or from ethnic and political grievances.
Each variant of the argument might again be split up into diﬀerent approaches. For instance, aca-
demic explanations of ethnic conﬂict fall into three schools of thought: a primordialist approach,
an instrumentalist approach and a constructivist approach. According to the ﬁrst, ethnicity is seen
as a ﬁxed characteristic of individuals and communities. Ethnic diﬀerences manifest themselves in
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secessionist conﬂicts. In the former cases, the rebels’ goal is to overthrow the incumbent
government and to establish themselves as the new government.5 In secessionist conﬂicts
the rebels do not seek to replace the government but to secede from it and to create
a new sovereign state out of a portion of the territory of the existing state. Although
revolutionary conﬂicts may be ethnically or class based “almost all (if not all) of the
secessionist conﬂicts of the last half century have been ethnically based” (Mason 2009,
p. 69).
Because in conventional civil warfare the rebels start from the scratches while the
government has at its disposal a comparatively large, hierarchically organized and al-
ready standing army, any rebel organization needs to pass a certain survival threshold
to become viable. Afterwards, it moves through three stages of guerrilla warfare that
are described as “sequential”, “evolutionary” (there are only gradual changes and no
sharp breaks in strategy and action), “eclectic” (there are no rigid timetables but a
general understanding when to move to the next stage) and “reversible” (Snow 1996,
p. 70). During the ﬁrst “organizational stage”, the guerrilla group is a fairly small, weak
group that is discontented and decides that only violent overthrow of the government
can accomplish the political goal. Basic imperatives are ﬁrst of all physical survival and
secondly the development of a political program to appeal to the public. The group needs
to ﬁnd a sheltered area and then starts a growth process by providing superior services
and relations than those of the government in this area. The “political act of conver-
sion” begins with the recruitment of guerrilla forces for the second stage, the “guerrilla
warfare stage”. During this stage the insurgency becomes gradually stronger while the
government turns weaker. Political acts are combined with military emphasis and a
campaign of attrition to slowly shift the balance of power from the government toward
the insurgents. During the ﬁnal stage, the guerrilla forces aim to defeat the government
forces and overthrow the government. Signs that the third stage is being approached
are the progressive withdrawal of domestic support for the government, the fact that
diﬀerences in traditions of belief and action towards primordial objects such as biological features
and territorial location. This automatically leads to ethnic conﬂict. Ethnicity is therefore inherently
conﬂictual. Certain groups are simply doomed to ﬁght each other due to ethnic diﬀerences. Ethnic
hatred is diﬃcult or impossible to overcome except through ethnic separation. The second, instru-
mentalist approach, claims that ethnic diﬀerence is not suﬃcient to explain conﬂicts. Instead, ethnic
wars are the result of political decisions by individuals, groups or elites who rely on ethnicity as a
tool to obtain some ends mostly to their own political advantage. This ﬁts with Sambanis (2001)
who studies the causes of ethnic and non-ethnic civil wars and ﬁnds that the former are mainly due
to political grievances. The third, constructivist approach, bridges these two schools of thought.
It sees ethnicity neither as completely open nor as completely ﬁxed. Instead, ethnicity is socially
constructed. Like instrumentalists, constructivists see ethnicity not as inherently conﬂictual. Ethnic
conﬂict is rather caused by certain pathological social systems which breed violent conﬂict (Sarkees
and Wayman 2010, pp. 556 sq.). An example would be such an explanation of the Rwandan genocide
which states that this incidence was possible because the ethnic distinctions between the Hutu and
the Tutsi were codiﬁed by the Belgian colonial power, e.g. on the basis of cattle ownership, the issuing
of ethnic identity cards or the reservation of administration and army jobs for Tutsi (Anderson 1991).
5E.g. the Sandinista rebellion in Nicaragua in 1979 or the Khmer Rouge rebels that overthrew the
Cambodian government in 1975.
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critical population segments are turning against the government, the fact that popular
perception of regime illegitimacy is growing as well as the spreading belief that the insur-
gents are true national heroes. Other opposition groups start joining the insurgency and
even regular army forces are recruited by the guerrillas. This results in a withdrawal of
foreign support for the government by former allies and supporters and growing support
for insurgents instead. Government forces start losing control over territory and the
population. The government becomes isolated in a few major cities while increasingly
bold guerrilla and terrorist acts are carried out against its oﬃcials and supporters. The
government is incapable of preventing such attacks and the eﬀort increasingly saps the
economy. This might even result in inﬁghting within the government over the question
of suﬃcient or insuﬃcient deployment of forces to engage in eﬀective counterinsurgency.
Especially during the third stage the government must engage in heavy, large-unit
counterattacks. Decimating the guerrilla forces, however, does not address the causes
of insurgency but rather the eﬀect of it. Even worse, military repression of insurgencies
creates the mindset that the insurgency is a military rather than a political problem. If
the government fails, the insurgency prevails. If it succeeds, the insurgency retreats to
the second guerrilla warfare stage. Fighting insurgency back within this second stage
only requires small-, but highly mobile unit activity. This, however, is unpopular among
military leadership because the operational command reverts to a much lower point in
oﬃce corps and there are relatively few large operations for the upper echelon to com-
mand (Snow 1996, pp. 70–73, 83). Due to this, governments tend to ignore or improperly
approach an insurgency in its early stages. According to the author, governments are
only eﬀective in counterinsurgency if they free people from insurgent coercion, if they
themselves apply good governance and if they meet rising population expectations with
higher living standards. Empirically, governments have their highest probability of beat-
ing the rebels in the early stages of an insurgency. Their chances of winning drop steadily
over time (DeRouen and Sobek 2004, p. 316).
The above illustrates that grievance rebellions grow from fairly small, weak and dis-
contented groups into comparatively large movements – given they survive the initial
stages.6 Grievance rebellions are also large in terms of the scope of warfare because the
rebellion ﬁnally aﬀects an entire region or the entire country. In addition, there is reason
to assume a fairly high level of violence – especially if conﬂicts are fought over real or
perceived deep ideological or social divisions that are turned into polarized politics by
political entrepreneurs prior to the outbreak of violence. During warfare, the enemy is
then easily demonized on the basis of these identity factors which legitimize the most
extreme and atrocious measures on and oﬀ the battleﬁeld. Furthermore, conﬂicts of prin-
ciple – whether ideological or identity-based – are likely to escalate into “bloody warfare
amongst fanatics” because all participants are ready to ﬁght hard and even die for the
6This, however, does not mean that every rapidly growing or large movement also enjoys large popular
support. People might decide to quickly join a violent organization in large numbers because they
are coerced to do so or in order to save their lives (Kalyvas 2006, p. 93).
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cause (Kalyvas 2006, pp. 64–66). In the case of ethnic or ideological conﬂicts, matters
of dispute are indivisible. This turns warfare into a zero-sum game not only from the
perspective of the rebels but also from the perspective of the government. The latter
ﬁghts for its existence and has the means to let violence escalate. This results in high
numbers of battle-related military deaths. In comparison, the number of battle-related
civilian deaths, however, might remain low. A battle for the hearts and minds of people
is crucial for both sides whose potential support resides in the same population. For this
reason, they face the practical problem of how to attack the other side’s support base
without attacking their own or alienating the uncommitted. The rebels are aware of the
fact that indiscriminate violence against civilians will not lead to political conversion
unless the other side acts even more atrociously. It might simply be more political harm
than military good in a context where the rebels aim to replace the existing regime and
therefore need to portray themselves as the “better” government. At least in theory,
this should deter them from subjecting the civilian population to extreme brutality and
indiscriminate violence.7 Instead, the insurgents appeal to the population mostly in a
positive way in order to convince it that its interests would be better served under their
rule. They apply a combination of political and military actions that ultimately will
win the sympathy of the country’s population (Snow 1996, pp. 67–68). If the rebels are
successful in their consistent approach to the center of gravity the rebellion sustains be-
cause preferences for violent resistance and support for the rebel movement are strong.
If it occurs, harsh repression against civilians is mostly applied by government forces to
undercut the civilian support base of the insurgency (Kalyvas 2006, pp. 148 sq.; Kalyvas
2004; Valentino et al. 2004). Provoking such violence by state forces might even be the
intention of the rebels because “[w]hen state repression becomes indiscriminate in the
selection of targets [so] that a person’s chances of becoming a victim are largely unre-
lated to whether or not he provides tangible supports to the rebels, then the person may
turn to the rebels for protection. [. . . ] Given this pattern, rebels often employ tactics
designed to elicit harsh repression by the state, in the hope that such action will drive
non[allies] to their side” (Mason 2009, p. 76).
Finally, during conventional grievance conﬂicts both parties are highly committed to
achieve their overall goal as fast as possible. Because both sides at least “ﬁght for an end”
(i.e. a change in the status quo) the overall duration of warfare might be comparatively
short.
In summary, the grievance model conceptualizes rebel organizations “as social [justice-
seeking] movements that use violence” (Weinstein 2007, p. 34). The rebels are ﬁghting a
repressive state for the sake of a better life. They clearly focus on the political objective
and aim to overthrow and replace the existing regime or to secede for the purpose of
7See Weinstein (2007, pp. 29 sq.) for reference to Mao Tse-tung’s and Che Guevara’s writings on this
subject. Both wrote about the challenges of organizing guerrilla campaigns, about common principles
and about necessary internal belief systems on how civilians should be treated (e.g. they stress the
importance of discipline and moral conduct, of political engagement with the population and of rigid
self-control)
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establishing a new, more abundant, equitable or egalitarian political, social and eco-
nomic order. While success or progress of old, inter-state warfare was measured by
the movement of armies, the capture and control of territory and the success of bat-
tles, grievance-based insurgencies succeed if a progressive transfer of political loyalty
from the government to the insurgents takes place (Snow 1996, pp. 74–75). Snow (1996)
names this total political purpose of insurgent wars their ﬁrst decisive characteristic.
Another characteristic of grievance rebellions is that both parties – the government and
the guerrilla forces – seek the same end, that is, physical control of the government.
Both actors also seek an absolute goal that is rarely amenable to peaceful or negoti-
ated settlement. This renders compromise unlikely. Although both parties share the
same goal, they diﬀer in the military requirements necessary for its attainment. The
guerrillas “[. . . ] must gradually shift the balance of power away from the government’s
initial monopoly of force to its own”. This requires “a patient, long term program of
gradual conversion and sapping of government strength” (Snow 1996, p. 66). The basic
measure of success is continued survival which means the insurgency wins by not losing
whereas the government can only win by successfully defeating the insurgents: it has to
win to win. Snow (1996, p. 67) refers to this feature as “an asymmetry of objectives”.
The fact that both sides appeal to the same population turns out to be another decisive
characteristic of insurgent wars. The quest for the loyalty of the national population
distinguishes true insurgent warfare from other forms of organized armed violence and
backs its political nature (Snow 1996, p. 76). This “struggle over the same center of
gravity” greatly aﬀects the applied strategies. Indiscriminate violence against civilians
is unlikely to be an eﬀective long term or general practice during grievance rebellions
(which sharply contrast with the supposedly high level of brutality and wantonness
against civilians in New Wars). If it occurs, repression against civilians is more likely
to be applied by state forces to undercut the civilian support base of the rebellion. As
a result, the number of battle-related civilian deaths might be comparatively low. Still,
warfare might be severe in terms of battle-related military victims – especially in cases
of ethnic or ideological conﬂicts. High overall numbers of military deaths might also be
due to the fact that grievance rebellions tend to expand and ﬁnally aﬀect entire regions
or countries. Lastly, both parties to the conﬂict at least “ﬁght for an end” which might
explain a comparatively short duration.
Although many studies argued in line with Deprived Actor Models, empirical ﬁndings
on the relationship between the outbreak of violence and grievances (measured through
land or income inequality, lack of political rights or ethnic hatred proxied by ethnolin-
guistic fractionalization) remain less than conclusive. Midlarsky (1988, p. 491) speaks of
a “weak” and “barely signiﬁcant” relationship between inequality and political violence
– at least if conventional measures of inequality like the Gini index are used. In 1998,
Mark Lichbach surveyed more than 40 early studies that tested whether greater inequal-
ity correlates with the incidence of political violence. He also concludes that there is
a decided absence of ﬁndings that are robust across studies (Lichbach 1998, p. 464).
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This outcome was later supported by the results of further empirical analyses.8 Collier,
Hoeﬄer, and Söderbom (2004) found that higher income inequality has a strong eﬀect
on the duration rather than the outbreak of civil wars. The most consistent ﬁnding is
that economic underdevelopment (measured as low GDP per capita, high infant mortal-
ity rates or low life expectancy) signiﬁcantly increases the risk of outbreak of violence.9
However, this result does not necessarily or exclusively support the grievance model.
Fearon (2004) interpret their indicator (GDP per capita) as a proxy for state strength
instead of deprivation and argue for the importance of strong state institutions in order
to inhibit violent conﬂict. Similarly, Collier and Hoeﬄer (2004) interpret low levels of
GDP per capita as a measure of low opportunity costs of participating in rebellion – a
reasoning which ﬁts their greed as well as their grievance model.
Mason (2009, pp. 72, 89) explains that inequality and poor economic development
cannot serve as powerful predictors for the outbreak of civil wars because these factors
change only little whereas levels of political violence can and do vary substantially over
much shorter periods of time. “Even among poor nations, most nations in most years do
not experience a civil war onset.[. . . ] Therefore, the more important question is, among
poor nations, what characteristics make them more or less prone to experience civil
war?” In addition, Deprived Actor Models fail to explain where exactly and when civil
wars break out. In some of the above mentioned cases, weak or non-existent eﬀects might
also be due to statistical issues. For instance, the impact of inequality on the outbreak
of violence might be partly captured by other variables in the same speciﬁcation (e.g.
by economic growth rates in Collier (1999)) or national-level data used in the above
listed large-N studies might be ill-suited to explore the relationship between inequality
and conﬂict. Cramer (2001, p. 12) suggests that the signiﬁcance of inequality might lie
beyond merely its presence or its degree of intensity. In order to explore the consequences
of inequality it might be necessary “[. . . ] to ask what kind of inequality prevails, what
form it takes, and within what mould of relations inequality is cast”.
Davies (1962) and Gurr (1970) also seize the idea of grievances but further reﬁne the
theoretical argument. According to their relative deprivation theory especially a sudden
sharp reversal in economic development that might even be more detrimental to some
social groups than to others leads to a decline in achievement without a commensurate
decline in expectations. The resulting gap between expectations and achievements pro-
duces a sense of relative deprivation. As in all grievance rebellions, the speciﬁc pathway
is psychological: People experience a discrepancy between what they think they should
have and what they can actually attain relative to others (Weinstein 2007, p. 34). If
the resulting frustration is widespread, violent uprisings become likely. Thus, relative
deprivation instead of absolute deprivation signiﬁcantly increases the chances for violent
conﬂict. “Davis and Gurr argue that the extremes of absolute deprivation corrode the
8See e.g. Collier (1999); Collier (2000); Collier and Hoeﬄer (1998); Collier and Hoeﬄer (2001); Collier
and Hoeﬄer (2004); Collier, Hoeﬄer, and Rohner (2006).
9See Sambanis (2004) for a meta-analysis.
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social fabric that is necessary for collective violence to emerge. Where severe deprivation
prevails, people are too preoccupied with the rigors of mere survival to engage in any
collective endeavor. Instead, revolt is more likely to occur where people who have experi-
enced some improvement in their standard of living but are confronted with a short-term
crisis that severely reduces their level of wellbeing. Unlike their counterparts in the most
deprived societies, they have both the motive and the means to revolt” (Mason 2009,
p. 73).
This again links with Snow (1996, pp. 51 sq.), who believes in a combination of eco-
nomic and political factors. The author explains the wave of internal wars which ac-
companied decolonization by the nature of the development process and by relative
deprivation concerns. He argues that decolonization produced both the desire for eco-
nomic development and the inability to meet the economic expectations of the newly
free people which resulted in discontent. What triggered instability was not the mere
existence of deprivation but rather the recognition of deprivation and the realization
that it need not continue. As soon as the possibility of change through political ac-
tion existed, political activity, including internal war to overthrow those creating the
injustice, became a possibility. Thus, freedom of expression has become a vehicle for
extremism as the coercive cloak has been lifted in a number of former colonies at the
beginning of independence and in formerly communist countries at the end of the Cold
War. Freedom from coercive control also brought older loyalties like ethnic or religious
identity to the forefront which served as a basis of mobilization (Snow 1996, pp. 38 sq.).
According to this argument, a violence-prone period is likely to occur when development
has already begun. For a variety of economic reasons (e.g. corruption, slow and unequal
economic development or lack of patience with the pace of change) people become dis-
contented with their living conditions. These relative deprivation concerns combine with
political factors (the already mentioned lack of political loyalty to the state, the lack
of national unity, the incompetence of political leaders, exclusionary politics or military
repression) that lead to further disillusionment and encourage the emergence of violent
political leaders. As soon as the possibility of change through political action exists, the
outbreak of civil war becomes very likely.
Although the relative deprivation argument seems convincing, Mason (2009, p. 73)
criticizes the authors for not explaining why people facing such a sharp decline in their
standard of living would not adjust their expectations downward. His main point of
critique, however, refers to the fact that Relative Deprivation Theory as well as Deprived
Actor Models do not address the collective action problem of grievance rebellions as
described by Mancur Olson (1965).10 Because grievance rebellions are a sort of collective
action that, if successful, produces beneﬁts that are public goods (non-excludable and
non-rival) a “rebel’s dilemma” arises. The beneﬁts of a successful revolution (a more
just, egalitarian and abundant social, political and economic order) can be enjoyed by
everyone – whether he or she participated in warfare or not. Thus, and regardless of
10See also Humphreys and Weinstein (2006b, pp. 11 sqq.) for this point of objection.
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what anyone else does, a rational actor would always have a strong incentive to “free
ride”, stay at home and let others do the ﬁghting. The temptations to free ride are
also especially strong because the beneﬁts of rebel victory are uncertain due to the
fact that rebellions often fail. The beneﬁts of rebel victory are unknown, too, in the
sense that there is no guarantee that victorious rebels will indeed establish a more
just, abundant and peaceful order. In addition, temptations to free ride are especially
strong because the beneﬁts of rebel victory are only prospective. There is no pay-
oﬀ that is instantly distributed among ﬁghters which requires patience and a strong
motivation to continue ﬁghting. Collier and Hoeﬄer (2001) name this constraint of
grievance rebellions a “time consistency problem”. Lastly, participation in grievance
rebellions is comparatively costly. Engagement in violent conﬂict means less time for
alternative income-earning opportunities within the repressive but still existing state
and its legal economy. Participation in a grievance rebellion is also especially costly
because it not only carries the possibility of being killed, captured or severely injured
but also the risk of being sanctioned by the state – during the course of the rebellion
as well as afterwards in the case of failure. In addition, the comparatively large size of
the rebel organization means higher internal coordination costs and comparatively little
inﬂuence for each individual participant over strategic or distributive decisions. Under
such circumstances, the formation of a rebel movement as a form of collective action
becomes very unlikely. The decisive yet unresolved question remains in how far and
under what conditions this constraint can be overcome. The failure of Deprived Actor
Models to address and solve this collective action problem motivated Rational Actor
Models of civil war which shall now be described in more detail.11
3.2. Explaining Greed Rebellions: The Rational Actor Model
Rational Actor Models have been used to explain the emergence of so-called greed re-
bellions. These models argue that due to the aforementioned collective action problem,
civil war will not occur, no matter how widespread and severe the deprivations suﬀered
by society. Instead, “among poor nations, factors that inﬂuence the ability of inspiring
rebels to solve the collective action problem should aﬀect the probability of civil war
onset” (Mason 2009, p. 89). Economic factors rather than grievances are decisive in or-
der to explain the emergence of rebel organizations, the outbreak and the duration of
violence.
In greed rebellions the collective action problem faced by grievance rebellions (due to
the public good character of rebel victory) is overcome through the provision of selective
incentives, deﬁned as “private beneﬁts that are available only to those who participate in
the collective action” (Mason 2009, p. 75). In greed rebellions, beneﬁts from participation
11The ideas expressed by Rational Actor Models are elsewhere attributed to “Utilitarian Individualism”
(Schlichte 2006a, p. 116).
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and from rebel victory are private instead of public goods. The goal of such rebellions
is not the achievement of justice or anything alike but to overthrow and replace the
existing regime or secede from it for the purpose of private gain (e.g. the exploitation
of lootable resources). This led to the expectation that greed rebellions most likely
occur where rebels have access to lootable and precious goods such as gemstones, timber
or drugs. Such resources form the “taxable base” over which rebels and government
troops are ﬁghting.12 They provide a strong motivation for individuals to engage in
ﬁghting in the ﬁrst place and opportunity to keep on ﬁghting over an extended period
of time.13 Capturing these commodities allows the rebels to pay, arm and equip their
ﬁghters during the later stages of rebellion as well as during the initial start-up phase
when the rebels need to overcome the survival threshold.
While in grievance rebellions the exploitation of lootable resources is a means towards
the achievement of the overall goal, in greed rebellions it is an aim in itself. Greed
rebellions are not justice-seeking movements but loot-seeking. While in grievance re-
bellions the beneﬁts from rebel victory are public, uncertain, unknown and prospective,
proﬁts from participating in and winning a greed rebellion are private, known, relatively
certain14 and immediately distributed among ﬁghters.
12The abundance of these resources has been measured through the share of primary commodity exports
in GDP. Collier and Hoeﬄer (2001) argue and ﬁnd support for a non-linear relationship between the
abundance of lootable resources and the risk of outbreak of violence. Increases in the share of
primary commodity exports in GDP correlate with an increased risk of conﬂict up to a certain point.
A medium share of primary commodity exports in GDP (around 32 percent) bears the greatest risk
of an outbreak of violence. If the share of primary commodity exports in GDP increases further, the
government has a strong incentive to defend these resources as it also uses them for taxation and
therefore its own war eﬀort. This again reduces the risk of outbreak of violence.
13More precisely, the civil war literature discusses four or ﬁve causal mechanisms linking the production of
natural resources to the onset of civil warfare: Firstly, the “motivation argument” that resource wealth
encourages internal armed conﬂicts by increasing the value of the state as a target (which applies in
cases where the rebels aim to capture the state) or by increasing the value of sovereignty in mineral-
rich regions (which might motivate separatist movements). Secondly, the “opportunity argument”
that resource wealth helps fund rebel organizations. Thirdly, the “political dutch disease argument”
that resource wealth causes internal armed conﬂicts by weakening the state. Resource wealth is said
to associate with weak state apparatuses because rulers have less need for a socially intrusive and
elaborate bureaucratic system to raise revenues (Ross 1999; Ross 2001; Collier and Hoeﬄer 2005;
Dunning 2005). Although this argument was originally developed to explain the unexpectedly weak
state apparatuses of relatively rich oil producing states, others argued that secondary diamonds and
narcotics have similar devastating eﬀects on the quality of state institutions (Snyder and R. 2005;
Gates and Lektzian 2005; Lujala 2010). Finally, resource wealth might lead to the outbreak of internal
armed conﬂict through trade shocks because the prize of minerals is unusually volatile making the
production of minerals susceptible to trade shocks and those countries who depend on this source
of revenue susceptible to civil war. In regard to the duration of internal armed conﬂict, it has been
argued that “resources wealth could lengthen a conﬂict if it provides funding to the weaker side,
helping it equalize the balance of forces” and “by providing combatants with opportunities to get
rich that would be absent in peacetime. By making war proﬁtable, it would reduce incentives to
bargain for peace” (Ross 2006, pp. 280-282).
14Because government troops are serious opponents and greed rebellions therefore also likely to fail,
beneﬁts from rebel victory are still uncertain. During warfare, however, private proﬁt can already be
skimmed oﬀ. These beneﬁts are comparatively certain.
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Contrary to grievance rebellions where the preferences for violent resistance are strong,
where the rather large, vertically organized rebel movement enjoys strong popular sup-
port and where the rebellion spreads to entire regions or the entire country, greed rebel-
lions simply happen because they are feasible and because the constraints upon rebellion
are weak. Popular support for the rebel movement, which is composed of rather small,
loosely organized quasi-criminal groups, is comparatively low.15 These groups ﬁght for
resources that can only be produced in limited geographic regions. Fighting is there-
fore often conﬁned to remote rural areas where the coercive reach of the central state
is weak (Mason 2009, p. 90). Only in these areas can the rebels hide, establish secure
base camps, evade the state’s counterinsurgency operations and survive. Accordingly,
certain geographic characteristics (e.g. a large share of mountainous terrain, forested
land or shared borders) which reduce the risk of participation in warfare and therefore
the recruitment costs for the rebels are expected to correlate with an increased risk of
civil war onset and a longer duration of ﬁghting – though empirical evidence remains
mixed.16
The comparatively small size of the rebel organization means that proﬁts need to be
distributed amongst few participants only. This increases the slice of the cake each
member can expect to receive. Within smaller organizations, each participant also en-
joys more inﬂuence over strategic or distributive decisions. Finally, the small size of
the rebel organization associates with comparatively low coordination costs. In case of
discrepancies among group members, the rebel organization splits further. As soon as
rebel organizations start ﬁghting each other, however, non-conventional (non-state or
sub-state) warfare can be detected which shall later be described in more detail.
Although Rational Actor Models seem to overcome the collective action problem they
are not without critique. To begin with, “the selective incentive solution assumes the
existence of a rebel organization capable of raising and dispersing selective incentives
but the genesis of that organization poses a prior collective action problem that cannot
be explained by selective incentives alone”. The availability of lootable resources may
account for how the nth rebel is induced to join the movement but it does not account for
how the rebel organization came into being at a time when it did not have any revenue
ﬂows to provide selective incentives or to recruit enough ﬁghters in order to capture the
ﬂow of the respective commodities (Mason 2009, p. 75). Approaches emphasizing the
role of selective incentives when explaining participation in violent uprisings have also
been criticized for their one-sided focus on positive incentives, so-called “pull factors”,
at the expense of “push factors”.17 This gives the impression that engagement in war-
fare is largely voluntary while coercion (or protection from rebel violence that is oﬀered
15Mason (2009, p. 77) observes that groups who rely on lootable goods “have a tendency to degener-
ate into organizations that are more criminal than revolutionary and, organizationally, they often
resemble the rebel equivalent of a neo-patrimonial state”.
16See e.g. Fearon and Laitin (2003); Collier and Hoeﬄer (2004); Sambanis (2004).
17For this point of critique see e.g. Humphreys and Weinstein (2006b, pp. 12 sq.) or Humphreys and
Weinstein (2008, pp. 437, 441 sq.).
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as a private beneﬁt) is generally overlooked. At least in certain cases, the assumption
that individuals have agency in making their choices about participation in warfare is
“empirically suspect”. For instance, 88 percent of former RUF ﬁghters interviewed by
Humphreys and Weinstein (2008, p. 438) reported being abducted. The selective incen-
tive solution further implies that participation in conventional greed rebellions is largely
a mercenary consideration. Participants can be counted on to support the rebellion
“only so long as selective incentives are forthcoming and their value (discounted for the
risks involved in earning them) exceeds the value of what can be earned in the legal
economy” (Mason 2009, p. 91). Under such circumstances the rebel movement is likely
to fail because ﬁghters will desert at the ﬁrst setback that degrades the ability of the
rebel organization to pay them or if the risks of participation increase (Mason 2009,
pp. 76 sq.). This suggests a rather low success rate of conventional greed rebellions.
The rebels might be capable of sustaining warfare for years, but rarely if ever win. The
availability of lootable resources therefore seems more relevant to explain the duration
of civil wars rather than their onset (Mason 2009, p. 92; Collier and Hoeﬄer 2004).
As a response to these weaknesses, the concept of “leadership goods” has been in-
troduced. Leadership goods are private beneﬁts like oﬃce or political power that will
accrue to the rebel leaders in case they succeed in overthrowing the government. Such
promises of future beneﬁts might help to explain the emergence of the revolutionary
organizations when monetary beneﬁts are not yet available and the risk of participation
is high. But Mason (2009, p. 76) rightly doubts that any rebel organization will have
the capacity to provide enough selective incentives to oﬀset the extreme individual risks
associated with participation in conventional civil warfare. As in grievance rebellions,
rebels in greed conﬂicts face a still functioning and militarily superior state army. Es-
pecially in cases where lootable resources are important for the national economy, the
government has a strong incentive to defend these commodities to raise tax revenue for
the provision of public (and in some cases private) goods, including national security.
Thus, the government ﬁghts for the control of these resources but also for its existence
as the rebels still aim to overthrow or secede from the existing regime. Therefore, high
numbers of battle-related military deaths can be expected. Again, the rebels do not
only face the risk of being captured, severely injured or even killed but also the risk
of being sanctioned by the state – during or after the course of the rebellion. Like in
grievance rebellions, opportunity costs are also non-negligible because engagement in
greed rebellions means less time for alternative income-generating tasks within the still
existing legal economy.
Finally, advocates of Social Movement Theory, of Resource Mobilization Theory and of
state-centric models of insurgencies criticized Rational Actor Models for their exclusive
focus on economic variables.18 In order to explain the outbreak of violent conﬂict they
instead emphasize the importance of social networks and institutions, of political factors
(changes in the political opportunity structure) and of state-structures and practices. Ac-
18See Mason (2009, pp. 70, 78 sqq.) for an overview of these approaches.
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cording to Social Movement Theory “[. . . ] people do not choose between participation
and free riding as isolated, atomized individuals. Their lives are embedded in already
established networks of social interaction that exist in part for the purpose of solving
collective action problems in everyday life” (Mason 2009, p. 70). These community net-
works and institutions provide a variety of social incentives for their (rational) members
to contribute to the public good and to participate in warfare as a collective action even
in the absence of selective, monetary incentives (Mason 2009, pp. 78 sq.). Furthermore,
social institutions and networks can be used or misused as “mobilizing structures” by
the leaders of rebel organizations (Mason 2009, p. 80). In order to persuade the members
of local social networks to join their national movement, rebel leaders employ framing
processes. They identify injustices and then try to convince people that the existing
regime is either responsible for these injustices or has the means to solve them but is
unwilling to do so. Thirdly, rebel leaders try to convince potential rebels that their trou-
bles are shared by others beyond the boundaries of their own community and, fourthly,
that only if each of them contributes to the collective action will the rebellion be suc-
cessful. Within this framing process, leaders make use of traditional symbols “to attract
nonelites to a new set of values and beliefs about the state that will make them more
willing to participate in a movement that challenges the state’s sovereignty. In so doing,
they redeﬁne local groups’ collective identity in such a way that members feel a commit-
ment to contribute to the national movement’s success” (Mason 2009, p. 80). A counter
elite emerges that develops the organizational capacity to mobilize a large segment of the
population, to establish itself as the de facto government in their everyday lives and to
engage in violent battle against the existing regime. The state then no longer exercises
a monopoly over the legitimate use of power within its territory but faces a situation
of “multiple sovereignty”. Likewise, strong and preexisting social networks and shared
collective identities serve as a valuable resource to monitor individual behavior and to
socially sanction defectors. People might simply join a rebellion because they fear social
sanctions if they don’t and only free-ride. In such cases, social pressure brought about
by strong communities changes the cost-beneﬁt calculations of joining a rebellion. This
argument leads to the expectation that individuals are more likely to engage in violent
uprisings against the state if members of their own community are already participating
voluntarily in the movement and if their community is characterized by strong social
structures, e.g. if their communities are relatively isolated with little mobility but a
high degree of autonomy from outside control, if strong peasant associations and cooper-
atives exist, if community structures are decentralized and participatory, or if resources
are held and regulated by the collective itself.19
Resource Mobilization Theory also provides an explanation for the outbreak of internal
warfare that reaches beyond economic factors. According to this theory the timing of the
outbreak of violent conﬂict depends on changes in the political opportunity structure.
“Even if large segments of the population are aggrieved, and even if dissident leaders
and organizations exist to mobilize them for collective action, people are not likely to
19See Humphreys and Weinstein (2006b, pp. 13–15); Humphreys and Weinstein (2008, pp. 442 sq.).
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join such a movement unless they perceive some change to have occurred in the stability
of the dominant coalition of elites and classes, and in the capacity and propensity of
the state to repress dissident activity” (Mason 2009, p. 80). Systemic crises, especially a
sudden weakening of institutional features (the state’s administrative organizations), of
the repressive capacity of the state (the state’s military and policing organizations) or of
informal political alignment render the existing regime weak and vulnerable. Changes
in access to power, shifts in ruling alignments and the emergence of potential allies or
of cleavages among elites also oﬀer new political opportunities. Such changes lower the
costs for collective action, they increase the rebellion’s chances of being successful and
of escaping state repression or they point political entrepreneurs toward vulnerabilities
among elites that can be exploited.20 The identiﬁcation of such “trigger factors” adds
value to Deprived Actor Models. According to Resource Mobilization Theory, poverty
or inequality itself does not suﬃce to explain the outbreak of internal warfare. Instead,
the capacity of leaders to successfully mobilize ﬁghters in a situation of systemic crisis
is decisive in order to ﬁgure out why poor nations are more or less prone to experience
a grievance rebellion. Likewise, changes in the political opportunity structure and the
ability to mobilize large segments of the population through framing processes also help
to explain why (and when) local greed conﬂicts escalate into nation-wide civil warfare.
Due to a lack of cross-national measures of the key concepts contained in Resource
Mobilization Theory, there is a lack of systematic tests. However, empirical research on
ethnic conﬂict provides some support. These studies assume shared ethnic identity serves
as a basis for mobilization because it facilitates recruitment as well as the detection and
punishment of free-riders. Potential members and free-riders can be easily distinguished
from others on the basis of ethnic markers. In addition, shared ethnic identity increases
the level of cohesion within the rebel organization. Grievances can be framed in ethnic
terms so that deprivation is equated with ethnic discrimination. Existing quantitative
analyses cannot measure the extent of popular mobilization directly but instead include
various measures for the extent to which a society is fragmented among multiple eth-
nic groups. The “Ethnolinguistic-Fractionalization Index” serves as a common measure.
However, ﬁndings on the relationship between ethnic fractionalization and the outbreak
of armed conﬂict are again inconclusive. Elbadawi (1999) and Reynal-Querol (2002) ﬁnd
that ethnically polarized societies face the greatest risk of outbreak of civil war while
Fearon and Laitin (2003), Collier and Hoeﬄer (1998), Collier and Hoeﬄer (2001), and
Collier and Hoeﬄer (2004) emphasize that ethnic dominance (e.g. deﬁned as a situation
where the largest ethnic group constitutes between 45 to 90 percent of the population)
signiﬁcantly increases the risk of civil war onset. Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002) also
dismiss any linear relationship between ethnic fractionalization and the probability of
civil war onset and instead argue in favor of an “inverted-u-shaped” relationship. Ac-
cording to these authors, civil war is least likely in ethnically homogeneous and very
heterogeneous societies while the danger of civil war is greatest in societies with a mid-
dle level of ethnolinguistic fractionalization. Although the existence of diﬀerent ethnic
20McAdam (1986, pp. 24, 32); Weinstein (2007, p. 46); Ellis (2003, p. 34) provide a similar argument.
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groups is necessary for dispute to arise, too much fractionalization increases the costs of
coordination for the purpose of rebellion between groups as well as recruitment costs.
Finally, Ellingsen (2000) used the relative size of ethnic groups as a measure. She found
that societies divided among relatively few but relatively large ethnic groups face a sig-
niﬁcantly higher risk of civil war (as compared with societies that are composed of a
relatively large number of relatively small ethnic groups or societies that are ethnically
homogeneous).
Which ethnic composition (whether ethnic fractionalization, polarization or domi-
nance) poses the greatest risk in terms of the outbreak of armed conﬂict is still being
discussed. Uncovering the relationship is especially diﬃcult as levels of ethnic or reli-
gious fractionalization, polarization and dominance are endogenous to warfare. Armed
conﬂict itself changes or even generates new ethnic or religious identities and cleavages.
Bosnia and Croatia serve as examples where the relationship between prewar polariza-
tion and civil war either seems to be inverse or where polarization only increased shortly
before or after the war erupted (Kalyvas 2006, pp. 74–82). Others warned that “the
extent to which ethnic groups are mobilized for collective action is a stronger predictor
of civil war than is the extent and depth of the grievances that motivated them” (Mason
2009, p. 94). In other words: Regardless of the level of grievances among ethnic minori-
ties, if mobilization fails, armed conﬂict does not occur. Among those characteristics
that aﬀect the ability of ethnic groups to mobilize, a shared ethnic identity but also the
geographical concentration of the ethnic groups as well as institutional features need to
be taken into account.21
State-centric theories of revolution also emerged as a reaction to Rational Actor Mod-
els as well as Deprived Actor Models that almost exclusively focus on conditions within
society that fuel civil war. Theda Skocpol criticized that the state – the prize over
which traditional civil wars are fought – was conspicuously absent from earlier concep-
tual frameworks although the state has interests of its own and oftentimes generates
the crisis that leads to the outbreak of violence. According to her, what catalyzes so-
cial revolutions are not conditions or developments in society but a politico-military
crisis of the state and class domination generated in part by the actions of the state
itself. This “echoes the concept of changes in the political opportunity structure that
social movement theorists posit as a determinant of when revolutions erupt. However,
Skocpol goes beyond this concept to explore how the structure of the state itself and
developmental changes in both the patterns of state-society relations and the states’ re-
lationship with its international environment produce the crisis that ignite revolutionary
outbreaks” (Mason 2009, p. 81). More speciﬁcally, long term trends within nations and
in the international arena can generate conﬂicts of interest between the state and the
dominant economic class. “Whether these conﬂicts produce a crisis of the state that
makes revolution possible or not likely is a function, in part, of the degree of the state
21See Gates (2002); Saideman and Ayres (2000, p. 1133); Lindström and Moore (1995); Scarritt and
McMillan (1995); Gurr and Moore (1997).
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autonomy from that dominant economic class. For Skocpol and for Glodstein (1991),
states that lacked suﬃcient autonomy from the dominant economic class were more
likely to experience revolution” (Mason 2009, p. 82). Other studies identify exclusionary
authoritarian regimes (neopatrimonial and sultanistic varieties), patrimonial praetorian
regimes or maﬁacracies as most vulnerable to revolutionary challenges. Speciﬁc state
practices that make certain types of regimes susceptible to violent uprising are also
given. Among these are the state sponsorship or the protection of unpopular economic
and social arrangements (such as inequitable land tenure arrangements or oppressive
labor conditions), the exclusion of newly mobilized groups from access to state power
or state resources, intolerance and repression of grassroots mobilization, indiscriminate
but not overwhelming state violence against opposition leaders, weak or geographically
uneven policing practices and infrastructural power, corrupt or arbitrary rule and the
de-professionalization of the military (Mason 2009, pp. 85–87).
Empirical studies investigating the claim that certain regime types are more prone
to civil wars than others are plagued by the absence of direct measures of types of au-
thoritarian regimes (Mason 2009, p. 95). Instead, they rely on proxy measures of regime
type. For instance, Fearon and Laitin (2003, pp. 75 sq.) argue that “ﬁnancially, organi-
zationally, and politically weak central governments render insurgency more feasible and
attractive” due to weak local policing, inept and corrupt counterinsurgency practices and
a lack of infrastructure development that would otherwise allow the state to extent its
authority throughout the entire territory to inhibit the emergence of insurgencies. They
measure state capacity only indirectly through GDP per capita and ﬁnd support for their
hypothesis. The “domestic democratic peace” proposition which expects democracies to
be relatively immune to civil warfare is related to the claim that weak authoritarian
regimes are more at risk. Although several studies have tested this claim, results are
inconclusive. Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier and Hoeﬄer (2004) do not ﬁnd a sig-
niﬁcant relationship while Krain and Myers (1997) and Henderson and D. Singer (2000)
ﬁnd democracies to be less likely to experience civil war. Hegre, Ellingsen, et al. (2001)
argue and ﬁnd support for an inverted-u-shape relationship. According to them, full
democracies and autocracies are rather stable and less likely to experience civil war than
autocracies. In addition, they ﬁnd that changes in the level of democracy are impor-
tant in regard to the onset of civil war: unconsolidated democracies, semi-democracies
or weak autocracies are indeed fragile and unstable and therefore less likely to survive
either positive or negative changes in their democracy scores (as compared with full
democracies or full autocracies). Thus, the probability of civil war onset declines with
each year that democracy persists and consolidates.
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3.3. Summary of Major Empirical Changes
Over three or more centuries prior to 1945, Europeans developed a theory and practice of
war in which massive violence is inﬂicted by large and organized state forces upon other
nations. Inter-state warfare reached its peak with the World Wars, was globally exported
and formed the basis of international rule-making on war. Since the end of World War
II, however, especially great power wars but also international wars in general have
increasingly turned into a “relict of the past” (Berdal 2003, p. 483).22 Intra-state wars
have replaced inter-state wars as the most frequent form of armed conﬂict. Chojnacki is
more cautious when noting that wars within states have dominated the picture of violent
conﬂict already since the early 19th century – at least in terms of numbers and with the
exception of the 1930 to 1939 period (Chojnacki 2006b, p. 49; Chojnacki 2004, p. 3).
Though he agrees that during the second half of the 20th century the ratio of inter-state
to intra-state wars acuminated due to a decline in great power wars and inter-state wars
in relation to conventional civil wars.23 Thus, we are safe to conclude that the frequency
of intra-state wars (which has always been above that of inter-state wars) has increased
dramatically since World War II, even after controlling for the size of the international
system (Hensel 2002, p. 7).
Today, civil warfare within nation-states is not only the most frequent but also the
most destructive form of armed conﬂict. In the 1990s, over 90 percent of deaths caused
by warfare occurred during intra-state wars (Weinstein 2007, p. 5). Between 1945 and
1999, warfare between states resulted in 3.33 million battle-deaths while civil warfare
within states killed about 16.2 million people (Fearon and Laitin 2003, p. 75). The
Yearbook 2011 of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) informs
that for the seventh year running, no major inter-state conﬂict was active in 2010. Over
the decade of 2001 to 2010, only 2 out of 29 major armed conﬂicts were inter-state
in nature (Themnér and Wallensteen 2011). If low-intensity armed conﬂicts are taken
into account, the number of conﬂicts within countries also by far exceeds the number
of conﬂicts between states: The 2014 UCDP/PRIO data24 report just three inter-state
armed conﬂicts25 within the last ten years but 274 intra-state armed conﬂicts.
22This, however, does not mean that militarized inter-state disputes (understood as threats to use force,
the display of force or even the use of force short of war) disappeared. In fact, the absolute number of
such disputes between states increased after the end of World War II. However, only about 4 percent of
all militarized inter-state disputes between 1816 and 1997 escalated to the point of inter-state warfare
(Hensel 2002, p. 6). Others note that at least between 1816 and 1976, the share of countries aﬀected
by militarized inter-state disputes stayed rather constant because the overall number of independent
states had also changed respectively. See Jones et al. (1996, p. 184) and Gochman and Maoz (1984,
p. 594) cited by Chojnacki (2006b, p. 52).
23Because the number of internationally recognized nation-states changed over time and because ceteris
paribus we would expect more conﬂict when there are more states that are eligible to ﬁght each other,
the ratio (instead of the total number) of countries involved in warfare serves as the better indicator.
24The UCDP/PRIO “Armed Conﬂict Dataset v.4-2014, 1946-2013”, available at http://www.pcr.uu.
se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_prio_armed_conflict_dataset/ (visited on 2014-11-03) .
25Thailand vs. Cambodia (2011), Eritrea vs. Djibouti (2008), and Sudan vs. South Sudan (2012).
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Most of the intra-state armed conﬂicts take place in Third World nations (Hensel 2002,
pp. 11, 28). Gantzel (2002, p. 2) refers to data gathered by the “Arbeitsgemeinschaft
Kriegsursachenforschung” (AKUF) at the University of Hamburg which indicate that
between 1945 and 2001, 93 percent of all 218 wars happened within developing countries.
In contrast, the 19th century inter- and intra-state wars concentrated in the Western
Hemisphere and Europe where the system of nation-states emerged. For a small subset
of today’s countries, civil warfare even seems to be “a chronic condition” (Mason 2009,
p. 66). Empirical evidence suggests that prior civil war experience increases the chances
of further civil war involvement. The 124 civil wars counted by Doyle and Sambanis
(2000) took place in 69 countries and the 127 civil wars counted by Fearon and Laitin
(2003, p. 75) involved 73 states. The latter note that between 1945 and 1999, single
countries had been involved in up to ﬁve civil wars.
Changes in the incidence (deﬁned as the number of ongoing armed conﬂicts in any given
year) are also observable. The incidence of internal armed conﬂict increased throughout
the Cold War era and peaked in the mid 1990s. It then dropped considerably and has
remained stable thereafter. The initial increase in the incidence of armed conﬂict results
from a “steady accumulation of ongoing conﬂicts” due to diﬃculties in their termination.
In other words, this development does not reﬂect any change over time in the frequency
or risk of onsets. The fraction of countries experiencing new conﬂicts each year has been
stable at between 1-2 percent during the entire period of 1945 to 1994. Instead, the rate
at which wars ended was signiﬁcantly lower compared to the rate at which new wars
began (Hegre 2004, pp. 243 sq.; Fearon and Laitin 2003). Variance in the duration of
warfare therefore is a decisive factor behind changes in the incidence of civil warfare.
Likewise, the decrease in the number of ongoing civil wars within the second half of the
1990s is “more a function of existing wars being brought to an end [i.e. a shortening
of their duration] than of any signiﬁcant decline in the rate at which new wars begin”
(Mason 2009, p. 66).
In this regard, the more proactive role of the international community, which through
the United Nations and other international bodies intervened in intra-state warfare to
separate warring parties and to broker peace agreements, seems decisive. It has been
argued that the kind of intervention matters (e.g. whether peacemaking, peacekeeping or
peace enforcement takes place or whether peacekeeping is multidimensional or traditional
in nature). Empirical analyses on the question in how far such interventions aﬀect the
duration of warfare or the stability of peace, however, yielded somewhat contradictory
results (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Fortna 2004). The timing of intervention and the side
on which the external forces are intervening also seems to be important for a successful
settlement (Collier and Hoeﬄer 2004). In addition, diﬀerent kinds of termination of
internal warfare (a decisive victory of either side, a negotiated compromise settlement, a
truce or a peace treaty) correlate with more or less stable peace (Fortna 2004). Empirical
evidence suggests that the longer the war lasts, the less likely a decisive victory of
either side. The result is a situation of a military stalemate (Mason and Fett 1996;
Mason, Weingarten, et al. 1999). According to the Ripeness Theory, this stalemate needs
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to be “mutually hurting” in order for the warring parties to start negotiations. This
structural element of a “ripe situation” is at least identiﬁed as a necessary (though
insuﬃcient) condition for negotiation (Zartman 1995; Zartman 2001). In any case, a
fast and decisive victory of either side seems to be desirable26 as negotiated settlements
have a major downside: compared to wars that ended by decisive victory, cases which
ended through negotiation are of a three times longer duration and violence is twice as
likely to break out again within a period of ﬁve years after the settlement. From this
perspective it seems concerning that, contrary to the Cold War era, a growing number
of recent wars ended through negotiation (HSC 2006, p. 4; Fortna 2004). However, even
in the case of compromise settlements that suﬀer from commitment problems, a renewed
outbreak of violence can be avoided if a third party is willing to guarantee the safety
of the adversaries during the critical implementation phase (Walter 1997; Walter 2002;
Fearon 2004). Such guarantees can also be built into the institutional design of the
treaty itself e.g. in the form of power-sharing mechanisms (Hartzell 1999; Hartzell and
Hoddie 2003; Licklider 2001; DeRouen, Lea, et al. 2009). Others found that the length
of internal warfare associates with structural conditions prevailing prior to conﬂict (e.g.
the degree of income inequality, per capita income levels, the degree of ethnic division or
population density) as well as circumstances during conﬂict like access to large revenues
from natural resources (Fearon 2004; Collier, Hoeﬄer, and Söderbom 2004; Lujala 2010;
Elwert 1997; Olsson and Congdon Fors 2004). Furthermore, a lack of state capacity (i.e.
an ineﬀective bureaucracy or a weak national army) and the respective regime type in
interaction with “viability enhancing factors” (e.g. geographical factors like mountain
cover that allows rebels to retreat and hide) also seem to contribute to a long duration
of ﬁghting (DeRouen and Sobek 2004; Herbst 2004). Final agreement on the decisive
factors determining the duration of warfare and stable peace is still pending. In the
meantime (throughout the last two decades), the average duration of intra-state wars
has more than doubled (Collier and Hoeﬄer 2004). This kind of warfare lasts at least
four times as long as inter-state wars.27
The comparatively long duration of civil wars explains their overall destructiveness.
“On average, casualties in civil wars occur at a much lower rate than in inter-state wars.
However, because civil wars last so much longer, their cumulative death toll substantively
exceeds that of inter-state wars” (Mason 2009, p. 67).
In addition to signiﬁcant changes in the incidence and in the duration of conventional
intra-state wars, some argue for another major shift in the pattern of armed conﬂict:
26For rather radical theses see Luttwak (1999).
27“The 108 civil wars in the Correlates of War project lasted on average 1665 days, whereas the 23 inter-
state wars lasted only 480 days on average” (Mason 2009, p. 67). The 25 inter-state wars identiﬁed
by Fearon and Laitin (2003, p. 75) lasted three months on average while the average duration of a
civil war within the same period (1945 to 1999) was as high as six years.
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Advocates of the concept of New Wars believe to observe the emergence of a new or
non-conventional type of intra-state armed conﬂict especially within the post-Cold War
era. Like Deprived Actor Models and Rational Actor Models, this third model takes
the nature and interests of actors and the costs and beneﬁts of participation in warfare
as a starting point to explain the causes and nature of internal warfare. The concept
of New Wars also builds on the assumption of rationality.28 All three models assume
that actors make choices that they believe will lead “to the best feasible outcomes for
them as deﬁned by their personal values and preferences” (De Mesquita 2009, pp. 5 sq.)
and that during warfare, decision makers act strategically. “They connect alternatives
consistently (i.e. transitively) in relation of preference or indiﬀerence”, take constraints
and the anticipated actions of others into account and “act in a manner that is consistent
with their desires and beliefs”. The assumption of rationality, however, does not mean
that decision makers have complete freedom of action or are in full control. Instead
“they must consider whatever constraints block the path to the outcome they desire
and adjust their behavior accordingly, often abandoning their most preferred goal in
favor of an attainable second or third best”. Also, “rational decision makers do not
exhaustively consider all possible alternatives if the cost of doing so exceeds the marginal
gain” (De Mesquita 2009, p. 6). Although “critics mistakenly believe that the assumption
of rationality means that self-interested actors must want to maximize their income or
wealth”, the rationality condition says nothing about the content of the ultimate goal(s)
pursued by the actors whose preferences might vary from theory to theory. (De Mesquita
2009, p. 7) emphasizes that “the assumption of rationality neither limits the goals to
be studied nor the identity of actors pursuing these goals. It only limits how actors
chose actions given their desires and beliefs”. Despite the fact that Rational Choice
Theory provides the basis for all three models of intra-state warfare presented here, the
concept of New Wars also touches upon Social Mobilization Theory when referring to
the role of so-called “identity politics”. According to the concept of New Wars, the
absence of functioning state institutions in times of state collapse contributes to the
outbreak and conduct of violence. This recalls the notion of systemic (politico-military)
crisis and changing political opportunity structures which also determine the timing of
the outbreak of violence according to Resource Mobilization Theory and state-centric
models of civil war. New Wars share some characteristics with grievance and with greed
rebellions, too, though they signiﬁcantly diﬀer in regard to other features. The following
second part of this book introduces this new, non-conventional kind of intra-state armed
conﬂict before summarizing major similarities and diﬀerences between them on the one
hand and conventional (state-based) internal armed conﬂicts on the other.
28Münkler (2005, p. 91) criticizes that the New Wars discourse gave so much attention to ethnic or
religious-cultural factors that economic aspects and motives were overlooked. NewWars were wrongly
identiﬁed as irrational warfare driven by “behavior from passions” (like ancient ethnic hatred) instead
of interests. “So long as the economic structures underlying these wars have not been addressed, one
can persist in the comfortable belief that rationalization and paciﬁcation would go hand in hand
[. . . ]. On closer examination, however, it becomes apparent that the new wars are in many respects
the result of economically purposive rationality, or that people pursuing economic objectives play a
major role in them as entrepreneurs, politicians and, not least, ﬁghting men.”
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4. The Political Context of New Warfare
The above argued that the process of decolonization overlaid by the Cold War produced
armed conﬂicts within Third World countries which arose in the absence of consensual
values or a sense of national unity, i.e. in weak societies1 but in situations where the
coercive power of the state was considerable, i.e. in strong states2. Such insurgencies
aimed to replace or secede from the existing repressive regimes in order to establish a
more just and abundant political, social and economic order.
In 2008, Robert Bates presented a popular and convincing theory on the emergence
of these repressive regimes and their failure in late-century Africa. According to this
author, the political and economic legacies of state failure in Africa reach back to the
restructuring of political institutions after independence which “triggered a logic of ex-
clusion, resulted in political privilege and economic inequality” (Bates 2008, p. 51).
Bates explains how the political elites in many African countries managed to “capture
the state” and to use their power to accumulate wealth (Bates 2008, p. 37). They formed
“single-party” or “no-party” authoritarian regimes in which the heads of state controlled
the means of coercion as well as access to material beneﬁts (Bates 2008, pp. 43 sq.). The
president supplied a small ruling coalition with political favors while the rest of the
“national pie” went to his own bank account (Bates 2008, p. 47). This gave way to a
political culture where “constituents viewed politicians as their agents whose job it was
to bring material beneﬁt to the local community – jobs, loans, or cash. [. . . ] Compet-
itive elections came to resemble a political marketplace in which votes were exchanged
for material beneﬁt” (Bates 2008, p. 38). Any incentive to provide public goods for the
broad public did not exist. A number of wrong policy choices (e.g. the decision to
distort key prices and to regulate markets and industries) aimed to establish “control
regimes” to the beneﬁt of the ruling elite and “contributed to the subsequent collapse of
Africa’s states” (Bates 2008, p. 56).3 In reaction to the forging of authoritarian political
1A weak society refers to the progressive absence of “a broad general consensus on the underlying values
of the society” (Snow 1996, p. 35).
2Snow (1996) refers to a strong state as “a situation in which the state’s coercive capabilities and
mechanisms are particularly robust, whereas a weak state has a less developed coercive component”
(Snow 1996, p. 35).
3For instance, governments subsidized the cost of capital and overvalued their own currency to protect
certain goods/sectors (e.g. the urban and industrial sector) from global competition. This led to the
adoption of (highly ineﬃcient but still privately proﬁtable) capital intensive technologies. In cases
where their own currency was over-valued to the advantage of importers, exporting farmers faced
losses when selling their products on foreign markets. Elsewhere, governments bought “cash crops at
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institutions and the establishment of control regimes, the real economy ﬂed from the
reach of the government. The emergence of black markets and widespread smuggling
are only two indicators of the resulting political and economic crisis at the national level
(Bates 2008, pp. 98 sq.).
Only a number of “trigger factors” managed to shatter these rather stable systems. The
increase in oil prices in the 1970s caused a global recession leading to sharp decreases in
the demand for African imports. Because export taxes were “the single largest source” of
ﬁscal income in most African countries, this resulted in a sharp decrease in public revenue
(which had already been declining due to the above mentioned bad policy choices and
due to the predatory behavior of the political elites). Public sector salaries eroded as
did the quality of public services. Roads and railways “fell into despair”, state-owned
companies were forced to shut down due to a lack of power and maintenance and the
public education system deteriorated. Corruption and private trade became a way of
income for public servants. Because military salaries also decreased, soldiers turned
to looting or other ways of income, e.g. the collection of thoroughfares in exchange
for access to streets which they controlled. Some African oil-producing countries who
had initially proﬁted from rising oil prices and initiated new projects “found themselves
burdened by the costs of these ventures” when petroleum prices returned to normal.
Oftentimes, they decided to borrow money and, for this reason, were equally drawn
into the following debt crisis (Bates 2008, pp. 24 sq., 99–105). Demands by creditors
for political reform and a shift to multi-party politics led to an unanticipated increase
in the level of political risk for those in power. Their political future suddenly turned
insecure (Bates 2008, pp. 26 sq., 108–110). Because they at the same time faced an
environment richly endowed by nature, rulers often employed means of coercion to prey
upon this wealth (instead of protecting the creation of it) while private citizens also
decided to devote their time to warfare and the predation of resources (instead of to the
production of wealth) (Bates 2008, p. 28). Former freedom ﬁghters also began agitating
for “the rewards of independence” (Bates 2008, p. 37). Predation of resources became
their way of compensation for the struggle. The violent and extractive political order
they built secured their private enrichment and their jobs. Finally, foreign support to
authoritarian regimes eased or even stopped with the end of the Cold War. “Abandoned
by foreign patrons and facing increasing threats at home, incumbents had increased
reason to fear for their political future. Their time horizons therefore shortened. In the
long run, repression might increase the level of political disorder, but incumbents had
less reason to place great weight on the long run” (Bates 2008, pp. 116 sq.). This allowed
for punitive measures against the national opposition (which caused further grievances)
and again increased the temptation to engage in predation as an alternative source of
private income.
low domestic prizes, sold them at the prices prevailing in international markets, and deposited the
diﬀerence in prices in the public treasury” (Bates 2008, p. 59). For more examples see Bates (2008,
pp. 55–74).
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Sub-national tensions rooted in the economies of Africa’s “politically expansionary
rural communities” further exacerbated the situation.4 In times of political instability
and decreasing public revenue, such local conﬂicts could no longer be contained. They
acquired national signiﬁcance and accelerated the failure of states (Bates 2008, pp. 75,
92). “[W]hile triggered at the elite level, political disorder was marked by the rapid
spread of insecurity to the local level [. . . ]. The nature of Africa’s societies helps to
account for the speed with which political disorder cascaded from the center to the
periphery” (Bates 2008, p. 93). Rival politicians transformed political organizations in
armed militias and regional tensions rose.
This illustrates how a number of exogenous shocks resulted in changes in two key vari-
ables: the level of public revenue and the elite’s rate of discount (Bates 2008, pp. 19 sq.).
In an environment richly endowed by nature, these “trigger factors”, in combination with
the already existing economic and political crisis at the national level and sub-national
tensions, led to the emergence of violent militias (which the author equates with state
failure) and the outbreak of greed- and grievance-based internal violence.
One aspect of the above-stated is particularly interesting in light of this study. Like
the concept of New Wars, Bates (2008, pp. 9–11) identiﬁes the exploitation of natural
resources for war ﬁnance as well as ethnic violence as “joint products of state failure”.
Both are symptoms of state failure, instead of causes. He argues that payoﬀs that re-
sult from predation (as opposed to payoﬀs that result from taxing the citizenry) are
especially attractive if tax revenue is low, if rewards from predation are high and if im-
mediate beneﬁts weigh more heavily than future payoﬀs because the latter are insecure.
Failing or failed states meet all three of these conditions. The argument itself applies
to state as well as non-state actors though Bates (2008, p. 131) focuses on the behavior
of incumbents (not insurgents) and aims to explain why African elites adopted policies
that impoverished their citizens. In addition, the author notes that “[a]t times of state
failure, politicians can [. . . ] marshal political followings and recruit armed militias by
championing the defense of land rights. In the midst of state failure, ethnicity may there-
fore come to the fore. But by this reasoning it is the product rather than the source of
political disorder”. In addition, ethnic violence is in fact nothing more than “a struggle
over the regional allocation of resources” (Bates 2008, p. 133). The remainder of this
book illustrates how well this ﬁts within the concept of New Wars and its masterminds.
During the post-Cold War era, Snow (1996) also identiﬁes a movement towards greater
freedom of expression, increasingly little social cohesion and therefore a weakening of the
coercive ability of those in power in a number of places. Failed or failing states emerged
that exhibit weak societies and weak state structures. Snow (1996) leaves aside the
question whether this weakening of state structures rendered the emergence of grievance-
4Bates (2008, pp. 78 sq., 90–93) explains that the strong forces of territorial expansion in Africa which
lead to competing claims for land and local non-state conﬂict between rural communities are under-
played by powerful cultural issues but also due to poverty and diminishing returns which causes an
out-migration of the youth to settle land on the periphery.
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based insurgencies also more likely. Instead, he argues that a new kind of internal
armed conﬂict (“attacks from criminal insurgencies”) is especially likely to emerge and
to succeed in such a context and therefore appears to be more prominent during the
post-Cold War era. This leads to the four-fold taxonomy presented in table 4.1 on this
page.
State
Strong Weak
Society
Strong Cell 1 Cell 2
Weak Cell 3 Cell 4(Insurgencies) (New Wars)
Table 4.1.: State Weakness and Types of Warfare (Snow 1996, p. 35)
States in Cell 1 have strong coercive powers and share a strong consensus on underlying
social values. This is also referred to as a situation of “popular dictatorship”. In these
cases agreement exists that society needs to include the strict enforcement of the political
order which is, for instance, the case in Singapore (Snow 1996, pp. 35 sq.).
States in Cell 2 represent the Western norm. There exists an underlying agreement on
social, political and economic issues or norms such as democracy and market economy
which produces freedom and motivation to nurture a highly developed free market econ-
omy. The existence of this societal support means that the state does not require great
coercive capacity but suppresses only criminal activity and deviation from the order.
Ironically, the most advanced states that fall into this category also possess the most
sophisticated technologies to insure the survival of its citizenry and thus the greatest
potential for massive coercive control.
States in Cell 3 and Cell 4 represent the most problematic combination. These are
the above described situations most likely to result in instability and violence. Cell 3-
states face the combination of a weak social structure but a coercive state most often
associated with authoritarian regimes. This strongly coercive state imposes authority
in the absence of a population that willingly accepts the authority of the state and that
confers legitimacy to the regime. The absence of commonly shared values also means
that some groups are imposing their values on others. This results in resistance by
those who feel oppressed which explains the emergence of grievance-based insurgencies
during the Cold War era and some post-Cold War violence. According to Snow (1996),
virtually all Cell 3 conﬂicts that remained unresolved at the end of the 1990s had such
roots (Snow 1996, p. 49).
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States in Cell 4 struggle with the absence of both social cohesion and strong govern-
mental mechanisms capable of imposing order on society. Power struggles among groups
take place and there is little or no governmental ability to mediate or suppress outbreaks
of violence. The worst case scenario constitutes state failure. Examples are Somalia,
Rwanda or Bosnia. Snow (1996) clearly mentions that these cases of warfare are not
unique to the post-Cold War world. Instead, they simply became more obvious. The
“new internal war” is sui generis not a form so fundamentally diﬀerent from that of the
Cold War. “What is diﬀerent is that some forms now appear less frequently, making
the remainder seem more prominent” (Snow 1996, p. 49). Thus, he believes to observe
a post-Cold War pattern which is tipping away from the more prevalent Cell 3 cases
(insurgencies taking place in strong coercive states masking weak societies) to Cell 4
cases (New Wars taking place in weak or failed states revealing weak societies).
It remains somewhat unclear whether Snow’s “new internal wars” just comprise “power
struggles among [non-state] groups” or whether the concept also covers state-based greed
conﬂicts as implied by the term “attacks by criminal insurgencies”. Likewise, it remains
to be answered whether today’s Cell 4 cases are yesterday’s Cell 3 cases (i.e. whether
we observe a change in the type of warfare within cases or across cases). The author
is, however, very clear on the fact that New Wars arise in a context of state weakness
and also speciﬁes this term. What makes him a true mastermind of the concept of New
Wars, however, is the fact that according to his theory, the strength of state structures
and society are decisive in determining not only the risk but also the type of warfare a
society is likely to face.
Some support for his theses stems from the fact that the concentration of internal
wars in the post-Cold War era is moving away from developing countries to those that
have not yet entered the developmental process. Again, armed conﬂict in the poorest
countries is not a post-Cold War phenomenon but more of the armed conﬂicts appear
to be occurring in these kinds of places. This is not what the development literature
of the 1950s and 1960s predicted: The paradigm that internal violence occurs mainly
in states undergoing development has apparently given way to a tendency of internal
violence to occur in the poorest and weakest states (Snow 1996, p. 58). Kaldor agrees
by emphasizing that New Wars take place where the modern state is “unraveling”, in
“frail”, in “quasi-” or “shadow states” (Kaldor 2004; Kaldor 2006b, pp. 6, 8; Kaldor
2001). Elsewhere she and others mention that New Warfare “involves” or is “associated”
with state failure, an unbuilding, disintegration or implosion of typically authoritarian
states under the impact of globalization (Kaldor 2005, pp. 3, 8; Kaldor 2006a, pp. 5 sq.;
Kaldor 2000; Münkler 2005, p. 76). This leaves the direction of relationship between
state disintegration and the outbreak of armed conﬂict undetermined. It also remains
unclear how state disintegration is deﬁned (e.g. whether the term only refers to the
coercive power of state institutions or societal factors as well), how much disintegration
is required to speak of state failure or a failed state and how exactly state failure may lead
to the outbreak of a certain kind of violent conﬂict. Instead, Kaldor (1999) at ﬁrst turns
to the causes of these processes of state disintegration. She stresses two macro-factors
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that in particular contributed to state weakness or an “erosion of the state’s monopoly of
legitimate organized violence from above”: processes of globalization during the 1980s
and 1990s (understood as “the intensiﬁcation of global interconnectedness – political,
economic, military and cultural”) and the end of the Cold War (Kaldor 2007, pp. 3 sq.,
6; Snow 1996, p. 35). In fact, the demise of the Eastern bloc, and therefore the end of
the Cold War, is itself seen as a consequence of globalization.5
Kaldor (2007, p. 4) accepts the argument that globalization has its roots in moder-
nity or even earlier. Still, she considers the globalization of the 1980s and 1990s “a
qualitatively new phenomenon” because it came as “a consequence of the revolution
in information technologies and dramatic improvements in communication and data-
processing”. She is also aware of the fact that economic globalisation which often goes
hand in hand with a liberalization and privatization can have positive impacts. For
instance, privatization breaks down authoritarian tendencies and, in a globalized world
that is connected through electronic media and international travel, external pressure
for democratization also easily reaches authoritarian or totalitarian regimes. “People in
those societies feel they have some opening, some possibility of making change” so that
internal pressure for reform also increases (Kaldor 2006a, p. 5). But in many countries
this “pressure for democratization led to increasingly desperate bids to remain in power,
often through fomenting ethnic tensions” (Kaldor 1999, p. 82). Kaldor (2000) warns
that “in [. . . ] situations where domestic pressures for reform are weak and where civil
society is least developed [. . . ] the opening up of the state both to the outside world
and to increased participation through the democratisation process is most dangerous”.
According to her, an outbreak of violence is most likely in cases where the process of
democratisation is largely conﬁned to elections (while other prerequisites of democratic
procedures like the rule of law, a separation of powers and freedom rights are not in
place) or in cases where these other prerequisites are more or less established but where
decades of authoritarianism leave the political culture vulnerable to populist ideologies.
“These are the circumstances that give rise to the ‘new wars”’ (Kaldor 2000).
In addition, Kaldor argues that globalization weakened states’ monopoly of legiti-
mate organized violence through the increasing transnationalization of military forces.
Although, this process had already started during the two world wars, it was institu-
tionalized by the block system during the Cold War era. Innumerable transnational
connections between armed forces also developed in the post-Cold War period. Kaldor
explains this growing importance of military alliances, cooperation and exchanges by
5“The fundamental source of the new wars is the crisis of state authority, a profound loss of legitimacy
that became apparent in the post-colonial states in the 1970s and 1980s and in the post-communist
states only after 1989. Part of the story of that crisis is the failure or exhaustion of populist eman-
cipatory projects such as socialism or national liberation, especially those that were implemented
within an authoritarian communitarian framework. But this failure cannot be disentangled from the
impact of globalisation” (Kaldor 2000). “[T]he end of the Cold War could be viewed as the way in
which the Eastern bloc succumbed to the inevitable encroachment of globalization” (Kaldor 2007,
p. 4).
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referring to changes in military technology, the growing destructiveness of weapons and
the evolution of international norms, e.g. on arms control or the illegitimacy of unilat-
eral aggression (Kaldor 1999, pp. 4 sq.; Kaldor 2007, p. 5). As a result, external actors
are increasingly interfering in conﬂict and post-conﬂict situations. Kaldor speaks of a
“network of global actors” that is composed of international reporters, mercenary troops,
military advisers, diaspora volunteers and an “army” of international agencies ranging
from NGOs to international institutions (Kaldor 1999, p. 4; Kaldor 2007, p. 5).
Both globalization and the end of the East-West controversy also contributed to crises
of identity, the rise of alternative, vertical identities and the emergence of “identity pol-
itics”. Kaldor (1999, pp. 73 sq.) argues that globalization breaks up vertically organized
cultures that have been characteristic of the era of the nation-state and that gave rise
to a sense of national identity and security. In many countries, globalization also asso-
ciates with extensive rural-urban labor migration. Traditional rural communities that
were characterized by strong family ties and a strong sense of belonging were broken
up and replaced by more anonymous urban communities. This resulted in a “crisis of
identity” and “a sense of alienation and disorientation”. A similar “vacuum” followed
the discrediting of socialism at the end of the Cold War as well as the discrediting of
the nation-building rhetoric of the ﬁrst generation of post-colonial leaders (Kaldor 2007,
pp. 7 sq.). As a consequence, new horizontal cultures that undermine the sense of a shared
political community arose out of informal non-governmental and transnational networks,
religious and ethnic groups, transnational crime or the regionalization of governments.
Ethnic or religious-cultural lines of divide that were supposed to provide the necessary
orientation and perspective quickly replaced old ideological references (Münkler 2005,
p. 91).
This “historic shift away from the vertical cultures” towards new horizontal cultures
oﬀers the perfect breeding ground for identity politics deﬁned as movements which mo-
bilize around sectarian (ethnic, racial or religious) identities for the purpose of claiming
state power (Kaldor 2007, p. 80). These sectarian identities that form the basis for iden-
tity politics are “re-invented” in the context of state failure or the corrosion of other
sources of political legitimacy (Kaldor 2007, pp. 7 sq.). For the purpose of political mo-
bilization, they are newly “constructed or accentuated” by ruling politicians and aspiring
opposition leaders who draw on pre-existing ethnic, religious or tribal cleavages and past
memories and experiences. Political groupings based on such identities are therefore de-
scribed as fragmentative, backward-looking and exclusive movements of nostalgia that
reconstruct a heroic past and the memory of injustices, real or imagined, and of famous
battles, won or lost. They acquire meaning through insecurity, rekindled fear of historic
enemies or a sense of being threatened by those with diﬀerent labels (Kaldor 1999, p. 78).
In New Warfare, violent actors use such identity politics to mobilize combatants and to
justify their criminal and illegal activities as well as their violent strategies.6
6Former administrative or intellectual elites ally with non-state actors on the margins of society to
mobilize the excluded and abandoned, alienated and insecure for the purposes of capturing and
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Globalization contributes to the spread of this type of mobilization through electronic
media.7 The ease of travel and communication in a globalized world also increases the
possibility of transnational support from diaspora communities (Kaldor 2007, p. 8). In
New Warfare, this support (e.g. in the form of ideas, funds and techniques) is especially
important because the end of the Cold War led to a shortfall of ﬁnancial and material
assistance from the former superpowers and other outside patrons (Kaldor 2004). This
further weakened states as well as non-state actors and fundamentally changed the ways
of ﬁnancing warfare. As far as possible, the lack of ﬁnancial resources was or is being
compensated by natural resource extraction and the build-up of mostly criminal war
economies that are well-connected to the global market.8 The negative economic conse-
quences of globalization, especially the failure of neoliberal development strategies and
the following debt crisis, further aggravated this ﬁght over natural resources.9
sustaining power. They play upon particularistic identities in order to increase legitimacy, “to justify
authoritarian policies, to create scapegoats [and] to mobilize support around fear and insecurity”
(Kaldor 1999, pp. 75 sq., 81; Kaldor 2007, p. 82). The preconditions for such an instrumentalization
remain unclear (e.g. whether members of ethnically homogeneous or heterogeneous societies are more
prone to being mobilized into warfare or the question whether ethnic dominance or polarity poses the
greatest risk in terms of the outbreak of violence). Kaldor only notes that “the new politics draws
on memory and history and [. . . ] certain societies where cultural traditions are more entrenched are
more susceptible to the new politics [. . . ] and that’s a new feature” (Kaldor 2007, p. 89).
7See Kaldor (2006a, p. 6) and Kaldor (2001) for evidence from Rwanda. In general and thanks to
global media, New Wars are fought out in public – contemporary warfare is “more theatrical than
ever before” (Kaldor 2006a, p. 4).
8“Diminishing tensions between the two superpowers has reduced external ﬁnancing for many rebel
groups and governments. This made them more dependent on alternative ﬁnancing, including ﬁ-
nancing from natural resource exploitation” (Lujala, N. P. Gleditsch, et al. 2005, p. 545). See also
Münkler (2005, p. 97), Ellis (2003, p. 34) or Berdal (2003, p. 484). The latter refers to the case of An-
gola where the end of the Cold War resulted in “a privatization of UNITA’s existing supply networks”
because former agents who were no longer of use to the Cold War networks started their own business
relationships with UNITA (Berdal 2003, p. 494). Heupel and Zangl (2003, fn 15 on p. 16) cite the case
of Khmer Rouge in Cambodia who after the end of the Cold War also increasingly augmented assis-
tance from their former allies with natural resource extraction. Because violent actors compensated
the loss of support from former Cold War allies with independent and frequently criminal sources of
income the end of the Cold War is especially linked with a criminalization of war economies (Heupel
and Zangl 2010, p. 31). In general, Ross (2006, p. 270) ﬁnds that already “existing rebel groups
shifted towards contraband funding, particularly at two points: in the mid-1980s, when insurgents
in Columbia and Peru began to take advantage of the narcotics trade; and at the beginning of the
1990s, when the end of the Cold War forced rebels in Angola and Cambodia to turn to gemstones
(and in the case of Cambodia, timber) to replace their foreign funding. [. . . ] [C]ontraband became a
more common way to ﬁnance new conﬂict once the Cold War had ended”. He adds that contraband
helped to fund seven of the 92 civil wars (7.6 percent) that began between 1945 and 1988, but eight
of the 36 wars (25 percent) that began after 1988.
9“As foreign assistance began to be replaced by commercial borrowing in the 1970s, as foreign debt
mounted and ‘structural adjustment’ programs were introduced, state revenues declined and, as in
the former communist countries, political competition for control over resources intensiﬁed” (Kaldor
1999, p. 82). Elsewhere, Kaldor argues that through neoliberal policies and structural adjustment
programs countries were forced to open their economies, to reduce their budget deﬁcits and to stabilize
their budgets (Kaldor 1999, pp. 81 sq.; Kaldor 2007, pp. 85–87). As a result, public spending was cut
and disparities in income and levels of unemployment increased. The decline of the welfare state and
the failure to overcome poverty and inequality led to the disillusion of post-independence hopes and
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Finally, the end of the Cold War not only left an enormous surplus of small and
light weapons that are primarily used in New Wars (Kaldor 2007, p. 102; Kaldor 1999,
p. 96; Münkler 2005, pp. 74 sq.) but also resulted in a large supply of well-trained and
battle-tested soldiers. Spiegel Online (2004) estimates that the end of the Cold War
resulted in up to seven million former soldiers that had been released into civil life.
Berdal (2003, p. 495) adds that “not only UNITA but a wide range of warring groups,
factions, and governments around the world [. . . ] have beneﬁted from the collapse of
[. . . ] export control regimes and the ability to monitor surplus stocks of weapons in
former Warsaw Pact countries and Soviet republics”. Both, the availability of surplus
arms and soldiers gave rise to private military companies and mercenaries that further
weaken the state’s monopoly of legitimate organized violence (Wulf 2005; Paul Singer
2008). Leading researchers from the Correlates of Wars Project also link the end of the
Cold War and globalization processes with the emergence of violent non-state actors
as well as the emergence of criminalized war economies which shall later be discussed
in more detail. More speciﬁcally, Sarkees and Wayman (2010, p. 45) note that the
“ﬂourishing of non-state actors has been related to [. . . ] the increase in worldwide
arms trade and the development of private armies; the growth of international drug
traﬃcking; the expanding power of multinational corporations; the fact that boundaries
are increasingly permeable by people, weapons, drugs; and the formation of diverse
coalitions that acquire weapons and form armies”. These various forms of criminal
behavior by violent non-state actors of course challenge the stability of states.
To those states that “turned” weak one needs to add those that were “born” (institu-
tionally) weak. For instance, Münkler (2005, p. 66) attributes a certain predisposition
to New Warfare to societies “where there is no long tradition of military discipline, and
where forms of violence similar to ‘small-wars’ practices are an established part of the
lifestyle” (Münkler 2005, p. 66). As an example he refers to nomadic peoples. However,
only some of these societies actually experience New Warfare. Similarly, it is often ar-
gued that after colonialism, newly independent but weak states were born (Kaldor 2007,
pp. 84 sq.). Snow (1996) already touches upon the colonial legacy of countries when ex-
plaining the emergence of insurgencies during the Cold War era. However and although
the colonial past of a country is often linked with today’s political, economic and soci-
etal weaknesses, empirical evidence shows that neither the colonial legacy itself nor the
identity of the colonial power (e.g. former British vs. French colony) seems to be the
decisive factor. Instead, Acemoglu et al. (2001) found that the quality of institutions cre-
ated by former colonial powers correlates with the quality of today’s institutions which
strongly inﬂuences the current economic and political performance (which are both de-
cisive factors in the prediction of the outbreak of violence). The authors explain that
the willingness or readiness to create high quality institutions, “the colonization strat-
egy or policy”, was very much determined by the conditions on the ground. The more
favorable the situation for the settlers themselves, the more likely they would settle and
to a loss of legitimacy of post-colonial states. This all contributed to the disintegration and erosion
of state structures and the outbreak of violence (Newman 2004, pp. 175 sq.).
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subsequently establish and implement appropriate institutions to regulate their political,
social and economic life. For example, unfavorable living conditions, like high (infant)
mortality rates and contagious diseases such as yellow fever and malaria, but the pres-
ence of valuable resources led to the establishment of an extractive state in the Congo.10
Institutions established by the Belgians did not introduce much protection for private
property, nor did they provide checks and balances against government expropriation.
At the other extreme, Europeans migrated and settled in a number of more favorable
colonies (e.g. Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the US), where they tried to replicate
European institutions. This theoretical argument provides the basis for an empirical in-
vestigation by Acemoglu et al. (2001) who apply Two-Stage Least Squares estimation
technique to account for reverse causation. The results support their hypotheses that the
(potential) settler mortality rates were a major determinant of settlements, settlements
were a major determinant of high quality, early institutions and that there is a strong
correlation between the quality of early institutions and the quality of institutions today.
Therefore, today’s institutional weaknesses – whether these relate to commonly shared
social, political or economic norms like democracy, market economy/the distribution of
wealth and property or the coercive power of governments – and the resulting econom-
ical, political and security problems are not only explained by processes related to the
end of the Cold War or globalization but date back to the colonial or institutional legacy
of the respective countries. Murshed (2003) agrees that a “functional social contract”
and the concomitant institutions that distribute income and resolve disputes can pre-
vent the violent expression of greed or grievance. He adds that “conﬂict aﬀected nations
have histories of weak degenerating social contracts. This weakness is often a legacy
of colonialism, with institutionalized mechanisms favoring certain groups over others”
(Murshed 2003). Rwanda might be an example where such policies provided ground for
ethnic violence culminating in the 1994 genocide. The institutionalist argument not
only applies to the African context but has also been mentioned e.g. by Calic (2005)
when discussing the root causes of the conﬂicts in Former Yugoslavia. According to her,
the main cause (a lack of an integrative, political concept of national identity based on
state tradition and shared norms and institutions instead of language or religion) can be
traced back to policies of foreign powers who ruled South Eastern Europe for centuries.
Wade (2005), Keen (2000) or Schlichte (2006b) also consider institutional mechanisms in
regard to the causes and context of New Wars. Schlichte (2006b) links the functioning
of neopatrimonial regimes with the delegation and fragmentation of statehood, although
he disagrees with the thesis of a denationalization of contemporary internal wars.
It follows from the above that especially the end of the Cold War, increasing global-
ization, or a combination of both contribute to New Wars in multiple ways, directly as
well as indirectly through weakening eﬀects on state authority. The colonial legacy as
one additional source of state weakness has also been mentioned. Kaldor (2007, p. 33)
provides the example of the disintegration of former Yugoslavia and the following war
in Bosnia which she calls “the archetypal example, the paradigm of the new type of
10This is in line with the previously mentioned “political dutch disease”- argument.
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war”. In line with her argument, the disintegration of former Yugoslavia, both at the
federal and at the republican level, associated with the emergence of “virulent national-
ism”, which “reinvented particular versions of history and memory” and was based on
“certain traditional social divisions and prejudices” to construct new cultural forms that
can be used for political mobilization. This kind of nationalism “has to be understood
in terms of the struggle, on the part of increasingly desperate (and corrupt) elites, to
control the remnants of the state” (Kaldor 2007, p. 37). Such identity politics that were
used before and during warfare worked well due to a preceding crisis of identity. The
Yugoslav political identity was drawn from the struggle of the partisans in World War
II, from the state’s capacity to provide reasonable living standards and from its political
role as the leader of the non-aligned movement. But “[a]s the memory of World War II
faded and as the economic and social gains of the post-war period began to disappear,
it was inevitable that its legitimacy would be called into question [. . . ] [T]he end of
the East-West division added a ﬁnal blow to former Yugoslav identity” (Kaldor 2007,
p. 38). Because the ruling communist party was discredited due to corruption scandals,
nationalist parties were the best available option. Thus, national communitarian iden-
tities ﬁlled the vacuum created by the loss of Yogoslavism. Unfortunately, nationalist
arguments seemed also most appropriate to cope with increasing economic diﬃculties.
While Yugoslavia had been supported by the West as a buﬀer against a possible Soviet
attack on Southeast Europe during the Cold War era, foreign aid declined substantively
in the 1970s and was replaced by commercial loans (Kaldor 2007, p. 39). A slowdown
in growth in Western countries, which associated with a decrease in remittances from
diaspora communities, was followed by a debt crisis of some 20 billion US dollars at the
end of the decade. The IMF Recovery Plan intensiﬁed competition over resources among
the republics and contributed to a growing criminalization of the economy (Kaldor 2007,
p. 39). High inﬂation and unemployment rates and series of curruption scandals (which
involved former politicians and future key ﬁgures of the war) are also mentioned as
signs of the unraveling Yugoslav statehood (Kaldor 2007, p. 40). Uneven development
between and within the single republics and “the growing divide between the economic
and scientiﬁc elite and backward rural regions [. . . ] which was especially acute in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and was exacerbated in the 1980s” contributed to rising discontent (Kaldor
2007, p. 43). The republics started to call for single economic space. They wanted to
declare autonomous regions, disregarded constitutional decisions, aimed at controlling
their own TV and radio stations and even builtup their own armed forces. Territorial
Defense Units (TOs) were established in the republics, “the Slovens and Croats were
secretly organizing and arming their own independent forces based on [these] TOs and
the police through the growing black-market for surplus arms then emerging in East-
ern Europe” while the Serbs created their own paramilitary groups. These were later
sided by forces of the former Yugoslav army and increasingly used as a tool by Slobodan
Milosevic (Kaldor 2007, p. 41). This breakdown of the monopoly of organized violence
in former Yugoslavia marked the beginning of the breakdown of stability within Bosnia.
The nationalism emerging in the region was not only new because it was associated with
the disintegration of the state (in contrast to earlier “modern” nationalisms which aimed
at state-building). It also lacked a modernizing ideology and “[. . . ] [i]t was [. . . ] new in
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terms of the techniques of mobilization and the forms of organization. It was Milosevic
who was the ﬁrst to make extensive use of the the electronic media to propagate the
nationalist message” (Kaldor 2007, p. 41). Kaldor (2007, p. 42) speaks of a “victim men-
tality” that was “nurtured with an electronic diet of tales of genocide” and a “virtual
war” that was experienced by the Serb public long before actual warfare started. The
Croats also relied on transnational forms of organization. They mobilized the Croatian
diaspora in the US who provided funds, arms and mercernaries (Kaldor 2007, pp. 42 sq.).
This supports the idea of a globalized world as the perfect context in which New Warfare
arises. The role of neighboring countries (Croatia and Serbia) as well as the role of the
international community in the outbreak of violence in Bosnia was also decisive. The
war was precipitated by the decision of the international community to recognize other
former Yugoslav republics. Bosnia itself was only recognized at the very moment of its
disintegration (Kaldor 2007, p. 46).
The more recent case of Iraq also illustrates the extent to which the disintegration of
the state links with the end of the East-West controversy, increasing globalization, the
rise of identity politics and, after the invasion by the United States, the outbreak of New
Warfare (Kaldor 2006b). “The [Iraqi] regime exhibited characteristics that are typical
of the last phases of totalitarianism – a system that is breaking up under the impact of
globalization, unable to sustain its closed, autarchic, tightly controlled character [. . . ]
On the eve of the invasion, Iraq was showing all signs of incipient state failure” (Kaldor
2006b, pp. 6, 8). In the Iraqi case, the “signs of incipient state failure” that could be
observed prior to the outbreak of New Warfare were high and increasing levels of debt,
falling GDP (mostly due to sanctions), increasing infant mortality, declining literacy
and de-urbanization (the proportion of those engaged in agriculture was doubling while
educated middle class people left the country). In addition, stronger appeals to tribalism
and Islam by the government in times of declining legitimacy were observable, as was a
discrediting of the Ba’athist ideology, the destruction of civil society, the emergence of a
parallel dollar economy, increasing corruption and criminality (Kaldor 2006b, pp. 7 sq.).
Elsewhere, Kaldor notes that this and other failing states might still be formally rec-
ognized by the international community and display “some of the trappings of statehood
– an incomplete administrative apparatus, a ﬂag, sometimes a currency”. However, they
have lost control over their territory and “access to the state apparatus is about private
gain not public policy” (Kaldor 2001). More concrete indicators of state failure mentioned
by the author are declining tax revenues or even the absence of an eﬀective system of
internal taxation to provide public services and to support the infrastructure of warfare.
This leads to reductions in public expenditure, a worsening of all sorts of socio-economic
indicators, a growing informal economy, increased corruption, rent-seeking and criminal
activity (Kaldor 2001).
The concept of New Wars argues that the degree of autonomy of private actors at the
local level increases along with the fragmentation of political authority. In failing or failed
states, domestic groups cannot count on the government for protection or to guarantee
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economic stability and wellbeing. They start competing for control so they can provide
their own security and follow their own economic interests. A classical security dilemma
arises because “these actions make others feel less secure, so they respond in kind, and the
environment is made less stable” (Weinstein 2007, pp. 36 sq.). Non-state actors are able
to establish alternative, territorially restricted forms of centralized violence. Because
state institutions are unable to inhibit a privatization of violent actors, to eﬀectively
end ﬁghting if it breaks out among non-state groups and to stop them from criminal
activity, the civilian population and natural resources fall prey to those who exercise
control over them (Münkler 2003, pp. 16 sq.). Thus, collapsed or collapsing states with
an increasingly fragmented political authority and order are the perfect environments
for New Wars. Advocates of the concept of New Wars expect the failure of the state
to be accompanied by a proliferation of private security agencies and the emergence of
a complex system of overlapping commands which leads to an “erosion of the state’s
monopoly of organized violence from below” (Kaldor 2007, p. 6).
However, weak states are not only a precondition for the emergence of violent non-
state actors but the existence and activities of such actors in return further weaken
states. “Each stage of the conﬂict accelerates the process of unraveling state institutions
and shared norms and rules” (Kaldor 2006b, p. 18). Due to this feed-back eﬀect, the
increasing involvement of private, non-state or sub-state actors in ﬁghting turns out to
be the centerpiece of the concept of New Wars (Chojnacki 2006b, p. 48). Consequently,
the restoration of a functioning state monopoly of legitimate organized violence is the
key for the termination of New Wars and a return to sustainable peace (Kaldor 2007,
p. 11; Kaldor 2006b, p. 19; Kaldor 2005, p. 9; Kaldor 2000).
In summary, the concept of New Wars links changes at the macro-level (increasing
globalization and the end of the Cold War) with national context factors (weak states,
the availability of conﬂict resources and identity factors) and with the emergence of
violent non-state actors who follow their private economic interests during warfare. The
existence and activities of these actors further weaken states and feed back on national
as well as global context factors. Violent non-state actors and their economic motives
are crucial to understanding the emergence of speciﬁc war economies, the strategies of
New Warfare as well as the long duration of New Wars. The following chapter further
clariﬁes these dimensions of New Warfare.
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5. The Dimensions of New Warfare
5.1. The Nature and Quantity of Actors in New Warfare
As mentioned above, internal and external non-state or “para-state” actors who confront
each other are the central feature of New Warfare (Münkler 2005, p. 8). The advocates
of the concept of New Wars speak of a privatization of warfare from above and from
below.1
Kaldor (2007, p. 100) and Münkler (2005, pp. 20 sq.) emphasize the growing impor-
tance of private security companies, privatized military companies (PMFs) and merce-
naries who actively engage in New Warfare. Especially the resurrection of mercenary
forces seems somehow surprising given their earlier downfall due to their “unreliabil-
ity”. In New Warfare, however, the disadvantages of mercenary armies (their focus on
economic incentives and their lack of political loyalty) seem to be either irrelevant or
even an advantage.2 In addition, child soldiers3 are a central part in New Warfare.
Adolescents are often “automatically driven into the arms of the warring parties” by
their hunger and their lack of peacetime social and economic prospects. Although child
1While the term “private violence” refers to the violence of the criminal, “privatized violence” challenges
or even substitutes the government’s monopoly of force Eppler (2002, pp. 12–14). Eppler (2002)
distinguishes between a privatization of violence from below (i.e. the emergence of non-state or sub-
state violent actors who either challenge the government or take over government functions and start
ﬁghting each other) and a privatization of violence from above. The latter describes the outsourcing
of security functions by the state to non-state actors (e.g. privatized military companies) or to
paramilitary forces who get out of control.
2Münkler (2005, p. 52) warned that “when the only bond between the political leadership and the
military has been bought with money for a limited period, it does not take long for suspicions to
creep in”. Such suspicions contributed to the replacement of the condottieri by more reliable standing
armed forces. In New Wars, the lack of loyalty to the political cause does not constitute a mayor
problem because there is neither a political cause nor a politically legitimate leadership to obey.
Those who employ mercenaries in New Warfare are some kind of businessmen who for instance wish
to exploit or to protect mining spots. Most private actors in New Warfare are not duty-bound to
any third, political party or institution. “Apart from the rules of the global economy, there is no
framework to which they must adhere” (Münkler 2005, p. 92).
3Child soldiers are children aged between eight and a certain maximum age (fourteen, ﬁfteen or eighteen)
“who have permanently joined the ranks of a warring party and bear arms and use force on its behalf”
(Münkler 2003, p. 17). Broader deﬁnitions include peripheral support roles (e.g. cooks or domestic
labor) as well as girls recruited for sexual purposes and forced marriage. See e.g. CSI (2011, cover
page). For a discussion of diﬀerent deﬁnitions see J. Davis (2008, pp. 24 sq.).
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soldiers struggle for material resources, including food and water, they also struggle for
prestige and recognition. “The experience of humiliation, together with a sudden power
that has never been subject to military discipline, leads to excesses of violence in which
pent-up hatred explodes in wild fantasies of omnipotence”. During warfare, these armed
adolescents can overcome hunger and destitution and act out these power fantasies with-
out hindrance. This includes a “free rein given to sexual needs” (Münkler 2005, pp. 78,
19). From the perspective of the warring factions, child soldiers signiﬁcantly reduce the
costs of warfare. They are not only cheap but also eﬀective instruments in warfare due to
their undemanding nature and their low awareness of risks because of lack of experience.
“Young people [. . . ] display a remarkable insouciance in the face of danger: fear and
death rarely touches their thoughts and actions, and their instinct for self-preservation,
especially in puberty, is considerably less marked than among adults. [. . . ] [T]his also
means that they have fewer inhibitions in using violence, make no allowances for defense-
less people and tend to be especially cruel and brutal” (Münkler 2005, p. 80). Children
are recruited because they are especially loyal to questionable ﬁgures and because they
commit violent acts that adults would shy away from (J. Davis 2008, pp. 13 sq.). Child
soldiers are also very obedient and easy to manipulate or misuse to carry out extremely
cruel acts of violence or crime because their systems of norms and values are not yet
solid or ﬁxed (Gantzel 2002, p. 15; Pittwald 2004, p. 210). This inclination is boosted
by drug consumption. The supply of drugs and the provision of regular meals (or the
possibility to plunder what they need) is enough to ensure their loyalty and subservience.
In addition, child soldiers are especially valuable when warlords are confronted with UN
peacekeeping troops who then face ethical problems. They hesitate to use open ﬁre
or even prefer to surrender rather than become involved in direct battle with children
(Münkler 2005, p. 80; Münkler 2003, p. 17). Especially when the number of available and
healthy adult recruits decreases due to high numbers of casualties incurred in long term
ﬁghting, the likelihood of child recruitment seems to increase. The longer the war, the
more likely the use of child soldiers who simply replace killed or wounded adult ﬁghters.
Thus, child soldiering might well associate with the long duration of New Warfare. In
many countries, increasing rates of HIV/AIDS and other diseases also signiﬁcantly re-
duced the number of available adult males to serve as soldiers at the expense of children
(Pittwald 2004, p. 211; J. Davis 2008, pp. 9, 19). In any case, non-state actors do not
have access to regular conscripts and might therefore more often rely on the (forced) re-
cruitment of children (Pittwald 2004, p. 211). Finally, technological developments might
explain the increasing use of child soldiers especially in New Wars that are fought with
small weapons. These weapons do not require much training and their size and weight
have fallen while their ﬁring frequency has increased. This makes them easy to handle
by children. Especially the spread of the AK-47 Kalashnikov riﬂe is considered “a key
explanatory variable in the growth of child soldiering” (J. Davis 2008, pp. 9 sq.; Pittwald
2004, p. 212). Due to these reasons child soldiers became “one of the warlords’ favourite
tools” (Münkler 2003, p. 17).
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Unfortunately, reliable data on the exact number of child soldiers involved in past as
well as present internal armed conﬂicts are not available. The only report monitoring
the recruitment, demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers worldwide is pub-
lished by Child Soldiers International (CSI), formerly known as the Coalition to Stop
the Use of Child Soldiers (CSUCS). The organization’s Child Soldiers Global Reports
monitor the compliance of governments and armed political groups with international
standards governing the recruitment and use of child soldiers, they provide detailed
country-by-country analyses of recruitment standards and practices, cover a wide range
of countries and help to identify national, regional and global trends. The reports mon-
itor the practices of all relevant groups involved in armed conﬂicts – government forces,
government-linked paramilitaries and non-governmental armed groups. In addition, data
on the use of child soldiers in countries with and without conﬂict/war experience are
given. Up to now, however, the Coalition only collected data on the period from mid
1998 to 2012, the reports are only published every three to four years, they are plagued
by missing data and data collection remains far from being systematic.4
Blattman and Annan (2010) compiled disaggregated, individual-level date on child
soldiers in order to assess the economic, educational and psychological eﬀects of child
soldiering. The geographical scope of this study, however, is limited to a single country,
namely Uganda, where an estimated 60,000 to 80,000 youth have been abducted by the
Lords Resistance Army.5 “Two-thirds of abductees were forced to perpetrate a crime
or violence. A third eventually became ﬁghters, and a ﬁfth were forced to murder
soldiers, civilians, or even family members in order to bind them to the group, reduce
their fear of killing, and discourage disobedience” (Blattman and Annan 2010, p. 883).
Similar disaggregated data on child soldiering elsewhere are not available. In general,
it is diﬃcult to obtain reliable ﬁgures on the level of child soldiering because those
who illegally deploy children are “generally unwilling to verify the use of child soldiers.
Especially rebel groups rarely maintain reliable statistical information on their force
strength or ages of participants” (J. Davis 2008, p. 18). Available global estimates of the
number of child soldiers therefore greatly vary between 300,000 and more than 500,000
(Münkler 2003, p. 17; J. Davis 2008, p. 2).
4The CSI report from 2012 “is based on information on military recruitment and use in over 100
states which includes detailed reviews of laws, policies and practices of more than 50 ‘conﬂict’ and
‘non-conﬂict’ states; information provided by 55 governments; reviews of documentation relating to
Optional Protocol implementation by some 70 states; and data contained in other UN and NGO
reports on child soldier recruitment and use in speciﬁc countries” (CSI 2012, p. 5).
5Elsewhere it is estimated that approximately 85 percent of the LRA’s forces were made up of children
and that the LRA abducted a total of 20,000 to 30,000 children (J. Davis 2008, p. 16).
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Between April 2004 and October 2007, children were actively involved in armed conﬂict
as part of government forces or non-state armed groups in 19 countries or territories,
namely in Afghanistan, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Ivory
Coast, the DRC, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Myanmar, Nepal, the Philippines, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand and Uganda
(see ﬁg. 5.1 on the current page).
Figure 5.1.: Use of Child Soldiers, Apr.2004 - Oct.2007 (CSUCS 2008, pp. 2 sq.).
A dramatic increase in the number of child soldiers occurred between 1988 and 2002
when their number nearly doubled (J. Davis 2008, p. 6; Achvarina and Reich 2006,
p. 128). “Since 1975, Africa has become the epicenter of the problem. [. . . ] Estimates
suggest that [. . . ] 40 percent of all child soldiers, were soldiering in Africa at the begin-
ning of the twenty-ﬁrst century. East Asia and the Paciﬁc ranked a distant second [. . . ].
Furthermore, Africa has experienced the fastest growth in the use of child soldiers in
recent years” (Achvarina and Reich 2006, pp. 130 sq.). In many conventional civil wars,
child soldiers are ﬁghting on the side of governments.6
6“Our data for the Liberian conﬂict of 1989 - 96 does indicate an overwhelming proportion of child
soldiers among the ranks of rebels and not the state’s military, but other conﬂicts demonstrate a
contrary trend toward a larger use of child soldiers by governments. The Liberian conﬂict of 1999 -
2003, for example, had a 70:30 split between rebel and government forces. The Sudanese civil war of
1993 - 2002 had a 64:36 split between rebel and governmental forces, but that majority was reversed
54
At least CSI’s 2008 Global Report found that the recruitment and use of child soldiers
by government armed forces had declined. By 2008, and as claimed by the advocates
of the concept of New Wars, “the majority of under-18s involved in armed conﬂict were
recruited by non-state armed groups” (i.e. by government-backed paramilitary groups,
militias, self-defense units and political groups opposed to central governments, groups
composed of ethnic, religious and other minorities, groups espousing separatist and other
political ideologies and clan-based or factional groups ﬁghting governments and each
other to defend territory and resources). Thus, “[w]hile fewer states are recruiting and
using child soldiers, when it comes to non-state armed groups the news is far less positive.
Despite some examples of progress, the bigger picture remains essentially unaltered”.
Non-state armed groups were/are deploying child soldiers in Afghanistan, Bhutan, Bu-
rundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Ivory Coast, DRC, India, Indonesia,
Iraq, Israel/Occupied Palestinian Territory, Lebanon, Liberia, Myanmar, Nepal, Nigeria,
Pakistan, the Philippines, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand and Uganda (CSUCS
2008, pp. 12, 22, 24). The organization also notes that solutions have proved elusive espe-
cially in relation to groups involved in protracted low-level conﬂicts where child soldiers
have been recruited and used over many years. Particularly challenging are also those
armed conﬂicts which involve irregular groups “with obscure goals and opaque command
structures that fragment, fracture and shift alliances and whose activities are often as
criminal as they are political” (CSUCS 2008, p. 24). Again, this seems to conﬁrm the
concept of New Wars.
In New Wars, child soldiers are often forcibly recruited by paramilitary groups, who
are the most common ﬁghting group. They are deﬁned as groups of armed men centered
around an individual leader that are often associated with particular extremist parties
or political factions. Paramilitary groups are mostly composed of redundant government
soldiers or breakaway soldiers but also include common criminals and unemployed young
men who rarely wear uniforms. Although their small-scale character has much in com-
mon with the non-state groups involved in guerrilla warfare, “they lack the hierarchy,
order and vertical command systems that have been typical of guerrilla forces” (Kaldor
1999, pp. 93–95; Kaldor 2007, pp. 98 sq.).
The role of state actors in New Warfare remains “barely reactive” (Münkler 2006,
p. 134). If anything, regular troops participate in international military interventions,
or, in accordance with the deﬁnition later provided by the “New List of Wars”, can only
be considered quasi-state actors or breakaway units thereof (Kaldor 2007, pp. 101, 104).
Kaldor explains this decay of national regular armed forces after the end of the Cold
to a 24 (rebel) and 76 (government) distribution by 2004. The data we compiled for the Angolan
conﬂict although not deﬁnitive, suggest that children have made up between 24 and 33 percent of the
government’s forces since the war against the rebels began in 1996. In that case, abduction has been
a major method of recruitment, with both sides estimated to have seized 40,000 children in total by
2003” (Achvarina and Reich 2006, pp. 129 sq.). Between January 2010 and June 2012, CSI reports
that there were 20 states “which are known to have used children in hostilities in one type of force
or another or in one capacity or another” (CSI 2012, p. 18).
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War by referring to cuts in military spending, often encouraged by external donors for
the best of motives (Kaldor 2007, pp. 97 sq.; Kaldor 2001; Kaldor 2006a, p. 5). This led
to declining prestige of the regular armed forces, shortages of equipment, spare parts,
fuel and ammunition, inadequate training and loss of morale. In cases were governments
could no longer ensure adequate training and pay, breakaway groups of soldiers acquired
surplus arms and joined private militias or became warlords who sought out their own
sources of funding. “Soldiers become looters for whom the laws of war or any kind of
military code of punishment no longer enter the picture”. So-called regular armies, who
might still claim to defend the state, “are mostly nothing other than marauding bands
[who are] not really subject to sanctions threatened under international law” (Münkler
2005, pp. 14, 22)
Besides the non-state nature of protagonists, New Warfare is said to be characterized
by a large number of diﬀerent groups of violent actors because weak states are unable
to avert the fragmentation of the regular army and the proliferation of violent actors.
In addition, these violent groups do not ﬁght a strong national army which otherwise
might require cohesive and joint action of opposition groups. Instead, they ﬁght each
other over resources. Distributional conﬂicts within these ﬁghting units contribute to
a further fragmentation and an even higher number of involved actors (Kaldor 2007,
pp. 97 sq.). “[E]ither warlords end up quarrelling with other entrepreneurs of war or
some of their junior leaders, believing they have not had their [fair] share of the booty,
[or they] start new wars to get their hands on the big pot of power and riches” (Münkler
2005, p. 80). Berdal (2003, p. 487) agrees that “[i]n situations where participants become
preoccupied primarily with economic gain, a process of fragmentation typically sets in,
with major armed factions splintering into smaller groups and units”. Münkler argues
that low costs of warfare contribute to an ever increasing number of those who simply can
aﬀord to participate in New Wars (Münkler 2006, p. 140; Münkler 2005, pp. 3, 75 sq.).
Warriors are hastily and easily recruited and even cheaper to deploy because they take
care of themselves through extortion, plunder and robbery. In addition, the weapons
and technology used in New Wars (e.g. automatic riﬂes, land mines, multiple rocket
launchers or modern communication devices like cellular phones or laptops) are also
cheap, light and small though rather advanced and accurate. Particularly concerning is
the low price of automatic weapons which has been driven below the cost of production
since the ﬂooding of the market especially with Russian products. These weapons can
easily be obtained, they do not require lengthy training and they can be operated even
by children. In addition, New Wars “use the civilian infrastructure” in such a way that
light pick-up trucks and jeeps are turned into armored personal carriers. Heavy weapons
are only occasionally deployed. If they are used, they consist mostly of remnants from
the stockpiles of the Cold War (Münkler 2005, p. 75; Münkler 2003, pp. 15 sq.; Kaldor
2007, pp. 9 sq.).
Kaldor again refers to New Warfare in Iraq and Bosnia for the purpose of illustration.
In line with her argument, New Warfare in Iraq involved “numerous, small and highly
decentralized cells with varying degrees of co-ordination that often [did] not even know
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their leaders or sources of ﬁnancing”. Initially, it was estimated that ﬁghting was carried
out by no more than 5,000 insurgents. In 2004, estimates by American oﬃcials had
increased to up to 20,000 ﬁghters organized in about 70 cells (Kaldor 2006b, pp. 8, 12).
After the US invasion and the dissolution of the army, former military personnel and
remnants of the former regime were the most important recruits. They formed “the
backbone” of New Warfare which now started in Iraq. Kaldor (2006b, pp. 8 sq.) reports
that former soldiers were especially valuable to the warring factions not only because
they provided the professional know-how but also because they were able to access some
of the former regime’s weapons stores. Although “some co-ordination from the pattern
of violent” could be observed in the Iraq case (e.g. an increase of attacks in the run-
up to the elections) there was also “some degree of inﬁghting [. . . ] and disagreements
over tactics” which contributed to a further fractionalization of involved groups of actors
(Kaldor 2006b, p. 13).
A similar decay of the regular armed forces and break-up of the military-industrial
complex could also be observed in Bosnia. From 1986 to 1991, military spending fell
dramatically, from 2.49 billion US dollars in constant 1988 prices to 1.38 billion (Kaldor
2007, p. 47). This contributed to a “growing sense of victimization and paranoia about
internal and external enemies” within the Yugoslav National Army. In the following,
the regular army and the newly emerging Territorial Defense Units disintegrated into a
combination of “regular and irregular forces augmented by criminals, volunteers and for-
mer mercenaries competing for control over former Yugoslavia’s military assets” (Kaldor
2007, p. 47). Some of the most notorious underground ﬁgures suddenly occupied key po-
sitions in these so-called paramilitary groups (Münkler 2005, p. 80). One Serbian group,
the Tigers, was led by Arkan, a criminal of the Belgrad underground world. Prior to
the war, he worked as an assassin and was involved in smuggling activities which he
expanded considerably during the war. Another Serbian paramilitary group, the Chet-
niks or White Eagles, even recruited additional “weekend ﬁghters” (Kaldor 2007, p. 50).
Both groups cooperated with the Yugoslav National Army and sometimes exerted con-
trol over local paramilitary groups. The Wolves, a Croatian paramilitary group, was
led by another underground ﬁgure from Sarajevo who had been in prison but managed
to escape. On the Bosnian side, similar groups existed (Kaldor 2007, p. 51). These ac-
tors used various black-market sources to acquire surplus ex-Warsaw Pact equipment
which is why they were very well armed. The Tigers, for instance, even used tanks and
mortars (Kaldor 2007, pp. 49 sq.). Kaldor speaks of a bewildering array of military and
paramilitary forces at the outset of the Bosnian war. Only during the course of the war
were forces increasingly centralized and three main regular forces (The Bosnian Serb
Army, the Coatian Defence Council and the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina) developed.7
In addition to these regular forces, three main types of irregular forces continued to
participate in warfare: paramilitary forces like the ones mentioned above, foreign mer-
7“Towards the end of the war, the local militia and paramilitary groups were absorbed into the regular
armies. The former became local brigades and the latter became ‘Special Units”’ (Kaldor 2007,
p. 58).
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cenary groups (like the Mujahedin, the Garibaldi Unit and mercenaries from Denmark,
Finland, Sweden, the US and Great Britain. The later were “made redundant in the
post-Cold War cuts and took up positions training both Bosnian and Croatian forces”)
as well as local militia or police forces organized by municipalities or big enterprises and
augmented by armed civilians (Kaldor 2007, p. 51). “The UN Commission of Experts
identiﬁed eighty-three paramilitary groups on the territory of former Yugoslavia – some
ﬁfty-six were Serbian, thirteen were Croatian and fourteen were Bosnian” (Kaldor 2007,
p. 49).8
Although these numbers might vary between sources, the thesis that New Wars are
fought between many non-state or only quasi-state groups of violent actors obviously
ﬁnds some empirical support. Nevertheless (and maybe even to increasing extent),
non-state actors are also ﬁghting in conventional (state-based) armed conﬂicts against
government troops. A privatization of violence from above through the outsourcing of
security functions to private military companies is also often observed in conventional
(state-based) armed conﬂicts (e.g. in Columbia). In fact, the privatization of violence
from above requires at least the existence of a state that is able to outsource security
functions and that is challenged by rebel forces. Thus, it seems reasonable to ask whether
we observe a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the quantity of non-state armed groups involved in
new (non-state) armed conﬂicts on the one hand and conventional (state-based) armed
conﬂicts on the other. Hypothesis 2 addresses this issue within the empirical part of this
book.
Despite changes in the quantity of actors and the aforementioned trends of privati-
zation, the advocates of the concept of New Wars also believe to observe changes in
the quality or nature of actors involved in intra-state warfare. According to them, in a
globalized post-Cold War world external military and non-military actors are more and
more engaged in internal wars. They argue that international peacekeeping forces are
more often deployed because the end of the Cold War signiﬁcantly reduced ideological
barriers within the United Nations Security Council. In addition, new technologies facil-
itate and reduce costs in international transport and communication which also aﬀects
the extent of engagement of humanitarian organizations, diasporas, criminal actors and
networks, private military companies or foreign mercenaries. This results in an inter- or
transnationalization of actors (Kaldor 2007, pp. 4 sq., 100 sq.).
The following factors might explain a comparatively strong interest of external actors
to militarily intervene in New Wars: 1.) the brutality of strategies, which justiﬁes
military intervention in order to protect human rights, to sanction violence and to inhibit
the outbreak of New Wars elsewhere, 2.) other costly “spill-over” eﬀects such as refugee
ﬂows or the spill-over of illegal activities and war economies that destabilize neighboring
countries or entire regions and 3.) the long duration of New Wars which justiﬁes military
intervention in order to end ﬁghting. Last but not least, New Warfare might be more
8See also Heupel and Zangl (2004, p. 351); Calic (1996).
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likely to grow into protracted transnational warfare because the disputed territories
often contain mineral resources that can be sold on the world market. The anticipation
of mining rights or promises for engagement in future oil production might explain a
strong interest of external actors to engage in New Warfare in the form of military or
ﬁnancial assistance.9
Because the aﬀected states are weak and unable to stop or prevent the outbreak of
violence themselves, the demand for external military support also increases. Due to
protection failures, governments but also multinational companies hire foreign security
companies often recruited from retired British or American soldiers to protect their
employees and production sites. For instance, in Sierra Leone and Angola, diamond
mines were protected by Executive Outcomes (Kaldor 2007, p. 100) while elsewhere
foreign mercenary companies actively engaged in warfare. Thus, the privatization of
violence automatically associates with a commercialization and an internationalization
of the involved actors. Because the growing demand for external military intervention
overburdens some of the existing international organizations, they also increasingly “out-
source” the provision of security to private military companies which contributes to a
further privatization (Wulf 2005). Empirical support comes from Chojnacki, Metternich,
and Münster (2009, pp. 31, 19 sqq.), who ﬁnd that a transnationalization (in terms of
actors) of state-based and non-state internal warfare indeed comes along with a pri-
vatization. More precisely, their study reveals that external military interventions by
non-UN forces strongly increase the probability of mercenary activities. The authors
also list the reasons for this trend. A privatization of warfare through the deployment
of mercenaries (who are by deﬁnition not members of the regular forces) is advanta-
geous for state actors insofar as it reduces the risk of being killed for their own regular
troops. It also enables state actors to intervene in internal warfare and at the same time
to circumvent political control by their own constituency. Finally, through the use of
mercenary forces they are able to disclaim responsibility in cases where things go wrong
(Chojnacki, Metternich, and Münster 2009, pp. 11 sq.).
Especially when compared with old, inter-state wars, New Warfare appears to be
speciﬁcally transnational in nature. Münkler (2005, p. 8) describes the old, state-building
wars in Europe or North America as taking place under “almost clinical conditions, with
no major inﬂuences from ‘outside’ [whereas] the state-disintegrating wars in the Third
World or the periphery of the First and Second Worlds [. . . ] have been subject to
constant political attempts from outside to inﬂuence the course of events”. Diﬀerences,
however, might be less pronounced when sub-types of internal warfare are compared with
each other. Critics of the concept of New Wars argue that warfare in general is becoming
more international. Military alliances have been on the rise for quite some time, and
there is indeed a greater willingness and actual engagement in active ﬁghting (and post-
conﬂict reconstruction) abroad (Schlichte 2006b, p. 550). Because the involvement of
external actors might be on the rise in state-based civil wars, too, the comparative
9Ross (2004) refers to this as “payment by booty futures”. See also Münkler (2005, pp. 125–130, 7).
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analysis presented within the empirical part of this book also investigates whether there
exists a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the quality of involved actors between conventional
internal armed conﬂicts on the one hand and new (non-state) armed conﬂicts on the
other (see Hypothesis 3).
To summarize the above, ﬁghting units in New Wars include foreign regular armed
forces operating under the umbrella of International Organizations (IOs), foreign mer-
cenaries, former national police and army forces or breakaway units thereof, local self-
defense units (composed of volunteers) as well as local, national or foreign private se-
curity companies, criminal gangs, warlords and paramilitary groups (who oftentimes
recruit child soldiers) (Kaldor 1999, pp. 91–95). These actors can be distinguished along
two lines: internal vs. external and former/quasi-state vs. non-state actors. According
to the advocates of the concept, the number of involved groups of violent actors is espe-
cially high in New Wars, violent groups are especially prone to factionalize and external
actors as especially likely to participate in warfare.
5.2. Individual Motives and New War Economies
The thesis that intra-state wars are increasingly fought between private, non-state actors
within weak or even failed states relates to the statement that actors in New Wars mostly
follow economic rationale. “From Mujahedin networks to contingents of hastily recruited
ﬁghters, from distinguished-looking security ﬁrms linked to the top addresses in the arms
trade through rowdy adventurers noted for their overindulgence in alcohol and for going
weeks without washing to preserve the traces of battle: none of these consists of state
subjects ﬁghting out of a mixture of political duty and patriotic attachment to a cause,
but rather of individuals driven mainly by ﬁnancial gain, a lust for adventure and a
range of ideological motives” (Münkler 2005, p. 21). The main goal of conventional civil
warfare has been to overthrow unjust or corrupt governments and gain control over the
capital of the country to assert political interests and ideas (Münkler 2005, p. 23). This
changed dramatically in the New Wars era where actors aim to gain or maintain control
over resources or trading routes. 10
Contrary to the war economies of the two world wars that were state controlled and
centralized (to increase the eﬃciency of the war and to maximize revenue to pay for
the war), that were totalizing (to mobilize as many people as possible to participate in
the war eﬀort) and that were autarkic (to be self-suﬃcient), New War Economies are
almost the opposite. They are characterized by high unemployment, a weak, fragmented
and decentralized administration as well as high levels of imports and low domestic
production. Generally, participation in the war is low relative to the population because
10See Jean and Ruﬁn (1996); Elwert (1997); Malone and Berdal (1999); Keen (2000); Reno (2000); Le
Billon (2000); Collier and Hoeﬄer (2004).
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of lack of pay and legitimacy on the part of the warring parties (Münkler 2005, p. 13;
Kaldor 2007, p. 95). As normal trade and tax revenue also decline, the war eﬀort becomes
heavily dependent on the exploitation of natural resources, illegal activities and external
support.
Private ﬁghting units in New Wars not only ﬁnance their war eﬀorts but also realize
their own economic interests through various forms of “asset transfer” (e.g. through
local predation, loot, robbery, extortion, pillage, hostage-taking or market pressure).
Checkpoints control the supply of food and necessities, as do sieges or blockades. Division
of territory between paramilitary groups allows them to control market prices. They raise
war taxes and “protection” money or engage in the production and black-market trading
of drugs, arms and valuable commodities such as oil or diamonds (Kaldor 2007, pp. 10,
108 sq.; Kaldor 2001). “Where no raw materials or mineral resources are available to be
sold [. . . ], and where geographical or climatic conditions are not suited to the growing of
poppy or coca plants, there is still the option of kidnapping women on a large scale and
forcing them into prostitution in the brothels of the OECD world” (Münkler 2005, p. 97).
Assistance from neighboring governments, revenue from aﬄuent diaspora communities
as well as the diversion or “taxing” of humanitarian aid are additional sources for private
proﬁt and ﬁnancing warfare. Even refugee camps are part of the war economy. They are
deliberately used by warlords as recruiting grounds, places to hide and to fall back on
food or medicine. “Indeed, the strategists of these wars now include international aid as
a logistical element in their operational planning. This is a further factor pushing down
the cost of war” (Münkler 2005, pp. 18, 87 sq.). With the help of international camera
crews, warlords have also learned how to start up and control the delivery of relief aid.
Thus, the media no longer serve a war-reporting function but have involuntarily become
a participant in war (Münkler 2005, pp. 88, 90). Oftentimes, warlords sell relief aid which
they somehow acquired to local dealers and smugglers who they keep in business and
who sell the goods on the local market. This keeps the war economy running, leads to a
collapse of local production and creates long term dependence on international aid. In
other cases (e.g. in Somalia) smaller NGOs had to rely on locally available transportation
to get their aid deliveries from the ports to the refugee camps. “Usually, it is only the
local warlords who have the necessary lorries and pick-ups. Most of all, however, aid
workers need protection against all kinds of attacks, and that too is something which
only the militia leaders and warlords can provide” (Münkler 2005, pp. 88 sq.).
The emergence of a typical New War Economy is observable in the DRC where ﬁghting
mainly was (and still is) about the control and trade of a few key mineral resources
(coltan, diamonds, copper and gold). These resources are exploited by violent actors
through conﬁscation, extraction, the establishment of forced monopolies and price-ﬁxing.
Similarly, between 1990 and 1994 Charles Taylor is believed to have made 75 million
US dollars per year by levying taxes on Liberian diamond, gold, iron ore, rubber and
timber exports organized from the territory under his control as a rebel leader during the
Liberian civil war (Berdal 2003, p. 485). In Sierra Leone, the RUF rebels are estimated
to have earned 25 to 125 million dollars per year during the 1990s through the sale
61
5. The Dimensions of New Warfare
of diamonds (Heupel and Zangl 2003, p. 26). In Angola, violent conﬂict mutated into
New Warfare after the end of the Cold War. Between 1992 and 2000, the value of
diamonds produced under the control of the UNITA rebels is estimated at 3 to 4 billion
dollars. The actual level of proﬁts is unknown (Le Billon 2001, p. 69; Global Witness
1998; Heupel and Zangl 2003, p. 21). In the Bosnian case, regular forces were largely
funded and equipped by sponsor governments while the local militia were funded by
municipalities (who “taxed” humanitarian assistance, enterprises and citizens of their
territory and abroad). The paramilitary, however, ﬁnanced themselves through loot and
extortion of expelled people, the conﬁscation of equipment from conquered territory,
taxation of humanitarian aid (which they collected at many checkpoints) and traﬃcking
in contraband (Kaldor 2007, p. 52; Berdal 2003, p. 492). Although there were nationalist
fanatics among the paramilitary, Kaldor (2007, p. 57) notes that “[t]he motivation of
the paramilitary groups seems to have been largely economic”. She continues by quoting
Vasic, who estimated that around 80 percent of the paramilitary were common criminals.
The remaining 20 percent were fanatical nationalists but they did not last long because
“fanaticism is bad for business”. In Bosnia and elsewhere, even UN personnel were part of
the war economy – deliberately if they engaged in black-market activities (Kaldor 2007,
p. 66) but also involuntarily or forcedly. For instance, when the Bosnian Serbs laid siege
on Sarajevo, they refused to let UN convoys into the city until they had skimmed oﬀ
a large part of the relief supplies for themselves. Humanitarian aid became “something
extra” that could be used to pay for a continuation of the war and the siege. The UN, in
that case, assisted both the besiegers and the besieged. In the Iraq, the Americans believe
that “the insurgents have unlimited money supply by members of the former regime or
by Saudi and religious charities” (Kaldor 2006b, p. 14). In addition, the exploitation
and production of conﬂict resources (oil and drugs) provided funding. Even some of the
funds made available under the oil-for-food programme “found their ways into the new
war economy”. In addition and despite the fact “that former Ba’athists and some Islamic
groups have substantial funding [. . . ] it is also clear that there is widespread looting,
hostage taking and convoy hijacking for money” (Kaldor 2006b, p. 14). While various
groups rely on such methods to ﬁnance their warfare, some of this behavior is “purely
criminal” and serves private enrichment. Similarly and although most of the groups
insist that their main target is the Western occupation and that they oppose abductions
or assassinations, “there are some groups that seem to specialize in these latter roles”
(Kaldor 2006b, p. 10). Thus, in Iraq “various organized crime groups, which operate
under the cover of the insurgency” emerged (Kaldor 2006b, p. 11). Kaldor (2006b, p. 14)
speaks of a “typical new war criminalized economy in which income often depends on
violent methods”. In general, New War Economies are characterized by a criminalization
of internal and external lines of supply and a symbiotic relationship between warlords
and organized crime (Heupel and Zangl 2003, pp. 8 sq.).
This very well links with another decisive feature of New War Economies, namely their
“openness” evident in their linkage to the international criminal economy. In the case
of Afghanistan, Münkler (2005, p. 94) observes a transition from a closed war economy
(that was operating on the basis of subsistence agriculture and Western and Islamic
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subsidies) to an open war economy. The key feature of this open war economy was the
growing production of raw opium which could yield considerable proﬁts on the trade
routes to the eastern Mediterranean. “Local warlords entered into cooperation with
international crime syndicates that also took in the countries’ traditionally well-organized
rings of smugglers. These rings [. . . ] earned large proﬁts that each warlord increasingly
threatened to conﬁscate by erecting road-blocks and charging tolls on through traﬃc.
In the 1990s, [. . . ] this informal economy of the warlords was linked to the international
criminal economy” (Münkler 2005, p. 94). The author emphasizes that in many other
countries where legal goods (like rare minerals or tropical woods) are produced during
warfare, a better integration into the world market “has by no means improved the
chances for peace, but has mainly consolidated the position of warlords” who were in
control of these resources (Münkler 2005, pp. 94 sq.).
In order to maximize their proﬁt, those involved in New Warfare even cooperate with
each other across supposed lines of confrontation. A famous example is the so called “sell
game” in Sierra Leone where government troops sold arms and ammunition to rebels.11
In Bosnia, “all three types of forces [the regular forces, the paramilitary and the militia]
cooperated with each other both militarily and economically” (Kaldor 2007, p. 52). This
is evident in one instance when the United Nations Protection Force intercepted a tele-
phone conversation between the local Muslim commander and the local Serb commander
ﬁghting each other in the city of Mostar. In this telephone call, they were discussing the
price in German marks to be paid if the Serbs would shell the Croats. Similarly, when
the Serbs took Mount Igman in 1993, the paramilitary groups that defended Mount
Igman at that moment were ready to “sell” their positions in exchange for control over
the black-market routes (Kaldor 2007, pp. 53 sq.). In light of this kind of cooperation
between opponents it comes as no surprise that there was no continuous front, relatively
little ﬁghting took place and little territory changed hands (Kaldor 2007, p. 53; Kaldor
2006a, p. 6; Berdal 2003, pp. 486 sq.).
In summary, the combination of weak state authority, political instability and ineﬃ-
cient national markets on the one hand but the presence of lootable, proﬁtable resources,
the possibility of various forms of asset transfer and access to the global market on the
other leads to the emergence of speciﬁc war economies that serve the economic inter-
ests of private actors in New Wars. State disintegration and the ease with which war
economies are able to feed into the ﬂows of capital and goods in the world market have
made war on a private basis “once more worthwhile”. It is this “proﬁtability of force”
which encourages a further privatization of warfare (Münkler 2005, p. 91; Münkler 2003,
p. 17). Some empirical support again comes from Chojnacki, Metternich, and Münster
(2009, p. 31), who ﬁnd that the involvement of at least mercenary forces is particularly
likely in (state-based and non-state) internal armed conﬂicts happening in countries
with (lootable and non-lootable) diamond deposits. The eﬀect is not only statistically
signiﬁcant and stable but also substantial. “Diamonds increase the probability of mer-
11See D. Keen cited in Kaldor (1999, p. 106); Kaldor (2007, p. 112).
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cenaries by approximately 20 percentage points” (Chojnacki, Metternich, and Münster
2009, p. 22). Whether this speciﬁc conﬂict resource is increasingly exploited to ﬁnance
internal warfare in general and New Warfare in particular will be further analyzed within
the empirical part of this book (see Hypotheses 4, 4a and 4b).
Finally, New War Economies can be linked with the already mentioned identity poli-
tics. According to Kaldor (1999, pp. 78 sq.), the new identity politics have two sources:
ﬁrstly, they emerge as a reaction to the declining importance and legitimacy of the es-
tablished classes in the context of weak states. In this case, identity politics become a
form of political mobilization, a survival tactic for those involved in politics. Especially
where lootable resources do not occur, exclusive identities serve as the main source of
motivation. Secondly, identity politics also emerge out of the above described paral-
lel economy because they serve to legitimize the building of alliances, various forms of
bribery, insider dealing, all sorts of shadowy forms of economic activities and other-
wise illegal or illegitimate methods of private gain. In return, exclusive identities are
cemented or reinforced by mutual dependence on the continued functioning of the war
economy (Kaldor 1999, p. 84). Thus, the New War Economies cannot be disentangled
from identity politics. In addition, Kaldor (2007, p. 113) notes that economic motivation
alone is insuﬃcient to explain the scale, brutality or “sheer viciousness” of New Wars.
Especially the use of identity politics contributes to the understanding of the severity of
violence applied in New Warfare. This shall be discussed in the following.
5.3. The Strategy of New Warfare
As indicated above, the changing nature of actors and motives connects with changing
methods of warfare. Nevertheless, the New Wars Strategy is not something fundamen-
tally new but borrows from both guerrilla warfare and from counterinsurgency (Kaldor
1999, p. 7). It borrows from revolutionary warfare the strategy of avoiding battle. There
are “few actual engagements and no major battles; military forces do not lock horns and
wear each other down, but spare each other” (Münkler 2005, p. 3). Like the guerrillas,
actors in New Warfare aim to control territory politically rather than militarily through
capturing territory from the enemy. This is easy as the central authority is weak and
the main contenders are not government forces but similar types of ﬁghting units. Often
the various factions even cooperate in dividing up territory.
In comparison with revolutionary warfare, however, the method of political control
diﬀers. Even though fear was a signiﬁcant element, popular support and allegiance to
the revolutionary idea was the central aim in guerrilla warfare. This is also referred to
as a strategy of “winning the hearts and minds of people”. Contrary to this, in New
Wars control is established through allegiance to a label (i.e. ethnic or religious identity)
rather than an idea or ideology. Again, exclusive identities are cemented or reinforced
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by shared complicity in war crimes (Kaldor 1999, pp. 84, 99). “Ethnic diﬀerences are
repeatedly used to justify the excesses [and therefore] intensify the violence [although]
they do not cause it” (Münkler 2005, p. 79).
Those who do not admit to the right label are eliminated. “Instead of creating a
favourable environment for the guerrilla, the NewWarfare aims to create an unfavourable
environment for all those people it cannot control” (Kaldor 1999, p. 98). The main
method of territorial control is not popular support but massive and forced popular
displacement. “Control of one’s own side depends not on positive beneﬁts, since in
the impoverished, disorderly conditions of New Warfare, there is not much that can be
oﬀered. Rather, it depends on continuing fear and insecurity and on the perpetuation
of hatred of the other” (Kaldor 1999, pp. 98 sq.). Thus and similar to counterinsurgency
technique, destabilization is applied, aimed at sowing fear and hatred.
In a context of state failure, civilians cannot rely on the state for their physical pro-
tection. Instead, former state forces or breakaway units of the national army themselves
participate in such kind of violent action. Kaldor (2000) therefore describes New Wars
as “protection failures”. This unwillingness or inability of the state to protect its citizens
from being attacked by violent non-state actors is observable in ethnic cleansing, sys-
tematic assaults on (or even systematic murder of) civilians, massive forcible population
expulsion or increasing numbers of internally displaced people and refugees. In order to
render areas uninhabitable, anti-personal land mines, shells and rockets are used against
civilian targets like homes, hospitals and crowded places. Forced famines, sieges, the
destruction of historic and cultural monuments or the involvement of civilians in active
ﬁghting as a buﬀer are also mentioned as indicators (Kaldor 2007, pp. 8 sq., 104–107).
In addition, Kaldor lists deﬁlement through systematic rape and sexual abuse as part of
the strategy applied in New Wars (Kaldor 1999, pp. 98 sq.). If sexual violence against
women is applied as a cheap and eﬀective instrument of warfare or ethnic cleansing,
it targets the community’s ethnic-cultural identity and the community’s reproductive
power represented by the women. Rape aims to wound the self-esteem of communities
and to ensure that the women raped no longer appear as potential wives and moth-
ers. The objective is “to smash up communities, to shatter family ties and to interrupt
the sequence of generations, thereby breaking its members’ will to assert their identity”
(Münkler 2005, p. 85). In other instances, rape serves as an instrument of humiliation
and emasculation and is applied to destroy the remaining illusions of power and prop-
erty of the opponent men. In this case, violence against women targets the enemy’s will
through violence inﬂicted on the women’s body. “This explains why in the new wars
[. . . ] many rapes take place in public places, or at least in the presence of the husband,
father and other relatives of the victim” (Münkler 2005, p. 85).
Unbelievable crimes against civilians, including rape as a weapon of war, were and
are still occurring in the Eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where
several non-state forces are still ﬁghting, the Congolese army, external regular forces
and each other. Médecins Sans Frontières reported that 75 percent of all the rape cases
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it dealt with worldwide were in Eastern Congo. A census by UNICEF counted 18,505
persons treated for sexual violence in the ﬁrst 10 months of 2008, 30 percent of whom
were children. In 2009, the situation deteriorated further with the UN Oﬃce for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Aﬀairs reporting a huge surge in sexual violence and
rape in Eastern Congo (Grignon 2009). Besides rape, countless people were tortured or
murdered and child soldiers were forcibly recruited. As a consequence, up to 400,000
people have been displaced since violence re-erupted in North Kivu in 2006. Between
850,000 to 1 million IDPs are still unable to return safely to their areas of origin (ICG
2008; ICG 2009).
In more detail, Kaldor (2007, p. 54) describes the “destruction of communities from
the top down” during the Bosnian war where violent acts against civilians were more
directed in nature. While “in urban areas [. . . ] ethnic cleansing was a slower, more
legalistic process” (Kaldor 2007, p. 55), the typical pattern of ethnic cleansing that was
applied to rural areas is described as follows: The regular forces started with shelling the
area and issued frightening propaganda (e.g. information on acts of terror in neighbor-
ing villages) in order to create fear and panic. Then they closed in, terrorized non-Serb
residents with random killing, rape and looting and established control over the local
administration. Oftentimes, non-Serb men were separated from women and taken to
detention camps or killed. “Women were robbed and/or raped and allowed to go or
taken to special rape detention centers. Houses and cultural buildings such as mosques
were looted, burned or blown up. The paramilitary groups also seemed to have lists of
prominent people – community leaders, intellectuals, SDA members, wealthy people –
who were separated from the rest and executed” (Kaldor 2007, p. 54). Kaldor (2007,
p. 55) refers to a UN report when stating that the worst atrocities (mass rape, sexual
assault, killing and torture in detention facilities) especially during the early stages of
warfare were committed by paramilitary ﬁghters. In fact, “paramilitary groups were
‘hired’ to do the dirty work necessary to instil the ‘fear and hate’ which was not yet
endemic in Bosnian society” (Kaldor 2007, p. 57). In line with the aforementioned, “the
situation was better in a few places where the local state apparatus survived” (Kaldor
2007, pp. 57 sq.). The city of Tuzla is given as an example, which was defended by the
local police and volunteers, where “an ideology of multicultural civic values was vigor-
ously promoted”, where taxes were raised and even energy supply and mining activities
continued throughout the war.
This illustrates Kaldor’s famous conclusion that “what were considered to be undesir-
able and illegitimate side-eﬀects of old wars have become central to the mode of ﬁghting
in the new wars” (Kaldor 1999, p. 100). What was proscribed according to the classi-
cal rules of warfare and codiﬁed in the laws of war in the late nineteenth century (e.g.
sieges, the destruction of historic monuments or atrocities against non-combatants) are
essential components of the New Wars Strategy. Thus, New Wars might well be speciﬁ-
cally brutal. However, Kaldor also emphasizes that it is less the scale but the quality of
violence that changes. In New Wars most violence is directed against civilians instead
of military targets as a consequence of counter-insurgency tactics and ethnic cleansing
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or due to diﬃculties in distinguishing insurgents from civilians (Kaldor 2005, pp. 3, 8;
Kaldor 2006b, pp. 15 sq.; Münkler 2005, p. 14). Respective trends over time are iden-
tiﬁed, too (Kaldor 2007, p. 9; Münkler 2006, p. 137). The thesis that violent actors in
internal warfare increasingly attack and kill civilians is then backed by referring to signif-
icant changes in the ratio of civilian to military battle-deaths.12 Although they choose a
diﬀerent wording and do not speak of “New Warfare”, Lacina and N. P. Gleditsch (2005,
pp. 160 sq.) conclude with a similar statement. They note that most present warfare is
in the form of civil conﬂict and in the form of “wars of state failure taking place outside
of areas of the major powers’ strategic interest”. The authors expect “that many of these
conﬂicts will be characterised more by severe humanitarian crises than combat of the
intensity seen during the Cold War”.
A serious comparison of the kind of violence applied in state-based and non-state
internal armed conﬂicts would require information on the (civilian or military) identity of
direct and indirect victims and perpetrators for both types of conﬂict. Reliable indicators
on the numbers of refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs) by type of armed
conﬂict would also be desirable. At least for new (non-state) armed conﬂicts such data
are not available. So far, it is impossible to assign the correct number of refugees and
IDPs to single cases of warfare if countries are experiencing several armed conﬂicts of
diﬀerent type, maybe even at the same time. Due to this lack of data, the analysis
presented in the empirical part of this book is forced to focus on the scale of violence.
More precisely, Hypothesis 5 asks in how far the severity of ﬁghting in new (non-state)
armed conﬂicts is signiﬁcantly higher compared with conventional (state-based) armed
conﬂicts.
12Kaldor (1999, p. 100) and Münkler (2005, p. 14) both state that at the beginning of the 20th century,
80 to 90 percent of casualties in war were military, i.e. combatants under international law. By
the late 1990s, this has been almost exactly reversed. Nowadays, approximately 80 percent of all
casualties are civilian. Mack (2007) calls this a “conventional wisdom” and the given numbers the
“most widely-cited statistics” although no evidence has ever been produced to substantiate these
fatality statistics. He believes the actual ﬁgure to be much lower and refers to UCDP data. These
data suggest that today 30 to 60 percent of violent deaths in armed conﬂicts are civilians (Mack 2007,
p. 8). Chojnacki (2004, p. 4) refers to Eckhardt (1989) when stating that “[t]he only study known to
analyse this relation in a historically systematical manner over a longer period of time concludes that
the proportion of civilians among war victims has constantly remained at about 50 percent since the
18th century”. Although this criticism is well taken, the ratio of civilian to military deaths might still
be much higher for a certain sub-type of intra-state armed conﬂict. In addition, the average certainly
masks regional diﬀerences.
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5.4. The Duration of New Warfare
Especially the economic motives of private actors and the emergence of New War Econo-
mies help to theoretically explain the long duration of ﬁghting. Since the above listed
(illegal) sources of private proﬁt and ﬁnancing can only be sustained in a context of
continued violence and state weakness, a war-logic is built into the functioning of the
economy (Kaldor 1999, p. 9).“Those, who conceive of war in traditional Clausewitzean
terms, based on deﬁnable geo-political goals, fail to understand the underlying vested
interests, both political and economic, in the continuation of war” (Kaldor 2007, p. 95).
Münkler (2005, pp. 45 sq., 94) adds that wars normally last longer the more access the
participants have to the resources of the world economy and the more of the conﬂict
resources can be sold on the world market which feeds and strengthens the warlords and
militia leaders economically. Thus, the notion of an underlying economic interest in the
continuation of warfare needs to be extended to the consumers of conﬂict resources like
timber, diamonds or drugs, who often reside in Western countries, as well as to foreign
producers and external provides of weapons and funds. Because actors in New Warfare
are not dependent on tax revenue which otherwise deﬁnes the length (and intensity)
of warfare, New Wars can at least in theory continue as long as external support and
internal resources are available. In addition, what matters in sustaining war is the
extent to which the goal and applied strategies of warfare are recognized by those who
participate in the war as legitimate (Kaldor 1999, p. 27). To provide a justiﬁcation
for otherwise illegal methods of private gain and to legitimize violent strategies that
systematically and permanently target civilians, New Wars Actors resort to identity
politics. The result are speciﬁcally brutal conﬂicts involving ethnic or religious issues
which are diﬃcult to end. Kaldor summarizes that the networks of actors involved in
New Warfare have a vested interest in perpetuating violence, both for political reasons,
because they thrive on fear and hate and for economic reasons (Kaldor 2004; Kaldor
2000).
Like in conventional civil warfare, the strategy of avoiding direct military encounters
also contributes to a long duration of New Warfare. “[S]ince these wars do not usually
involve a rapid and total mobilization of forces but slowly use them up on an ongoing
basis, most of them last a long time and keep ﬂaring up after temporary lulls” (Münkler
2005, p. 45).
Finally, the high number of opposed actors can be linked with a comparatively long
duration of New Warfare. With an increase in the number of ﬁghting factions, peace
negotiations become more diﬃcult and renewed outbreaks of violence more likely.13
13Münkler (2005, pp. 46 sq.) again provides the historic example of the Thirty Years’ War that shares
much likeness with New Wars: “For some fourteen years there had been talk of holding a compre-
hensive European peace congress, before this ﬁnally resulted in the Peace of Westfalia [. . . ]. [I]t took
three years for the negotiations at Münster and Osnarbrück to end in an agreement on the main
(not all) points. This was partly due to the fact that many interest groups had taken shape in the
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If even one of the many small groups of violent actors is unhappy with the emerging
peacetime conditions, it is an easy matter for them to rekindle the ﬂames of war. Münkler
(2005, p. 13) warns that because each of the many groups capable of violence needs to
be won over to the renunciation of violence, peace agreements are replaced by lengthy
and fragile peace processes. The latter require outside guarantees in terms of funds
and forces and more often end in failure than in success. Therefore, the duration of
New Wars is expected to be signiﬁcantly longer compared with conventional civil wars
(see Hypothesis 6). A ﬁnal overview of the context and dimensions of New Warfare is
provided by the following ﬁgure (see ﬁg. 5.2 on the following page).
course of the war” (including many outside powers), that “no military resolution had determined in
advance the structure of the negotiations” and that the Thirty Years’ War involved a “sequence and
superimposition of several diﬀerent wars and conﬂicts, so closely intertwined or interlinked that it is
possible to speak of a single war”.
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5. The Dimensions of New Warfare
Figure5.2.:TheContextand
Dim
ensionsofNew
W
arfare.Source:own
depiction.
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6. Interim Summary I: The Theoretical
Concept of New Wars
According to the advocates of the concept, New Wars arise in a context of “state failure
[. . . ] or at least a failing state” (Kaldor 2006a, p. 6). Especially processes of globalization
and the end of the Cold War contributed to state weakness. Globalization weakened
states’ monopoly of legitimate organized violence “from above” e.g. through the in-
creasing transnationalization of military forces and the interference of private external
actors in conﬂict and post-conﬂict situations. Both globalization and the end of the
East-West controversy contributed to crises of identity, the rise of alternative, vertical
identities and the emergence of “identity politics”. The latter are used by violent actors
in New Warfare to mobilize combatants and to justify their criminal and illegal activi-
ties. The end of the Cold War also led to a shortfall of ﬁnancial and material support
from former super-powers which further weakened states and violent non-state actors.
As far as possible, the lack of ﬁnancial resources is compensated by natural resource
extraction and the build-up of speciﬁc New War Economies. The failure of neoliberal
development strategies and the following debt crisis further aggravated the ﬁght over
natural resources. Finally, the end of the Cold War not only left an enormous surplus
of small and light weapons that are primarily used in New Wars but also resulted in a
large supply of well trained and war-experienced soldiers. This gave rise to rebel groups,
private military companies and mercenaries.
Weak states are unable to inhibit a privatization of violence, to eﬀectively end ﬁghting
if it breaks out among non-state groups and to stop them from criminal activity. At
worst, non-state or quasi-state actors completely take over government functions up to
the provision of selective security. This has been referred to as an erosion of states’
monopoly of organized violence “from below”.
The emergence of multiple non-state actors following their private economic interests
results in the establishment of New War Economies. Within these war economies, the
realization of private gain depends on the continuation of fear and the perpetuation
of hate. In order to stabilize war economies violent actors therefore resort to identity
politics and strategies that systematically and permanently target civilians.
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6. Interim Summary I
Both the New War Economies and the New War Strategies explain the comparatively
long duration of New Warfare. In addition, a quick and stable settlement solution
through negotiation is unlikely due to the high number of opposed actors which also
increases the chances of a renewed outbreak of violence (Kaldor 1999, p. 9).
Because extensive and intensive warfare further weaken states there exist feed-back
loops which render a determination of the direction of relationships diﬃcult. For in-
stance, while in Old Wars victory over an enemy resulted in state-building, New Wars
“exacerbate the disintegration of the states” (Kaldor 2005, p. 3; Münkler 2005, p. 76).
Therefore, state weakness contributes to the outbreak of New Wars and Conﬂicts as
much as it can be considered a consequence of New Warfare. Likewise, state weakness is
a precondition for the emergence of violent non-state actors. However, the existence and
activities of non-state violent actors in return weaken states. Similarly, exclusive identi-
ties can be considered a cause of New Warfare because they contribute to the outbreak of
violence, provide ground for the emergence of identity politics, excessive violence and the
functioning of war economies. However, the spread and hardening of sectarian ideologies
(up to the emergence of a “culture of violence”) are also a consequence of (prolonged
and intense) warfare (Kaldor 2001). Kaldor (2006a, p. 8) notes that “those conditions I
describe that lead to war are worsened by war. The criminalised economy has spread,
extremist ideologies catch on, as people get killed they start to hate. The institutions of
the state are even weaker than they were before and what that means is that these are
wars that are terribly diﬃcult to end, they go on for years and years and years”.
The above introduced the term “New Warfare” as a sub-type of internal armed conﬂict
that is characterized by a speciﬁc combination of values of the following dimensions of
warfare: The nature and quantity of actors involved in ﬁghting, their motives and modes
of ﬁnancing warfare, the applied strategies and the duration of ﬁghting. This is largely
in line with Kaldor (1999, p. 14), who distinguishes old, inter-state wars from New Wars
with respect to the type of policy and army involved in ﬁghting, the goals of warfare, the
associated mode of ﬁnancing warfare and the applied military technique. Others came up
with slightly diﬀerent distinguishing features1 which indicates that a clear diﬀerentiation
of Old from New Wars is by no means trivial. Kaldor further complicates the matter
by noting that New Wars involve elements of pre-modernity and modernity such as a
1Heupel and Zangl (2010, p. 31) distinguish old and new intra-state wars “by four criteria relating to the
warring parties, their war economy, war motives and warfare strategies”. They use these criteria as
“gradual scales” to determine the extent to which their selected cases of warfare resemble a new wars
proﬁle. According to Snow (1996, p. 76), New Wars and conventional insurgencies diﬀer in regard
to the overt purpose of gaining political power, the degree to which the parties pursue the political
loyalty of an identical center of gravity, the degree to which they rely on terror and intimidation
rather than positive appeals and the extent to which they follow something like the mobile-guerrilla
strategy in waging war. Newman (2004, p. 174) distinguishes Old from New Wars in terms of the
protagonists (state/public or non-state/private actors), their primary motives (ideology, territorial
secession or material aggrandizement), the spacial context of warfare (inter-state, ‘civil’, regional or
global), the technological means of violence (weapons and strategies), the social, material and human
impact of conﬂict and the political economy and social structure of conﬂict.
72
blurring of the distinctions between war (usually deﬁned as violence between states or
organized political groups for political motives), organized crime (violence undertaken
by privately organized groups for private purposes, usually ﬁnancial gains) and large-
scale violations of human rights (violence undertaken by states or politically organized
groups against individuals) (Kaldor 2007, p. 2; Kaldor 1999, pp. 2 sq.; Kaldor 2005,
p. 3). Although New Wars are localized, they build on transnational connections so that
a distinction between internal and external, between aggression (attack from abroad)
and repression (attacks from inside the country), between local and global are diﬃcult
to sustain. Although the privatization of violence is an important element of New Wars,
Kaldor realizes that in practice, the distinction between what is private and what is
public, state or non-state, informal and formal, between what is done for economic or
political motives cannot easily be applied. Single features of New Wars and Conﬂicts
have indeed been mentioned as characteristics of old, inter-state wars. For example, the
use of mercenaries or only partly professional armies can already be observed in the early
modern wars. An erosion of what is internal and external already happened in ideological
Cold War ﬁghting when the importance of military alliances became apparent. The
elimination of the distinction between private and public and the targeting of civilians
and economic infrastructure have as well been mentioned as features of total warfare
while private interests in warfare (the latest) rose with the emergence of the military-
industrial complex. This renders a clear diﬀerentiation of types of armed conﬂict in
general (and between sub-types of internal armed conﬂict in particular) very diﬃcult
though indispensable.
An exhaustive and mutually exclusive typology (that includes all dimensions of armed
conﬂict, that assigns each case to only one type of armed conﬂict and that is able to
concisely describe a great deal of information) still needs to be developed through a sys-
tematic process rather than merely by intuition. The development of such a typology is
necessary not only for rhetorical reasons to justify the labeling of these wars and conﬂicts
as “new” but mostly for analytical purpose. Kaldor (2005, p. 10) adds another argument.
She calls New Wars “new” not because they are altogether new but “because we can
only develop alternative strategies if we see how diﬀerent they are from World War II,
[the] Cold War or the ‘War on Terror”’. Although I agree that a profound understanding
of the phenomenon forms the basis of any political action including intervention, I dis-
agree in one regard: in order to develop alternative strategies we especially need to see
how diﬀerent New Wars are from conventional, intra-state wars (Kahl and Teusch 2004,
pp. 384 sq., 400; Heupel and Zangl 2003, p. 6). The following chapter therefore summa-
rizes major similarities and diﬀerences between sub-types of internal warfare. The aim is
to provide a more systematic comparison of conventional (state-based) armed conﬂicts
(especially greed rebellions) on the one hand and new (non-state) armed conﬂicts as ﬁrst
described by Mary Kaldor (1999) on the other. This comparison does not substitute for
the development of an exhaustive and mutually exclusive typology but hopefully adds
some clarity.
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7. Non-State vs. State-Based Internal
Armed Conﬂicts
Greed models and the concept of New Wars share the importance that is attributed to
the role of lootable resources and to the establishment of war economies. In both types of
warfare, violent actors ﬁght over the control of lootable resources that provide motivation
for ﬁghting and opportunity to ﬁnance the war eﬀort. Both types of warfare are either
predominantly or even entirely loot-seeking. Often, external actors participate in the
looting of resources and demand their share in the country’s wealth. Contrary to this,
in grievance rebellions the exploitation of resources is not an aim in itself but a means
towards the achievement of an “ennobling” political or ideological goal – to overthrow or
secede from the existing regime in order to establish a new, more abundant, equitable or
egalitarian political, social and economic order. If external actors participate, they do so
for the same reason (to achieve the overall political goal) and justify their engagement in
terms of shared identity or ideology with one of the warring factions. Conventional greed
rebellions and New Wars and Conﬂicts also share the characteristic that beneﬁts from
rebel victory are private and immediately distributed among those involved in warfare.
On the contrary, grievance rebellions face a “rebels’ dilemma” due to strong incentives
to freeride as well as a “time-consistency problem” because beneﬁts from rebel victory
can be enjoyed by everyone and are only prospective. If ever, these collective action
constraints can only be overcome in cases where the grievances suﬀered by the civilian
population and the shared identity among ﬁghters are very serious. Grievance models
have therefore been criticized for not oﬀering a convincing solution to the collective action
problem. As a result, they most likely over-predict civil wars. In both conventional greed
rebellions and New Wars and Conﬂicts, the rebel organizations involved in ﬁghting are
described as comparatively small, quasi-criminal organizations. The small size of the
organization guarantees each individual member more inﬂuence (e.g. on the distribution
of beneﬁts). Because warfare is a constant competition over the control of resources, both
types of warfare are also likely to experience a further fractionalization of the warring
parties. Finally and like in greed rebellions, violent groups in New Warfare are only
loosely organized. They “lack the hierarchy, order and vertical command systems that
have been typical of guerrilla forces” ﬁghting insurgencies or grievance rebellions (Kaldor
2007, p. 101; Kaldor 2006b, p. 8). Despite these similarities, however, conventional greed
rebellions diﬀer from New Wars and Conﬂicts in many regard.
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7. Non-State vs. State-Based Fighting
Firstly, the (repressive) state still exists and constitutes the opponent in greed (as well
as grievance) rebellions while New Wars and Conﬂicts take place in a context of state
failure or even state collapse. According to Snow (1996), Cold War insurgencies occurred
in countries with weak societies but relatively strong and oppressive state structures,
while New Wars are happening in countries characterized by weak societies and weak
state structures. Greed and grievance rebellions happen because they are feasible (due
to the availability of conﬂict resources) or because preferences for violent resistance are
strong. New Wars and Conﬂicts occur because they are feasible and because there is
nothing to prevent them.
While greed (and grievance) rebellions always involve state forces who ﬁght internal
opposition groups, New Wars and Conﬂicts are non-state or sub-state in nature. A
functioning state army does not exist any more or is unable or unwilling to intervene.
Instead of a comparatively strong army (that ﬁghts for its existence, the control over
important resources and has the means to let violence escalate), rebels battle each other.
All opponents in New Wars and Conﬂicts are small, quasi-criminal gangs that mostly
rely on light weapons. Thanks to globalization and left-over stockpiles from the Cold
War, “everybody more or less can have access to accurate and destructive weapons”
which results in an “equalisation of military technology” (Kaldor 2006a, p. 7). In con-
trast, conventional greed and grievance rebellions are characterized by an asymmetry in
military power.1
The distribution of military power among opponents aﬀects the strategies, the scale
and nature of violence. Because rebels in conventional civil wars know that they cannot
defeat regular armies, they avoid open battle. Instead, they aim to politically control
territory by winning the hearts and minds of people and then use that territory as a
safe haven. From there, they hit the regular army in little incidents, through attrition.
If necessary, they retreat until the government would be suﬃciently weakened to be
defeated or to give up (Kaldor 2006a, p. 6). Kaldor and Münkler emphasize that in New
Warfare, direct military encounter among the warring parties is rare, too (Kaldor 2005,
p. 3; Kaldor 2006b, p. 1; Münkler 2005, p. 3). In fact, it might be even less likely than
in conventional, state-based armed conﬂicts because “battles are just too dangerous,
because of the equalization of military technology” (Kaldor 2006a, p. 7). This leads to
the expectation of rather low, overall numbers of direct, battle-related military casualties
per conﬂict and year.
1I follow Kaldor’s argument that New Wars are characterized by a symmetry of military power and
objectives, although much of the violence in New Warfare is applied asymmetrically (against unarmed
civilians instead of warring parties). Münkler also emphasizes this one-sided, asymmetric nature of
violence in New Warfare, but he also speaks of the “new (military) asymmetries” that appeared with
the emergence of private actors in internal warfare (Münkler 2005, p. 135; Münkler 2006, pp. 134 sq.,
142 sq.). In this regard, he fails to clearly diﬀerentiate new (non-state and symmetric) internal armed
conﬂicts from conventional (state-based and asymmetric) civil wars.
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On the other hand, identity politics are applied which might result in bloody ethnic
or religious wars with especially high numbers of direct battle-related civilian casualties.
Actors in New Warfare can aﬀord strategies that systematically target civilians because
winning is not their primary objective. They neither pursue political loyalty nor the
loyalty of an identical center of gravity. They do not battle for the hearts and minds
of people. New Warfare lacks any conscious connection to politics and is “hardly ever
ideological in the sense of oﬀering an alternative and presumably superior, form of gov-
ernance” (Snow 1996, p. 56). Because violent actors in these conﬂicts do not need to
portray themselves as the better government, some even predict a senseless slaughter
of civilians and a reversion to the pre-Clausewitzian style of war.2 Consequently, popu-
lar support for such rebellions is comparatively low. These two oﬀsetting characteristics
(comparatively low numbers of direct military deaths but high numbers of direct civilian
deaths) could explain why the average total number of (military and civilian) battle-
related deaths might not necessarily diﬀer much from conventional (state-based) armed
conﬂicts. At least there is no straightforward answer as to whether the overall scale of
violence signiﬁcantly varies between these sub-types of intra-state armed conﬂict. The
composition of overall deaths, however, most likely is due to the comparatively high
share of civilian victims in New Wars.
In addition to the nature of the victims, the nature of the perpetrators of violence dif-
fers. In New Wars and Conﬂicts, violence against civilians is applied by non-state forces
while in conventional civil wars “harsh repression” against civilians is mostly applied
by state instead of non-state forces. While the former is evident (due to the entirely
non-state nature of the involved actors) the latter requires some explanation. Again, it
can be argued that in conventional civil warfare (even in greed conﬂicts), the rebels aim
to replace the existing regime for political or economic reasons and therefore need to sell
themselves as the better government. At least in theory, this should deter them from ex-
erting indiscriminate violence against civilians. Contrary to this, the government needs
to react swiftly to crush the rebellion once and for all. While the rebels can retreat in
order to regain strength and recover from set-backs, the government needs to win in or-
der to survive and to avoid lengthy and costly warfare. In conventional armed conﬂicts,
counter-insurgency by government forces therefore involves rigorous measures not only
against the rebels but also against civilians who support or hide the rebels (Valentino
et al. 2004; Azam and Hoeﬄer 2002). The longer the rebellion lasts, the more inappro-
priate and unsuccessful are the counter-insurgency measures by the government. In the
end, this serves the rebels, who even provoke harsh and disproportionate repression by
the government against civilians because such reprisals help them to recruit supporters
(Kalyvas 2006, p. 151).
2“A Clausewitzian analysis does very little to explain the rampage in Rwanda, wherein there was
no ennobling political or ideological goal behind the slaughter (other than possibly serving to keep
conservative Hutu in power), one could ﬁnd no common center of gravity to which contending parties
were attempting to appeal, and the rapaciousness of the violence violated all tenets of the theories
of insurgency-counterinsurgency” (Snow 1996, pp. 26 sq.).
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7. Non-State vs. State-Based Fighting
Another diﬀerence between conventional greed rebellions and New Wars and Conﬂicts
concerns the scope of warfare which links with the context of state collapse. Violent
actors in greed rebellions ﬁght over lootable resources in remote rural areas where the
coercive reach of the central state is weak. Such warfare remains local and distant from
the center. In contrast, due to state collapse, violent actors in New Warfare are able to
ﬁght each other over lootable resources wherever they occur. Such warfare carries the
potential to aﬀect an entire, resource rich region even close to the capital. Besides the
occurrence of resources and their geological form, there are few constraints that inhibit
warfare from spreading to a comparatively large share of the national territory. In regard
to their scope, New Wars and Conﬂict rather resemble conventional grievance instead
of greed rebellions that also aﬀect entire regions (in case of secessionist conﬂicts) or the
entire nation-state – though for diﬀerent reasons.
Finally, while “politics of ideas” serve as the source of mobilization in conventional
civil wars, “identity politics” serve as the source of mobilization in New Warfare. Kaldor
explains that in conventional civil wars supporters are often mobilized on the basis of
shared ideological beliefs. This is what she describes as “politics of ideas” that “tend to
be integrative, embracing all those who support the idea” (Kaldor 1999, pp. 77 sq.). In
addition to ideology, shared ethnic or religious identity and community ties also serve
as a basis for mobilization. In conventional civil wars, these identities are then linked
“either to a notion of state interest or to some forward-looking project – ideas about how
society should be organized” (Kaldor 2007, p. 7). Thus, identities are used as a source
of mobilization for political campaigns and lead to “demands for cultural and religious
rights” which is quite diﬀerent from the identity politics applied in NewWarfare. Identity
politics are not demands for political and religious rights, but “demand[s] for political
rights based on identity”, i.e. “[a] form of communitarianism that is distinct from and
may [even] conﬂict with individual political rights” (Kaldor 1999, p. 77). Elsewhere,
Kaldor (2006a, p. 6) explains that a New War is “fought not to acquire cultural rights
or religious rights, it’s fought because you feel that as a Muslim, as a Hindu, as a Serb,
as a Croat, you have a right to the state: it’s about labels”. Instead of integrative,
forward-looking projects, identity politics are described as exclusive, fragmentative and
backward-looking movements of nostalgia used by rebel leaders to increase legitimacy,
to justify authoritarian policies or their predatory behavior, to create scapegoats and
to mobilize support around fear and insecurity. Ideology is not important anymore.
Instead, control is established through allegiance to a label rather than an idea. Those
who do not profess to the right label are eliminated (Kaldor 1999, pp. 77 sq., 81, 98).
In addition to identity politics, New Wars and Conﬂicts mobilize their participants on
the basis of selective incentives. Like in greed rebellions, participants in New Wars and
Conﬂicts can be counted on to support the rebellion only so long as these incentives are
provided. If the “payments” to the rebels are not forthcoming anymore or if the risks of
participation increase, New Wars and Conﬂicts are also likely to fail. This means that
there is not much diﬀerence between conventional greed rebellions and New Warfare in
the logic that drives violent action. However, a situation in which participants would
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desert is far less likely in New Wars and Conﬂicts because warfare is less risky due
to the absence of a functioning state that would otherwise defend its resources. This
guarantees a steady ﬂow of private beneﬁts from warfare. In addition, the protagonists
do not face any risk of being sanctioned by the government because there simply is no
state. Furthermore, individuals involved in New Warfare are less likely to desert and the
rebellion is less likely to fail because warfare is comparatively cheap. The fact that the
state and the legal economy collapsed greatly reduces the opportunity costs of joining
the rebellion because alternative income-earning opportunities do not exist. Snow (1996)
notes that contrary to insurgencies that happened in developing countries, New Wars
are taking place in even poorer countries that belong to the group of least developed
states.
Most importantly, however, lootable resources do not need to be “provided” or cap-
tured from the state but are simply available for exploitation via self-service. If rebels
engage in battle, they only ﬁght similar criminal gangs (in terms of size, structure, in-
terests and weaponry) over the distribution of these resources. Because there is nothing
to prevent the rebels from exploiting these resources in the ﬁrst place, they are capable
of rising and dispersing selective incentives right from the beginning. This solves the
question of who provides the selective incentives within the initial stage of warfare.3
Such New Warfare then sustains for years – not because the rebels are unsuccessful
in defeating the government but because winning is not what they intend. Although
conventional civil wars that are fought according to the principles of guerrilla warfare
might last long, too, the rebels still seek “a military resolution of the war”. Contrary
to this, “most players in new wars [. . . ] content themselves with what Mao called
‘strategic defensive’; that is, they use military force essentially for self-preservation,
without seriously looking for a military resolution to the war. If both sides conduct the
war with this aim in mind, then clearly, with suﬃcient internal and external funding, it
can theoretically last for ever” (Münkler 2005, p. 12). As long as the beneﬁts outweigh
the costs of participation, a change in the status quo is not desired by either party to
the conﬂict. Only the continuation of instability and state dysfunction guarantees these
proﬁts. Both sides win if they do not lose. This logic also applies to greed rebellions,
but only to one side of the conﬂict (namely the rebels). As long as the beneﬁts outweigh
the costs of participation, the rebels do not have any interest in changing the status
quo (although in the long run an overthrow of the existing regime or secession in order
to gain full control over resources would guarantee even more proﬁt and fewer war-
induced costs). In conventional greed rebellions, however, the other side to the conﬂict
(the government) needs to win to win. Therefore, conventional greed (and grievance)
conﬂicts are characterized by an “asymmetry of objectives” while in New Wars and
Conﬂicts a “symmetry of objective” exists.
3However, it does not in itself explain why the state no longer exercises its monopoly over the legitimate
use of violence. The causes of state collapse reach beyond economic factors as brieﬂy mentioned
before.
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7. Non-State vs. State-Based Fighting
In summary, I argued that out of the question of what motivates rebels to engage in
political violence, two theoretical models of civil warfare emerged which after the end of
the Cold War replaced the dominant Western view of inter-state armed conﬂict by an
intra-state perspective: Deprived Actor Models and Rational Actor Models. The ﬁrst
part of this study presented both models which are widely used to describe conventional
(state-based) greed and grievance rebellions. Afterwards, I introduced a third model
which explains the causes and nature of non-conventional internal armed conﬂicts: The
concept of New Wars. I continued to compare conventional (state-based) greed and
grievance rebellions with new (non-state) armed conﬂicts in terms of their political con-
text, the violent actors they involve (their nature, their overall aim, their organizational
size and their sources of motivation, mobilization and ﬁnancing), in regard to the costs
and beneﬁts of ﬁghting, the scale and nature of applied violence as well as the duration
and scope of warfare. This comparison revealed some similarities but also substantial
diﬀerences between these sub-types of internal armed conﬂict which are summarized by
table 7.1 on page 82. For instance, I argued in favor of signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the
nature (instead of the scale) of violence that is applied. The share of civilian victims
in overall battle-related deaths is expected to be especially large in non-conventional
(non-state) ﬁghting (although the overall number of battle-related deaths per conﬂict
and year might not diﬀer much). In addition, New Wars and Conﬂicts are expected to
result in a large share of indirect civilian victims (e.g. internally displaced people) as
opposed to direct, battle-related (military and civilian) deaths. The micro-mechanisms
explaining especially brutal strategies towards civilians during new (non-state) armed
conﬂicts will be identiﬁed and discussed within the following part of this study. Further-
more, the above came to the conclusion that grievance models most likely over-estimate
the outbreak of violence because they do not oﬀer a solution to the collective action
problem. Greed models address this issue through the provision of selective incentives.
Still, they fail to oﬀer an answer to the question of who provides the selective incentives
at the beginning of the movement. Even the concept of leadership goods (the requi-
sites of oﬃce and political power) cannot explain the emergence of rebel organizations
from scratch and the participation of early joiners when the risks are greatest, when the
prospects of victory are lowest and when the rebels lack the means to oﬀer immediate
material rewards. Greed rebellions therefore also tend to over-predict the outbreak of
violence. Instead, they might be better suited to explain the duration of warfare. In
regard to the solution of the collective action problem, the concept of New Wars and
Conﬂicts performs better. As in greed rebellions, collective action failures are overcome
through the provision of selective incentives. Beneﬁts of participating in ﬁghting are
privatized and immediately available to those who engage in the collective action. How-
ever, easily lootable and accessible resources do not need to be captured from the state
but, in a situation of state failure or even state collapse, simply need to be taken by
the rebels. Because there is no militarily superior opponent who prevents the rebels
from looting these resources in the ﬁrst place, they are capable of rising and dispersing
selective incentives right from the beginning. Selective incentives are therefore already
available within the early stages of rebellion. The distribution of these resources among
similar competing groups remains the only matter of dispute.
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Whether these diﬀerences justify the introduction of a new sub-type of intra-state
warfare is heavily disputed. The next chapter, which provides a critical discussion of the
concept of New Wars, comments on this and other major points of critique. Beforehand,
however, I would like to brieﬂy contrast NewWars and Conﬂicts with terrorism – another
contemporary form of organized violence that is often (and wrongly) equated with New
Wars by the critics as well as the advocates of the concept of New Wars.
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8. Non-State Internal Fighting vs.
Terrorism
Münkler (2005, pp. 3, 30 sq., 131) refers to international terrorism as “a method” of New
Warfare which ﬁts well with his understanding of New Wars as a form of asymmetric
battle. Elsewhere the author speaks of the “new terrorist wars” and explicitly notes that
“[t]errorism is a form of warfare” (Münkler 2005, pp. 102, 111). According to him ter-
rorism has changed its nature. Traditional forms of terrorism (e.g. social-revolutionary
or ethnic-nationalist terrorism) have been replaced or supplemented by “new forms of
terrorism”. Traditional terrorists limited their actions “to a brief phase of the liberation
struggle and to a highly selective list of targets”. They had their constituency in mind,
in whose interests they claimed to wage their struggle. Such kinds of terrorism started
from the need to actively involve this “third party” in the struggle as a source of legiti-
macy while “none of the members of the constituency was supposed to be come to harm
as a result of any terrorist attack – a condition that totally excluded the use of weapons
of mass destruction”. Through demonstrative acts of violence, terrorists aimed to rouse
this third party from its (supposed) political apathy or resignation and to motivate it
for the armed struggle.
On the contrary, “in the new forms of terrorism that third party must be not only
activated but ﬁrst produced as a political quantity”. Religious-fundamentalist themes
are increasingly used as an impetus and justiﬁcation for terrorist attacks. The emer-
gence of religious-fundamentalist forms of terrorism resulted in a greater diﬀuseness of
the constituency and deﬁnition of the enemy of terrorist attacks beyond the holders of
political power to entire civilizations. This, and the increasing internationalization of
terrorism, which only began in the 1960s and took oﬀ in the 1990s, removed the limits
of violence which led to higher casualty rates of terrorist attacks by organizations that
might even consider the use of atomic, biological or chemical weapons.1 In religiously
motivated terrorism, a third party as the basis of legitimacy to which the operation is
addressed is not even needed. Instead, “[g]od, or the Divine, provides legitimacy or
even an addressee – or at any rate a reference – and requires no political calculation
of the maximum damage and the maximum number of casualties that an attack must
not exceed” (Münkler 2005, p. 113). Increasingly, “the success of operations came to be
measured by the resulting material damage, the numbers killed and wounded, and above
1See Münkler (2005, pp. 102–104, 112 sq.) and Sarkees and Wayman (2010, p. 560), who also argue
that their supranational character diﬀerentiates terrorist threats of al-Quaida from earlier terrorism.
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all the intensity and duration of the media reporting of the incident [. . . ] [T]errorism
has changed into a global war of terror fought with no restrictions as to the choice of
targets. In a parallel process, the civilian population and infrastructure have become
critical resources of war” (Münkler 2005, pp. 106 sq.).
Similar to those actors involved in New Wars, terrorists avoid any direct military con-
frontation. Like New Warfare, the new forms of terrorism require a minimum of funds
that are mostly provided by external actors. Both kinds of violence involve rather small,
non-hierarchically organized cells. Brzoska (2004, p. 112) refers to Münkler and Eppler,
who both identify many similarities between rebels in New Wars and international ter-
rorists, e.g. in terms of tactics, sources of funding and their disregard for any restraint
on violence. Kaldor (2001) even lists terrorist cells among the actors of New Warfare.
In the preface to the second edition of her book on “New and Old Wars” she explicitly
notes that “[t]errorism has to be understood as one variant of ‘new wars”’ (Kaldor 2007,
p. ix). Elsewhere she refers to terrorist incidences in New York or Iraq as “a variant of
[the] new strategy – the use of spectacular, often gruesome, violence to create fear and
conﬂict” (Kaldor 2007, p. 9). She continues that “the characteristics of new wars [. . . ]
are to be found in North America and Western Europe as well. The right-wing militia
groups in the United States are not so very diﬀerent from the paramilitary groups in
Eastern Europe or Africa [. . . ]. [Even] [t]he violence in the inner cities of Western Eu-
rope and North America can, in some sense, be described as new wars” (Kaldor 2007,
pp. 12 sq.). These and similar remarks blur the line between conventional insurgencies
and old forms of terrorism as well as between New Wars and new forms of terrorism.
Further conceptual confusion stems from the fact that the same authors who more or less
equate armed conﬂict or (new) warfare with terrorism also identify diﬀerences between
both concepts. In the following I summarize these distinguishing features in order to
argue in favor of a clear diﬀerentiation of the two concepts.
Contrary to any kind of armed conﬂict or warfare, terrorism mainly seeks to produce
results in an indirect way. Terrorists choose targets that only symbolize what they
oppose and their strategies are designed to cause psychological rather than direct physical
eﬀects. The main purpose of the actual and demonstrative act of violence is not to defeat
anybody militarily or to defend or gain control over resources. Instead, terrorists want
to draw attention to their cause and to obtain the greatest publicity in order to send a
message through which the political will of those under attack shall be broken. Terrorists
count on the psychological eﬀect of violence and the resulting fear which is spread by
the media. This fear causes economic damage which appears to Münkler (2005, p. 100);
Münkler (2006, pp. 146 sq.) to be the ultimate goal of terrorism. Terrorism clearly
inﬂuences an audience beyond the immediate victim.
This links with the fact that, unlike armed conﬂict, terrorism has two addressees.
Those who are the direct object of attack (e.g. the US army in Iraq, US politicians
or the US public), who are shown that they are vulnerable and that their continued
presence in Iraq will incur political costs (material damage and human losses).
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Secondly, every terrorist attack contains a message to a third party in whose interests
the terrorists claim to be waging their struggle. Even in the case of religiously-motivated
terrorism, where this message to the third party might have lost signiﬁcance, it is still
there. In Iraq, terrorists also aim to send the message that resistance to what appears to
be a superior power is possible and also successful in changing policies (Münkler 2005,
pp. 101 sq.).
Thirdly, NewWarfare mostly happens in (remote) rural areas of failing or already failed
states where natural resources occur. Although an important transnational component
exists in regard to the ﬁnancing of warfare and the involved actors, this sub-type of intra-
state warfare takes place within a nation-state. In contrast, terrorism carries violence
into the population centers of the enemy under attack. Transnational or international
terrorism strikes elsewhere, in faraway countries, while the terrorist organization remains
based within its home country. The enemy under attack is often “the West” because
the terrorists know that post-industrial societies with a democratic constitution and a
high media density are unable to respond in kind and at the same level (Münkler 2005,
p. 109).
While terrorism is a strategy whereby militarily weaker forces engage in violent opera-
tions against large powers or even superpowers, New Wars and Conﬂicts involve similar,
small groups of non-state actors who ﬁght each other.
Terrorism and New Wars and Conﬂicts also diﬀer in regard to the weapon technologies
used. While in New Wars and Conﬂicts actors mostly rely on light and small ﬁre arms,
“[t]he oﬀensive capabilities of terrorists rest upon their logistical use of the civilian
infrastructure of the country under attack, and at the same time on their conversion
of it into a weapon” (Münkler 2005, p. 29). Examples are the attacks on the World
Trade Center, when the terrorists used airplanes as rockets or the attacks on the public
transportation systems in London and Madrid.
While actors in New Warfare are most concerned about private gain and avoid any
situation where they might need to risk their lives, terrorists are prepared to sacriﬁce
themselves. Münkler (2005, p. 109) speaks of heroic determination to the cause which
allows terrorists to focus all their energy on the attack itself instead of worrying about
escape routes and how to maximize their personal means of income generation (Münkler
2005, p. 109). This links with the notion that terrorism and New Wars diﬀer in regard
to their purpose. Terrorism is the systematic use of terror to coerce or intimidate gov-
ernments or societies in the pursuit of political, religious, or ideological goals. Münkler
(2005, p. 100) himself deﬁnes terrorism as a means of forcibly imposing a political will.
“If such a will cannot be determined, it may be possible to speak of terror, but not of
terrorism”. Due to the absence of such a political will it is rather terror (i.e. terrible
events causing great fear) instead of terrorism (i.e. a strategy or tactic to achieve a
political, religious or ideological goal) that is (and always has been) applied in warfare.
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In general, I reject the notion that terrorism is a kind of warfare. Amongst peace
and conﬂict analysts, the term warfare is usually and rightly reserved for bilateral and
sustained acts of violence among two or more organized armed groups while terrorist
violence remains unilateral in nature. For an event to be classiﬁed as an armed conﬂict
or even warfare a certain number of people need to be killed per year and on both sides.
These criteria rule out sporadic and one-sided acts of violence like genocides or terrorist
incidents. Together with the above mentioned points these diﬀerences justify a clear
conceptual distinction between the concepts of armed conﬂict/warfare and terrorism.
Arguing in favor of such a clear conceptual distinction by no means denies empirical
changes in both phenomena. The incidence and nature of terrorism as well as counter-
terrorism strategies certainly changed over time. Whether these changes are profound
enough to speak of new (as opposed to old) terrorism needs to be discussed and decided
elsewhere. For the purpose of this book, it just seemed important to mention that New
Wars are not simply a merger of internal warfare with terrorism. New Wars and new
forms of terrorism are not equatable. This implies that New Wars are neither the only
kind of warfare nor the only kind of organized violence occurring today. New Warfare
is just one of many diﬀerent contemporary forms of bilateral and unilateral, sporadic
or more sustained forms of organized violence. Besides (extra-state, international and
internal) state-based and non-state armed conﬂicts, contemporary forms of organized
violence also include campaigns of one-sided violence (e.g. genocides/politicides, acts of
terrorism and organized crime). “The new network wars” which Kaldor believes to be
“the dominant wars of our time” are not even the only kind of New Warfare identiﬁed by
the author. Kaldor also observes the emergence and increasing importance of so-called
spectacle wars2 and of neo-modern wars3. Both, however, are inter-state in nature and
therefore not the focus of this study.
2Spectacle wars are waged by states, linked to the need to maintain a military role for the US after the
end of the Cold War and to justify high levels of military spending. Examples are the US invasion
of Iraq or the War on Terror (Kaldor 2006b, pp. 1–3; Kaldor 2005, pp. 1, 7). Because powerful
norms emerged that prohibit killing, these wars combine aerial bombardment at long distance and
rapid oﬀensive maneuvers (as in old warfare) with high technology. This allows casualty-free warfare
(at least in terms of Americans killed). A “Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment Network” (Der
Derian 2001) emerges which allows US citizens to watch these wars “as a kind of replay of World War
II” and to imagine that they are leading “a mission for democracy” or a “powerful moral crusade of
freedom” against tyrants or terrorists (Kaldor 2006b, pp. 4 sq.; Kaldor 2005, pp. 6–8). The origins
of this kind of warfare date back to the post-Vietnam era. Spectacle (inter-state) warfare and new
(non-state and intra-state) warfare reinforce each other, e.g. in Iraq where the violence following the
US invasion resembles New Warfare (Kaldor 2006b, p. 8; Kaldor 2004).
3Neo-modern wars are waged by states that seek to achieve conventional military objectives and are
willing to risk the lives of their soldiers. They involve either limited inter-state warfare or counter-
insurgency to defeat extremist networks (e.g. the conﬂicts in Chechnya or the Kashmir conﬂict).
Because warfare involves counter-insurgency measures, the impact on civilians is devastating and
similar to the impact of the New Wars. Yet, due to the growing destructiveness of weapons and the
resulting diﬃculties of overcoming defensive positions, military victory is hard to achieve (Kaldor
2004). Nevertheless, states that engage in neo-modern militarism “are still under the illusion that
they can win militarily” (Kaldor 2001).
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9. Critical Discussion of the Concept of
New Wars
The concept of New Wars has been criticized for conceptual weaknesses as well as its
lack of empirical relevance (Chojnacki 2006b, p. 48). Some of the criticism put forward
is well-considered and justiﬁed, while other objections are based on a rather superﬁcial
reading or simpliﬁed interpretation of the concept. For instance, in an early paper on
this matter Kalyvas (2001), one of the most ﬁerce critics of the concept of New Wars,
distinguishes old from new civil wars in regard to their causes or motivations (collective
vs. private causes and motivations), their popular support base (whether they enjoy
or lack popular support) and the kind of violence applied (controlled vs. gratuitous
violence). By reducing the concept to these three dimensions, the author misses decisive
characteristics of New Warfare, e.g. the nature and number of actors involved. Likewise,
he oversimpliﬁes the discussion, e.g. on the question whether the quantity or quality
of violence diﬀers between types of internal armed conﬂict or whether these parameters
changed over time within cases of warfare.
While descriptions of the concept of New Wars often remain superﬁcial, lists of New
Wars authors and those who are accused of having adopted “a related analytical distinc-
tion” are overly comprehensive. On the one extreme, Kalyvas (2001, pp. 100 sq.) and
Kahl and Teusch (2004, fn 7, p. 8) include best-selling authors like Enzensberger or Ka-
plan whose writings on civil warfare in general and on single New Wars cases have been
controversially discussed.1 Both are not academics but journalists, essayists, poets or
dramatists. On the other extreme, their lists of New Wars authors comprise Paul Collier
and his colleagues from the World Bank who are well known for their theoretical models
of greed and grievance conﬂicts and their ambitious econometric analyses. According to
my understanding, Collier et al. are neither representatives of the concept of New Wars
nor have they adopted a related analytical distinction. They investigate conventional
civil warfare and therefore stick to state-based armed conﬂicts. Squeezing these diverse
authors under the umbrella of one school of thought is awkward. Kaplan’s and En-
zensberger’s works have been referred to as “pessimistic culturalism” (Schlichte 2006a,
p. 112). They believe to observe a tendency to self-destruction and collective madness.
According to Enzensberger (1994, fn 6, p. 30), New Wars are fought “about nothing at
all” while Paul Collier and his colleagues deﬁne greed conﬂicts as violent competition
between rebel groups and the national government for the control of valuable resources
1See Enzensberger (1994); Kaplan (1994a); Kaplan (1994b).
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(Collier and Hoeﬄer 2004, pp. 565–570). While the former describes New Warfare as
the uncontrolled and senseless slaughter of civilians by combatants who have an “innate
inability to think and act in terms of past and future”, the latter describe violent actors
as greedy and rational individuals who follow their private economic interest and thereby
apply violence strategically. Thus, I agree with Münkler (2006, p. 133), who accuses the
critics of the concept of New Wars to make little eﬀort in choosing representatives of
this school of thought and in diﬀerentiating their arguments.
Because Kalyvas (2001) lumps together the above mentioned diverse concepts, he
more or less equates conventional (state-based) greed conﬂicts with new (non-state or
sub-state) warfare. This explains why a large part of his critique refers to the concept of
looting which is central to the concept of greed conﬂicts. He calls the concept of looting
“analytically problematic” because it remains unclear whether it refers to the causes of
warfare or to the motivations of the combatants (or to both). He asks whether people
wage war in order to loot or whether they engage in looting in order to wage war. At
the same time, however, he admits that the direction of causality may be irrelevant for
predicting the likelihood of armed conﬂict which Paul Collier and his colleagues aim to
explain (Kalyvas 2001, p. 104, fn 21). Like many others, Kalyvas (2001, p. 104) rightly
questions the validity of the proxies used for measuring “lootable resources”2 and notes
that the concept of New Wars fails to clarify who does the looting (elites, autonomous
militias or armed peasants).
This relates to the phenomenon of warlordism. Kalyvas (2001, p. 105) suggests looking
at historical cases which prove that a key feature of warlordism has always been and
still is rule (rather than looting). According to him and others, warlords were and are
state-builders.3 This, however, is not at odds with the concept of New Wars, which
2Studies on resource wealth and civil war have been criticized for theoretical reasons (e.g. uncertainty
about causal mechanisms) and for statistical reasons (e.g. problems of reverse causation, a lack of
robustness and measurement errors). See e.g. Lujala, N. P. Gleditsch, et al. (2005); Ross (2006);
DeSoysa (2002); Ballatine (2003) or the Special Issue of the Journal of Conﬂict Resolution 49 (4) in
2005. It has been argued that looting in fact depends on other factors (e.g. access to the regional
and global markets, the value of the resources or the technological as well as geographical availability
of the resources to the predators). This led to the suggestion of conditional theories of the resource
curse because easily lootable resources have been present and processed in many countries for quite
a while but only at times they are looted by violent actors and only under certain circumstances
they fuel warfare (see also Dunning (2005) for a similar argument). In other words, there is too little
variance in the abundance of lootable resources in order to explain the great variance in the outbreak
or duration of violent conﬂict. Although the abundance or production of lootable resources might in
general increase the risk of war onset, it can neither explain the timing of the outbreak of violence
nor is it the only factor increasing the risk of warfare. Chojnacki (2004, p. 10) suggests to consider
the varying eﬀect of diﬀerent resources on the onset and duration of armed conﬂicts and adds that
diﬀerent kinds of asset transfer (e.g. the exploitation of precious gemstones or the looting of civilian
populations by rebels) follow diﬀerent logics of action.
3For instance, Schlichte (2006b, p. 565) notes that non-state actors involved in warfare in developing
countries often take over state functions, they establish welfare systems, their own rules of warfare and
systems of ﬁnancing their war eﬀort. He extends this argument further by stating that after World
War II, all kinds of wars (wars of decolonization, social-revolutionary wars, wars within developing
88
argues that warlords, because they emerge in a context of state weakness, are able to
oﬀer services and even provide (selective) security which otherwise would be provided
by the state. The concept acknowledges that warlords establish structures for ﬁnancing
their war eﬀorts and to enrich themselves, e.g. they levy taxes. This explicitly in-
cludes sophisticated economic interaction with foreign ﬁrms that buy raw materials like
diamonds or timber from the rebels and/or sell them weapons (Kaldor 2007, p. 111).
An example is De Beers (the world’s leading diamond company), which has been ac-
cused of buying and trading “blood diamonds” from and with rebels that have been
produced by slaves or child soldiers during and after warfare in the DRC, Angola and
Sierra Leone (Le Billon 2000; Le Billon 2001; Global Witness 1998). Foreign businesses
have also been involved in the coltan trade in the DRC (Raeymaeker 2002) while The
Danzer Group (the number one hardwood veneer producer and one of the biggest ex-
porters of round timber, sawn timber and veneer in the world) earned several hundred
million US dollars a year by exporting timber from war-torn countries like Liberia or
the DRC. This company’s contractors and partners were not only conducting massive
anarchic and illegal logging outside their concessions but also cooperated with violent
actors. Danzer/Interholco’s exclusive agent for the export of round timber in Liberia,
the Inland Logging Company, was closely related to the former Liberian warlord and
president, Charles Talyor, whose rebels were controlling the illegal trade in diamonds
during the Liberian war. In March 2001, the UN imposed a ban on trading diamonds
from and arms to Liberia and 130 people surrounding Charles Taylor were confronted
with a travel ban. This included Maurice Cooper, the owner of the Inland Logging
Company. The Manager of another vendor to Danzer/Interholco, The Oriental Timber
Company, is deemed to be the central ﬁgure in the logistics of the illegal arms trade
to Liberia (Greenpeace 2005). In addition, warlords establish structures for cooperation
with international crime syndicates (Münkler 2005, p. 94). According to Kalyvas (2001,
p. 105), such organized, systematic and sophisticated economic interaction is at odds
with the extreme fragmentation implied by the concept of New Wars. However, the
countries, wars within neopatrimonial states and wars within peripheral socialist countries) rather
strengthened the idea or logic of statehood. Oftentimes, newly independent states emerged as a result
of warfare. According to him, the crises of political authority which accompanied these wars never
resulted in a lasting weakening of state structures. Even if wars happened in neopatrimonial states
(his kind of warfare which comes closest to the concept of New Wars), rules of politics did not vanish
entirely. Statehood was simply delegated and fragmented. According to this author, territorial and
bureaucratic control still existed even in countries like Somalia or Afghanistan where the central
government had collapsed meanwhile (Schlichte 2006b, pp. 562, 566). In line with this, Chojnacki
(2006b, p. 67) speaks of a “reconﬁguration” of force or power. Warfare not only means the collapse of
political order but also the emergence of new or changed social order and political institutions. “[W]ar
economies [. . . ] not just reﬂect the economic interests of diverse entrepreneurs of violence, but they
also compensate for the decrease of power of political elites, alter loyalty relations and thus produce
social conditions [. . . ]. Especially in areas where state authorities have collapsed, war economies are
accompanied by the emergence of multiple patterns of political authority and network-like, informal
political practices” (Chojnacki 2004, p. 10). He adds that even sub-state actors who do not want to
take over the government might want to acquire “ﬁctitious statehood and sovereignty” because this
strengthens their inwards actions and may give them an advantage over political rivals, e.g. in terms
of recognition or access to international aid (Chojnacki 2004, p. 25).
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author fails to provide a convincing explanation for this bold conclusion. Instead, one
might argue that economic exchange between foreign companies and contemporary war-
lords is mostly illegal and often violates existing embargoes. The risky nature of such
endeavors might well contribute to the fragmentation of armed groups not least because
organized, systematic and sophisticated economic interaction during warfare is much
easier to sustain for small (but internally more cohesive) splinter groups.
The concept of New Wars also addresses well the question whether and in how far the
phenomenon of warlordism has changed over time. Advocates of the concept agree that
warlordism was already observed in early modern warfare and is by no means a new
phenomenon. Still, contemporary forms of warlordism and classical warlordism diﬀer.
While “[i]n the classical forms of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, warlordism
rested upon the structures and conjunctures of an agrarian economy, it has since pene-
trated the subcultures of urban youth (its largest source of recruitment), where it uses
the culture-industry settings of rap or raggea and corresponding promises of consump-
tion and status to draw in and motivate future ﬁghters. In some warlord conﬁgurations,
sunglasses and kalashnikovs have become iconic signs of a readiness to engage in brutal
unpredictable violence” (Münkler 2005, p. 17). According to Münkler (2005, p. 66) this
“combination of kalashnikov and Hollywood” is not only new but also in part explains
the unchaining of violence in New Wars. Elsewhere, he notes that “[t]he passage from
closed to open war economies is mainly what distinguishes the new wars from the war-
lord conﬁgurations in nineteenth-century Latin America or in China in the ﬁrst half of
the twentieth century, as well as from the classical model of civil war” (Münkler 2005,
p. 95). The closed war economies of classical warlordism rested essentially upon agrarian
subsistence economies, could maintain themselves for long periods only in peripheral and
usually isolated areas and had a limited sphere of inﬂuence. They did not pose a major
problem for either international relations or the world economy. “In terms of world
politics, they were so marginal that they could be virtually ignored. [. . . ] [P]olitical or
economic metastasis was not a feature of these war economies” (Münkler 2005, p. 96).
Warlords and the closed war economies they established and exploited were more a tran-
sitional phenomenon, “a feature of the immediate postwar period than of the war itself,
and black-markets soon disappeared as the supply of goods increased and currency sta-
bilized” (Münkler 2005, p. 77). Regional warlords had strong incentives to soon formalize
and regularize the structures of force or to take over oﬃces and institutions. This has
changed. From the 1950s onwards, war economies opened up to the inﬂuence of either
the Eastern or the Western block. They were placed under a certain political control
by the respective superpowers who kept them running. But with the end of the Cold
War, this option of building an open war economy by relying on a powerful third party
vanished. At least the ﬂow of resources that used to take place within the East-West
controversy was replaced with links mediated by the world market.4 Although the new,
open war economies also prosper from a constant inﬂow of resources from abroad, war-
fare funded through shadow globalization became an “increasingly attractive option for
4See also Kahl and Teusch (2004, p. 396).
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regional belligerents”. The new warlords derive income from the exploitation of strategic
raw materials and from illegal goods sold in the global shadow economy (Münkler 2005,
pp. 95, 97). Today’s global market oﬀers opportunities for extra-territorial reinvestment
and accumulation of wealth which classical warlords simply lacked (Kahl and Teusch
2004, p. 399). Today, most of the wars and war economies in question are no longer
subject to outside political control by other states or international organizations. Mün-
kler (2005, p. 98) summarizes that scarcely any of today’s warlord conﬁgurations rests
upon a closed war economy. Warlords who have long been seen as a typical feature of
stalled modernization processes “have been propelling a modernization process of their
own during the last two decades. They have emancipated themselves from the speciﬁc
social and economic structures to which they used to be tied”.
In general, critics of the concept claim that the importance of economic motivations
has been greatly overstated in new civil wars and greatly understated in old civil wars
(Newman 2004, p. 183; Berdal 2003, pp. 479, 490 sqq.). They argue that rebel moti-
vations are (and have always been) diverse and include concerns that go beyond mere
banditry (Schlichte 2002, pp. 129 sq.; Schlichte 2006a, pp. 117 sqq.). Therefore, “to fo-
cus excessively on material explanations and greed-inspired motivations of actors may
lead to one-sided explanations of conﬂict” (Bøås 2005, p. 73). Bøås (2005) points to the
historical roots (rather than mere greed) that created political and economic grievances
and cemented ethnic cleavages in Liberia which later inspired internal warfare. He adds
the regional context, the role of external actors and Charles Taylor’s interests and poli-
tics as alternative explanations for the outbreak or escalation of violence. Unwittingly,
however, many of his arguments correspond quite well with the concept of New War,
which leaves room for historical and identity factors, e.g. when it comes to the causes of
state weakness and the emergence of identity politics. Bøås (2005, pp. 78 sqq.) himself
describes how Liberia mutated from a typical “Cell 3 case” with weak social structures
but a strong coercive state into a “Cell 4 case” characterized by the absence of both
social cohesion and strong governmental mechanisms capable of imposing order on soci-
ety. “The” Liberian civil war as implied by the title of his essay does not exist. Instead,
several conventional (state-based) and new (non-state) armed conﬂicts took place.5 Ka-
lyvas (2001, pp. 103–105) refers to the New War cases in Sierra Leone or Mozambique
5In 1979, grievances led to the outbreak of riots. President Tolbert was killed by a group of young
oﬃcers and Samuel Doe assumed state power. Later, Charles Taylor and his rebel army sneaked over
to Liberia from Ivory Coast to topple Doe’s brutal and despotic regime. What had started as another
(conventional) grievance rebellion soon changed into (or was accompanied by) a new (non-state)
armed conﬂict. During the 1990s, “[d]issension emerged within Taylor’s ranks” and splinter groups
(e.g. Taylor’s NPFL rebels, Prince Johnson’s forces, ULIMO-K, ULIMO-J and the Liberian Peace
Council) started to ﬁght each other and the ECOMOG force. “[S]igniﬁcant human rights violations”
occurred, “economic motives became to play an increasingly important role” and an underground
war economy emerged in which “the factions’ leaders and the Nigerian generals in ECOMOG [. . . ]
became important actors” (Bøås 2005, pp. 81 sq.). Warfare only ended in 1997 when Charles Taylor
was elected president. Because his political practice was again characterized by corruption, patronage
and coercion, another conventional and internationalized grievance rebellion broke out. Until 2003,
LURD and MODEL rebels fought against the government of Charles Taylor.
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where the rebels have been “stigmatized as lacking any ideology” although they had a
“sophisticated political understanding of their participation” and articulated “peasant
ideologies”. He accuses the New Wars argument as being based on “incomplete or biased
evidence derived from journalistic reports that tend to quote uncritically city-dwellers
and members of pro-governmental organizations” who portray the rebels as reckless loot-
seeking criminals. Ideological motivations are simply overlooked because they are less
visible. It remains somewhat unclear whether this point of critique is a conceptual one
or whether the author intends to criticize the measurement of rebel motivations and
the quality of data used. One might counter that at least indirect measures of rebel
motivations (like the kind of violence applied or the identity of the victims) might well
capture the motives, even in cases where the true motivations are not made explicit.
Furthermore, reference to single cases that contradict the concept of new wars does not
necessarily disprove an overall, general trend. Finally, some of these authors’ concerns
are in fact shared and addressed by the advocates of the concept of New Wars. Kalyvas
(2001, p. 104, fn 25) emphasizes the diversity of individual motives to join a rebellion
which range from getting food for survival or stopping others from killing your family
and friends to forced recruitment or sheer adventurism.6 This almost perfectly resem-
bles Mary Kaldor (1999, pp. 19, 25), who notes that “[m]en go to war for a variety of
individual reasons – adventure, honor, fear, comradeship or the protection of ‘home and
hearth”’. In fact, “more emotive causes have always been required to instill loyalty and
to persuade men to risk their lives”. According to Kaldor (1999, p. 25) and Kaldor (2007,
p. 28), economic incentives as well as state interest are inadequate as a motivation for
warfare because “socially organized legitimate violence needs a common goal in which
the individual soldier can believe and which he shares with others. If soldiers are to be
treated as heroes and not as criminals, then heroic justiﬁcation is needed to mobilize
their energies, to persuade to kill and risk to be killed”. While in old wars the recruitment
of combatants, the cohesion of armed groups and the legitimacy of warfare depended on
a shared ideology and a common political goal, New Warfare relies on identity politics
instead of ideology and oﬀers economic incentives to mobilize people to engage in warfare
and to sustain ﬁghting. In fact, the satisfaction of economic interests suﬃces to instill
loyalty and to persuade the combatants to risk their lives because the risk of being killed
on the battleﬁeld is relatively low. In addition, those involved in New Warfare do not
6See also Kalyvas (2006, pp. 44–46), who notes that ideology does motivate action as much as ﬁnancial
considerations, social cleavages, local politics, personal animosities, peer pressure or the desire to take
revenge, to save jobs, privileges or the own life. The author speaks of multiple and often conﬂicting
reasons. Later he notes that “joining a rebel army and collaboration with it result from variable
and complex sets of heterogeneous and interacting motivations, which are aﬀected by preferences
over outcomes, beliefs about outcomes, the behavior of others and the networks into which people
are embedded, and security considerations in an environment where chance and contingency cannot
be underestimated”. Other ﬁghters are motivated by their “curiosity, the prospect of excitement or
adventure, the lure of danger, the acquisition of a new and more rewarding individual identity or
moral world view, the pleasure of acting as one’s own agent, and purely criminal motives” (like access
to public goods or individual material beneﬁts). “Protection against indiscriminate violence from the
opposite side, escape from obligations, acquisition of higher status, personal or local disputes, or
simply the response to emotions” (e.g. to anger or personal humiliation) complete his long list
(Kalyvas 2006, pp. 95–97).
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care much about their reputation and whether they are treated as heroes or criminals.
The applied violence is neither socially organized nor legitimate. New Warfare cannot
be described anymore as an “act of extreme coercion, involving socially organized or-
der, discipline, hierarchy and obedience [that] requires loyalty, devotion and belief from
each individual” (Kaldor 2007, p. 29). Still, the increasing importance or dominance
of economic motives does not mean that more emotive causes are entirely irrelevant –
especially because identity politics play upon them. Heupel and Zangl (2003, pp. 10, 22)
agree and provide case evidence from Angola where ethnic diﬀerences played an impor-
tant role in the formation of rebel groups and their initial grievance rebellion. Over time,
however, conventional internal warfare increasingly turned into New Warfare. Ethnic
diﬀerences clearly paled and were merely used by the UNITA rebels to cover their true
economic interest in warfare. Münkler (2005, p. 24) fails to provide a clear distinction
between “politics of ideas” and “identity politics” but elaborates further on the rather
instrumental role of ideological and identity factors as merely ordering or rhetorical de-
vices in New Warfare. He notes that players, “if necessary, use ideologies to legitimize
their struggle” and that “warring parties are more than happy to exploit [ethnic and
cultural] diﬀerences as an ideological resource for the recruitment of followers and the
mobilization of support”. Therefore, “ethnic or religious oppositions are not usually the
causes of a conﬂict, but merely reinforce it” (Münkler 2005, p. 6). According to him,
individuals in New Warfare are “mainly driven by ﬁnancial gain, a lust for adventure
and a range of ideological motives” (Münkler 2005, p. 21). He speaks of a “web of mo-
tives and causes” and a “mixture of personal cravings for power, ideological convictions
and ethnic-cultural oppositions that keep the new wars smoldering away”. Obviously, he
and other New Wars advocates do not clearly diﬀerentiate recruitment from retention,
although these are separate processes (Nordås and Gates 2010). The initial motivations
(the reasons for joining an army), the reasons for remaining in it and the reasons for
active engagement in actual warfare signiﬁcantly diﬀer (Kalyvas 2006, pp. 100 sq.). At
least, however, Münkler (2005, pp. 6–8) also distances himself from any economic reduc-
tionism by noting that “[n]one of the [above mentioned] causes may be singled out as
the really decisive one [. . . ] so that the various monocausal explanations [. . . ] fall short
of the mark”.
Unfortunately, the concept of new wars does not address diﬀerences in motivations
within rebel organizations although ordinary soldiers’ motivations most likely diﬀer
from leaders’ motivations as well as their rhetoric. Kalyvas (2001, pp. 107, 110–112,
119) accuses civil war research in general of inferring the motivations of the rank and
ﬁle members from their leadership’s articulation of ideological messages. Because the
meaning of rebellions is often articulated by elites in the language of national cleavages,
observers tend to erroneously code them as actually mobilizing popular support along
those cleavages. Individual motivations, however, are not necessarily informed by im-
personal cleavages related to grievances, but often by local and personal conﬂict. The
individual decision to join one side or the other is shaped by local loyalties and rivalries,
e.g. between competing clans. Kalyvas (2001, p. 107) even states that “local considera-
tions have always trumped ideological ones at the mass level”. Schlichte (2006a, p. 118)
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distinguishes between the motivations of the rebel leaders (who might be most inter-
ested in political power, material aggrandizement but also social privilege, honor and
the establishment of some sort of political order), the regional and local commanders
(who might still be ideologically motivated but also strive for access to political power
or revenge for historical injustice) and the rank and ﬁle members (who are participating
in warfare because of fear or coercion as well as their aim for a better life). Theoret-
ically, this issue could be addressed by a Principal Agent Approach which depicts the
leaders of the rebel groups as the principals, the soldiers as the agents and the regional
commanders as either agents (in relation to the leaders) or principals (in relation to
the soldiers). Kalyvas (2001, p. 108) further elaborates upon this issue by referring to
“numerous studies” investigating soldier’s motivations to participate in armed struggle.
These studies found that ordinary combatants are usually motivated by group pressures
and processes involving either regard for their comrades, respect for their leaders, con-
cern for their own reputation with both or an urge to contribute to the success of the
group. These ﬁndings, however, are based on interviews with participants of conven-
tional (state-based) guerrilla warfare. The motivations of rebels engaged in sub-state
or non-state warfare are not investigated. Unfortunately, this also holds for otherwise
promising recent studies by Cunningham (2013), Nordås and Gates (2010), Seymour
(2010), or Findley and Rudloﬀ (2012). In addition, the evidence provided by Kalyvas
(2001) is again derived from single case studies and therefore inadequate to disprove the
rather general or global trends proposed by the concept of New Wars. In order to explore
whether the true motivations of those engaged in conventional (state-based) civil wars
diﬀer from those engaged in new (non-state) warfare, standardized interviews with the
combatants of both kinds of internal warfare across a large number of cases and regions
are needed.
Attached to the causes and motivations of internal warfare is the issue of popular
support. The concept of New Wars states that old civil wars were based on considerable
popular support at least for the rebels while NewWars are characterized by a lack thereof.
According to Kalyvas (2001, p. 109), this impression is again based upon incomplete
and biased information. Renamo in Mozambique is given as an example of a New Wars
actor who nevertheless enjoyed “considerable popular support”. The author reports that
“this support was present in rural areas controlled by Renamo, where researchers and
journalists rarely traveled rather than in the cities under government control”. Likewise,
popular support in many old civil wars was much lower than often presumed. He and
others refer to Latin American civil wars and the war in Vietnam where the Vietkong
relied on extensive coercion against the civilian population. Kalyvas (2001, p. 113)
summarizes that “[i]n old civil wars, popular support was shaped, won, and lost during
the war, often by means of coercion and violence and along lines of kinship and locality;
it was not purely consensual, immutable, ﬁxed, and primarily ideological. In this respect,
old civil wars are not as diﬀerent from new civil wars as they appear to be”.
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Contrary to what Kaldor argues, mass population displacement is nothing new either.7
Likewise, the critics of the concept of New Wars remark that the abduction of children
and the practice of recruiting child soldiers has already happened in old civil wars (e.g.
in Afghanistan, Peru, Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua or during the Cultural Revo-
lution in China). In the latter case, eight to ﬁfteen year olds (the Young Red Guards)
were among the most violent groups (Kalyvas 2001, p. 115). Similarly, the critics of
the concept argue that violence in warfare has always been especially directed against
women (Newman 2004, p. 183). Münkler (2005, p. 81) replies by opposing this “strong
form of generalization” because it presents violence against women “as an ever identi-
cal phenomenon” or “an anthropological constant” and therefore overlooks the extent
to which violence against women during warfare has varied historically in both scale
and intensity. He argues that since the eighteenth century, “mass rapes have no longer
been a semi-institutional part of war” because since then rape has been considered a
war crime for which the penalty has usually been death. In old warfare, sexual violence
on the enemy territory was even considered dysfunctional because it slowed down the
movement of armies, because it increased the risk of infections with sexually transmitted
diseases and because it undermined morale (Münkler 2005, pp. 81, 83). In cases where it
nevertheless occurred, the use of violence against women was mainly the outcome of mis-
conduct among soldiers. In contrast, violence against women is often highly functional
and the outcome of calculated planning in New Wars. There, “women are no longer
just booty, trophies or sex objects” but the main target of attack and part of a strategy
based on ethnic cleansing. In New Wars, the local military leadership does not prevent
or punish sexual violence against women but orders and organizes the systematic rape
and forced pregnancy of women in that section of the population which is targeted for
expulsion. Because rape does not require any extra deployment of forces, weapons or
immediate risk of life from the side of the perpetrator, ethnic cleansing can be achieved
more eﬀectively and cost eﬃciently through systematic rape.8 In those cases where rape
is not part of a planned strategy by the military leadership, it is still part of the New
War Economy. In nearly all New Wars, the rape of women is also a prize for the victors
and conquerors. It is not applied as an on-oﬀ action and limited to a short period of
time after the end of hostilities but happens extensively throughout the entire duration
of New Warfare.
In defense of the advocates of the concept of New Wars I record that they acknowl-
edge the existence of phenomena like warlordism, war economies or violence against
civilians/women in old warfare. However, they argue that the scale and/or quality of
these phenomena have changed. For instance, even if the practice of child recruitment is
7See e.g. Kalyvas (2001, p. 110); Newman (2004, pp. 181 sq.); Gantzel (2002, pp. 12 sq.); Pradetto
(2004, p. 196); Kahl and Teusch (2004, pp. 385, 393 sq., fn 12).
8Again, such strategies are not necessarily new. However, earlier population transfers “may be regarded
as a policy success, in so far as they laid the foundation for a redrawing of state frontiers or a
reconﬁguration of multinational empires into a number of nation states” (Münkler 2005, p. 82). This
is not the case in New Warfare, where according to the author ethnic cleansing and massacres replace
battle and any political purpose of warfare.
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nothing new and even if entire sub-units like the Young Red Guards have been composed
of children in old civil warfare, the overall share of children in the total armed forces
of violent groups might still have increased over time. The recruitment of child soldiers
became increasingly popular within the last 10 to 15 years – especially in Africa where a
tradition of child soldiering does not exist (Pittwald 2004, p. 215). Others agree that “in
pre-colonial African armies, the general practice was that children could not be consid-
ered warriors until three to four years after reaching puberty” (J. Davis 2008, pp. 6 sq.).
The author refers to Peter Singer (2008), who even notes that he could not ﬁnd a sin-
gle example where traditional tribes or ancient civilizations relied upon ﬁghting forces
made up of young boys or girls. This might relate to the fact that the functions of child
soldiers have changed. J. Davis (2008, pp. 1 sq.) explains that one of the consistencies
throughout history has been the avoidance of using children as combatants. “Even in
pre-modern societies, where adulthood was considerably younger than the eighteen years
currently prescribed in international law, children were typically used in support roles
as cooks, supply assistants, or launderers but rarely as armed combatants”. The author
sees The Children’s Crusade, the Hitler Jugend or the Janissaries of the early Ottoman
Empire as anomalous cases. Only “[i]n recent wars, there has been a signiﬁcant increase
in the mobilization and use of children in combat, as opposed to support roles”. The
American Civil War of the 19th century is one of the ﬁrst historic examples of children
being mobilized as actual combatants. The next example of this practice was not seen
until World War II (J. Davis 2008, p. 8).
Dramatic increases in the number of child soldiers especially in Africa seem to support
the expectation that (forced) child soldiering especially occurs in New Wars. It has been
argued that non-state actors involved in New Wars lack access to regular conscripts and
therefore more often rely on children. Child soldiering might also be especially likely
in New Wars because over its extended duration, New Warfare depletes the pool of
adult conscripts. In addition, children might be more likely to be misused as soldiers
in New Wars because these wars are fought with small arms that are easy to handle by
children. Achvarina and Reich (2006) adds another point which very well ﬁts into this
line of argument. The author states that “the degree to which children are protected
in refugee camps is the primary determinant of child soldier recruitment rates” (Achva-
rina and Reich 2006, p. 132). According to this thesis, a larger percentage of ﬁghting
forces will be made up of child soldiers in those cases where refugee and IDP camps
are vulnerable to inﬁltration or raids by violent groups. If unprotected, these camps
are an important resource pool for the recruitment of the camps’ inhabitants (including
children) through the use of coercion or propaganda because then violent actors are able
to inﬁltrate the camps and become indistinct from the civilian population. The result
is a “militarization” of camps which under “normal” conditions would be impossible or
more diﬃcult because then these camps would fall under the protection of a legitimate
judicial authority (the government, a regional entity or an international organization).
In New Warfare, this protection crumbles because the state is collapsing or already col-
lapsed. Furthermore, those ﬂeeing from non-state or sub-state armed conﬂicts do not
fall under the conventional deﬁnition of a refugee, asylum seeker or internally displaced
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person. Refugee and IDP camps are much better protected under international law in
the case of conventional (state-based) internal warfare. If the international community
does not intervene to protect these forced migrants, and if a way out does not exist
because borders are closed, children are much more likely to be recruited as warriors in
a situation of New Warfare. It is at least tempting to assume that the increase in the
number of child soldiers after the end of the Cold War is a product of the breakdown of
state control (and that rebel forces, not states, recruit child soldiers). However, and as
already mentioned, empirical evidence drawn from African cases is “far more ambigu-
ous” (Achvarina and Reich 2006, pp. 129 sq.). It remains to be answered whether the
observed increase in the number of child soldiers is indeed due to their more frequent
use in emerging New Wars or whether it is due to their increasing use in conventional
(state-based) civil wars (where they are also often recruited by governments).
In defense of the concept of New Wars, one might also argue that even if old civil
warfare also resulted in many deaths, the quality of violence might have changed (e.g.
the share of direct and indirect civilian victims might have increased). Even if the total
number of civilian battle-related deaths did not change signiﬁcantly, the share of such
victims might have increased (if the overall number of direct military deaths decreased).
Likewise, the perpetrators of violence against civilians might have changed. Advocates
of the concept of New Wars claim that in old civil wars violence against civilians was
mostly committed by state forces (as a means of punishment for supporting the rebels)
while in New Wars this kind of violence is carried out by non-state forces. Such changes
cannot be detected by looking at the (maybe even declining) overall level of violence.
Kalyvas (2001) remains silent on time trends but critically comments on diﬀerences in
the nature of violence across types of internal warfare. According to him, violence in New
Warfare is not as senseless or gratuitous as it often appears. He refers to massacres in
Algeria and Mozambique that were highly selective and where violence had been applied
strategically. In Sierra Leone, rebels cut oﬀ the hands of women to prevent them from
sowing and their husbands from deserting and returning to their villages during harvest
season. The rebels used the same tactic to hinder people from casting their vote in the
upcoming election which the rebels boycotted. In this and other cases, horrifying and
seemingly absurd acts of violence entailed a high degree of rational calculation.9 Such
kind of rebel behavior does not contradict the concept of New Wars. It very well ﬁts with
the notion that violence against civilians is part of a strategy aimed at sowing fear and
hatred. Systematic rape as well as public, very visible acts of brutality are indicators of
New Wars that “are rational in the sense that they apply rational thinking to the aims
of war and refuse normative constraints” (Kaldor 1999, p. 100; Münkler 2006, p. 141).
Advocates of the concept of New Wars would also agree with their critics10 that intra-
state warfare in general is particularly cruel and that violence is in fact the central
9See Kalyvas (2001, p. 116); Kalyvas (2004, p. 100); Kalyvas (2006, p. 28).
10E.g. Kalyvas (2001, p. 114) or Kahl and Teusch (2004, p. 393).
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component of all kinds of internal warfare – whether ethnic or non-ethnic, old or new.
However, they would insist that the scale and quality of violence varies considerably
within and between categories of internal warfare. Whether one accepts Kalyvas (2001,
p. 114) reference to Madame de Stael who observes “that all civil wars are more or less
similar in their atrocity” depends on what “more or less similar” in terms of atrocity
means. Between 1945 and 1999, 145 conventional civil wars occurred which resulted
in 16 to 21 million direct, battle-related deaths. While the mean number of battle-
related deaths per conﬂict stands at 143,883, the median is only 19,000. A few cases
like the war in the DRC (from 1998 to 2003) are characterized by an extraordinary high
death toll while half of all civil wars resulted in 19,000 or fewer direct victims. The
distribution of battle-related deaths is therefore heavily right-skewed and by no means
equal (Sambanis 2004, p. 820). This great deal of variation in the scale of violence in
civil warfare constitutes the dependent variable in numerous quantitative studies. These
analyses found that certain types of civil wars (e.g. identity conﬂicts, religious conﬂicts in
combination with separatist movements or civilizational conﬂicts) are signiﬁcantly more
violent in terms of direct, battle-related deaths. This holds even if the respective studies
control for intervening variables like the overall length of warfare or the population size
of the aﬀected country.11
Those who do not share the expectation that New Wars are speciﬁcally brutal or
bloody12 might instead claim that New Warfare is nothing other than “small warfare”,
which is not a new phenomenon either. Once more, New Wars theorists agree at least
with the second half of this statement. They note that small wars already existed, e.g.
in the eighteenth century. Back then, “the small wars, with their use of light troops,
chasseurs and hussars, had had the function of protecting the movements of the main
army, preventing the advance of enemy troops, repeatedly cutting their supply lines for
short periods and generally inﬂicting the maximum economic damage on the enemy by
means of plunder and devastation” (Münkler 2005, p. 23). This very much sounds like
NewWarfare. However, the combination of small and large wars no longer applies in New
Warfare. Münkler (2005, pp. 23 sq.) refers to Christopher Daase, who ﬁnds that “small
wars changed from a supportive instrument for large wars to its functional replacement”.
Still, the question remains whether another new class of internal warfare is actually
needed in light of the myriad of existing related concepts like “small wars”, “low-intensity
conﬂicts”, “wildcat wars”, “molecular civil wars”, “neo-Hobbesian wars”, simply “inter-
nal” or “civil wars”, “privatized” or “informal” wars, “post-modern” or “degenerate”
warfare. At least Henderson and D. Singer (2002) doubt that “the landscape of armed
conﬂict has changed so dramatically that it has necessitated a revision of the prevalent
typology of war, a reconsideration of the correlates of war, and a reconceptualization of
the theoretical assumptions regarding the etiology of war. While it is clear that pat-
11See Fox (2002); Fox (2004); Melander et al. (2006); Lacina, Russett, et al. (2006); Lacina (2006);
Lacina and N. P. Gleditsch (2005).
12Even Mary Kaldor distances herself from this claim when emphasizing that it is less the scale but the
quality of violence that changes (Kaldor 2005, pp. 3, 8; Kaldor 2006b, pp. 15 sq.).
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terns of warfare shift across time and space, it is not clear that war itself has changed
‘fundamentally’ and has become inexplicable in light of theoretical arguments in world
politics”. Advocates of the concept of New Wars counter-argue that related concepts
come only close to the New Wars and have been developed with another purpose in
mind. For instance, the argument that small wars have replaced large wars (and that
New Warfare therefore only means small warfare) has been “[. . . ] made chieﬂy with
regard to the consequences for the international order, and not so much for the purpose
of understanding the evolution of new wars as such” (Münkler 2005, p. 24). Christopher
Daase indeed explores the transformative eﬀect of small warfare on the international
system, i.e. on the distribution of power and resources within the international sphere
but also on institutions like norms or international law (Daase 2006). Furthermore, he
deﬁnes small wars as asymmetric warfare between rebels and government forces and con-
trasts them with big and symmetrical inter-state wars. Sofsky speaks of “wildcat wars”
that are, in line with the concept of New Wars, characterized by marauding bands, the
increasing frequency of bloody massacres and systematic rape. However, Sofsky’s focus
on irrational violence, confused rage and extreme blood lust “does not adequately grasp,
or does not grasp at all, either the ideological or the economic aspect”.13 In addition,
Sofsky misses the interweaving of intra-state players with globalization processes. This
also holds for Enzensberger’s concept of “molecular civil wars” or Trutz von Trotha’s
model of “neo-Hobbesian wars”.14 For a similar reason, Kaldor (2007, p. 2) opposes any
equation of New Wars with “internal” or “civil wars”. According to her, this term would
neither adequately capture their transnational connections, nor their non-state nature.
Likewise, the term “privatized” or “informal” wars as for example used by David Keen
(1995) also falls short of describing New Warfare where a clear distinction between pri-
vate and public, non-state and state, informal and formal “cannot easily be applied”
(Kaldor 2007, p. 2). According to Kaldor (2007, p. 2), “post-modern” warfare as pro-
posed by Mark Duﬃeld (1998) or Michael Ignatieﬀ (1998) better captures the nature of
New Wars but this concept has already been used to describe virtual wars and wars in
cyberspace. Shaw introduced the related concept of “degenerate warfare” (Shaw 2000;
Shaw 2003; Shaw 2007). The author argues that war in the global era is a degenerate
form of total war, in which counterrevolution and genocide have become more prominent.
In fact, New Wars are genocidal wars. They carry the logic of extremism in total war-
fare to the point where war is genocide (Shaw 2000). Thus, the term degenerate warfare
is used to emphasize the similarities between total (inter-state) warfare, genocide and
contemporary (inter-state and internal) wars. It serves well to draw “attention to the
decay of the national frameworks, especially military forces” (Kaldor 2007, p. 2) and to
the changing nature of violence. However, little attention is given to other dimensions
of New Warfare. In addition, decisive diﬀerences between the concept of degenerate
13The same argument applies to van Creveld’s concept of low-intensity wars. According to him, low-
intensity wars are marking the end of the “Clausewitzian Trinity” (the rigid static hierarchy and
clear distinction between the people, the army and the government as present in classical, inter-state
warfare) (Gantzel 2002, pp. 6–8; Creveld 1991).
14For these points of critique see Münkler (2005, p. 24). Where Trutz von Trotha speaks of “globalized
small wars” he rather refers to acts of international terrorism (Gantzel 2002, pp. 8–10).
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warfare and New Wars do exist. For instance, in degenerate warfare, the destruction
of the enemy is extended to also include the destruction of the civilian population –
but still as a means towards the defeat of the organized enemy. Degenerate warfare is
described as breaching accepted standards of warfare, too, but still masks itself in the
general legitimacy of war (Shaw 2007, Chapter 2).
Finally, critics of the concept of New Wars argue that the diﬀerences between old and
new civil wars do not array themselves neatly and dichotomously around the end of the
Cold War (Kalyvas 2001, p. 117; Ellis 2003, p. 32). Although they admit that the end of
the Cold War “potentially aﬀected the way in which wars are fought if not their frequency
as well as their ﬁnancing”, they criticize the concept of New Wars for not specifying any
exact mechanisms. How the end of the Cold War and changes in funding aﬀected the
ways in which civil wars are fought remains largely unclear (Kalyvas 2001, p. 117; Berdal
2003, p. 478). In addition, those who contest the New Wars theses insist that it is less the
nature of warfare but our understanding or perception of internal armed conﬂicts that
changed profoundly with the end of the East-West controversy. “By removing coherent,
if ﬂawed, political categories and classiﬁcatory devices, the end of the cold war has led
to an exaggeration of the criminal aspects of recent civil wars and a concomitant neglect
of their manifold political aspects. It is highly possible that interpretations of recent
civil wars that stress their depoliticization and criminalization are attributable more to
the demise of the conceptual categories generated by the cold war than to the end of the
cold war per se” (Kalyvas 2001, p. 117).15 Mary Kaldor (2007, p. 3) responds that by
introducing the New Wars debate it was indeed her intention to change the prevailing
but ﬂawed perceptions of war, especially among policy makers. She wanted to emphasize
the growing illegitimacy of contemporary wars and to argue in favor of a cosmopolitan
15Berdal (2003, p. 477) agrees that the Cold War shaped and distorted thinking in particular about
civil and intra-state wars “whose local sources and regional dynamics were often overshadowed by a
preoccupation with the central strategic balance and the competition for inﬂuence between East and
West”. Thus, the end of the Cold War had a “liberating impact” on the study of conﬂict. Those
engaged in Cold War analysis simply needed “new” objects to study (Pradetto 2004, p. 197). A similar
distorting eﬀect on the perception of warfare is attributed to the events of 9/11 which draw attention
to “a number of inter-related phenomena, and especially international terrorist, militant and criminal
networks, often with a distinct ethnic identity, that are linked to failed states, often on the rather
inaccurate assumption that these are new formations” (Ellis 2003, p. 20). Brzoska (2004, p. 113)
provides another explanation for the strong and sudden interest in New Wars in Germany. According
to him, the distorted perspective of an increasingly violent world emerged because Germany started
to militarily engage in out-of-area activity at the end of the 1990s (ﬁrst in Kosovo in 1999, followed
by several UN and EU peacekeeping missions). This “New Paciﬁsm” needed to be politically justiﬁed
(Schlichte 2006a, p. 123). In this regard, Pradetto (2004, p. 199) speaks of New Wars as a “marketing
phenomenon” or “slogan”. In addition, the concept of New Wars links their incidence to globalization
in a way that “nicely ﬁtted the more general criticism of globalization” which became increasingly
popular in Germany (Brzoska 2004, p. 114). Newman (2004, p. 179) adds that our understanding of
the underlying dynamics of armed conﬂicts improved considerably which is why our perception of
warfare has changed, too. “In addition, advances in communication and the media have undoubtedly
brought realities of civil war – and especially the atrocities – to the public attention more than
before”. Shifts in the causes, nature and impact of war are therefore simply more apparent than real.
See also Gantzel (2002, p. 16) or Pradetto (2004, pp. 197–199).
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political response that puts individual rights and the rule of law as the centerpiece of any
international intervention. She also admits that there is “some truth” in the position
that the dominance of the Cold War overshadowed the signiﬁcance of small wars or
low-intensity conﬂicts. Still, she insists that “the ‘new war’ argument does reﬂect a new
reality”. Contrary to the belief of most of her critics, however, she explicitly adds that
this new reality “was emerging before the end of the Cold War”. At the very beginning
of her book, Kaldor (2007, p. 1) writes that New Wars already developed “during the
last decades of the 20th century”. Elsewhere, she diﬀerentiates post-colonial from post-
communist countries where crises of state authority and legitimacy – “the fundamental
source of the new wars”- either became apparent as early as the 1970s or only after 1989
(Kaldor 2000, p. 4). Obviously, the end of the Cold War is just one among other factors
(e.g. processes of globalization or the colonial legacy) that caused or at least aggravated
state weakness even before 1989. Changes in the nature of warfare are and have always
been slow, “often imperceptible” or “rather subtle” (Münkler 2006, p. 144). They did
not suddenly follow after the end of the Cold War but need to be portrayed as a process
– as much as the end of the Cold War itself was a process.
The above illustrates that the concept of New Wars sparked a lively theoretical de-
bate. Although critics admit that civil wars diﬀer from each other in many regard, they
believe the diﬀerences to be far less pronounced than claimed by the advocates of the
concept of New Wars. For instance, they believe that the importance of ideological mo-
tivations has been greatly overstated in old civil wars and greatly understated in New
Wars while the opposite applies to the importance of economic motives. This leads to
the objection that certain New Wars phenomena, e.g. warlordism or the massive killing
of civilians, could already be observed in old warfare. Sometimes not only the novelty
but the actual importance of phenomena is called into question, e.g. the ﬁnancing of
warring parties through remittances from diaspora communities or the diversion of hu-
manitarian aid (Berdal 2003, p. 496). In addition, critics oppose the idea that diﬀerences
between old and New Wars array themselves neatly and dichotomously around the end
of the Cold War. Defendants of the concept of New Wars counter-argue that the end
of the Cold War is a decisive but not the sole factor causing or aggravating a crisis of
state authority and legitimacy which then associates with the outbreak of New Warfare.
According to them, New Wars reﬂect a reality that was emerging before the end of the
Cold War. At least theoretically, this leaves room for the occurrence of New Warfare
before 1989. Furthermore, they insist that some features of old and New Warfare only
appear similar at ﬁrst sight while in fact their nature has changed signiﬁcantly. Most
importantly, however, advocates of the concept openly admit that new and old wars
share certain characteristics.16 Some features of old warfare survived, changed their
16See e.g. Kaldor (2005, p. 3) who notes that New Wars “have much in common with wars in the pre-
modern period in Europe, and with wars outside Europe throughout the period. It is even possible to
identify some elements of what I have called ‘new wars’ within ‘old wars”’. Elsewhere, Münkler (2003,
p. 21) writes that “[i]t looks as though, during the twenty ﬁrst century, the chameleon of war will
increasingly change its appearance to resemble in many respects the wars waged from the fourteenth
to the seventeenth centuries”.
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quantity and/or quality and, in combination with other features, deﬁne New Warfare. In
this sense, New Wars are not fundamentally “new”. Instead, it is rather the coincidence
of speciﬁc changes and values in already known dimensions or parameters of warfare
that constitutes the fundamental novelty of New Wars.17 Reference to the prior occur-
rence of single dimensions of New Warfare in old wars is therefore insuﬃcient in order
to fundamentally shatter the concept. To a certain degree this even supports Henderson
and D. Singer (2002) who claim that “many of the ‘new wars’ are simply amalgamations
of various inter-state, extra-state, and intra-state wars – i.e., the ‘old wars’ – that have
been lumped into a single category. The result is a hodgepodge of armed conﬂicts whose
diﬀerent correlates derive from their diverse morphologies rather than their novelty as
wars unlike any we have experienced previously”.
Whether (or to what degree) New Wars are actually “new” is an ongoing debate
that cannot be solved here. Instead of joining this debate, I adopt a more modest
approach as proposed by Chojnacki (2006b). He argues against an entire dismissal of
existing typologies of armed conﬂict but for the inclusion of the missing category of non-
state or sub-state armed conﬂicts. Although it is common practice in quantitative civil
wars research to diﬀerentiate armed conﬂicts according to the political status of their
protagonists, most existing data collection eﬀorts do not gather information on non-
state armed conﬂicts. For this reason, this sub-category of internal warfare is absent
from many commonly used conﬂict data sets and therefore from most empirical studies
on the incidence and nature of contemporary internal warfare. The remainder of this
book argues that this omission might lead to biased results if new (non-state) armed
conﬂicts systematically diﬀer from conventional (state-based) armed conﬂicts.
The warning is also well taken not to coin conceptual categories grounded in observa-
tions of current events rather than good theory (Kalyvas 2001, p. 117). For this reason,
the previously presented comparison of new (non-state) and conventional (state-based)
armed conﬂicts was theory-driven. Still, this comparison does not substitute for the de-
velopment of an exhaustive and mutually exclusive typology. It is only a starting point
for a sound conceptual categorization which even the main advocates of the concept of
New Wars have failed to provide. Contrary to this study, Kaldor and her colleagues
developed the term mainly in distinction to classic, inter-state wars (Heupel and Zangl
2010, p. 30). They applied a much broader and less precise deﬁnition of New Wars. As a
consequence, not every case they refer as a New War also qualiﬁes as entirely non-state
warfare and therefore as a new or non-conventional war according to my understanding.
However, every non-conventional (non-state) war to which I also refer to as a New War
certainly qualiﬁes as a case of New Warfare according to Kaldor’s understanding and
that of most of her fellow colleagues.
17See Kaldor (2007, pp. 2 sq.); Münkler (2006, p. 135); Münkler (2005, p. 2); Heupel and Zangl (2004,
p. 355); Heupel and Zangl (2003, pp. 12 sq., 33).
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I adopted this rather narrow understanding of New Wars and Conﬂicts as entirely sub-
state or non-state internal armed conﬂicts mainly for analytical purposes. In addition,
this deﬁnition allows for the conceptualization of New Wars and Conﬂicts as recurring
and timeless phenomena. They are expected to emerge if a “window of opportunity”
exists, i.e. in a context of failing or failed states. This and the presence of conﬂict
resources enables non-state actors to take up arms and battle each other – whether before
or after the end of the Cold War. I argued that countries aﬀected by New Warfare were
either born weak or turned weak over time. Some of the (internal and external) factors
and processes causing state weakness have already been presented. However, the causes
of New Warfare are not of main interest to this study. Instead, the remainder of this
book focuses on the nature of new (non-state) internal armed conﬂicts as opposed to
conventional (state-based) internal armed conﬂicts.
I also agree with the critics that the concept of New Wars remains under-theorized.
The New Wars’ relations to other contemporary forms of war are left un-clariﬁed (Shaw
2000) and several key concepts (e.g. “state weakness” or “globalization”) are not ad-
equately speciﬁed. According to Berdal (2003, pp. 479 sqq.), the term globalization is
used as no more than a metaphor for a number of universal processes that are at best
measured by a limited and random selection of indices. Others are more concerned about
the unclear direction of relationships, e.g. between state weakness and the duration of
warfare or in regard to the question whether people wage war in order to loot or vice
versa. Likewise, globalization is presented as external to New Warfare. It contributes
to the outbreak of New Wars through its weakening eﬀects on state authority and le-
gitimacy. It also reduces the resources available to governments to exercise state power
while increasing the capacity of violent non-state actors to arm themselves and to ﬁ-
nance warfare. At the same time, however, globalized war economies are a main feature
of New Wars. Globalization is therefore also internal to this kind of warfare (Kaldor
2007, pp. 72 sqq.). Although many oppose a “hyperglobalization thesis”, nobody denies
the reality of change in the world economy in terms of increasing ﬁnancial liberalization
and deregulation in cross-border ﬂows of goods and services, the revolution in the ﬁeld
of communication and information technology or the internationalization of production.
The question that remains is how these changes brought about by globalization relate
to the nature and prevalence of intra-state armed conﬂicts. According to Berdal (2003,
pp. 482 sqq.), the concept of New Wars only touches upon two diﬀerent strands of argu-
mentation. Firstly, globalization brought growth and prosperity to Western nations but
increased poverty in developing countries and widened inequalities within these countries
and globally. Secondly, a more open and deregulated international economy has enabled
belligerents to develop and maintain a vested economic interest in continued conﬂict.
Although the New Wars debate drew attention to these issues, it fails to explain when,
where and how the tension and stress caused by globalization transmute into armed
violence on a societal scale. This example illustrates the lack of theoretical work that
deduces causal hypotheses from the concept of New Wars and speciﬁes key mechanisms
which explain the outbreak and causes of New Warfare.
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The main characteristics of New Warfare, such as weak states and self-funding, are
only tautologically linked to other current phenomenon such as globalization (Brzoska
2004, fn 2, p. 108; Heupel and Zangl 2010, p. 28). This relates to an objection against
the concept of New Wars which has not received much attention yet: The fact that a
clear understanding is missing of how the single dimensions of New Warfare (a privatiza-
tion, fractionalization and transnationalization of actors, an economization of motives,
especially brutal strategies towards civilians and extensive ﬁghting) interact with and
reinforce each other. The third part of this book aims to provide a respective reﬁnement
of the concept of New Wars by asking to what extent diﬀerences between conventional
and non-conventional internal armed conﬂicts in their actors (their nature, number and
motives) can be linked with diﬀerences in the character and intensity of applied violence.
Because the concept of New Wars as presented by Mary Kaldor (2007) and others lacks
a micro-foundation, it cannot be considered a real causal theory.18 Instead of formu-
lating hypotheses that specify cause-eﬀect relationships between at least two variables
the concept of New Wars broadly deﬁnes or describes what constitutes New Warfare in
comparison to other forms of violence. This comparison is based on subjective obser-
vation (Münkler 2006, p. 134). Critics dismissively refer to Kaldor’s book on “New and
Old Wars” as a “travelogue” (Gantzel 2002, p. 3). They describe the New Wars debate
as an attempt to comprehend changes in the pattern of armed conﬂict within and across
societies “through empirical inquiry and philosophical reﬂection” (Berdal 2003, p. 477).
The main methodological instrument is no more than an appeal to logic and common
understanding of current events. The goal is to understand, not to prove.
In addition to the fact that causal paths are left unclariﬁed, advocates of the concept of
New Wars hardly ever investigate a thesis. Instead, they illustrate their point by giving
case examples. Because the presented cases are hand-picked to match the proﬁle of New
Wars, they of course substantiate claims. They “are mined for facts that ﬁt into the
line of argument”. This leaves the propositions made by the advocates of the concept
“vulnerable to methodological fallacies”. In addition, “[f]actual statements are pulled
from analytical literature or journalistic accounts but seldom from primary sources”. As
a result, a number of the central theses of the concept of New Wars do not stand up
to empirical scrutiny (Heupel and Zangl 2004, p. 347; Brzoska 2004, p. 108). Critics
speciﬁcally questioned that the incidence of New Wars has been on the rise since the
end of the Cold War. They refer to available data that show a marked decline in the
number of internal wars at least since the second half of the 1990s (Brzoska 2004, p. 108;
Newman 2004, p. 180). In defense of the concept of New Wars, I would like to repeat
18A causal theory has been deﬁned as a collection of statements that propose causal explanations for
a phenomenon or set of phenomena (not single events). Any theory includes an interrelated set of
causal hypotheses. Each of these hypotheses speciﬁes a posited relationship between dependent vari-
able(s) that shall be explained and independent variables that are expected to explain the dependent
variable(s). Consequently, any hypothesis creates observable implications of the following kind: if
the speciﬁed explanatory variables take on certain values, other speciﬁed values are predicted for the
dependent variables (King et al. 1994, pp. 99 sq.).
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that the decline in the incidence of conventional internal armed conﬂicts from the mid
1990s onwards reﬂects changes in the duration of warfare rather than an actual decrease
in the rate of new onsets. Secondly, a quantitative decline in global internal warfare
does not foreclose any qualitative change. Although there might be fewer internal wars,
their nature might have changed signiﬁcantly. Thirdly, armed conﬂicts short of war
might still be on the rise. Most importantly, however, this and other points of critique
are based on a misinterpretation of the concept of New Wars. Critics (as well as those
defending the concept) simply and wrongly equate New Wars with conventional (state-
based) internal wars19 although the advocates of the concept only believe a certain type
of internal warfare to be rising. At ﬁrst glance, Kahl and Teusch (2004, pp. 389 sqq.)
avoid this mistake by dividing internal warfare into sub-types. They refer to a number
of quantitative studies that also support a decline (instead of an increase) in ethnic
or “ethno-political” conﬂicts, in “armed conﬂicts over self-determination”, in “violent
intrastate nationalist conﬂicts” and in “minor armed conﬂicts”. Unfortunately, these
studies only take conventional (state-based) conﬂicts into account. The same applies to
other empirical studies that are referred to in order to support or disprove the concept of
New Wars. For instance, Eck and Hultman (2007, p. 233) lend support to the thesis that
within post-Cold War internal armed conﬂicts, rebels tend to be more violent than state
actors. However, their analysis only explores direct and deliberate killings of civilians
(so-called acts of one-sided violence) by state or non-state actors during the course of
conventional (state-based) internal armed conﬂicts. Acts of one-sided violence against
civilians in non-state or sub-state armed conﬂicts are not included. Byman et al. (2001)
ﬁnd support for the thesis of dwindling state support and the increasing importance of
non-state sources of funding in internal warfare (e.g. support from diaspora communities,
refugees, foreign guerrilla group movements, religious organizations or rich individuals)
after the end of the Cold War. Again, only actors involved in conventional insurgencies20
are studied while those engaged in non-state or sub-state armed conﬂicts are excluded.
Harbom et al. (2008) provide some support for the thesis that the average number of
warring parties per conﬂict is on the rise. However, the authors only count the number of
dyads involved in conventional (state-based) internal armed conﬂicts. Kahl and Teusch
(2004, p. 393) also refer to a study by Hensel (2002), who did not ﬁnd any support
for a clear increasing trend in the share of battle-related civilian deaths in intra-state
warfare. Reference to this study, however, is problematic for several reasons. First of all,
Hensel (2002, p. 26, table 3) only examines the trend in battle-related, non-state deaths
for conventional (state-based) internal wars as deﬁned by the COW project. Entirely
non-state as well as low-intensity armed conﬂicts are not taken into account. Secondly,
he notes that in his data set non-state death ﬁgures are missing and cannot be imputed
for over half of all intra-state wars (Hensel 2002, pp. 8, 26). Because access to data is
particularly diﬃcult in severe and internal war settings, this introduces a systematic
bias. Finally, the data he uses only cover armed conﬂicts up to 1997.
19See e.g. Gantzel (2002, p. 2), who notes that “New Wars obviously means intra-state wars” or Münkler
(2005, p. 15) himself, who at times uses the term “intra-state” warfare interchangeably with New
Warfare.
20For the deﬁnition see Byman et al. (2001, pp. 4 sq.).
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Lacina (2006) and Lacina, Russett, et al. (2006) clearly reject the assertion that overall,
combat-related violence has remained constant or even gone up. Melander et al. (2006);
Melander et al. (2009) agree and add some reﬁnement: The authors clearly reject the
assertion that overall, battle-related violence against civilians has increased. Instead,
they ﬁnd that the human impact of civil conﬂict (measured through battle-related deaths,
the ratio of military to civilian battle-deaths and the number of displaced civilians) is
considerably lower in the post-Cold War period (Melander et al. 2009, p. 505). Unlike
their colleagues, all three studies at least refer to the concept of New Wars and take
(most of) the post-World War II period (instead of only the post-Cold War era) into
consideration. However, all three studies also per deﬁnition exclude the direct and
indirect civilian and military victims of New Wars and Conﬂicts. The analyses are
based on conventional conﬂict data sets that do not capture wars between non-state
actors, taking place in a context of complete or partial state failure or within states that
lack international recognition. Again, these studies only focus on a single dimension of
New Warfare (the intensity/nature of violence). Finally, Melander and his colleagues fail
to diﬀerentiate the nature of the perpetrators of violence. Therefore, they do not provide
any answer to the question as to whether violence against civilians was committed by
state actors or, as claimed by the advocates of the concept of New Wars, by non-state
actors. This is important to note because the share of battle-related civilian deaths killed
by non-state actors might still be increasing although the overall level of battle-related
violence against civilians in intra-state warfare is on the decline.
I conclude that the argument about fundamental changes in the nature of intra-state
armed conﬂict has been made without much systematic data-based analysis. The ad-
vocates or defendants of the concept of New Wars21 and their critics22 alike have relied
on anecdotal evidence or evidence derived from single or comparative case studies only.
Both can be criticized for making general propositions on the basis of reports from se-
lected cases mostly without recourse to quantitative evidence (Brzoska 2004, p. 107).
Given the global nature of their claims, however, even a comparison of a few selected
cases does not suﬃce to support either side (Melander et al. 2009, pp. 506 sq.; Choj-
nacki 2006b, p. 48). This even holds for the most sophisticated, within-case comparison
which has recently been published by Heupel and Zangl (2010). The authors investigate
whether a fundamental transformation of modern intra-state warfare has taken place
with the end of the Cold War, they make explicit the deﬁning criteria implicit to the
concept of New Wars, they claim to identify by means of process-tracing the causal
mechanisms that underpin this transformation, and they ﬁnd strong support for the
New Wars theses: “in the 1990s, war economies based on criminal activities became
more important and triggered the fragmentation of warring parties and the economiza-
tion of their war motives. Moreover, in combination, the fragmentation of warring parties
and the economization of their war motives facilitate the application of brutal violence
against civilians” (Heupel and Zangl 2010, p. 26). However, they only investigate ﬁve
21E.g. Kaldor (2007); Münkler (2006); Heupel and Zangl (2010).
22E.g. Kahl and Teusch (2004); Schlichte (2006b); Kalyvas (2001); Ellis (2003); Berdal (2003).
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cases: Cambodia, Afghanistan and Angola (where proﬁles of internal warfare changed
from conventional (state-based) warfare before the end of the Cold War to new (non-
state) warfare afterwards) and Somalia and Sierra Leone (where New Wars broke out
only after the end of the Cold War). They refer to their eﬀort as a “plausibility probe”
of the concept of New Wars. An appropriate test, of course, would require a large-N
research design that allows inferences about general historical trends. A respective study
would need to cover all regions over an extended period of time, it would need to include
all cases of internal armed conﬂict (or a randomized or representative sample thereof)
and it would need to comprise all sub-types of internal armed conﬂict. The few existing
large-N-studies that explicitly claim to test at least some of the New Wars theses23 also
fail to meet this last requirement. In addition, most of the empirical evidence against or
in support of the concept of New Wars remains unconvincing because reliable and valid
micro-level data and indicators still need to be collected and identiﬁed, e.g. on the na-
ture and number of (direct and indirect) victims of new and conventional internal wars
(per conﬂict and year). Data are also lacking on the location and size of new war zones
and the production of conﬂict resources therein. The true motives of violent actors and
determinants of mobilization are not only diﬃcult to measure but also change over time
which requires panel data. Data are also lacking on the involvement of certain “new”
actors like PMFs. And how could we possibly measure and observe the extent to which
children are involved in internal armed conﬂicts, whether violence is applied to win the
war or to keep it running, whether troops are trained or just bands of warriors and what
kinds of weapons are used? Up to now it is simply unknown in how far the distribu-
tion and number of small arms vis-à-vis heavier weapons changed over time (Brzoska
2004, p. 113). Especially “[. . . ] operationalizing small arms sales for the purpose of a
quantitative test designed to establish a causal linkage is extremely diﬃcult”. Oﬃcial
statistics on arms sales to single countries are available but “they provide only a partial
picture, given the extensive volume of the illicit arms trade market. Figures on this
trade are diﬃcult to obtain and notoriously unreliable; they fail to take into account
indirect transfers through neighboring countries by rebel force purchases, and tend to
omit long-term transfers resulting from past proxy wars” (Achvarina and Reich 2006,
p. 137).
The empirical part of this study elaborates further on these data constraints but
also presents new data sets that are available to test at least some of the hypotheses
that can be deduced from the concept of New Wars. For the ﬁrst time, the presented
analyses include all cases of internal ﬁghting, i.e. conventional (state-based) as well
as non-conventional (non-state) internal armed conﬂicts. An initial descriptive analysis
investigates whether new/non-conventional (non-state) armed conﬂicts are indeed the
dominant type of internal ﬁghting or whether they are at least of increasing signiﬁcance.
I continue with a simple, bivariate analysis (comparing the context and nature of these
two types of internal ﬁghting) which is then followed by a multiple regression analysis
on the linkages between the single dimensions of internal ﬁghting.
23E.g. Melander et al. (2009); Lacina, Russett, et al. (2006); HSC (2006).
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Beforehand, however, some clariﬁcation is required as to why it is theoretically plausible
to expect a coincidence of the above mentioned characteristics. The focus therefore shifts
away from the causes of New Warfare (the question why and how state weakness and
the abundance of conﬂict resources lead to the outbreak of non-state armed conﬂict)
towards the dynamics and nature of New Warfare (the question how the aforementioned
features shape and reinforce each other).
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Reﬁning the Concept of New Wars
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10. Explaining Violence Against Civilians in
Non-State Conﬂicts
In order to identify micro-mechanisms linking the dimensions of New Warfare, the fol-
lowing third part of this book relies on theoretical work by Jeremy Weinstein. In his
articles, which appeared in the Journal of Conﬂict Resolution, in the American Political
Science Review and in his book “Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence”,
Weinstein presents a theory which explains diﬀerences in violent strategies pursued by
rebel organizations in civil warfare (Weinstein 2005; Weinstein 2007; Humphreys and
Weinstein 2006a). The author suggests that diﬀerences in how rebels treat civilians dur-
ing warfare are due to variation in the initial conditions rebel leaders are facing. The
kind of resources available to rebel leaders determines their recruitment strategy which
shapes the membership proﬁle of the emerging rebel group. The membership of the
rebel organization explains the internal structure of the group as well as the kind of
institutions it develops in order to govern the local population which then determine the
patterns of violence applied against non-combatants.
Weinstein’s theory can explain why the level of applied violence against civilians varies
between rebel groups. This is remarkable because neither the concept of New Wars,
nor the greed or grievance models presented before have much to oﬀer as to why rebel
organizations abuse civilians in some contexts but not in others. Furthermore, Weinstein
provides the missing micro-foundation linking a major context factor of New Warfare
(the availability of economic resources) with one of the main outcome variables of the
concept of New Wars (the level and character of violence committed during warfare).
However, Weinstein’s theory was designed to apply to conventional civil warfare only.
For this reason, a close look into his assumptions and major arguments is needed to ﬁgure
out in how far the above logic applies to non-state armed conﬂicts as well. Secondly,
Weinstein focuses on the extent of civilian victimization in internal warfare. How violence
is applied – whether selectively or indiscriminately1 – is given less attention.
1Selective violence personalizes threats. Certain individuals or groups are targeted for tactical purposes.
Those who support the rebels can be relatively certain that cooperation is exchanged for the right to
survive. In contrast, indiscriminate violence makes no distinction among potential victims. It neither
protects supporters nor punishes defectors. It selects its victims irrespective of their individual actions
on the basis of their membership in a certain group (based on ties of kinship, location, class, ethnicity
etc.) that is perceived to be connected with the opposition. The lack of discrimination among targets
according to their actions is usually caused by a lack of information and renders indiscriminate
violence comparatively ineﬃcient and ineﬀective. Indiscriminate violence is described as “usually
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Luckily, this question has been discussed elsewhere. In his book on “The Logic of
Violence in Civil War”, Kalyvas (2006) argues that it is the type of sovereignty or control
that exists in a given region which aﬀects the violent strategies of political actors involved
in armed conﬂict. Where violent state and non-state actors lack the military resources
necessary to impose unilateral control, they are more likely to use indiscriminate violence
against civilians as a means to shape collaboration and deter defection. Thus, the
author speciﬁes the conditions under which indiscriminate violence becomes more likely
(despite the fact that indiscriminate force is generally perceived as counterproductive in
conventional civil warfare). Again, it remains to be discussed whether the same logic
explains the nature of violence against civilians in non-state armed conﬂicts.
Interestingly, the main independent variable speciﬁed by Kalyvas (the level of military
control which a belligerent is able to exert over a contested territory) well relates to
the explanatory factors identiﬁed by Weinstein (the quantity and quality of resources
available to rebel organizations and the development of more or less eﬀective and eﬃcient
structures of internal and external control and management). Both certainly impact
upon the rebels’ chances of gaining and maintaining territorial control. In addition, I ﬁnd
Kalyvas’ argument quite helpful in order to link the speciﬁc nature and quantity of actors
involved in New Warfare with the nature of applied violence. The more actors involved,
the greater the competition and the less likely the establishment of permanent unilateral
control which, according to Kalyvas, increases the risk of indiscriminate violence against
civilians. Actors recruited outside of the conﬂict area who lack local knowledge might
also ﬁnd it more diﬃcult to exert control over a given territory and for this reason use
violence indiscriminately. Instead of presenting Kalyvas’ argument as an alternative
explanation to Weinstein’s theory, I therefore consider the two theories complementary.
The following introduces Weinstein’s and Kalyvas’ mechanisms and explores their ex-
planatory power beyond conventional civil warfare. This procedure is based on the
observation that the intensity and the character of violence applied during armed con-
ﬂict varies greatly between as well as within sub-types of internal armed conﬂict. Even
conventional insurgent organizations that challenged the state and sought to remove
undemocratic regimes “hacked, raped and pillaged their way through the countryside”,
causing large numbers of civilian casualties (e.g. in Sierra Leone), while elsewhere (e.g.
in Nepal), insurgents exhibited restraint, discipline and control. They transformed lo-
cal structures of governance, mobilized large numbers of civilians and committed fewer
civilian deaths – even over extended periods of warfare (Weinstein 2007, pp. 5 sq.).
It therefore remains to be seen whether the same mechanisms explaining this variance
in the level and nature of violence within the sub-category of state-based armed con-
ﬂicts (i.e. between greed and grievance conﬂicts) also explain such variance within the
late”, “often arbitrary”, “totally disproportionate” and “inconsistent and erratic”. Because threats
are completely unpredictable and individuals have no way to react, indiscriminate violence produces
a “paralyzing, turbulent and irrational fear” which “destabilizes social relations” and atomizes society
through suspicion and apprehension of strangers and each other. This fear might push the population
into “total passivity” (Weinstein 2007, p. 18; Kalyvas 2004, pp. 105, 97, 101–103, 118).
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sub-category of non-state armed conﬂicts as well as between sub-types of internal armed
conﬂict (i.e. between state-based and non-state internal armed conﬂicts). This approach
suggests that “[w]hile the contexts may diﬀer, the mechanisms [might] recur” (Kalyvas
2006, p. 10).
10.1. Weinstein’s Structuralist Mechanism
In the initial stages of rebellion, Weinstein (2007, p. 52) depicts rebel leaders as being
in a race with each other to form the dominant rebel group. Because warfare is a high-
risk collective action and because participants trade oﬀ the costs and beneﬁts of their
involvement, rebel leaders need to develop appeals that motivate individuals to engage
in their respective group. They oﬀer or at least promise material as well as immaterial
selective incentives, i.e. beneﬁts that only accrue to those who actively participate
in warfare. In doing so, rebel leaders have three diﬀerent strategies at their disposal.
Sometimes they attract participants by oﬀering material beneﬁts. In other cases they
appeal to existing ethnic, religious, cultural or ideological identities, beliefs and norms.
This strategy works if potential participants “have been and believe they will continue to
be engaged in repeated interaction with others from the group” and if they highly value
such future interaction with each other.2 As a third and related approach in recruiting
soldiers, rebel leaders might try to actively change people’s beliefs by activating “a
process orientation rather than one focused on potential ends”. They again draw on
community norms “to make participation as important to individuals as any material
rewards they might receive” (Weinstein 2007, pp. 99 sq.).
The above illustrates how rebel leaders’ recruitment strategies depend on the resources
available to them. In the ﬁrst case, rebel leaders are able to draw on economic endow-
ments derived from natural resource extraction, taxation of local production, criminal
activity or donations from external patrons and diaspora communities. In order to
be easily mobilized and translated into selective incentives, such economic endowments
should be concrete which means the rebels should be able to utilize them directly and
immediately to purchase arms or ammunition and to pay their soldiers. The ability to
draw on such economic endowments not only reduces the potential costs of participation
but also improves the position of a rebel groups vis-à-vis its opponent(s). In addition,
“the use of economic endowments minimizes the importance of trust in the unoﬃcial
contract between rebel leaders and recruits” because beneﬁts can be delivered instantly
instead of being only promised in the future (Weinstein 2007, p. 101). In order to be of
such advantage, economic endowments should be lootable (i.e. a small group of individ-
uals should be able to extract and transport these resources) and their extraction and
trade should be diﬃcult to obstruct (Weinstein 2007, pp. 47 sq.).
2See Weinstein (2007, p. 99) or Axelrod (1987) for the original argument.
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If rebel leaders lack easy access to economic resources, they might alternatively draw
on social endowments. This term refers to “distinctive identities and dense interpersonal
networks that can be mobilized in support of collective action”. Social endowments also
serve as “a source of solidarity and moral commitment”, they help groups to overcome
the barriers to organization and they can lower transaction costs by activating inter-
nalized norms of reciprocity between group leaders and their ﬁghters and by fusing
individual and collective interests (Weinstein 2007, pp. 48 sq.). Because the leaders and
their potential followers are tied by means of ethnic, religious or ideological bonds (and
therefore share beliefs, expectations and norms), the promises leaders make about the
political agendas they will implement if they succeed in capturing the state are espe-
cially credible. In other words, shared identities and belief systems serve as the glue
that is holding an organization together and help to generate trust across members.
This enables rebel leaders to recruit soldiers by promising selective rewards that are
only available in the future in case of a successful rebellion like the abolition of ethnic or
religious discrimination of so far marginalized groups (Weinstein 2007, p. 9; Weinstein
2002, p. 3).
Those who decide to participate in such rebellions tend to be highly committed in-
dividuals, so-called “investors” or “die-hard activists”. These individuals are dedicated
to the political cause of the rebel organization and willing to make costly investments
(including risking their lives) today in return for future rewards. This willingness to
make investments without receiving immediate private rewards prevents the organiza-
tion from being ﬂooded by opportunistic joiners. Weinstein calls the movements in which
such highly-committed individuals are willing to engage “activist rebellions” (Weinstein
2007, pp. 9, 103; Weinstein 2002, p. 2).
An entirely diﬀerent membership proﬁle arises in cases where participation is less risky
and individual ﬁghters are motivated by economic endowments. Those who engage in
such rebellions expect to be rewarded immediately for their engagement. They are de-
scribed as low-commitment individuals, so-called “consumers”, who seek only short-term
gains from participation. Those individuals are less productive for the rebel organization
because their support depends on a continual expenditure of resources (Weinstein 2007,
p. 102). Weinstein refers to this kind of organization as “opportunistic rebellions”.
In one of his earlier works Weinstein (2002, p. 2) presented the four situations in
which rebel leaders might ﬁnd themselves as depicted in ﬁg. 10.1 on the facing page.
Type A rebellions very much resemble New Wars and Conﬂicts. Leaders can draw
on economic resources for ﬁnancing which renders such rebellions cheap to build and
maintain and relatively attractive to opportunistic recruits. Type B rebellions (e.g.
grievance rebellions) lack such ﬁnancing but are able to compensate for their lack of
economic resources by drawing on social endowments. Type D rebellions are unlikely to
emerge due to a lack of economic as well as social endowments while Type C rebellions
can draw on both kinds of endowments and are therefore best equipped.
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Figure 10.1.: Theoretical Possibilities of Rebel Organizations (Weinstein 2002, p. 2; We-
instein 2005, p. 602).
Of course, Weinstein (2007, p. 50) is aware of the fact that, in practice, rebel leaders
mix economic and social endowments – an insight which emanates from his earlier case
studies.3 The above typology only depicts theoretical or ideal situations to illuminate his
argument that the kind of endowments or resources available to rebel leaders determines
the membership proﬁle of their rebel groups. Easier access to one endowment than
to the other conditions the recruitment strategies of leaders and the kind of members
they attract which shapes the type of organization that emerges and ﬁnally the kind of
violence that is applied.
Weinstein argues that activist rebellions ﬁnd it easier to maintain internal discipline
and to decentralize power within their armies as they are build on shared norms, net-
works and trust. “Because they have clear guidelines about how combatants should
behave and strong mechanisms for enforcing discipline, activist insurgencies are better
able to selectively identify targets, implement attacks, and discipline the use of force”
(Weinstein 2007, p. 10). Furthermore, activist rebellions need to obtain resources like
3In 2006, Weinstein co-authored the ﬁrst version of a study which two years later appeared in the
American Journal of Political Science. This study explores why individuals choose to participate in
the rebellion in Sierra Leone. The authors ﬁnd that individual decisions to join a rebel organization
are simultaneously shaped “by personal grievances, cost-beneﬁt calculations, and social pressures
that emerge from tight-knit communities”. More precisely, the risk of voluntary participation in
warfare (either on the side of the rebels or in defense of the state) was signiﬁcantly higher for poorer
individuals with little or no education who were living in districts with adverse health conditions.
Individuals were also signiﬁcantly more likely to voluntarily engage in internal warfare if they were
excluded from political participation, if they believed that participation would increase their personal
security, if they had a personal connection to the ﬁghting units and if they were oﬀered material
rewards. Interestingly, the latter holds for voluntary recruits as well as abductees and poor as
well as less aggrieved individuals. Obviously, “[m]ultiple logics of participation can and do exist
within the same conﬂict” so that “[p]articipation in Sierra Leone’s civil war can best be understood
in the context of this diversity of motivations”. Models taking only into account one or two of
these arguments (grievances, selective incentives or social sanctions) perform much worse than the
combined, comprehensive model. In addition, the authors ﬁnd that “distinct patterns of recruitment
are apparent across diﬀerent ﬁghting factions” (Humphreys and Weinstein 2006b, p. 22; Humphreys
and Weinstein 2008, pp. 448, 451 sq.).
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food, shelter, supplies and intelligence from the local population. Therefore, they often
strike cooperative agreements with civilians. This inhibits them from using indiscrimi-
nate violence against their own support base.4
Opportunistic rebellions are less dependent on civilian support in order to survive and
prosper. For ﬁnancing they resort to natural resource extraction or support from an
external patron. For this reason, they lack local ties. This makes it much harder for
rebel leaders to identify potential defectors and to apply violence selectively. Instead,
they are “prone to make mistakes” on and oﬀ the battleﬁeld. In addition, the “constant
demand for short-term rewards drives combatants to loot, destroy property, and attack
indiscriminately” (Weinstein 2007, p. 10). In fact, opportunistic rebellions must allow a
certain degree of indiscipline to maintain their membership. Sometimes, rebel leaders
explicitly encourage or at least permit the pillaging of civilians or the looting of natural
resources as a way of paying their soldiers. Such behavior was observed, for instance,
in the case of Renamo in Mozambique after the external patron (Rhodesia) collapsed
and South Africa failed to fully ﬁll the gap. Although South Africa provided military
support, “the ﬂow of salaries, clothes, and food that translated seamlessly into selective
incentives came to an end [. . . ]. Renamo began to develop alternative sources of revenue
to replace the ﬂow of resources from Rhodesia. Payoﬀs resumed as Renamo permitted
its soldiers to loot public and private property as part of their attacks on civilian areas.
[. . . ] In addition, Renamo became involved in the cross-border trade of ivory, which
yielded [. . . ] 13 million [US dollars] alone in 1988 [. . . ]. Renamo also obtained funds
through the extortion of multinational corporations in exchange for security guarantees”
(Weinstein 2005, pp. 612, 614; Weinstein 2007, pp. 112, 116). The author also warns
that economic motivations can undermine the cohesion of a rebel group. In Columbia,
economic motivations “generated individualism and led to internal rift, disloyalty and
a weakened capacity of the group leaders to shape the behavior of their members”
(Weinstein 2007, p. 321). Finally, because opportunistic rebellions lack a foundation of
shared norms and identities, trust is missing among combatants within the organization
and in the rebels’ external relationship with civilians. This connects with the expectation
that opportunistic rebel organizations tend to employ coercive tactics simply “because
they cannot credibly commit to non-abusive behaviour” (Weinstein 2007, p. 10).
The author summarizes that “factors that raise or lower the barriers to organization
by insurgent leaders – in particular whether material resources to ﬁnance warfare can
be easily mobilized without civilian consent – shape the type of individuals who elect to
4The same argument has been made earlier, e.g. by Valentino et al. (2004, pp. 384 sq.) who also argue
that in the long term, abusiveness would be counterproductive as it would destroy the human and
physical base of the local community on which the rebels depend. The authors refer to Mao Zedong’s
famous saying that the relationship between the people and the rebels can be compared with the
relationship that exists between the water and the ﬁsh. Because the rebels depend on the people as
much as the ﬁsh depend on the water, they usually have strong incentives to avoid violence against
non-combatants. At least they try to be selective in their use of force in order not to alienate the
civilians.
116
participate, the sorts of organizations that emerge to ﬁght civil wars, and the strategies
of violence that develop in practice” (Weinstein 2007, p. 7). The fact that rebel groups
abuse civilians in some contexts but not in others is not attributed to ethnic hatred or
the fact that this kind of violence is of strategic beneﬁt to the warring parties because
it deters or threatens the military opponent. Instead, it is attributed to “dimensions of
organization – including resources, membership, authority structures and internal rules”
(Weinstein 2007, p. 27).
According to this argument, which is rooted in an older line of Resource Mobiliza-
tion Theory, the dynamics of a rebel movement are in important ways conditioned by
structural constraints, namely its resources and organization (Weinstein 2007, p. 46).
“Violence becomes the natural outcome of a path of organizational evolution rather
than a strategic choice made in response to changing conditions on the ground” (We-
instein 2007, pp. 11, 21). This argument entails a high degree of path dependency. It
clearly emphasizes structure over agency. Weinstein (2007, p. 50) departs from the
contention that the initial stock of economic and social endowments available to rebel
leaders are – at least in the short run – relatively ﬁxed and determined exogenously: The
availability of natural resources is largely a function of geography while social endow-
ments (identities and belief systems) are diﬃcult and slow to change (Weinstein 2007,
p. 50; Weinstein 2005, p. 602; Weinstein 2002, p. 2). Weinstein justiﬁes the assump-
tion of ﬁxed endowments by referring to the enormous amount of analytical leverage it
provides for understanding the diﬀerent strategies which groups pursue. According to
him, it is surprising how much variation in his dependent variable (the character and
level of violence perpetrated by rebel groups) can be explained by his key independent
variables (diﬀerences in the social and economic endowments available to rebel groups,
their membership and their set of organizational practices and structures). Critics might
counter-argue that a group’s economic and social endowments are not ﬁxed but, for in-
stance, a function of their leadership. Competent leaders might well be able to inﬂuence
the endowments available to them by generating material resources or fostering social
ties. Weinstein forecloses this objection and answers that although leadership is critical,
the emergence of such competent leaders is itself endogenous to the process of group
formation. It is shaped by factors similar to those that aﬀect a group’s membership. In
other words, “[d]iﬀerences in the viability of insurgency can account too for the leaders
that come to the fore” (Weinstein 2007, pp. 21 sq., 51; Weinstein 2005, pp. 618 sq.).
Others might criticize Weinstein for being overly deterministic. For instance, Staniland
(2012) doubts that resource wealth necessarily encourages the degeneration of violent
groups into criminal and fractious, loot-seeking thugs as happened with the UNITA in
Angola or the RUF in Sierra Leone. He argues that resource wealth at least bears the po-
tential to also help insurgents in building disciplined and cohesive organizations. “Simply
relying on drug money, state sponsors, or illicit smuggling has no single consequence for
organizational cohesion and discipline: instead, resources are used in diﬀerent ways by
diﬀerent types of armed actors” (Staniland 2012, p. 144). He reminds that the Taliban
in Afghanistan, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka or the Sudan People’s Liberation Army
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in Sudan all heavily relied on external funding and illicit economic gain but nevertheless
forged and even improved their organizational eﬀectiveness. This empirical diversity
prompted Staniland to develop his “Social-Institutional Theory of Insurgent Organiza-
tion”. According to the author, the structure of preexisting social networks or ties upon
which an armed group is built determines the organizational integration or fragmentation
of the group (whether robust institutions can be build to internally discipline and control
the group members) which then shapes the eﬀects of resource ﬂows (whether resources
are harnessed for organization building or whether they become linked to organizational
degradation). Integrated institutions that are embedded within an overlapping social
base, that are built on preexisting networks of collective action, on vertical ties to lo-
cal communities and on horizontal ties among the organizers “can manage and contain
the lures of resource wealth. These organizations use resources to improve their ﬁght-
ing power and internal control, rather than becoming greedy loot-seekers” (Staniland
2012, pp. 143, 152). When resources enter such integrated and cohesive organizations,
“they ﬂow along robust lines of both social and organizational loyalty and monitoring,
thus disciplining and mitigating the lures of material gain”. Resource wealth provides
such rebel organizations with political capital and social support because it is used to
buy weapons, to bribe government oﬃcials, to pay ﬁghters and to provide services to
their families and to the civilian population. Even in cases of large and rapid increases in
wealth “[t]his type of organization deploys resources for political and organizational tasks
rather than becoming a band of greedy [fragmented and undisciplined] thugs” (Staniland
2012, pp. 148, 151, 153). In contrast, armed groups that are built upon socially divided
networks are much worse in controlling and disciplining the use of resources. Like We-
instein, Staniland (2012, p. 154) argues that “[w]eak preexisting horizontal ties among
leaders create internal cleavages that are likely to persist and discourage the creation
of central institutions for making and implementing decisions. This makes future lead-
ership splits and feuds more likely. Weak vertical ties undermine the creation of local
institutions. Revolts, indiscipline, and deﬁance from below are the result”. Of course
such fragmented groups react diﬀerently from integrated organizations to infusions of
external aid, drug money or diamonds. Due to a lack of internal control and alternative
ways of motivating ﬁghters, resources will become “objects of contestation and sources of
indiscipline”. Although resources ﬂowing into these fragmented organizations “will not
fundamentally change the organization’s structure [and] may initially be useful to hold
together a loose coalition, [. . . ] over time they can exacerbate preexisting conﬂicts over
control and distribution that lead to unrest and indiscipline within the group” (Staniland
2012, pp. 151, 154). Elsewhere, the author notes that “[i]n these fragmented organiza-
tions, resources are more likely to become linked to internal rivalries, parochial individual
and local agendas, and purely proﬁt-seeking behavior” (Staniland 2012, pp. 143, 152).
According to this theory, “the social bases and consequent organizational structures of
militant mobilization determine what happens when cash, guns, and narcotics begin
to course through a group’s vain”. How resources are used then aﬀects the insurgents’
ﬁghting power, their vulnerability to counterinsurgency and their treatment of civilians
(Staniland 2012, p. 143).
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The statement that the eﬀect of resource wealth on the organizational performance
of rebel groups (i.e. on their level of internal discipline, cohesion and control) is condi-
tioned by another factor (their social origins) is not at odds with Weinstein’s argument.
Instead, it further speciﬁes the relationship by introducing another intermittent variable
or interaction eﬀect. Both authors might slightly diﬀer in their perspective. However,
their theoretical arguments largely overlap. Weinstein asks how economic endowments
contribute to the emergence of organizations with weak social bases in the ﬁrst place
and, in cases where organizational bases are already fragmented, contribute to a further
disintegration. Staniland focuses on the second half of this chain of explanation by ask-
ing in how far the social bases of organizations (whether they are built on preexisting
social networks of collective action or on socially divided bases) in return shape the ﬂow
of resources, the organizational form and behavior of insurgent groups. Staniland’s ar-
gument serves well to explain the vicious circle aﬀecting fragmented but resource-rich
armed groups: Due to their weak internal structures, such organizations will not be
able to harness resources for organization building which further degrades their struc-
tural bases. Weinstein would agree that armed organizations with already weak internal
structures/social bases cannot escape the resource trap but enter an institutional race
to the bottom. Overall, Weinstein’s theory is as much a “Social-Institutional Theory
of Insurgent Organization” as Staniland’s. As mentioned before, Weinstein’s concept of
“social endowments” refers to “distinctive identities and dense interpersonal networks
that can be mobilized in support of collective action”. In other words: nothing other
than the social base of an armed organization. For this reason, Staniland’s description
of how integrated armed groups are coping with the inﬂow of resources resembles Wein-
stein’s description of activist rebellions that, in addition to their social endowments, have
some natural resources at their disposal or receive ﬁnancial aid from an external patron.
Finally, both authors prioritize structure over agency. Staniland also notes that “[s]ocial
innovation is constrained [. . . ] by the group’s social-organizational underpinnings. The
pathways of likely change are determined by the original structure of the organization.
Armed group leaders cannot make institutions as they please, even if these leaders are
broadly popular, following ideological precedents, or facing a weak state” (Staniland
2012, p. 152).
In his book, Weinstein (2007) explores the violent strategies of four rebel organiza-
tions in more detail: the National Resistance Army (NRA) in Uganda, the Resistencia
Nacional Mocambicana (Renamo) in Mozambique, Sendero Luminoso Nacional (the na-
tional organization of the Shining Path) and its regional committee of Alto Huallaga
(CRH) in Peru. He presents a controlled comparison of these four cases5 and a large-N
5For this comparative study, he uses Mill’s Method of Diﬀerence. The research design chosen by the
author is a Most Similar Systems Design which means the four cases exhibit similar characteristics
in regard to alternative explanatory factors while they only vary in terms of the key independent
variable. This variance then explains diﬀerences in the dependent variable. All four cases exhibit a
similar level of state weakness. All four governments were unable to inhibit the formation of violent
internal opposition groups and to control their entire territories. Still, they were able to ﬁnance and
maintain an army more powerful than the rebel forces and “strong enough that [. . . ] the conﬂict was
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analysis comprising all civil wars between 1945 and 2000. Due to some methodological
and statistical shortcomings6, the author hesitates to draw any ﬁnal conclusions. Still,
both analyses largely support the overall argument advanced in his book.7 Especially
the results of his more ﬁne-grained comparative case studies conﬁrm that those rebel
groups emerging in environments rich in natural resources or with external support of
an outside patron (Renamo and CRH) indeed committed higher levels of indiscrimi-
nate violence against civilians. In such cases, reports of large outﬂows of refugees and
insurgent-perpetrated massacres, rape, looting and forced recruitment of combatants
are also quite common. In contrast, movements that arose in resource-poor contexts
(the NRA and the national organization of the Shining Path) perpetrated far fewer
abuses and employed violence selectively and strategically. Furthermore, he ﬁnds that
the initial endowments of rebel organizations explain variation in their violent practices
independently of state power (Weinstein 2007, pp. 7, 310 sq.).
Although Weinstein’s theory seems to suit New Warfare very well, a closer look un-
covers several points of departure. Weinstein explicitly notes that he only investigates
classical cases of asymmetric insurgency and that he excludes environments in which the
state had ceased to exist.8 His understanding of violence “as the outcome of an inter-
asymmetric, with the government’s military representing a real and credible threat [to the rebels]”
(Weinstein 2007, pp. 14 sq.). Comparing only cases with similar relative state power allows ruling out
the eﬀect of this variable on the level and character of violence applied by the rebel forces. This is
important because the strength of the state’s bureaucratic and military machinery might well aﬀect
the structure and strategy of insurgent groups and therefore provides a plausible alternative explana-
tion (Weinstein 2007, p. 14). In addition, all four rebellions emerged at times of political transition/of
widening political opportunities, all were organized in environments of extreme rural poverty and all
started with the dream of capturing control of the central state and its resources (Weinstein 2007,
pp. 55 sq., 95). But the four cases greatly diﬀer in regard to their initial resource endowment. The
leaders of the NRA in Uganda and of the national organization of the Shining Path in Peru drew on
social endowments. Both are described as activist rebellions organized around ethnicity or ideology
while Renamo in Mozambique and the Shining Paths Regional Committee of Alto Huallaga were
opportunistic rebellions supported by an external patron or the drug trade. Elsewhere, Weinstein
adds evidence from Sierra Leone, Nepal and Eritrea (Weinstein 2007, pp. 301–305; Weinstein 2005).
6For instance, Weinstein (2007, p. 326) notes that due to a lack of respective micro-level event data,
this large-N analysis does not lend itself to an assessment of causal mechanisms but only explores
macro-level relationships, i.e. the question whether there exists a statistically signiﬁcant correlation
between “access to material resources” and the level (not the character) of violence committed during
warfare. The latter is measured through the number of military and civilian deaths which means
killings perpetrated by rebel groups and government forces are conﬂated.
7For instance, Weinstein (2007, pp. 308 sq.) ﬁnds that in conventional civil warfare, the use of contra-
band resources (including drugs and diamonds) to ﬁnance an insurgency is statistically associated
with higher levels of overall violence. However, the author rightly notes that this outcome is also
consistent with rival explanations (e.g. access to material resources might simply lead to a greater
capacity to inﬂict harm on non-combatants through the purchase of more eﬀective weapons).
8See Weinstein (2007, p. 55); Weinstein (2005, p. 604, fn 7). Only at the very end of his book does
Weinstein (2007, pp. 312 sq.) come close to depicting new (non-state) warfare. There, he argues
that in situations of entire state collapse only a few barriers exist to the formation of rebel groups.
This undermines the rebel’s incentives “to build a cohesive, national organization with an eﬀective
internal structure”. Furthermore, “the absence of state power, like the presence of material resources,
reduces the dependence of military organizations on their constituents for the support needed to
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action in which rebel groups act strategically in seeking support from non-combatants”
is also tailored to conventional (state-based) internal warfare. Weinstein assumes that
the “prospect of territorial control” and the “desire to govern [. . . ] disciplines the be-
havior of the rebel leadership and heightens the importance of developing sustainable
mechanisms to supply an army and establishing constructive relationships with civilian
populations”. Because rebels know that their interaction with civilians will be repeated
in the future if they are successful, they refrain from applying violence indiscriminately
(Weinstein 2007, pp. 17, 45, 55). In addition, Weinstein criticizes any distinction between
wars based on the expressed motivations of belligerents (e.g. justice vs. loot-seeking).
Instead, he allows for various motives and goals. He distinguishes three kinds of violent
groups: those who seek to capture the center, those who want to secede and those who
use violence but have no interest in achieving territorial control of any sort (Weinstein
2007, pp. 17, 55). The latter category explicitly refers to terrorist groups who – for the
aforementioned reasons – I suggested to exclude from any study exploring armed con-
ﬂict. These points of departure raise the question whether the mechanism identiﬁed by
Weinstein also applies to bilateral and non-state armed conﬂict that is characterized by
a rather symmetric distribution of military power among the adversaries and where the
belligerents do not seek permanent control of the central state but only control of a cer-
tain region like a mining area to extract easily lootable resources which does not require
the consent of the civilian population or the establishment of a cooperative relationship
with them – neither in the short nor in the long term. I would answer this question
in the aﬃrmative. The restraining eﬀect of a “desire to govern” on the use of violence
against civilians drops out in the case of New Warfare. The belligerents do not seek
control of the state but immediate, short-term and private gain. In accordance with
Weinstein’s logic, advocates of the concept of New Wars expect this to increase the risk
of indiscriminate violence against non-combatants. Secondly, the fact that conventional
civil warfare is asymmetric in nature is irrelevant for Weinstein’s argument. A speciﬁc
distribution of power amongst the adversaries is at no point of importance for the iden-
tiﬁed mechanism. Instead, Weinstein ﬁnds that his key independent variable (the kind
of initial endowments available to rebel leaders) explains variation in the violent prac-
tices of rebel groups independently of the relative power of the adversary. Thirdly, the
concept of New Wars shares with Weinstein’s theory the assumption that individuals act
rationally (Weinstein 2007, p. 40). Weinstein, however, focuses not so much on material
rewards but explicitly includes non-material payoﬀ derived from participation in rebel-
lion (such as prestige, acceptance or the opportunity to exercise agency). The advocates
of the concept of New Wars touch upon non-material payoﬀs and more emotional mo-
tives, too.9 Taking non-material payoﬀs into account seems a reasonable expansion of
the concept of New Wars instead of a contradiction. Fourthly, Weinstein’s theory oﬀers
a number of interesting and testable implications for non-state internal armed conﬂict.
For instance, one might argue that the leaders of groups involved in non-state ﬁghting are
wage a struggle”. In such circumstances, militias are either unable (due to their internal structures)
or unwilling to discipline their behavior. “[T]he actors that emerge in this vacuum exhibit behaviors
consistent with opportunistic insurgencies” (Weinstein 2007, p. 325).
9See e.g. Kaldor (1999, pp. 19, 25).
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also in a race with each other to form the dominant rebel group. Because easily available
economic resources enable groups to get oﬀ the ground more quickly, rebel groups need
to act fast and start competing for these resources. In a context “[. . . ] where economic
endowments can be mobilized, [those] rebel leaders who utilize them [ﬁrst] are likely to
emerge as the dominant players. Appeals to identity and ideology [simply] take much
longer to develop and reﬁne”. Thus, “[w]here economic resources are available to meet
the start-up costs of rebellion, the extended process of shaping identities, mobilizing net-
works, and building ideologies is often cut short”. This explains why opportunistic rebel
leaders emerged ﬁrst and crowded out activists in contexts where resources permitted it
(e.g. in Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Congo/DRC) (Weinstein 2007, pp. 52,
328, 331 sqq.). Elsewhere, the author explains that “the marginal beneﬁts of moving fast
are much higher in resource-rich environments. Potential rebel leaders know that if they
adopt a more time-consuming strategy of social mobilization, others might accept oﬀers
of external assistance, capture lootable resources, or beat them to the capital”. Weinstein
(2007, p. 329) further adds that where barriers to the organization of insurgency are low
due to the availability of economic resources or the collapse of state structures, more
rebel groups will emerge. The greater number of challengers puts a further premium on
speed in the process of organizational formation.10 These developments which through
the above described dynamic lead to indiscriminate violence against civilians should in
particular apply to new, non-state warfare where economic resources are more easily
available and exploited by violent non-state actors due to state collapse.
For the same reason, rebel groups involved in New Warfare can be expected to par-
ticularly suﬀer from a problem of adverse selection. Weinstein explains that recruits are
well aware of their true commitment to the organization while rebel leaders lack this
knowledge. “A recruit’s type [whether he/she is low- or highly-committed] is private
information, and individuals have a strong incentive to misrepresent their level of com-
mitment”. Due to this lack of information and despite the fact that they might want
to recruit only the most committed individuals, rebel leaders run the risk of attracting
opportunists by oﬀering short-term rewards that are higher than the actual opportunity
costs for joining the rebellion (Weinstein 2007, p. 102; Weinstein 2005, pp. 603 sq.).
This risk is especially prevalent in a context of New Warfare where selective material
incentives are comparatively easy at hand while the opportunity costs to participate
in warfare and the risks of individual engagement are comparatively low (because the
state and its military and policing institutions are collapsing or already collapsed, be-
cause rebel groups are ﬁghting each other instead of a militarily superior state army,
because rebels avoid open battle in order not to disrupt their illegal economic activities
or because alternative income generating options hardly exist).
10Weinstein’s statistical analysis later conﬁrms that “[c]onﬂicts [. . . ] linked to resources exhibit signiﬁ-
cantly larger numbers of rebel groups” (Weinstein 2007, pp. 329 sq.).
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Weinstein identiﬁes three recruitment methods which can be used by rebel leaders
to reduce their informational disadvantage to avoid adverse selection (Weinstein 2007,
pp. 104 sq.; Weinstein 2005, p. 606). In order to ﬁgure out whether they are truly
committed and trustworthy, rebel leaders can actively gather information about the
recruits’ past behavior. Secondly, rebel leaders can only accept those new recruits who
are invited to join the rebellion by current trustworthy soldiers who act as guarantors for
their honesty and commitment. This strategy of “vouching” is of course only eﬀective as
long as those engaged in the rebellion care about their reputation within the organization.
It worked, for instance, in the case of the NRA in Uganda where Museveni encouraged the
Bataka to volunteer their sons for the cause. “The new recruits were thus in a position
of needing to protect their reputation with the NRA and with their families” (Weinstein
2007, p. 110). Finally, rebel leaders can apply “costly induction”. In this case, new
recruits have to pass a period of political indoctrination and study the political ideology
of the rebel group followed by written or oral examination. Alternatively, access to
weapons can be deliberately delayed. New recruits are then required to pass a period of
“rebel apprenticeship” during which they actively engage in warfare without wearing a
gun. The level of risk associated with this requirement would be unmanageable for low-
committed individuals. This method was for instance used by the national organization
of the Shining Path in Peru where full membership could be only achieved after recruits
had passed a number of less popular stages. This assured that “the opportunity to hold
a gun and wield real power was far down the road” (Weinstein 2007, p. 119).
Unfortunately, all three methods of recruitment (information gathering, vouching and
costly induction) “can be employed only by groups rooted in shared identities or be-
lief systems with networks that connect them to the civilian population”. This leads
to the expectation that all three methods are more likely to be used by activist rebel-
lions. Groups involved in New Warfare are among those who use material payoﬀs to
attract soldiers. According to Weinstein, such groups do not or cannot screen out new
members because they lack the respective networks necessary to obtain information on
new recruits. Instead, they accept nearly all interested individuals who do not need
to show any commitment to any superior goal (Weinstein 2007, pp. 106 sq.; Weinstein
2005, p. 607). In comparison with activist rebel groups, those organizations involved in
New Warfare are therefore expected to be more heterogeneous in terms of identities or
beliefs within their membership.
Finally, Weinstein’s logic implies “that the level of advanced education in groups that
recruit using payoﬀs should be much lower than in groups that employ alternative ap-
proaches” because “[p]eople who place a higher value on rewards they might receive in
the future are [also] far more likely to absorb the costs of investing in education”. Ac-
cordingly, the average level of education should be much lower among those engaged
in New Warfare as opposed to those ﬁghting conventional civil wars (Weinstein 2007,
p. 106; Weinstein 2005, p. 607).
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Later on, Weinstein (2007, pp. 127 sq., 131) identiﬁes three tools (investment in train-
ing, the nurturing of an organizational culture and the establishment of structures of
hierarchy and delegation) which can be used by rebel leaders to solve problems of organi-
zational control and management, e.g. principal-agent problems11, or to avoid defection,
deﬁned by the author as actions taken by individual combatants to maximize their per-
sonal gains at the expense of the group’s broader objective. Again, eﬀorts to solve
problems of internal control and management are expected to be made by rebel leaders
of activist rather than opportunistic rebellions because “[t]he groups’ membership both
aﬀects the magnitude of the challenge of maintaining control and constrains the set of
tools leaders can employ in response” (Weinstein 2007, p. 128). In line with this reason-
ing, organizations involved in New Warfare can be expected to refrain from investments
in the training of new recruits. At least they will not invest in political education but
instead only focus on military training. In addition, they can be expected to not develop
an organizational culture or shared sense of mission based on their ideological conviction.
Consequently, a written Code of Conduct does not exist or is not enforced. In terms of
their internal structures of management and control, such organizations are either char-
acterized by extreme levels of decentralization or a very high degree of centralization.
In cases where rebel leaders still exert some control over their inferiors, extreme levels
of centralization might emerge as a characteristic as much as a response to high level
of indiscipline, incoherence and inconsistency in the behavior of their combatants (We-
instein 2007, p. 159). In these cases, superiors avoid decentralization because it would
worsen their informational disadvantage relative to their local units and further magnify
incentives to defect. In cases where rebel leaders have already lost much of their internal
control, weak or extremely decentralized internal structures emerge. As a consequence,
combatants face at best arbitrary punishment in case of civilian abuse. Defection in
the form of personal enrichment also goes largely unpunished or is even encouraged by
leaders. In fact, it might become “the modus operandi” of such organizations (Weinstein
2007, p. 157).
The author notes that at least initially, activist rebellions tend to establish hierarchi-
cal structures, too, because these organizations “are shaped in powerful ways by ﬁrst
movers”. These ﬁrst movers are the “initial core of leaders” who have “a great deal at
stake and often demand signiﬁcant control over the trajectory of the organization [. . . ]
[and who] will not relinquish control over the direction of the group”. At the beginning
of the rebellion, these leaders might be convinced that clear lines of hierarchical control
help them to operate eﬀectively in environments of uncertainty and limited information.
Such structures might appear helpful because “rebel organizations face a government
adversary that is highly resourced, centralized and coordinated” and because “a fully
11During armed conﬂict, principal-agent problems arise because the principal (i.e. the rebel leader)
cannot directly observe, control and evaluate the agent’s (i.e. the combatant’s) actions. Principal-
agent problems are aggravated by the fact that combatants operate under the command of multiple
principals (the national leadership of the organization, regional commanders and local leaders), that
operations are mostly decentralized and that most rebel groups have limited access to communications
technology (Weinstein 2007, pp. 130 sq.).
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decentralized structure would [. . . ] make it more diﬃcult for rebels to take on the tasks
of governance [. . . ] and the eﬀective rule of the state should they succeed in battle”
(Weinstein 2007, p. 134). However, due to the kind of members they attract, their rigor-
ous screening during the process of recruitment and various eﬀorts to establish trust and
cooperative arrangements between leaders and combatants, decentralization becomes an
attractive option. As time passes, leaders may decide to share decision-making power
with combatants (e.g. by creating forums in which soldiers can participate in discussions
about the future direction of the movement) or rebel leaders may place constraints on
their own capacity to supervise other members. In addition, training which not only
focuses on weapons handling but also political education fosters a shared sense of mis-
sion, purpose and duty. Several rebel groups (e.g. the NRA in Uganda or the national
organization of the Shining Path in Peru) even published a written Code of Conduct.
Of course, mechanisms for monitoring and evaluating rebel behavior also need to be
introduced. For instance, lower units within the national organization of the Shining
Path in Peru were required to submit operational tactical plans in advance of each mil-
itary operation. These plans assigned responsibilities to each individual engaged in the
planned operation which allowed for evaluation afterwards (Weinstein 2007, p. 153). A
system of (not necessarily immediate) rewards (e.g. promotion within the organization
based on merit, performance and understanding of the purpose of the movement and
its ideology) and punishments (e.g. public trials in cases of defection) further ensures
cooperative behavior (Weinstein 2007, pp. 136 sqq.).
The above argued that opportunistic and activist rebel groups greatly diﬀer in their
internal structures as well as in their external structures to manage their relationships
with civilians. Weinstein notes that all rebel organizations strive for (short or long term)
control over (a smaller or larger part of) territory which requires the establishment of
some sort of structure to manage their relationships with the local populations on whose
support and compliance they depend to varying degree. In fact, “[t]he decision to control
territory [. . . ] necessitates the development of a strategy for governing non-combatants
in the course of conﬂict” (Weinstein 2007, p. 195). Thus, all rebel groups need some
sort of governance structures – understood as “informal and formal rules that deﬁne a
hierarchy of decision making and a system of taxation” (Weinstein 2007, p. 164) – to
mobilize support from non-combatants or to extract key resources. However, the external
governance structures created by rebel groups diﬀer in regard to two dimensions: Their
degree of power-sharing (which determines the degree of responsiveness to the preferences
of non-combatants) and their level of inclusiveness (which relates to the proportion of
the civilian population which is entitled to participate in governance) (Weinstein 2007,
pp. 155, 166). In some contexts, rebel leaders construct institutions that formalize power-
sharing arrangements with civilian populations and ensure the participation of not only
elites but all relevant segments of the respective communities. In other contexts, rebel
groups and their leaders reject such power-sharing arrangements. Instead, they resort
to unilateral military control, a structure that employs coercion in the organization of
resources and the prevention of defection. Because only some civilians are provided with
elite positions, a hierarchical structure of control emerges.
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In order to illustrate the variety of governance structures established by rebel groups,
Weinstein again refers to the NRA in Uganda which created institutions of grassroot
democracy, so-called “resistance councils” (RCs), that were locally elected and used to
organize the provision of food for the nascent insurgency. People who struggled to meet
their own subsistence needs were not forced to contribute. The rebels always sought
to pay for their food and provided public goods (security or health care services) in ex-
change for civilian contributions. The RC system enshrined power-sharing arrangements
as it was explicitly designed to check formally the power of the military. The national
leadership council of the rebel organization was composed of military and civilian mem-
bers (leaders of the RC system, political supporters or intellectuals) (Weinstein 2007,
pp. 175–180). Likewise, the national organization of the Shining Path in Peru built so-
called “open people’s committees” which ensured a full incorporation of civilians into the
rebel movement. The base force of the organization was made up entirely of community
members who produced their own food. This rendered any forced or voluntary collec-
tion obsolete. In exchange for their support, civilians received education. The rebels
also established a system of redistribution of wealth amongst those in need while the
Sendero militants themselves lived in absolute poverty (Weinstein 2007, pp. 186–192).
Weinstein (2007, p. 187) summarizes that “[i]n rebel-held zones, the Shining Path built
structures of governance that broadened participation beyond elite intellectuals; created
overlapping institutions of control where power was shared between the military, the
party, and the local administration; and drew resources from the civilian population in
manageable and accepted ways”. In contrast, the regional committee of the Shining Path
in the Upper Huallaga Valley used civilians for a single purpose, namely the production
of coca leaves. Sendero-Huallago formed a centralized, hierarchical and authoritarian
system of administration that maintained unilateral and military control over the coca
market. But the production of coca requires extensive and sustained civilian labor. For
this reason, an “odd form of inclusiveness” (a system of taxation that ensured civilians
beneﬁted suﬃciently from this trade) was necessary in order to prevent defection to the
other side (Weinstein 2007, pp. 192–195). The Renamo in Mozambique also established
structures of hierarchical control in the villages it controlled by resurrecting traditional
authorities. Power was returned to community-level chiefs (so-called régulos). Although
this seems generous at ﬁrst sight, it in fact limited a broad participation of civilians.
In addition, the rebels worked only with cooperative régulos and simply appointed new
régulos where it encountered resistance. “Régulos were not given political authority
[. . . ]. No forum existed for constructive debate, civilian perspectives were rarely aired,
and traditional leaders served at the will of the rebel army. Governance was not joint
and did not involve powersharing. There was no formal check on the actions of the rebel
leadership” (Weinstein 2007, p. 183). The national leadership council of Renamo was
almost exclusively composed of senior military commanders and rebel soldiers. The sys-
tem of hierarchical and unilateral military control and governance that was established
by Renamo also involved a great deal of coercion. For instance “[n]o eﬀort was made to
distinguish between those who could aﬀord to contribute [food to the rebels] and those
who were unable” (Weinstein 2007, p. 185). Civilians rarely received public goods in
exchange for their support and contributions (Weinstein 2007, pp. 181–186).
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Weinstein (2007, p. 171) traces this great variance in the structures of governance
established by rebel organizations back to the conditions present at the organization’s
inception and the types of members who were attracted to participate. More specif-
ically, he states that three factors determine the shape of governance structures: the
resource endowments of rebel groups, the degree to which the resources a rebel group
wishes to obtain require civilian labor to produce and the membership and organiza-
tional structure of the rebel group itself (Weinstein 2007, p. 196). This again leads to
a number of empirical implications concerning the governance structures established by
groups involved in New Warfare as opposed to those ﬁghting conventional civil wars.
Conventional insurgencies largely depend on the productivity of and the support from
the civilian population, and their members are characterized by a long term perspective.
Such organizations are able to credibly commit themselves and their members to agree-
ments with non-combatants due to the shared norms, rules and identities on which they
are built. In addition, the rebels intend to take over the state and therefore expect that
interaction between them and their future constituents will be repeated. Their shadow
of the future is comparatively long. In order to realize long term rewards, the rebels
might be even willing to establish institutions which constrain their own self-interested,
short-term actions. In such situations, cooperative and trust-based arrangements with
non-combatants (e.g. structures of joint governance, rule-making, management of re-
sources and the provision of public goods) are not only a necessity but comparatively
easy to establish and maintain (Weinstein 2007, pp. 167–169). In addition, the rebels
are held in check and forced to cooperate with civilians through the capacity of non-
combatants to punish coercive or exclusive rebel behavior by ﬂeeing or switching sides.
Both reactions would undermine the rebel’s ability to obtain the support and resources
which they need to survive (Humphreys and Weinstein 2006a, p. 430). This puts non-
combatants “in a position of power” (Weinstein 2007, pp. 170, 203) which they lack in
New Warfare.
Opportunistic rebel groups involved in New Wars are able to draw on economic endow-
ments to survive and prosper even if civilians withhold contributions. This means they
are able to exist and enrich themselves independently of civilian support. Because they
are unconcerned about the reactions of the civilian population, they cannot only aﬀord
to behave in a more predatory fashion (Weinstein 2007, pp. 171 sq.) but their leaders also
have little incentive to share power with non-combatants (e.g. in order to jointly man-
age resources). From the perspective of the rebels, future beneﬁts from cooperation with
civilians are unlikely or insecure. In fact, rebel-civilian cooperation within a future state
is not even intended. The rebels are characterized by a comparatively short shadow of
the future. Trust as the basis of any cooperative arrangement between the rebels and the
local population is lacking, too, due to a lack of shared norms and identities. The rebels
also quickly develop a negative reputation because their weak internal structures result
in high levels of defection and inconsistency in behavior. “[C]ivilians learn quickly that
commitments [made by such groups] are not credible and promises cannot be trusted”
(Weinstein 2007, pp. 172, 205). For these reasons, opportunistic rebels would fail to build
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cooperative relationships with civilians even if they would try (Weinstein 2007, p. 196).
At the same time, civilians are unable to pay a bribe large enough to convince the rebels
to restrain themselves or to establish more inclusive governance structures (Weinstein
2007, p. 172). Switching support to the other side does not help either because “the
other side” (the remaining non-state actors involved in ﬁghting New Wars) has similar
incentive structures and is therefore unlikely to treat civilians much diﬀerently. A com-
paratively strong government which at least promises to provide security and to defend
public interests does not exist. Civilians only have the option to ﬂee which would make
it even easier for the rebels to illegally extract resources in the area. Therefore, oppor-
tunistic rebel groups deliberately engage in forced displacement. Alternatively, civilians
could actively resist warfare. This, however, would most certainly result in further re-
pression and the establishment of more governance structures rooted in military control
and coercion (Weinstein 2007, p. 172). In either case, the risk of violence against civilians
increases.
A hybrid situation arises where opportunistic rebel groups heavily depend on civilian
labor in order to produce the resources they wish to obtain. Sendero-Huallago has
already been given as an example. The rebels needed non-combatants for the labor-
intensive production of coca leaves. For this reason they established a highly centralized,
hierarchical and authoritarian system of administration and unilateral military control
that inhibited citizens from co-managing the rebellion but which was combined with some
“odd form of civilian inclusion” in the distribution of beneﬁts. “[W]here the realization
of revenues from economic endowments requires civilian labor, rebel groups tend to build
structures that are more broadly participatory, even if they lack mechanisms for sharing
signiﬁcant power” (Weinstein 2007, p. 173). According to Elwert (1997, p. 98), the same
logic also aﬀects the intensity of warfare: In cases where the exploitation of the conﬂict
resource requires a lot of labor to extract, the rebels simply fear a war-induced shortage of
labor: Very severe ﬁghting which results in large numbers of direct and indirect military
and civilian deaths would lead to a shortage of those who exploit the resources on behalf
of the rebel commanders.12
The above already touches upon the ﬁnal causal link speciﬁed by Weinstein. The
author argues that the kind or quality of internal structures established by rebel leaders
to control and manage their members and the kind or quality of institutions they develop
to regulate their external relationships with the civilian population determine the level
and kind of violence applied against non-combatants. Again, the implications for New
Warfare as opposed to conventional civil warfare are straightforward.
12Elwert (1997, p. 98) adds that those engaged in new war economies need to fear a breakdown or
decrease in the demand for the conﬂict resources they produce and therefore a shortage in money,
arms and other goods which they receive in return and which they need for warfare. He therefore
concludes that war economies will remain a “ephemeral phenomenon” because they are without much
protection exposed to the cyclical nature of markets.
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According to Weinstein (2007, p. 198), opportunistic rebel groups not only commit high
levels of indiscriminate violence because their membership proﬁle and internal structure
inhibit leaders from policing defection within their ranks, but also because their external
relationships with civilians are build on coercive instead of cooperative structures. Op-
portunistic groups simply lack networks of local ties that would otherwise enable them
to solicit information from non-combatants which are needed to identify and punish de-
fectors individually. The precondition for the selective use of violence (i.e. a capacity
to obtain valuable and trustworthy information and to use it to direct violence without
making mistakes) is heavily obstructed (Weinstein 2007, pp. 204 sq.).
In contrast, “[a]ctivist rebellions tend to have the institutions needed to choose tar-
gets carefully; as a consequence, such movements employ largely selective violence at
much lower levels of intensity” (Weinstein 2007, p. 198). Avoiding indiscriminate vio-
lence renders activist rebellions more eﬃcient in their use of force which also increases
their eﬀectiveness: Civilians know that in case of defection, punishment by the rebels
will only target the defectors (i.e. violence is used eﬃciently). This implies that col-
laboration with the rebels ensures survival or at least protection from attacks by the
other side which reduces incentives to defect (i.e. the rebellion becomes more eﬀective)
(Weinstein 2007, p. 204).
The four case studies again support these theses. The NRA in Uganda established
mechanisms to include supportive forces and put in place mechanisms of internal control
that guaranteed a rather consistent level of discipline within the organization even far
from the center of rebel control. Its shared ideology and its tight linkages to local com-
munities enabled the organization to carefully direct force and to limit the number of
mistakes. The NRA worked through its local committees to identify traitors and gather
evidence. If eﬀorts to convert defectors failed, the rebels employed targeted assassina-
tions, which were the dominant form of NRA violence against non-combatants. Overall,
rebel groups were responsible for the smallest number of incidents of violence during
this conﬂict (Weinstein 2007, pp. 220–229). The second activist group studied by the
author, the national committee of the Shining Path in Peru, also applied force selectively
against non-combatants. But, particularly in the later stages of the rebellion and in the
zonas altas where the rebels encountered greater resistance and lacked the monitoring
mechanisms that restrained abuses in the lowlands, large civilian massacres occurred. In
these cases, however, civilians were collectively punished for their active resistance, vio-
lence was used strategically to send strong signals to the remaining civilian population
and attacks were disciplined (Weinstein 2007, pp. 240–250). The two opportunistic rebel
groups studied by Weinstein, Renamo in Mozambique and Sendero-Huallaga in Peru,
which did not establish cooperative relationships with civilian populations and which
lacked internal control and discipline, used coercive tactics. For the regional committee
of the Shining Path in Huallaga, “[v]iolence became the toll of choice [. . . ] as it sought to
maintain control of the drug trade” (Weinstein 2007, p. 251). The organization became
increasingly indiscriminate in its use of violence over time and attempts by civilians to
ﬂee or to ﬁght back were met with even more violence by the Sendero cadres (Weinstein
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2007, pp. 252, 257). Renamo forces in Mozambique only used violence selectively to
target Frelimo ﬁghters but otherwise did not show much restraint in their use of force.
The rebels were responsible for the vast majority of incidents of violence, large civilian
massacres were a consistent feature of rebel behavior especially as the organization grew
in size and spread geographically and the violence applied against civilians is described
as “fairly indiscriminate” in nature. In contested zones, the rebels made no eﬀort to
identify the victims, their incursions were brutal and violence careened out of control.
Renamo was even unable to protect its own supporters from its attacks. Far from the
center, the level of violence was much lower, but the character of rebel behavior remained
the same. In rebel-held areas, people experienced high levels of coercion on a daily basis
(Weinstein 2007, pp. 230–239). Weinstein (2007, p. 239) identiﬁes this abusiveness as
an unintended by-product of the rebel organization’s recruitment strategy: The short-
term, material motivations of Renamo ﬁghters rendered the commanders unable to police
defection within their units.
In summary, Weinstein argues that the initial endowments to which rebel leaders have
access determine the membership of their rebel group. The proﬁle of recruits then con-
ditions the choices rebel leaders make about how to internally manage and control the
behavior of their combatants. In addition, the kind of endowments available to rebel
leaders determines the choices they make about how to govern the surrounding civilian
populations. Both the quality of internal and of external structures of control and man-
agement shape the ways in which the rebels employ violence against non-combatants.
The leaders of resource-poor organizations are forced to draw on social endowments
(shared norms, beliefs and identity) instead of material incentives to mobilize and mo-
tivate their combatants. This yields a core of highly committed members. Members
attracted to, selected by and raised during such rebellions are willing to endure enor-
mous costs – even death – for rewards that are only available in the future if the rebels
succeed in taking over the state. This enormous commitment is reinforced by respective
systems of training, political education and promotion based on merit and understand-
ing of the political message of the movement. Because highly committed combatants
are more likely to follow the orders of their commanders, this membership proﬁle al-
lows leaders to decentralize operations and to more eﬀectively control and manage their
members. Rebel groups with such internal structures are better able to take on military
targets and to exhibit discipline in liberated zones. In addition, the rebels intend to
cooperate with civilians in the long term. For this purpose, they establish structures of
governance within the areas they control that are responsive to the needs and interests
of large segments of the civilian population. These institutions are characterized by high
levels of inclusiveness and power-sharing with non-combatants. The rebels are able to
build a reputation of restraint and to largely abstain from coercive measures and one-
sided violence against civilians. If it is used, force against non-combatants is applied
systematically, strategically and selectively to punish defectors. In contrast, access of
rebel groups to economic endowments enables leaders to make appeals for participation
that are rooted in short-term material incentives. Resource-rich groups tend to attract
combatants who expect immediate payoﬀs and relatively low risks in comparison to re-
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wards. Such membership does not allow for the use of the above mentioned tools to
thoroughly select members and exert internal control.13 Due to the dearth of mecha-
nisms for selecting committed recruits and sanctioning defectors, the organization that
emerges operates on the basis of constant defection. Structures of delegation within the
organization either “involve a high degree of centralization – because local units cannot
be trusted to follow the orders of the central command – or signiﬁcant decentralization,
within only a loose alliance joining largely independent ﬁghting units” (Weinstein 2007,
p. 300). The organization becomes oriented toward maintaining the ﬂow of rewards to
their leaders and members through pillaging and looting. Soldiers avoid military en-
gagement and instead attack civilian targets because this is less risky in order to capture
resources (Weinstein 2007, p. 139). Within the zones they control, such opportunistic
rebel groups not only exhibit indiscipline due to their weak internal structure but they
also tend to establish institutions of governance that are little responsive to the needs
and interests of civilians. Because the rebels do not depend on support from civilians,
power-sharing with non-combatants does not exist or at best includes elites. Centralized,
hierarchical and authoritarian systems of administration and unilateral military control
emerge which often entail a high degree of coercion. Because they lack networks of local
ties, such rebel organizations are unable to solicit information from non-combatants on
individual defectors. For this reason, they are less able to direct violence and to avoid
mistakes. This further increases the risk of indiscriminate use of force against civilians.
Unfortunately, opportunistic rebellions have little ﬂexibility to adapt their internal
organizational structures due to the above mentioned pressure to maintain their mem-
bership through a constant and immediate ﬂow of material incentives. Combatants’
access to material rewards obtained through violent means must continue if an orga-
nizational collapse is to be prevented. Alternatively, one might argue that the cost of
increasing discipline is especially high in resource-rich environments because the temp-
tations for rebels to line their own pockets are greater. This decreases the willingness
of rebel leaders to invest in discipline and might therefore also explain the persistence
of violent strategies (Weinstein 2007, p. 329 fn 2). Still, opportunist groups involved in
conventional greed rebellions might realize that economic endowments are only initially
a blessing while at some point they result in a rebel “resource curse” because they at-
tract recruits who are “possibly ill-suited to the long term goal of capturing state power”
(Weinstein 2005, pp. 598, 600). In addition, opportunist groups involved in conventional
greed rebellions become aware of the fact that in the long run opportunistic approaches
are counterproductive to achieve their overall goal because early missteps in the use of
13Unlike activist rebellions that must grow in size to successfully challenge the government forces and
to control the state, the leaders of opportunistic rebel groups involved in New Warfare might want
to curb the growth of their organization because small organizations are “[t]he most eﬃcient [. . . ]
for committing crime” (Weinstein 2007, p. 128) and much easier to oversee. In New Warfare, even
comparatively small and poorly organized groups (whose combatants avoid combat, attack civilian
rather than military targets and who capture resources for themselves rather than for the group)
may remain and prosper “because the market is not capable of disciplining them”. If the opponent
non-state forces are suﬃciently weak, such a group may even emerge as the victor (Weinstein 2007,
pp. 132 sq.).
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force generate civilian resistance and defection. Groups involved in New Warfare who
in the ﬁrst place do not aim to capture state power and who do not compete for the
loyalty of civilian populations can be expected to be much less sensitive in this regard.
Although indiscriminate violence against civilians is likely to generate civilian opposi-
tion, too, the rebels are willing and able to reply with ever greater levels of coercion
over time. Because they are well aware of the fact that it is not an attractive option
for non-combatants to switch support to the other side, violence spirals out of control.
Therefore, opportunistic rebel organizations involved in New Wars are least likely to
change their behavioral patterns – except in the case of external shocks that threaten
the structure and coherence of the involved organizations and alter their membership.
Such external shocks include massive battleﬁeld losses as well as military successes or
changes in endowments (because external patrons lose or gain interest in the conﬂict due
to altered geopolitical considerations or because rebels conquer new territories carrying
valuable resources) (Weinstein 2007, pp. 260 sqq.). Patterns of indiscriminate violence
against civilians do not only tend to persist but even reproduce themselves because the
unremitting exposure to violence “desensitizes” soldiers (and civilians) and destroys the
“psychosocial mechanisms of self-sanctioning” that serve as guides for conduct and de-
terrents of mischief during peaceful times (Kalyvas 2006, pp. 55–62). The experience
of violent conﬂict itself – whether as a victim or perpetrator – but also the length of
this experience leave their marks. New Wars that are “[. . . ] not intended to secure a
swift military resolution nearly always end in the loss of discipline. The men under arms
increasingly go over to using war as a means to personal enrichment and guns as an
instrument for the acting out of fantasies of omnipotence and sadism” (Münkler 2005,
p. 44).
10.2. Kalyvas’ Mechanism of Contestation
Weinstein’s argument that insurgent violence against civilians follows on from an orga-
nization’s material strength seems to stand in sharp contrast with alternative theoretical
arguments linking such violence to the relative weakness of an insurgent group. For in-
stance, Eck and Hultman (2007) state that losing rebel groups tend to commit violence
against non-combatants in order to signal resolve. The authors explain rebel violence
against civilians through dynamics of contestation instead of environmental factors (the
kind of resource endowments available) or instead of organizational features (the inter-
nal characteristics of rebel groups). In contrast to Weinstein’s exclusive focus on the
insurgent side, this requires an investigation of both parties to the conﬂict and moves
the distribution of power among the adversaries to the center of analysis. The latter also
holds for Kalyvas (2006), who points to the role of territorial control in order to explain
violence against civilians during civil warfare. His argument of contestation shall now
be presented in more detail.
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Like Weinstein, Kalyvas (2004, p. 97) departs from the puzzle why we sometimes do
observe instances of indiscriminate violence against civilians during civil warfare14 even
under conditions that make this strategy counterproductive. His approach, however,
diﬀers from Weinstein, who always poses this question with regard to the violent be-
havior of rebel groups. Kalyvas (2004, pp. 108–110) instead notes that indiscriminate
violence against civilians during civil warfare tends to be empirically associated with
the incumbent forces (i.e. government troops) rather than insurgents.15 Like Wein-
stein, he therefore identiﬁes the factors that make indiscriminate violence attractive for
violent actors in the ﬁrst place before mentioning the reasons why rebel forces can be
expected to nevertheless refrain from using this strategy at least in the long run. In
addition, he identiﬁes the reasons and conditions that render indiscriminate violence
counterproductive from the perspective of government forces.
Already in his earlier work, Kalyvas argues that government forces can aﬀord to apply
violence indiscriminately only as long as their opponents, the rebels, are comparatively
weak and unable to protect their supporters against such attacks. Then, civilians are
left with no other choice but to cooperate with the attacking forces as this seems to be
their only chance to survive. In cases, however, where the rebels are strong enough to
defend their support base against attacks, the incumbent’s long term interest to also
govern and not to alienate the civilian population renders indiscriminate violence un-
sustainable. The use of indiscriminate violence would then be counterproductive from
the perspective of the incumbent forces because it would “trigger an intense emotional
reaction [ranging from ‘ill will’ to ‘visceral anger’,] making people more risk-seeking and
hence more likely to play an active role in the rebellion under a previously unacceptable
risk” (Kalyvas 2004, pp. 114 sq.). Later, Kalyvas (2004, p. 117) refers to this problem
as the failure of indiscriminate violence to generate “a clear structure of incentives for
non-collaboration with the rebels”. Instead, indiscriminate violence by government forces
14With his theory, Kalyvas (2006, pp. 19 sq.) aims to explore a certain kind of violent event during
civil warfare, namely the intentional and direct inﬂiction of physical harm (ﬁrst and primarily violent
death or homicide) on civilians (i.e. those who are not full-time members of an armed group).
15Valentino et al. (2004) agree and explain that mass killing by government forces is substantially more
likely than mass killing by insurgent groups because guerrilla forces are diﬃcult to defeat directly. For
this reason, governments facing major guerrilla insurgencies (i.e. guerrillas that receive high levels
of active support from the local population and pose a major military threat to the regime) have
strong incentives to target the guerrillas’ civilian base of support. This is comparatively easy because
state military organizations have a greater capacity for violence. They are usually larger and better
equipped in terms of weaponry than the rebels. For the same reason, state forces can devote greater
resources to defending their own civilian supporters while guerrillas seldom can aﬀord to engage
in the static defense of speciﬁc territories because this would expose their forces to direct combat
with militarily superior government troops. Thus, insurgents are less capable of killing government
supporters in large numbers, less able to defend their own supporters and more fearful of massive state
reprisals (Valentino et al. 2004, p. 385). Kalyvas (2004, pp. 108–110) adds that government armies
are more likely than insurgents to indiscriminately attack civilians because they tend to establish a
less permanent presence in an area and therefore lack the kind of information necessary to identify
individual defectors and to apply violence more selectively. In contrast, the insurgents are “almost
always the ﬁrst movers” who set up local institutions which they can use in order to collect the
information required for targeted attacks.
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“may even produce strong incentives for collaboration with [the rebels] – thus generating
defection rather than deterring it”.16 The indiscriminate use of force simply decreases
the opportunity costs of collaboration with the rival actor (Kalyvas 2006, p. 144). The in-
consistent nature of indiscriminate violence may also cause shock and confusion or signal
weakness which might contribute to a further alienation of the civilian population from
the government and increasing support for the rebels (given the existence of a relatively
strong rebel organization which catalyzes emotions into actions) (Kalyvas 2004, p. 118).
This relates to another reason which renders indiscriminate violence counterproductive
from the perspective of government forces, namely the fact that it might help the rebels
“to solve their collective action problem by turning the protection of the civilian popula-
tion into a selective incentive [. . . ]. [S]urvival-maximizing civilians will collaborate with
the political actor who credibly oﬀers them a way out – as opposed to the political actor
that leaves them no option” (Kalyvas 2004, pp. 120 sq.). Furthermore, indiscriminate vi-
olence turns out to be counterproductive from the perspective of government forces if it
produces “reverse discrimination” against non-rebels or anti-rebels. The author explains
that especially those individuals who consider themselves innocent because they never
engaged in any rebellion against the state might fail to protect themselves. This might
result in the ironic situation that indiscriminate attacks by government forces most likely
hit those who feel no need to ﬂee or hide instead of those who associate with the opposi-
tion forces (Kalyvas 2004, pp. 118 sq.). Finally, indiscriminate violence against civilians
by government forces is not very eﬀective or even counterproductive if the strength of
ties between the rebel forces and the civilian population are much weaker than assumed
by the government. In cases where civilians lack any inﬂuence on the rebels and where
the rebels care little about their civilian support base, the use of indiscriminate violence
against civilians by government forces will not succeed in pressuring the rebels into com-
pliance. This seems to be the case quite often. At least insurgents are “usually aware of
the risk they force on the civilian population [. . . ] and are generally unwilling to stop
ﬁghting because of them” (Kalyvas 2004, p. 123).
Obviously, a number of reasons exist which render the use of indiscriminate violence
by incumbent forces ineﬃcient, ineﬀective or even counterproductive. Still, this violent
strategy is frequently applied during civil warfare, a fact which Kalyvas attributes to
the following reasons. At the individual level, certain emotions emerge during warfare
(e.g. pleasure in killing people or stress, fear and personal frustration as a result of the
exposure to danger and death, anger or a desire for revenge) that induce actors to follow
this sub-optimal strategy.17 Secondly, at the collective level, mere ignorance or organi-
zational incompetence allow the free reign of these emotions. Oftentimes, the military
is also overly optimistic as to its own chances of defeating the rebels quickly because
the threat posed by a rebellion is believed to be negligible. This incorrect perception
combines with inadequate training. Regular armies are not prepared to deal with the ab-
16Kalyvas (2006, p. 104) deﬁnes defection as “active collaboration with the rival actor” in the form of
non-compliance, information sharing with the opponent or switching side.
17However, “it is also unclear whether emotions and attitudes [. . . ] are the causes, the correlates, or the
results of using indiscriminate violence” (Kalyvas 2006, p. 161).
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sence of clear front lines, and they fundamentally misunderstand the nature of irregular
warfare as they are usually trained to ﬁght inter-state wars. In addition, inappropri-
ate organizational features like authoritarian structures within regular armies as well as
their weak institutional memory and their resistance to learning (e.g. due to institu-
tional distortions like fast rotation periods for military personnel) might explain why
incumbents do not refrain from using indiscriminate violence although the deleterious
eﬀects of this strategy seem obvious (Kalyvas 2004, pp. 126–133). Even in the presence
of knowledge about its counterproductive eﬀects, indiscriminate violence might be used
because it is much cheaper than selective violence which requires “a complex and costly
infrastructure” to identify, locate and kill the enemy one by one. “Most incumbents real-
ize quickly that they lack the necessary resources” to proceed in such a targeted manner
(Kalyvas 2004, p. 130). Finally, Kalyvas (2004, pp. 124–126) notes that the apparently
frequent use of indiscriminate violence against civilians might simply be an artifact or
the result of a selection bias. He suggests that selective violence is much more likely
to be missed or miscoded by those who engage in data collection. Oftentimes, patterns
in violence go unnoticed. Violent acts are coded as indiscriminate although they are
only indiscriminate on the surface. In addition, research tends to focus on those acts of
violence that are or appear to be indiscriminate in nature while ignoring the numerous
instances where actors refrain from using this strategy although they had the ability to
do so (Kalyvas 2006, pp. 160 sqq.).
In summary, Kalyvas states that during conventional civil warfare, the likelihood of
indiscriminate violence is greatly increased under steep imbalances of power and (local)
information between the competing actors. In such circumstances, governments face
a major rebel movement that seriously threatens the regime but which is not strong
enough to defend its own civilian support base against violent attacks by the govern-
ment. Theoretically, such a situation allows the incumbents to be indiﬀerent about the
type of violence they apply. Practically, however, they most likely resort to indiscrim-
inate violence as this is their least expensive option. Likewise, rebel forces can aﬀord
to be indiscriminate when incumbents are close to defeat. If parity emerges over time,
both parties to the conﬂict develop strong incentives to change their strategies from an
indiscriminate to a more selective use of force. They eventually learn that the indis-
criminate use of force is counterproductive to their long term interests. In situations
of balanced power, indiscriminate violence only alienates civilians who then defect and
refuse to cooperate (e.g. to share local information) because they fear counter attacks
by rival forces. This leads to the expectation that “given a balance of power between
competing actors, indiscriminate violence is more likely at early rather than late stages”
of conventional, state-based internal warfare (Kalyvas 2004, pp. 97, 135, 138).
In his book “The Logic of Violence in Civil War”, Kalyvas (2006) elaborates further
on the question of how processes of contestation and the distribution of power among
violent actors aﬀect the nature of violence applied during warfare. He develops a micro-
foundational theory of conventional civil warfare which consists of two strands (a model
of selective violence and a model of indiscriminate violence). The latter presents a
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more formalized version of the above argument that an imbalance of power and local
information between belligerents associates with the indiscriminate use of force. The
underlying logic of this argument is useful to understand the practice of indiscriminate
violence during new, non-state warfare, too. In addition, Kalyvas’ argument combines
well with Weinstein’s theory.
Kalyvas (2006, p. 18) departs from the notion that warfare produces situations of di-
vided or dual sovereignty. In the former case, one of the warring parties manages to
establish exclusive control and to dispel the opponent from a certain area. This cor-
responds to the overall aim of warring parties involved in conventional civil wars: To
entirely and unilaterally control a certain territory and its population. Thus, during
conventional civil warfare areas of segmented or divided sovereignty are likely to emerge
where two or more political actors exercise full sovereignty over distinct parts of the
territory. In contrast, New Warfare lacks mutually exclusive claims to authority. It is
characterized by ﬁerce competition over conﬂict resources and the absence of a com-
paratively strong opponent which might otherwise require cohesive and joint action by
internal opposition groups. This renders the emergence of war zones more likely where
several warring parties compete for control. Situations of dual or overlapping sovereignty
emerge. In these cases, territory is fragmented, i.e. two or more political actors exercise
limited sovereignty over the same area (Kalyvas 2006, pp. 88 sq.).
Kalyvas continues by arguing that the type of territorial control and sovereignty that
exists in a given region (whether fragmented or segmented) determines the kind of vio-
lent strategy followed by warring parties. As mentioned above, actors who manage to
establish unilateral territorial control “can protect civilians who live in that territory –
both from their rivals and from themselves, giving survival-oriented civilians a strong
incentive to collaborate with them, irrespective of their true or initial preferences. In
this sense, collaboration is largely endogenous to control” (Kalyvas 2006, pp. 12, 124).
The author adds that if control is exercised for a longer period of time, it produces
“mechanical ascription”, e.g. it “generates cascades of support because the families of
ﬁghters tend to support the armed factions where their younger members are ﬁghting”.
This links with the notion that especially long term control signals credibility, military
strength and eventually victory, which might also cause collaboration (Kalyvas 2006,
pp. 125–128). In this context, Kalyvas (2006, p. 129) speaks of a self-reinforcing dy-
namic. In some cases, control by a certain political actor creates the impression that the
controlled population is indeed loyal to this actor. After a while, this reputation might
turn into a self-fulﬁlling prophecy by generating new and enduring political identities
of the controlled. In addition, actors who control a certain territory also control its re-
sources which they might use in order to “buy” collaboration. Especially in a context of
scarcity, however, control over a certain territory and its population also enables actors
to enforce collaboration through coercive means. Only the imposition of control allows
the eﬀective use of violence to deter defection. “[T]he eﬀectiveness of threats hinges on
control” (Kalyvas 2006, pp. 117, 124). The less coercive version of this argument empha-
sizes the fact that control enables actors to better monitor and sanction the local civilian
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population, e.g. through the establishment of a system of administration or through the
establishment of a network of agents who are constantly present on the ground (Kalyvas
2006, pp. 128, 183–192). Whatever the exact causal mechanism might be: “the higher the
level of control exercised by a particular actor in an area, the higher the level of civilian
collaboration with this political actor [and vice versa]” (Kalyvas 2006, p. 111). A high
level of civilian collaboration generally reduces the need for coercive means (as there will
be less defection) and brings about private information (e.g. through denunciation) that
is needed by belligerents to better target attacks. Kalyvas (2006, pp. 195, 145) argues
that individuals are more likely to denounce their fellows if the actor to whom they are
denouncing is able to shield them from retaliation or counter-denunciation. Thus, the
provision of local information through denunciation (and therefore the determination of
whether violence can be applied selectively or indiscriminately) is a function of control
exercised by belligerents in a given region.
But if collaboration is endogenous to control, what determines the distribution of
control? Kalyvas (2006, pp. 132–138) replies that control hinges largely on military
eﬀectiveness which is often determined by geography (e.g. the distance of the area from
military bases, local administrative centers, urban areas, roads or borders). I add that
the capacity of any violent actor to gain and maintain military control over a contested
territory depends on the quantity and quality of resources available to the group as well as
on the development of more or less eﬀective and eﬃcient internal and external structures
of control and management. The capacity to exert permanent and unilateral military
control over contested territory is endogenous to the process described by Weinstein.
More precisely, the kind of resource endowments available to rebel leaders conditions
their recruitment strategy and the membership proﬁle of the emerging rebel group which
determines the group’s internal structure as well as the kind of external institutions the
rebel organization establishes in order to govern the civilian population (see Weinstein’s
argument). Both impact upon the capacity of the rebel organization to establish and
maintain territorial control which, according to Kalyvas, then shapes the level and kind of
violence applied against civilians (see Mechanism 2, ﬁg. 10.3 on page 143). Violent groups
which lack internal discipline and deny civilians any inﬂuence (e.g. on the distribution
of local resources) are more likely to face high levels of defection within the organization
and opposition from non-combatants which both render such organizations ineﬀective.
In addition, such organizations are ineﬃcient in their use of force. Violence is used
indiscriminately because locals withhold the kind of information necessary to apply
violence in a more targeted manner. It is plausible to expect that such ineﬀective and
ineﬃcient organizations also ﬁnd it more diﬃcult to achieve military successes like the
establishment of unilateral and permanent territorial control. According to Kalyvas, this
further increases the chances of indiscriminate violence against civilians. In contrast,
rebel organizations with tight internal mechanisms of control and management, high
levels of power-sharing with civilians and high levels of inclusiveness of non-combatants
face lower levels of defection and less opposition from the local population. They are able
to apply violence more selectively as they enjoy access to local networks and information.
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Because they are also more eﬀective due to low levels of defection, they ﬁnd it easier to
defeat competitors and to establish unilateral territorial control which further decreases
the risk of indiscriminate violence against civilians.
In addition, one might argue that access to certain natural resources as well as non-
material resources (like trust by civilian populations) quickly and easily transfers into
military strength, e.g. through the purchase of weapons or the acquaintance of impor-
tant strategic information. Thus, the quantity and kind of resources available to rebels
immediately impact upon their relative military power. This relates to the level of terri-
torial control these groups are able to exert which ﬁnally shapes their violent strategies
towards non-combatants. Organizations that can draw on plenty of valuable conﬂict
resources like gemstones or ivory ﬁnd it easier to purchase weapons, to quickly set up an
army, to defeat competitors and to establish unilateral and permanent military control
over a contested territory (see Mechanism 3, ﬁg. 10.3 on page 143).
Obviously, Kalyvas’ theory was (again) designed to apply to situations of conventional
civil warfare where power asymmetries matter. Changes in the distribution of power
among violent actors are a decisive factor in his theory. More precisely, the author depicts
ﬁve possible constellations which might arise during state-based civil warfare. In the ﬁrst
case, either the government or the insurgent forces are able to dispel their opponent from
a certain territory over which they gain full control. No defection takes place because
civilians do not enjoy access to the other party and because the group in control of the
area credibly protects its supporters against attacks from the rival. Denunciations only
take place at low rates because nobody dares to oppose the occupying forces. Low levels
of defection and high levels of collaboration render the use of force against civilians
obsolete. If violence occurs, it is indiscriminately applied by the rivals who, due to
their lack of control, do not possess local information necessary to better target their
attacks. Alternatively, situations might arise where one of the belligerents exercises
secure but incomplete control over a certain territory. The opponent is still present in
the surrounding area and makes sporadic visits during night time.18 Defection increases,
as civilians enjoy access to rival forces. Denunciation also takes place more often. Thus,
the dominant actor has an incentive as well as the ability to apply violence selectively.
Again, indiscriminate force only takes place on behalf of the militarily inferior rivals.
Finally, a situation of balanced power might arise where high levels of defection to the
other side are accompanied by a “nondenunciation equilibrium”. Civilians are unwilling
to supply private information to the belligerents due to high costs. Neither side has
the power to protect their collaborators which causes fears of counter-denunciation and
inhibits collaboration. For this reason, both belligerents lack private information to
attack selectively. Still, they refrain from indiscriminate violence because this would
result in even higher rates of defection. Thus, during conventional civil warfare, the
most contested areas are an “oasis of peace” (Kalyvas 2006, pp. 195–209).
18For a deﬁnition of “full control” and “secure but incomplete control” see Kalyvas (2006, p. 211).
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If anything, indiscriminate violence is used by one side only (the militarily inferior
forces) and is never applied as a long term strategy. In addition, coercive violence
during conventional civil warfare – even if it is applied indiscriminately – is neither
necessarily gratuitous, wanton or solely vengeful nor necessarily massive. Instead, civil
warfare implies low levels of violence because “[c]oercion fails if it merely destroys the
subject whose compliance is sought” (Kalyvas 2006, pp. 26 sq., 150).
The question re-emerges whether the same reasoning also applies to new, non-state
armed conﬂict which lacks the severe power asymmetries eminent in conventional civil
warfare between government forces and insurgent troops. According to the above logic,
the rather balanced distribution of power among New Wars Actors should decrease the
likelihood of indiscriminate violence against civilians. However, in New Warfare, violent
actors do not depend on the support of the local population to survive and prosper. The
perpetrators of violence do not intend to govern these people in the future and therefore
do not seek their loyalty. The aim of violence is not to induce civilians into compliance.
Instead, violence is used to exterminate an entire group, for the pleasure of terrorizing
people or as a calculated economic strategy (to enrich oneself through the compulsory
acquisition of resources) rather than a calculated military strategy (to achieve political
ends). Oftentimes, New Wars violence remains entirely non-instrumental and is con-
ducted with an indiﬀerence to consequences (e.g. when it happens as a by-product of
looting).19 Most importantly, there are no rival forces who would treat civilians much
diﬀerently and who would be willing to establish for them a safe zone of permanent
sovereignty. Therefore, defection to the other side is not an option for non-combatants.
This renders civilians rather powerless and, from the perspective of the combatants,
indiscriminate violence the cheapest, most eﬃcient and most eﬀective option – even in
the long run and even in a situation of balanced power. We should therefore not ob-
serve a shift toward a more selective use of force as the conﬂict waxes on. Even if New
Wars Actors would wish to apply violence more selectively, the context of fragmented
sovereignty would render them unable to obtain local information necessary for a more
targeted use of force. Finally, the indiscriminate use of force against non-combatants
further decreases civilians’ incentives to collaborate with the rebels. Because the rebels
can aﬀord to reply with even more indiscriminate violence, a vicious circle sets in.
19Kalyvas (2006, pp. 23–26) diﬀerentiates the non-instrumental from the instrumental use of violence.
Non-instrumental violence is “completely independent from the intentions of the main actors and
materializes as a by-product of their action, such as looting or certain forms of revenge”. It follows
simple, expressive motives, is often described as “anomic” or “nihilistic”, combines with identity or
sectarian violence and is “conducted with an indiﬀerence to consequences”. In contrast, instrumental
violence is used to either exterminate an entire group or to control the civilian population (e.g.
through physical destruction, mass deportation or ethnic cleansing). If violence is applied coercively
to control the civilian population, it “[. . . ] becomes a resource rather than the ﬁnal product [. . . ]
[and] performs a communicative function with a clear deterrent dimension”. In this case, “ [. . . ] at
least one political actor intends to govern the population it targets for violence; an empirical indicator
of this intention is whether the targets of violence have the option to surrender.”
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Advocates of the concept of New Wars stress the context of state failure as an addi-
tional reason for especially high levels of indiscriminate violence against civilians. At
ﬁrst sight, this seems to be at odds with Kalyvas (2006, pp. 17 sq.), who deﬁnes the kind
of violent event under study as “armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized
sovereign entity between parties subject to a common authority at the outset of the
hostilities”. In new, non-state warfare, this sovereign entity has ceased to exist already
at the onset of ﬁghting. While civil warfare might lead to an eﬀective “breakdown of
the monopoly of violence by way of territorially based armed challenge” (Kalyvas 2006,
p. 88), this is where New Warfare starts. Later on, however, Kalyvas explicitly links a
context of state failure with high levels of indiscriminate violence “because [in such cir-
cumstances] no actor has the capacity to set up the sort of administrative infrastructure
required by selective violence”. He adds that in this sense, high levels of “eliminationist
violence [. . . ] could be endogenous to state failure” (Kalyvas 2006, p. 171).
Elsewhere, he labels the kind of violence applied in such a context “reciprocal exter-
mination” and the corresponding kind of intra-state and bilateral warfare “symmetric
non-conventional”. In such warfare, “neither political actor intends to govern the pop-
ulation it targets for violence”. Instead, all belligerents “hold symmetrical intentions to
exterminate each other’s civilian basis”.20 This can either be the case in multilateral,
inter-state warfare or in intra-state warfare where any institution with a legitimate claim
to governance disappeared. Accordingly, reciprocal extermination often associates with
state collapse and the dissolution of government forces which also provides the opportu-
nity to rivaling armies to “equip themselves by plundering the arsenal of the disbanded
state army” (Kalyvas 2006, pp. 31, 171, 68). Although Kalyvas does not explicitly use the
term “New Warfare”, his understanding of symmetric non-conventional warfare comes
very close to the understanding of new or non-conventional (non-state) internal ﬁghting
presented here. In this kind of internal armed conﬂict, the entire breakdown of the po-
litical (and social) order enables undisciplined and armed non-state actors to transgress
established norms and rules. The absence of professional armies and structures causes
a breakdown in military discipline which enables “decentralized looting, banditry, and
all kinds of violence against civilians” to an extent not seen in conventional civil warfare
(Kalyvas 2006, p. 68). Like in “symmetric non-conventional” warfare, clear front lines
hardly exist which causes a feeling of the enemy’s presence behind one’s back. This
might cause emotional reactions (e.g. the rise of frustration, fear or anxiety or even
panic among those involved in warfare) which then lead to preemptive violence and a
brutalization of warfare. Likewise, uncertainty about who is guilty (and part of the
opponent’s military force) and who is an innocent civilian has been shown to facilitate
preemptive violence or “trigger-happy reactions” of those bearing arms. “[I]n an envi-
ronment where it is impossible to tell civilian from enemy combatants apart it pays to
be violent”. Accordingly, in symmetric non-conventional wars “the warriors’ honor is to
be replaced with barbarism” (Kalyvas 2006, pp. 68 sq.).
20See also Snow (1996, p. 68) who notes that New Wars “[. . . ] are not wars for the hearts and minds of
men, but naked attempts by one group to subjugate or destroy another” (Snow 1996, p. 68).
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By asking whether the political actors intend to govern the targeted population and
whether violence is produced unilaterally or bilaterally/multilaterally, Kalyvas arrives
at the four-fold “Typology of Mass Political Violence” presented by table 10.1 on the
current page. This typology contrasts the kind of violence applied in “symmetric non-
conventional” internal wars (reciprocal extermination or New War Violence) with 1.)
violence applied in conventional civil wars, 2.) with state terror and 3.) with genocide.
Table 10.1.: Types of Violence in Warfare. Based on Kalyvas (2006, p. 29).
10.3. Summary of Mechanisms
While past civil war research largely focused on the causes of internal armed conﬂict,
more recent studies aim to explain the scale and character of violence applied during such
warfare. Some of these studies consider certain context factors (e.g. the relative isolation
of a conﬂict region or the availability of conﬂict resources) decisive to understand patterns
of abusiveness during warfare while others stress the importance of characteristics of the
adversaries (e.g. their political ideology, military culture or underlying social basis), of
local factors (e.g. local tactics to resist violence or leadership strategies), of international
factors (e.g. the kind and extent of external assistance or prevailing international norms)
or of individual reactions (e.g. emotional responses). To complicate things further, these
factors might interact with each other and have reciprocal eﬀects (Kalyvas 2006, pp. 3,
fn 2 and 3, 8). Whatever the key independent variable might be: all of these studies
share the insight that the level and practice of violence changes with dynamics that
are internal to warfare. Identifying the reasons for the initial outbreak of violence (e.g.
greed or grievance factors) does not suﬃce to understand the application or escalation of
violence during warfare. For this reason “the causes of violence in civil warfare cannot
be subsumed under the causes of civil war; hence a theory of civil wars cannot be a
theory of violence in civil wars – and vice versa” (Kalyvas 2006, p. 20).
This reasoning prompted Stathis Kalyvas to remain entirely ambivalent about the
causes and goals of warfare and the individual’s motivation for joining one of the armed
groups. In his eﬀort to uncover the logic of violence in civil warfare, he simply drops the
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assumption that preferences are stable. He only assumes that launching and winning a
rebellion requires the commitment of a signiﬁcant part of the population, regardless of
their individual motives, regardless of whether this commitment results from persuasion
or coercion and regardless of the fact that individuals might change the level and direc-
tion of their commitment over time. Instead of specifying the single or most dominant
motivation for joining warfare, he speciﬁes the reasons to apply a certain violent strategy
(Kalyvas 2006, pp. 17, 100 sq.). This approach is refreshing after the greed vs. grievance
debate has been discussing the most dominant motivations for joining rebellions to the
point of exhaustion. Furthermore, this discussion detracted from the fact that the mech-
anisms explaining the scale and nature of violence applied during diﬀerent sub-types of
internal armed conﬂict might in fact concur.
In order to identify these mechanisms, I introduced theories designed by Weinstein
and Kalyvas to explain the scale and nature of violence in conventional (state-based)
civil warfare. I continued to argue that both approaches apply to new, non-state warfare
as well. They are helpful to link the context of state failure, the availability of conﬂict
resources and the speciﬁc nature and quantity of New Wars Actors with the scale and
nature of the applied violence. Once more, ﬁg. 10.2 on this page depicts Weinstein’s
structuralist mechanism, which states that the kind of resource endowments available
to rebel leaders conditions their recruitment strategy and the resulting membership
proﬁle of the emerging rebel group. This determines the group’s internal structure (its
mechanisms of internal control and management) and the kind of external institutions
it establishes in order to govern the civilian population (the degree of power-sharing and
the degree of inclusiveness of civilians) which then shape the rebels’ violent strategies
towards the local population (Mechanism 1).
Figure 10.2.: Mechanism 1 Explaining Civilian Abuse in Internal Armed Conﬂict.
Source: own depiction based on Weinstein (2007).
In contrast, Kalyvas predicts high levels of (indiscriminate) violence against civilians
in places where insurgent or government groups are dominant but unable to unilaterally
control the territory. Weinstein repeatedly presented and explicitly tested this argument
as an alternative hypothesis to his own theory. I, however, consider the two theories
complementary because Weinstein’s explanatory factors (the quantity and quality of
available resources and the development of more or less eﬀective and eﬃcient structures
of internal control and external governance) well relate to Kalyvas’ main independent
variable (the capacity of belligerents to gain and maintain permanent and unilateral
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territorial control). Mechanism 2 and Mechanism 3 therefore combine ideas presented
by both authors (see ﬁg. 10.3 on the current page).
Figure 10.3.: Mechanisms 2 and 3 Explaining Civilian Abuse in Internal Armed Conﬂict.
Source: own depiction based on Weinstein (2007) and Kalyvas (2006).
Mechanism 2 argues that the quantity and quality of resources available to any mil-
itary organization shape the organization’s membership proﬁle which conditions the
development of more or less eﬀective and eﬃcient internal and external structures of
control and management. The latter determines the organization’s capacity of gaining
and maintaining territorial control which then shapes the level and kind of violence ap-
plied against civilians. Rebel organizations with tight internal mechanisms of control
and management, high levels of power-sharing with civilians and high levels of inclusive-
ness of non-combatants face lower levels of defection. They are able to apply selective
violence as they enjoy access to local networks and information. Because they are also
more eﬀective due to low levels of defection, they ﬁnd it easier to defeat competitors
and establish unilateral territorial control which decreases the risk of high levels of in-
discriminate violence against civilians. In contrast, organizations characterized by a
lack of internal discipline and low levels of inclusiveness of non-combatants are likely to
face high levels of defection within the organization and non-collaboration by civilians.
Locals withhold private information necessary to apply violence in a more targeted and
eﬃcient manner. Such ineﬀective and ineﬃcient organizations ﬁnd it diﬃcult to achieve
military successes like the establishment of unilateral control over contested territory.
Instead, control over territory remains fragmented. During conventional civil warfare,
this oﬀers non-combatants the option to defect and join the other side. Because both
sides depend on civilian support and intend to govern these people in the future, the
belligerents respond to increasing defection with eﬀorts to better target their violent
attacks. But in the case of New Warfare, neither condition is met. For this reason and
because indiscriminate violence is much cheaper to apply, New Wars Actors instead turn
more coercive and repressive if facing defection. Even if the belligerents would want to
better target their violent attacks, this is diﬃcult in situations where control over terri-
tory is fragmented. In such a context, groups tend to have imperfect information about
who is collaborating and who is defecting which renders the use of selective violence less
likely while the risk of indiscriminate violence against non-combatants increases.
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While Mechanism 2 links the availability of conﬂict resources with the establishment
of less eﬃcient and eﬀective rebel organizations, with a reduced capacity to establish
and maintain territorial control and with high levels of indiscriminate violence against
civilians, Mechanism 3 argues in favor of the opposite. It states that access to con-
ﬂict resources might also quickly and easily be transferred into relative military strength
(e.g. if revenues from these resources are used to purchase weapons, to hire and pay
more soldiers or to acquire important strategic information) which then enables violent
actors to gain territorial control which ﬁnally shapes their violent strategies towards
civilians. In other words, the availability of conﬂict resources might associate with low
levels of indiscriminate violence against civilians if such resources are used to improve
the organization’s military performance and to establish unilateral military control over
a contested territory. This argument is in line with Staniland (2012, p. 152), who notes
that “[r]esources do not dictate their use, people do”. Applying this argument to New
Warfare leads to the expectation that New Wars Actors allocate a comparatively small
share of their resource wealth to institution building. They are more concerned about
lining their own pockets than willing to invest in the organization’s military performance
because defeating their enemies is not their main intention. If proﬁts derived from the
exploitation of conﬂict resources are reinvested to purchase additional or more lethal
weapons, this only stabilizes their violent strategies and results in even more indiscrim-
inate violence against non-combatants. In addition, Staniland (2012) argues that the
extent to which resource wealth is harnessed to militarily strengthen armed organiza-
tions is a function of the social-organizational underpinnings of armed groups. “[P]roxy
armies, undisciplined looters, and groups abandoning revolutionary purity for the lures
of wealth arise not because of resources per se, but because of the relationships between
resources and social bases. When social ties are insuﬃcient to build strong organizations,
resources become linked to preexisting conﬂicts and cleavages” (Staniland 2012, p. 155).
Resources entering such organizations create new internal rivalries and reinforce preex-
isting cleavages. This, and a lack of internal control, causes fractionalization. Armed
groups involved in new, non-state wars belong to this group of organizations that are
badly equipped to harness resource wealth for institution building because they are built
upon socially divided networks. A sudden and massive inﬂow of funding during later
stages (e.g. provided by an external patron, the Diaspora or through the discovery or
conquest of additional mining sites) further degrades their internal structure so that
the problem worsens over time. Armed groups involved in conventional (state-based)
internal warfare might also exploit natural resources (e.g. in the case of greed conﬂicts)
or receive ﬁnancial and/or material support from an outside patron (e.g. in grievance
conﬂicts). Nevertheless, the social bases of these integrated armed groups allow them to
use resource wealth for institution building. Their comparatively strong horizontal ties
among leaders (who share the same vision in terms of ideology and the overall political
goal) and their comparatively strong vertical ties to local populations (on whose sup-
port they depend) provide an institutional basis for the establishment of robust lines of
social and organizational loyalty and monitoring to discipline and mitigate the lures of
material gain and to control violent action.
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The notion that New Wars Actors are more likely to fractionalize reconnects with
Kalyvas and the simple argument that the higher the level of factionalization, the more
actors involved and the more contested a territory will be, the less likely the establish-
ment of permanent and unilateral control. According to Kalyvas, this increases the risk
of indiscriminate violence against civilians (ﬁg. 10.4 on this page). In such a context,
the selective use of violence becomes more diﬃcult because warring groups tend to have
imperfect information about who is collaborating and who is defecting. High levels of
fragmentation and large numbers of involved actors also increase the options to defect
and join the other side which might associate with high levels of indiscriminate use of
force, too (Weinstein 2007, pp. 203–206). Both arguments well accommodate New War-
fare, where violent groups tend to disintegrate into multiple but similar rivaling factions.
Figure 10.4.: Mechanism 4 Explaining Civilian Abuse in Internal Armed Conﬂict.
Source: own depiction based on Kalyvas (2006).
Figure 10.5.: Mechanism 5 Explaining Civilian Abuse in Internal Armed Conﬂict.
Source: own depiction based on Weinstein (2007) and Kalyvas (2006).
Likewise, actors recruited outside of the conﬂict area lack local knowledge and net-
works. This not only increases their chances of making mistakes on and oﬀ the battleﬁeld
but also decreases their capacity to permanently and unilaterally exert territorial control
which both result in high levels of indiscriminate violence against civilians (ﬁg. 10.5 on
the current page). Again, this reasoning especially well applies to New Warfare which is
supposed to be characterized by a transnationalization or internationalization of violent
actors.
All of the above mechanisms expect a comparatively high level of indiscriminate vio-
lence against civilians in new, non-state warfare. While it is counterproductive, ineﬀec-
tive and ineﬃcient in conventional civil warfare, indiscriminate violence against civilians
is the most eﬀective and eﬃcient strategy in new, non-state warfare – also in the long
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run and even in a situation of balanced power. The dynamics which according to Ka-
lyvas and Weinstein lead to indiscriminate violence against civilians in particular apply
to new, non-state warfare because economic resources are comparatively easy at hand
and exploited due to state collapse (which explains the emergence of opportunist rebel
groups) and because non-combatants ﬁnd themselves in a comparatively powerless po-
sition (as neither party to the conﬂict intends to govern them and switching support
to the other side is not a real option). Whether New Warfare is also likely to result in
comparatively high numbers of battle-related military deaths shall be discussed in the
following.
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11. Explaining Military Deaths in
Non-State Conﬂicts
Especially three theoretical arguments that are usually used to understand barbarity
during conventional civil warfare1 appear suitable to also explain the scale of battle-
related, military death during new, non-state warfare.
The ﬁrst argument links the context of state failure not only with high numbers of
civilian but also military deaths because the entire breakdown of political and social order
reveals or creates a culture of generalized brutalization amongst soldiers that is otherwise
contained by the state’s security institutions or by social norms. For this reason, the
disintegration of the professional army and the emergence of militarily undisciplined non-
state forces are expected to come along with acts of barbarity against non-combatants
as well as enemy forces. The breakdown of the justice system results in a spiral of
retaliation and generates security concerns that might even result in preemptive violence.
The removal of social controls and sanctioning institutions during warfare (e.g. through
the destruction of social hierarchies) further decreases the costs of violent activity. As
soon as barbarity establishes itself as a feature of warfare, self-reinforcing eﬀects set in
because, and as already mentioned, their unremitting exposure to violence “desensitizes”
soldiers and destroys the “psychosocial mechanisms of self-sanctioning” that otherwise
serve as guides for conduct and deterrents of mischief (Kalyvas 2006, pp. 55–64).2
Secondly, barbarity during New Warfare might result from identity politics. In this
case, violent entrepreneurs play upon real or perceived divisions (e.g. ethnic or religious
diﬀerences) to demonize the enemy and legitimize the most extreme and atrocious mea-
sures against non-combatants as well as combatants on and oﬀ the battleﬁeld (Kalyvas
2006, pp. 64–66).
1For an overview of these arguments see Kalyvas (2006, pp. 52–86).
2This, however, does not mean that a breakdown in political order results in random or anomic acts
of violence. Revenge, for instance, “tends to be implemented by organized political actors” and
is far from being random or anomic. It also does not mean that undisciplined non-state armed
forces are the only ones capable of brutal attacks against civilians. “In numerous civil wars [. . . ]
the greatest proportion of violence was produced by highly disciplined regular troops rather than
insurgent irregulars. Indeed, mass killing tends to be associated with order rather than disorder”
(Kalyvas 2006, pp. 71, 73). See also the previous chapter on this topic.
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Finally, it might be argued that New Wars involve irregular armies on both sides. Like
in conventional civil warfare, the absence of clear front lines and the presence of enemy
forces behind one’s back might cause emotional reactions (e.g. endemic uncertainty,
fear or panic) which facilitate preemptive violence or “trigger-happy reactions” of those
bearing arms (Kalyvas 2006, p. 69). According to this argument, the speciﬁc technology
of New Warfare might correlate with comparatively high numbers of direct military
deaths.
Alternative hypotheses, however, seem reasonable, too. New Wars might cause rather
low numbers of military deaths because direct military encounters among the warring
parties is rare. As mentioned before, Kaldor (2006a, p. 7) attributes this to the equalisa-
tion of military technology in New Warfare which renders open battle just too dangerous
for all opponents. Secondly, ﬁerce competition amongst the warring factions over con-
ﬂict resources might not necessarily translate into high levels of direct battle-related
military deaths because New Wars Actors do not intend to win but to realize private
gain during warfare and for these economic reasons wish to avoid intense warfare. Severe
ﬁghting would be counterproductive because it would interrupt or at least complicate
the exploitation of conﬂict resources as well as their transnational (illegal) black-market
trading (e.g. through the destruction of infrastructure and production sites or the killing
of those who exploit the resources on behalf of the rebels). On the contrary, small-scale
battle with sometimes even temporal disruption suﬃciently destabilizes states to oﬀer
opportunity for private gain. A context of limited ﬁghting even allows for collaboration
between enemy forces for the sake of exploiting resources. Constant instability but low-
scale ﬁghting suﬃces to guarantee a steady ﬂow of revenue from the otherwise illegal
exploitation of lootable resources. At the same time, small-scale ﬁghting ensures that
the rebels are facing little competition from other peace-time actors (e.g. artisanal min-
ers and mining companies) while their individual chances of being injured or killed are
minimized (Addison et al. 2001; Addison et al. 2003; Buhaug et al. 2005; Lujala 2009).
In fact, the chances of surviving New Warfare might be even higher among combatants
than among civilians of the same gender and age groups. This reduces the costs of re-
cruitment and facilitates the formation of armed and violent groups. The expectation of
only minor or intermediate armed conﬂict – at least in cases where economic reasoning
dominates because identity politics are not or cannot be applied – is in line with Berdal
(2003, p. 486), who notes that in civil wars where economic agendas play an important
role, the opposing parties acquire a shared interest in reaping the beneﬁts of war and, “if
local conditions permit, avoid costly and drawn-out battle. Where chains of command
are weak and the scope for plunder is particularly great, ﬁghting may assume an almost
ritualistic quality serving instead as a cover for looting and plunder”. Münkler (2006,
pp. 145 sqq.), who distinguishes between ideologically-loaded “resources wars” (the New
Wars), “wars of paciﬁcation” (military interventions by external actors in New Wars)
and “wars of destruction” (terrorism), also describes New Wars as low intensity armed
conﬂicts.
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11.1. Summary of Mechanisms
The above presented three mechanisms arguing in favor of comparatively high numbers
of battle-related military deaths in new (non-state) warfare. Mechanism 6 expects the
breakdown of political and social order (especially the disintegration of the professional
armed forces, the breakdown of policing institutions and the justice system and the re-
moval of social controls and sanctioning mechanisms) to associate with real and perceived
impunity on (and oﬀ) the battleﬁeld. In addition, the breakdown of these institutions
gives cause for serious security concerns that can be used to justify preemptive violence
against enemy forces. Because the experience of brutal warfare further desensitizes sol-
diers, a spiral of retaliation might set in which also contributes to an emerging culture
of generalized brutalization among soldiers (see ﬁg. 11.1 on this page). Secondly, Mech-
anism 7 attributes high numbers of military deaths to the fact that identity politics are
applied. This turns New Wars into zero sum games. Killing oﬀ the enemy becomes
an aﬀair of the heart which leads to barbarity on the battleﬁeld (see ﬁg. 11.2 on the
current page). Finally, Mechanism 8 stresses the technology of New Warfare (especially
the fact that clear front lines do not exist and irregular forces battle each other). Among
those bearing arms this might cause emotional reactions (like endemic uncertainty, fear
and panic) leading to trigger-happy reactions and high numbers of military deaths (see
ﬁg. 11.3 on the following page).
Figure 11.1.: Mechanism 6 Explaining High Numbers of Military Deaths in Internal
Armed Conﬂict. Source: own depiction.
Figure 11.2.: Mechanism 7 Explaining High Numbers of Military Deaths in Internal
Armed Conﬂict. Source: own depiction.
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Figure 11.3.: Mechanism 8 Explaining High Numbers of Military Deaths in Internal
Armed Conﬂict. Source: own depiction.
On the other hand, I mentioned the following alternative mechanisms that speak in
favor of comparatively low numbers of battle-related military deaths in new (non-state)
warfare: Mechanism 9 states that due to the equalization of military technology in New
Warfare, the rebels avoid open and risky battle. In addition, opportunistic rebel groups
might try to avoid severe battle because intense warfare would be counterproductive to
their economic interests (Mechanism 10). In either case, the result is low numbers of
battle-related military deaths (see ﬁgs. 11.4 and 11.5 on the current page).
Figure 11.4.: Mechanism 9 Explaining Low Numbers of Military Deaths in Internal
Armed Conﬂict. Source: own depiction.
Figure 11.5.: Mechanism 10 Explaining Low Numbers of Military Deaths in Internal
Armed Conﬂict. Source: own depiction.
150
12. Interim Summary II: Beyond the
Concept of New Wars
So far, this book has described major shifts in the patterns of warfare. Old wars –
inter-state wars as well as conventional (state-based) internal wars (greed or grievance
conﬂicts) – have been contrasted with New Wars as ﬁrst described by Mary Kaldor
(1999). For this purpose, I speciﬁed the context and dimensions of New Warfare. De-
spite being private in nature, advocates of the concept describe New Wars as being
fought between numerous and often transnational warring parties who follow economic
rationale. Over their comparatively long duration, New Wars are said to result in large
numbers of direct and indirect civilian deaths and to occur in especially weak and poor
countries. Some believe such kind of warfare to emerge as the dominant type of internal
warfare within the post-Cold War era. After 1989, the New Wars advocates therefore
expect to observe a privatization, fractionalization and transnationalization of violent
actors involved in internal warfare as well as an economization of their motives, a brutal-
ization of violent strategies, more extensive ﬁghting and a tendency of internal wars to
increasingly happen in the weakest and poorest states. The ﬁrst theoretical part of this
book concluded with a critical discussion of the concept of New Wars and of the current
State of the Art. I defended the concept of New Wars against unjustiﬁed or unfair points
of critique but also presented the major concerns that have been put forward. I added
my own points of criticism and argued in favor of some adjustments in order for the
concept to serve as a useful theoretical basis of this analysis.
Firstly, I distanced myself from Mary Kaldor, who sometimes lists state actors amongst
the adversaries of New Warfare.1 In contrast, I deﬁned New Wars and Conﬂicts more
narrowly as entirely non-state armed battle between two politically organized groups.
This includes former soldiers, breakaway units of the army or remnants of the national
military and police forces who are ﬁghting each other in circumstances where the state
and its security institutions have already collapsed. They also do not qualify as state
actors anymore because they are following their own, private motives – either individually
or as a group – instead of defending the common good or otherwise deﬁned state interest.
1E.g. when insisting that New Wars are fought by “networks of state and non-state actors” (Kaldor
2005, p. 3). Elsewhere, her wording remains at least imprecise, e.g. when noting that New Wars are
fought by mixtures of remnants of the state, bits of the army, militias, criminal gangs and non-state
actors (Kaldor 2006a, p. 5).
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Secondly, Kaldor sometimes emphasizes the political character of New Wars that are
held together by “an extreme political ideology based on the exclusive claim to state
power on the basis of identity” (Kaldor 2001; Kaldor 2000). These identity politics
appear like true political demands. However, Kaldor (2000) also notes that “[a]s the
state becomes privatised [. . . ] it shifts from being the main organisation for societal
regulation towards an instrument for the extraction of resources by the ruler and his [. . . ]
privileged networks”. Access to or control over the state in that sense only means access
to or control over resources. In these cases “the claim to the attributes of state power [. . . ]
is merely a continuation of booty-hunting by other means” (Münkler 2005, p. 17). Thus,
I consider New Wars to be driven primarily by economic instead of political interest.
In a context where state institutions are non-existent or failing, political control of the
Ministry of Mining becomes relatively irrelevant while physical control of mining spots
matters. In addition, identity politics are only one “important organizing principle” that
is “usually, but not actually always” applied in New Wars (Kaldor 2006a, p. 6; Kaldor
2000). If identity politics are not or cannot be applied, New Warfare remains purely
predatory.
Thirdly, Kaldor (2006a, p. 5) objects to the notion that New Wars are internal or
intra-state in nature because their actors and geographical scope transcend state borders.
Münkler also emphasizes that in New Warfare, state boundaries no longer play a role.
“This type of war crosses national borders without being waged as a war between states”
(Münkler 2003, p. 20). In contrast, I aimed to clearly diﬀerentiate New Wars from
warfare between states. New Wars and Conﬂicts have been described as a sub-type of
internal armed conﬂict also because the stated incompatibility (what the parties are
or claim to be ﬁghting over) lies within the state. The term internal warfare neither
excludes the possibility of warfare spreading to another country nor does it exclude the
possibility of external involvement. In most cases of intra-state warfare, a certain degree
of internationalization of actors can be observed. If information on the degree of external
interventions is provided, this can be treated as an interesting variable.
Fourthly, I distanced myself from Kaldor (2001) and Münkler (2005) who at times
describe (international) terrorism as a form of (new) warfare. Instead, I argued in favor
of a clear distinction between terrorism and warfare (as two distinct forms of organized
violence) and between terrorism (as a strategy to achieve political, religious or ideological
goals) and indiscriminate, senseless or even unrelated acts of terror applied in all kinds
of warfare.
The fact that Münkler (2005, p. 131) identiﬁes international terrorism as a kind of
New Warfare relates to my ﬁfth point of departure: According to the author, New Wars
are asymmetric in nature.2 He notes that New Wars are characterized by a “greater
2The author notes that asymmetrical warfare is the “salient feature of the new wars in recent decades”
and goes on to describe asymmetrical warfare as “based to a large extent on the diﬀerent velocities
at which the parties wage war on each other”. He diﬀerentiates “asymmetries of strength” (i.e.
diﬀerences between the actors in the capacity for acceleration) from “asymmetries of weakness”
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asymmetry of military force, so that the adversaries are as a rule not evenly matched”.
He states that the course of New Wars is in the hands of players “for whom war as
a contest between like and like is an alien concept” and speaks of a “clash of military
strategies and political rationale [. . . ] which are in principle dissimilar from each other”
(Münkler 2005, pp. 3, 30 sq., 135, 137). These claims only hold true if New Wars are
either understood as violent conﬂicts between rebels and government forces (situations
which I described as conventional (state-based) internal armed conﬂicts) or if New Wars
are understood as violent conﬂicts between armed rebels and largely defenseless civilians
as their unequal “opponent”3 (a situation I would refer to as one-sided violence against
civilians instead of bilateral warfare). According to my understanding, New Wars and
Conﬂicts are rather symmetric in terms of the distribution of military power amongst
the adversaries and in terms of the weapons used. This symmetry is a major point of
distinction between New Wars that are fought amongst rather similar non-state armed
groups and conventional internal armed conﬂicts that are fought amongst militarily
superior government forces and one or several inferior internal opposition group(s) who
try to weaken the government forces in order to arrive at an equilibrium only throughout
warfare, by a tactic of withdrawal and dispersion. In addition, New Wars and Conﬂicts
are symmetric in terms of incentives. Both sides ﬁght for access to or control over power
and riches. Civilians either join such violent groups and become part of one of the
ﬁghting fractions or they are directly or indirectly aﬀected by non-state warfare. In the
latter case, they do not actively engage in ﬁghting but are the victims of New Warfare.
Thus, I only agree insofar as the overall costs of New Warfare are unevenly distributed
between the actual combatants and the civilian population. “[T]he new wars are highly
lucrative for many of the participants, because in the short-term the force used in them
yields more than it costs – and the long term costs are borne by others”. The proﬁts
of New Warfare are privatized while the costs and losses are socialized (Münkler 2005,
p. 92; Münkler 2003, pp. 15 sq.).
Despite these objections, I mainly criticized the concept of New Wars for not clearly
specifying some of its main concepts (e.g. state weakness). Later, when the issue of
measurement arises, this shall be discussed further. In addition, the concept of New
Wars remains under-theorized. I argued that a clear understanding is missing of how
the single dimensions of New Warfare interact with each other – especially because the
advocates of the concept of New Wars claim that the coincidence of the above mentioned
characteristics constitutes the fundamental novelty of New Wars. It remains virtually
(i.e. diﬀerences in the readiness and ability to slow down the pace of the war (Münkler 2003, p. 9).
Elsewhere, he notes that “[i]n asymmetric warfare assumptions of equality (broadly similar weaponry,
no strategic disparities in information, and a socially analogous form of recruitment and training of
combatants) are violated” and “[i]n asymmetrical wars, there is a tendency for the violence to spread
and permeate all domains of social life because the weaker side uses the community as a cover and a
logistical base to conduct attacks against a superior military apparatus” (Münkler 2003, pp. 19 sq.).
3According to Münkler (2005, p. 75) “new wars are not waged against a similar armed enemy but mainly
employ long-term violence against large parts of the civilian population”. Elsewhere he speaks of New
Wars as “a confrontation between soldiers and civilians, not between soldiers and soldiers” (Münkler
2005, p. 90).
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unclear why it is plausible to expect a privatization of warfare, a transnationalization
of violent actors and an economization of their motives to come along with a brutal-
ization of strategies or more extensive ﬁghting. After a comparison of the concepts of
conventional (state-based) and non-conventional (non-state) armed conﬂicts, the second
theoretical part of this book therefore aimed to identify respective mechanisms linking
the political context of New Warfare, the nature and number of New Wars Actors and
their economic motives with the kind and intensity of the applied violence. I arrived at
a number of mechanisms expecting a comparatively high level of indiscriminate violence
against civilians in non-conventional (non-state) armed conﬂicts. At the same time, I
remained undecided as to whether non-conventional (non-state) armed conﬂicts also re-
sult in signiﬁcantly higher numbers of direct, military deaths. At least it seems equally
reasonable to argue in favor of the contrary.
The theoretical arguments outlined so far allow for the deduction of the following main
trends and hypotheses. Some of these shall be reﬁned later. Given the availability of
suitable data, I also intend to supplement and test further hypotheses which, for this
reason, will be presented at the end of the data section: First of all, the New Wars ad-
vocates state that over time (and especially in the post-Cold War era), non-conventional
(non-state) internal ﬁghting became the dominant type of internal ﬁghting [Hypothesis
1] or is at least of growing signiﬁcance [Hypothesis 1a]. The increasing importance or
signiﬁcance of non-state armed conﬂicts can be measured through respective changes
in their total number or in their share in overall internal armed conﬂicts as well as in
changes in their spatial expansion (as indicated by the number or share of aﬀected coun-
tries). Unfortunately, for an extended period of time, estimates of the actual scope of
conﬂict zones are only available for conventional (state-based) armed conﬂicts.4
Because I use the above mentioned narrow deﬁnition of New Wars and Conﬂicts,
violent non-state groups per deﬁnition constitute the dominant (yet only) type of warring
party. However, non-state actors are also involved in conventional (state-based) civil wars
where they are ﬁghting the respective government. For this reason, I would like to explore
whether there exists a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the quantity of involved groups of actors
between the two sub-types of internal warfare. The respective hypothesis expects that
the number of national armed groups involved in non-conventional (non-state) internal
wars is signiﬁcantly higher than in conventional (state-based) civil wars [Hypothesis 2].
The advocates of the concept of New Wars would also claim that over time, especially
in the post-Cold War era, national paramilitary groups became the dominant actors
as well as the main perpetrators of violence in internal armed conﬂict. They would
expect the number of involved paramilitary groups (as well as the share of battle-related
casualties that can be attributed to these groups) to be signiﬁcantly higher in New Wars
4See e.g. Buhaug and Gates (2002) who draw on the UCDP/PRIO “Armed Conﬂict Dataset” for the
1946-2000 period to determine the location of all battle-zones for all conventional (state-based) armed
conﬂicts in this time period, thereby identifying the geographic extent and the center point of each
conﬂict.
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as compared with conventional civil wars. Similarly, advocates of the concept of New
Wars claim that over time, especially in the post-Cold War era, child soldiers became
increasingly involved in ﬁghting internal wars. Again, they would argue that this trend is
mainly driven by the comparatively frequent recruitment of child soldiers in New Wars.
The number of involved child soldiers is therefore expected to be signiﬁcantly higher in
New Wars as opposed to conventional civil wars. Empirical testing of these hypotheses
requires data on the presence of certain violent groups, their relative strength (e.g. their
group size) and their military impact (e.g. in terms of people killed). Unfortunately,
such data on the perpetrators of violence are not available beyond single cases, over
an extended period of time and by type of armed conﬂict. However, information on
the involvement of mercenaries might be available soon through the “Mercenaries and
War Dataset” (see chapter 13 on page 169). This data set intends to measure the
military activities of mercenaries and private military companies in state-based and
non-state internal wars (that resulted in at least 1,000 military or civilian deaths over
their duration) since 1946.
Because the “Mercenaries and War Dataset” promises to deliver data on the involve-
ment of external mercenaries as well, it is also eagerly awaited to investigate whether
there exists a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the quality of involved groups of actors between
the two sub-types of internal armed conﬂict. More precisely, the New Wars advocates
state that over time (and especially in the post-Cold War era) external actors became
increasingly involved in internal warfare. The likelihood of an external military interven-
tion in non-conventional (non-state) internal wars is expected to be signiﬁcantly higher
compared with conventional (state-based) internal wars [Hypothesis 3]. “External mili-
tary intervention” will later be deﬁned as active violent interference in ongoing warfare
by outside state or non-state forces who, in the case of New Warfare, are expected to be
mostly driven by economic interests or security concerns. The indicator seems to be a
rough but valid measure in order to capture an “internationalization” of internal warfare
as predicted by the New Wars advocates and explicitly excludes non-military interven-
tions (like humanitarian interventions) and peacekeeping or peace enforcement eﬀorts.
Nevertheless, there are compelling reasons to also expect (UN) peacekeeping and peace
enforcement troops to be more often deployed in cases of non-conventional (non-state)
internal warfare as opposed to conventional (state-based) internal wars. It has been men-
tioned that the end of the Cold War lifted ideological barriers within the UN Security
Council and similar institutions which for this reason should be able to more easily and
swiftly agree on peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions in general. In addition,
it might be argued that due to global media reporting, the public knows more about
patterns of violence in internal warfare than it used to. This increases the level of public
pressure on democratic governments to save lives and defend human rights particularly
in New Wars cases where civilian suﬀering assumes especially horrifying proportions.
Empirically, UN peacekeepers and peace enforcement missions are indeed more often
deployed in “diﬃcult” cases, i.e. in conﬂict areas where warfare has become protracted,
where strong and stable institutions do not exist, where there is no clear winner and
where no formal peace treaty was signed. Especially Chapter VII enforcement missions
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are more likely in cases where severe and brutal ﬁghting left a fatal legacy and where
three or more factions were involved in warfare.5 The preliminary results of a recent
study using disaggregated data on the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces and the
location of (state-based) conﬂict events conﬁrms this outcome at the sub-national level.6
Within already diﬃcult cases, UN peacekeeping forces tend to be deployed to diﬃcult
areas, i.e. areas where actual ﬁghting takes place, where the conﬂict started and where
a civilian population exists that needs protection (though peacekeepers are less likely to
reside in conﬂict areas that are in the periphery of the country or far from the capital)
(Ruggeri et al. 2011). This seems to justify the expectation that external intervention
in the form of UN peace enforcement or peacekeeping missions is more likely during or
after New Wars which qualify as diﬃcult cases due to their intensity in terms of civilian
casualties and their speciﬁcally long duration. In addition, New Wars should rank ﬁrst
amongst the hard-to-solve cases because of “[. . . ] the absence of eﬀective governance by
whatever government is in power, combined with the absence of any form of coherent
governing alternative among the insurgents” (Snow 1996, p. 90). In order to investigate
whether (UN) peace enforcement or peacekeeping is indeed more likely in the case of
non-conventional (non-state) as opposed to conventional (state-based) armed conﬂict,
(geographically disaggregated) data would be desirable on all international peacekeeping
missions by agency and type of involvement, for all kinds of internal armed conﬂicts,
everywhere, before as well as after the end of the Cold War. A ﬁrst step to collect such
data is made at the University of Essex where the “Peacekeeping Operations Location
and Event Dataset (PKOLED)” is being compiled. This data set promises to deliver
geographically and temporally disaggregated data (on a monthly basis and at the level of
province) on at least UN peacekeeping missions that have been deployed in conventional
(state-based) armed conﬂicts after 1989.7
5See e.g. DeRouen and Sobek (2004, p. 311); Gilligan and S. J. Stedman (2003); Fortna (2008); Fortna
(2004). The latter concludes that “[. . . ] the answer to the question where do peacekeepers get sent
is quite complicated. It depends on whether we are talking about UN peacekeeping or missions by
other actors, and it depends on what type of peacekeeping we are interested in. We do not have a
highly predictive model of peacekeeping deployment. But to the extent that there is a pattern, we
can see that, in several respects at least, consent-based peacekeepers tend to get sent to the hard
cases rather than the easy ones. Peace is generally more stable after decisive victories than after
wars that end in a tie, and peacekeepers are usually deployed where there was no clear winner in the
war. Moreover, peacekeepers are no more likely to deploy when belligerents have signaled their will
for peace in a formal treaty; if anything, just the opposite is true. If renewed conﬂict is less likely
in states with large armies [. . . ] the fact that peacekeepers tend to shy away from militarily strong
states also strengthens the conclusion that peacekeepers go where they are most needed rather than
where peace is easy to keep in any case. [. . . ] Just as sicker patients are more likely to receive medical
care, places in which the danger of another war is higher are more likely to receive peacekeeping”
(Fortna 2004, p. 281).
6Ruggeri et al. (2011) examine the spacial deployment of UN peacekeeping troops in eight sub-Saharan
African countries (Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, the DRC, Ivory Coast, Liberia,
Sierra Leone and Sudan). For single case studies on the question where peacekeepers are deployed
see e.g. Dorussen and Raleigh (2009); Costalli and Moro (2010).
7See Dorussen (2007); Ruggeri et al. (2011). The latter already rely on PKOLED data for their com-
parative study of eight sub-Saharan African countries.
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Despite these diﬀerences in the quantity and quality of their actors, non-conventional
(non-state) armed conﬂicts and conventional (state-based) armed conﬂicts are expected
to signiﬁcantly diﬀer from each other in regard to the role of conﬂict resources which
motivate violent actors and ﬁnance warfare. Accordingly, New Wars advocates expect
conﬂict resources to be found and produced signiﬁcantly more often in countries experi-
encing non-conventional (non-state) armed conﬂicts as opposed to countries involved in
conventional (state-based) armed conﬂicts. Likewise, at the war, the conﬂict and the con-
ﬂict episode level, conﬂict resources are expected to be found and produced signiﬁcantly
more often prior to or during non-conventional (non-state) armed conﬂicts as opposed to
conventional (state-based) armed conﬂicts [Hypothesis 4]. According to the New Wars
advocates, the ﬁnancing of warfare and private enrichment through the exploitation of
conﬂict resources is a major characteristic of new, non-state warfare though the phe-
nomenon certainly also exists in conventional (state-based) armed conﬂicts. However,
the universe of state-based internal armed conﬂicts comprises greed-based insurgencies
(where conﬂict resources also matter) and grievance-based insurgencies (where the ex-
ploitation of conﬂict resources constitutes just one source of ﬁnancing warfare in only
a fraction of all cases). This justiﬁes the expectation of a greater relevance of conﬂict
resources in New Wars countries and in cases of non-conventional (non-state) armed con-
ﬂict. In order to explore this relationship, at least the occurrence and production status
of conﬂict resources everywhere (not only in war-torn countries) need to be known. In
the ideal case, geographically disaggregated data on these resources as well as the lo-
cation of battles would be available to detect whether ﬁghting actually occurs close to
important mining sites or major trading routes. Data would also be desirable on the
identity of those who exploit the resources, on the extent to which these resources are
reinvested into warfare as well as on the extent to which the war eﬀort depends not only
on the exploitation of valuable resources but also on local predation (e.g. through rob-
bery and pillage, hostage taking, the establishment of check points and blockades or the
collection of protection money) and on external ﬁnancial support (e.g. from neighboring
governments or diaspora communities). This detailed information is diﬃcult or impos-
sible to obtain for all kinds of conﬂict resources and cases of internal armed conﬂict.
The fact that black-market trading in conﬂict resources is not captured by any data set
constitutes another major obstacle. It is, however, possible to explore whether certain
kinds of conﬂict resources are more often found and produced in New Wars countries
and whether there exists a temporal overlap between the production of these resources
and internal ﬁghting. The reﬁned hypotheses on this matter shall be presented later.
The concept of New Wars also oﬀers some arguments in favor of the thesis that New
Warfare is especially brutal in terms of battle-related deaths. I relied on Weinstein
and Kalyvas to identify respective theoretical arguments and mechanisms (Mechanisms
6-8). However, I also presented two plausible explanations that are not at odds with
the concept of New Wars but speak in favor of comparatively low numbers of military
deaths in non-conventional (non-state) armed conﬂicts (Mechanisms 9 and 10). Whether
there exists a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the scale of violence (in terms of battle-related
deaths) between conventional (state-based) and non-conventional (non-state) internal
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armed conﬂicts therefore remains to be seen. At least most New Wars advocates believe
that the severity of ﬁghting (in terms of direct, battle-related deaths) is signiﬁcantly
higher in non-conventional (non-state) armed conﬂicts as compared with conventional
(state-based) armed conﬂicts [Hypothesis 5].
However, others emphasize that it is less the scale but the quality of violence that
signiﬁcantly diﬀers between new and conventional civil wars. They claim that over time,
especially in the post-Cold War era, the strategies of internal warfare became increasingly
directed towards civilians. The extent of conﬂict-related suﬀering of civilians is expected
to be signiﬁcantly higher in New Wars as compared with conventional civil wars. Again,
I relied on Weinstein and Kalyvas to specify respective mechanisms (Mechanisms 1-5).
So far, however, data constraints inhibit a systematic large-N analysis of any hypothesis
on the nature of violence or the patterns of abusiveness seen in state-based vs. non-state
internal armed conﬂict. In order to measure the extent of conﬂict-related suﬀering of
civilians, data on the total number of civilian battle-related deaths or the ratio of civilian
to military battle-deaths would be needed. This information is again not available for
every case and both kinds of internal armed conﬂict which also holds for alternative and
more indirect measures of lethal as well as nonlethal conﬂict-related violence against
civilians. Otherwise, the number, frequency or intensity of conﬂict-related attacks on
civilian targets (people, infrastructure or historic monuments), the number of refugees
and conﬂict-related internally displaced people, the number of people who suﬀer and/or
die from war-related famines or diseases or the number of victims of war-related rape
and sexual abuse would be valid measures, too.
Because the New Wars advocates suggest that New Wars are also especially long-
lasting, I also explore whether there exists a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between conventional
(state-based) and non-conventional (non-state) armed conﬂicts in the duration of ﬁght-
ing. According to the New Wars advocates, the duration of internal warfare has been
increasing – especially within the post-Cold War era. At the war or conﬂict level, they
expect the duration of non-conventional (non-state) armed conﬂicts to be signiﬁcantly
longer as compared with conventional (state-based) armed conﬂicts [Hypothesis 6]. Un-
fortunately, the concept of New Wars only casually implies a speciﬁcally long duration
of New Warfare. For this reason, I would like to brieﬂy summarize the main arguments.
Theoretically, the long duration of New Wars has been explained by the high level of
fractionalization and the large number of violent groups involved in this kind of armed
conﬂict. This renders the drafting and implementation of cease-ﬁre agreements or peace
treaties diﬃcult. At least negotiated settlements become less likely because the interests
of all relevant actors need to be satisﬁed and because the coordination and cooperation
costs amongst the negotiators increase with their number. In this regard, Chojnacki
(2004, p. 10) notes that a fragmentation of conﬂict parties enhances the problem of
incomplete information and evokes commitment problems, thereby increasing the com-
plexity of conﬂict [and post conﬂict] situations. In addition, the non-state nature of
violent actors helps to explain the supposedly long duration of New Wars. Defective
behavior from non-state groups during peace negotiations is little constrained by public
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pressure. They cannot be sanctioned through elective mechanisms for behavior that
deliberately causes setbacks, a retardation of the peace process or even a resumption of
warfare. UNITA serves as an example. This rebel organization delayed its demobiliza-
tion eﬀorts in order to build up a criminalized New War Economy that would guarantee
the organization’s survival (and rearmament) in case of failure of the peace process.
Income derived from diamond exploitation later allowed UNITA to boycott the Lusaka
peace process (Heupel and Zangl 2003, p. 21). This links with the economic motives of
New Wars Actors and the establishment of New War Economies which further contribute
to a long duration of warfare. It was explained earlier that the end of the Cold War
reduced the willingness and ability of former superpowers to inﬂuence and moderate the
conduct of internal wars. Because strategic partnerships became less important, they
withdrew their support to client regimes and for this reason lost much of their leverage
on the warring factions. In order to compensate for this loss of income, violent actors
intensiﬁed their illegal exploitation of conﬂict resources to ﬁnance warfare and to enrich
themselves. This led to the emergence of independent criminal war economies. In New
Wars, all actors involved have a vested economic interest in the functioning of these
economies and therefore in the continuation of warfare. Only a state of war guarantees
them private proﬁt that could not be maintained in peaceful and stable environments
with a working state authority enforcing law and order. Consequently, the higher the ex-
pected private proﬁt from a continuation of ﬁghting, the longer the duration of warfare.
This expectation is in line with the “Rebellion as Business” model postulated by Collier
and Hoeﬄer (2004)8 or the idea that a “mutually hurting stalemate” as envisioned by
Zartman (2001)9 is diﬃcult to reach in a situation where warfare allows the belliger-
ents, who do not intend to take over the state, to enrich themselves and to continue
ﬁghting while the risk of being killed as a soldier might be rather low. It is also in line
with the ﬁndings of a number of empirical studies which explore the eﬀect of natural
resources wealth on the duration of conventional civil wars. For instance, a large-N
analysis by Collier and Hoeﬄer (2004), covering the period from 1960-2000, conﬁrms
that increases in the proﬁtability of warfare, measured through increases in the prizes of
primary commodities (consisting of cash crops and fuel exports) that a country exports,
signiﬁcantly lengthen the duration of warfare. Ross (2006) criticizes this measure for
being imprecise and endogenous to civil warfare but still ﬁnds that the exploitation of
contraband resources (all kinds of gemstones, timber and narcotics) by rebel forces is
robustly linked to conﬂict duration. Buhaug et al. (2009, pp. 561 sq.) start with a de-
8According to this theoretical argument “[r]ebellions will occur where and only where they are proﬁtable
(although they need not be motivated by proﬁt). They will be proﬁtable where revenues during
conﬂict are atypically high and costs atypically low. [. . . ] [T]he rebellion-as-business approach
assumes that rebel revenue exceeds costs” (Collier and Hoeﬄer 2004, p. 256).
9This concept centers on the parties’ perception of a “mutually hurting stalemate” (MHS) which refers
to a situation where unilateral means of achieving a satisfactory result through continued warfare are
blocked and the parties to the conﬂict feel that they are in an uncomfortable and costly predicament.
They ﬁnd themselves “locked in a conﬂict from which they cannot escalate to victory and this
deadlock is painful to both of them (although not necessarily to equal degree or for the same reasons)”.
Therefore they seek a way out. They are ready to grab on a proposal for solution that usually has
been in the air for a long time and only now appears attractive (Zartman 2001, p. 8).
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scriptive analysis revealing “that lootable gemstones were available in 26 percent of all
intrastate conﬂicts and 38 percent of all conﬂict years since 1946. Similarly, 15 percent
of the conﬂicts and 21 percent of all conﬂict years occurred in areas with signiﬁcant
narcotics cultivation. For petroleum, the ﬁgures are 44 and 52 percent, respectively.
The fact that a larger share of the observations (conﬂict years) than the conﬂicts include
these resources tentatively indicates a positive association between local resource wealth
and conﬂict duration”. For their subsequent quantitative analysis, the authors use data
on the production/extraction of three types of valuable resources in zones of conﬂict at
the time of conﬂict outbreak: secondary diamonds and other gemstones, petroleum (oil
and gas) and drugs (coca, opium and cannabis). They ﬁnd “that intrastate conﬂicts in
areas with gemstones and petroleum production are signiﬁcantly more durable than the
reference group”. Because they do not ﬁnd support for a similar systematic relationship
between drug cultivation and the duration of conﬂict, they conclude that a distinction
between types of resources is important. Only recently, Lujala (2010, p. 16) found
that the presence of secondary diamonds, other gemstones or hydrocarbons10 within
the actual conﬂict zone more than doubles the conﬂict duration while resources located
outside the conﬂict region do not have a prolonging eﬀect on the duration.11 Although
the direction of relationship between resource wealth and the duration of state-based
civil warfare remains somewhat obscure12, more and more evidence emerges in support
of a positive correlation. Keeping peace in a context where the illegal exploitation of
natural resources has been an established way of income during prior wartime also seems
especially challenging. Downs and S. Stedman (2002, pp. 44, 57) report that “[. . . ] no
civil war peace agreement has been fully, successfully implemented in a context where
[valuable, easily marketable commodities such as timber and gem stones] are present”.13
10“Hydrocarbons include oil (petroleum), gas, and condensate. Condensate exists in gaseous form in
the reservoir but changes from gas into liquid when the hydrocarbons are produced. In most cases
the condensate occurs only as a small proportion of total reserves and production volume” (Lujala,
Rød, et al. 2007, p. 240, fn 1).
11The author refers to an early study by Fearon (2004), who was the ﬁrst to code conﬂicts in which
rebels are known to have exploited lootable resources (gemstones and drugs) and who found that
such conﬂicts tend to last substantially longer. However, Fearon (2004) failed “to account for cases
where lootable resources were available in the conﬂict region but, for one reason or another, rebels
did not exploit them” (Lujala 2010, p. 18). For other early studies on this matter see e.g. Lujala
and Gates (2002) or Lujala, N. P. Gleditsch, et al. (2005) who ﬁrst found support for a lengthening
eﬀect of secondary diamond production on the duration of civil warfare or Ross (2004) who reviewed
14 cross-national econometric studies and many qualitative studies and concluded that “lootable”
commodities like gemstones and drugs do not make the outbreak of armed conﬂict more likely but
tend to lengthen existing conﬂicts.
12“[I]t is possible that contraband is involved in prolonged conﬂicts precisely because they are long and
the rebels are forced to exploit natural resources; use of natural resources may be merely an indication
of prolonged conﬂict but not the cause” (Lujala 2010, p. 18). See also Ross (2006, pp. 292 sq.) who
informs that in many cases rebel groups did not begin to sell contraband until many years after
the conﬂict started. He presumes that they simply needed some time to establish their production
and trading networks. In addition, he explains that longer-lasting conﬂicts are simply more likely to
continue from the era when contraband was less important to the era when the former superpowers
started to withdraw their support and contraband became more important.
13The authors investigate sixteen cases of peace implementation between 1980 and 1998.
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According to the authors, the successful implementation of a peace agreement not only
hinges upon the willingness of third parties to provide the necessary resources and troops
(based on their own national security interests) but also on the degree of diﬃculty of the
implementation environment (whether spoilers are present who oppose the peace agree-
ment and who use violence to undermine it, whether neighboring states exist which
funnel resources to potential spoilers and, last but not least, whether valuable, easily
marketable commodities are available). The leaders of rebel groups who used to ﬁnance
their warfare and to enrich themselves through the exploitation of conﬂict resources will
only agree to stop ﬁghting and looting if they receive some kind of compensation, e.g.
if they are credibly promised a powerful political position within the new regime, like
the position of the Minister of Mining, which grants them control over natural resources
or other riches and which in more or less peaceful but corrupt settings oﬀers alternative
opportunity for personal enrichment.
Furthermore, it has been argued that expected economic gain strengthens group iden-
tity. This provides a fertile breeding ground for identity politics which either serve to
legitimize the criminal economic activities of private actors and to stabilize the New War
Economies (and through this mechanism contribute to a long duration of warfare) or
which serve to legitimize violent strategies that systematically and permanently target
civilians. Especially brutal attacks cause hatred, demand revenge, desensitize soldiers
and – as long as no side prevails – for these reasons also contribute to a long duration of
New Warfare. Thus, where identity politics are applied and a brutalization of violence
takes place, an extension of warfare can be expected. This is in line with the empirical
ﬁnding that armed conﬂicts causing large numbers of civilian casualties and armed con-
ﬂicts involving ethnic or religious factors are especially diﬃcult to settle, face a higher
risk of renewed warfare and are of a speciﬁcally long duration.14 Still, assuming a sim-
ple linear relationship between the severity and the duration of warfare might be overly
simplistic. At least in the case of conventional (state-based) armed conﬂicts, ﬁghting
might be severe at the beginning so that the just mentioned prolonging mechanisms
apply. This, however, levels oﬀ as the number of potential military targets decreases
alongside with increasing severity. The initial high level of violence simply cannot be
sustained forever. In fact, the more severe the conﬂict in terms of battle-related military
deaths at its beginning, the sooner this leveling-oﬀ process will take place. In addition,
the more severe the conﬂict, the more likely the international community gets involved.
A quick intervention at least bears the potential to stop otherwise endless warfare. Both
arguments speak in favor of a non-linear relationship between the severity and the du-
ration of conventional (state-based) armed conﬂicts: With an increasing severity the
duration is expected to increase (and vice versa). Though, very severe ﬁghting depletes
the number of potential military targets and prompts the international community to
intervene.15
14See Doyle and Sambanis (2000, pp. 786 sq.), Hartzell (1999), Hartzell and Hoddie (2003) or Valentino
et al. (2004, pp. 381 sq.)).
15See Fearon (2004) who ﬁnds that very severe warfare correlates with a short duration or Lacina (2006)
who models a logarithmic relationship between the severity and the duration of civil warfare.
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If, however, Mechanism 9 and 10 (see section 11.1 on page 149) hold true, non-
conventional (non-state) armed conﬂicts result in comparatively low numbers of battle-
related military deaths. In this case, the above described leveling-oﬀ process never sets in
(or only sets in later). Instead of battling each other, New Wars Actors deliberately at-
tack non-combatants whose number is virtually inﬁnite. Therefore, this kind of warfare
is likely to last very long despite its intensity in terms of civilian casualties. Furthermore,
the above argued that diﬃcult (i.e. severe and protracted) conﬂict situations prompt
the international community to intervene. Unfortunately, “[. . . ] the more intervention
is needed, the less likely it is to be eﬀective” (Snow 1996, p. 88). This leads to the
expectation that although UN interventions might be more likely in the case of New
Warfare, such interventions are also likely to be less eﬀective due to the diﬃcult nature
of the conﬂict situation. If the UN is signiﬁcantly more likely to fail in its eﬀort to stop
ﬁghting and to establish lasting peace in New Wars settings, this further contributes to
a long duration of warfare even if warfare is intense in terms of civilian casualties.16
Finally, “weak statehood” aﬀects the duration of internal warfare because weak or fail-
ing states might act less timely and take less rigorous measures to stop ongoing ﬁghting
between non-state forces. If states entirely collapse, non-state ﬁghting and rent-seeking
behavior of violent non-state actors happen without any hindrance. In addition, weak
statehood facilitates the mobilization of ﬁghters based on ethnic or religious grounds
and in this way links with the use of identity politics and a long duration of warfare.
“Systems of attributing meaning transmitted from generation to another, even if in an
amended form, are vectors of historical memory and of social and political identity. They
are particularly important in this respect in the absence of a state that is something close
to a monopoly of violence, powerful and self-conﬁdent. [. . . ] Where states have lost their
ability to govern through bureaucracies, political mobilization has increasingly taken an
ethnic form. Where national armies have lost any pretension to a monopoly of coercion,
ethnic militias or other private armies arise” (Ellis 2003, pp. 36 sq.). All of this supports
the expectation that the weaker the state, the longer the duration of non-conventional
(non-state) armed conﬂicts.
16Of course, the success or eﬀectiveness of UN peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions depends
on many factors. Despite the character of the conﬂict situation itself, the willingness of a third
party to credibly guarantee the safety of the adversaries during the critical implementation phase
of a peace agreement is important (e.g. by sending a strong enough peacekeeping force in terms of
numbers and mandate) (Walter 1997; Walter 2002). Doyle and Sambanis (2000) also found that the
type of peace operation and the peacekeeping agency makes a diﬀerence while others consider the
deployment of peacekeeping soldiers plus the extent of institutional guarantees provided in the peace
agreement decisive (e.g. the extent of power-sharing mechanisms) (Hartzell 1999; Hartzell and Hoddie
2003). Ruggeri et al. (2011) emphasize the importance of the exact location of peacekeepers within
a conﬂict-ridden country. For an overview of diﬀerent schools of thought on third-party intervention
see Hampson (2001).
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The level of state weakness not only aﬀects the duration of warfare. According to
the New Wars advocates, it also increases the risk of outbreak of New Warfare. They
explain their reasoning while blinding out that the risk of conventional (state-based)
armed conﬂict also increases with rising state weakness. In addition, the New Wars
advocates explain how macro-factors (increasing globalization and the end of the Cold
War) weakened states “from above” and how the emergence of violent non-state actors
contributes to state weakness “from below”. However, the relationship as such between
state weakness and political instability is taken as a given. Therefore, I also wish to
brieﬂy recall the main theoretical arguments linking state weakness to the outbreak of
internal armed conﬂict. These arguments are neither startling nor late-breaking. For
instance, state weakness can be linked to armed conﬂict through its negative eﬀect on
economic variables (e.g. growth rates and foreign direct investment) that are known to
increase the risk of internal warfare. Öberg and Melander (2010, pp. 8 sq.) present a di-
rect and more sophisticated argument borrowed from bargaining theory. They consider
high level of state capacity (as indicated by high bureaucratic quality) decisive in order
to process information, e.g. on grievances. According to them, high bureaucratic quality
“reduces the information asymmetry between the parties and/or enables them to com-
municate resolve credibly, [which] will reduce the risk that a conﬂict escalates to war”.
They argue that especially in autocratic regimes (where citizens lack the right to openly
express their grievances and to organize themselves to pursue their interests), political
leaders depend on “a professional bureaucracy that [. . . ] has the integrity and autonomy
to speak truth to the leaders” in order to obtain “estimates of popular grievances”, to
gather information on the “true state of public opinion” or “on the nature and strength
of potential rebel’s preferences”. This information helps the government to avoid rebel-
lion by reacting on time either through redistribution or repression. The same point has
previously been made in order to explain inter-state warfare.17 The most common thesis
linking state weakness to political instability is rooted in relative deprivation theory and
centers around the grievances generated by state weakness thus providing incentive for
rebellion. More precisely, it is argued that weak states are lacking extractive capacity
and are therefore unable to deliver the basic services they are supposed to. In addi-
tion, they lack administrative capacity. The fact that unprofessional bureaucrats are
systematically directing state resources to their kin groups also often is a root problem
(Kocher 2010, p. 142). This bears the danger that “populations might perceive [such]
weak, corrupt or ineﬀective governments as the source of their expectations-ability dis-
crepancy” (Hegre and Nygard 2012, p. 3) and for this reason start to question state
legitimacy.18 Furthermore, weak states lack coercive capacity. Their authority is lim-
ited or only arbitrarily exercised. Due to these obstacles, weak states are neither able
to control their territories and societies through coercive means (i.e. repression) nor
through accommodative responses (i.e. cooperation or co-optation). This means people
17See e.g. Fearon (1995) or Råby and Teorell (2010). The latter ﬁnd “that the impact of quality of
government, most notably corruption, on the risk of interstate conﬂict by large amounts trumps the
inﬂuence of democracy” (Råby and Teorell 2010, pp. 2, 12 sq.).
18For an empirical study on the linkage between the quality of government and state legitimacy see
Gilley (2006).
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are not only willing but also able to support armed action to address the issue. The risk
of a grievance-based rebellion increases.19 In an attempt to regain order, weak states
often respond with violence to the violence and protests caused by their own failures
which intensiﬁes the grievances. At least armed conﬂict often leads governments to in-
duce martial law and to limit political rights which also increases the risk of a renewed
outbreak of grievance-based violence oftentimes in connection with upcoming elections
(Hegre and Nygard 2012, pp. 26–28).
A political opportunity model also lies at the heart of the alternative argument that
the weaker the state, the less likely it is to defend its resources, the less likely it is to
eﬀectively participate in warfare if attacked itself and the less eﬀective it is in stopping
non-state actors from ﬁghting each other. This not only motivates and enables violent
groups to rise and to ﬁght the state for control over resources (which increases the risk
of conventional greed-based rebellions). It also motivates and enables non-state actors
to rise and to ﬁght each other over resources (leading to non-conventional (non-state)
armed conﬂict). While the above mentioned grievance-based rebellions happen in a
context where the state is weakened but still exists and oftentimes behaves repressively,
such non-conventional (non-state) armed conﬂicts are at least more likely to cluster
at the lower end extreme of state fragility. This leads to the hypothesis that non-
conventional (non-state) armed conﬂicts tend to emerge in situations of extreme state
weakness or even state collapse while conventional (state-based) armed conﬂicts also
happen in weakened but comparatively stable and repressive states. Accordingly, the
New Wars advocates expect that over time (and especially in the post-Cold War era),
internal warfare increasingly occurred in the context of failing or failed states. The
degree of state weakness is believed to be signiﬁcantly worse in countries experiencing
non-conventional (non-state) armed conﬂicts as compared with countries involved in
conventional (state-based) armed conﬂicts. Likewise, at the war or conﬂict level, the
degree of state weakness is expected to be signiﬁcantly worse prior to or at the outbreak
of non-conventional (non-state) armed conﬂict as opposed to conventional (state-based)
armed conﬂict [Hypothesis 7].
The theoretical argument nevertheless lacks the power to convince. If the relationship
between state weakness and the kind of internal armed conﬂict that arises is a matter of
degree of state weakness, a theoretically sound argument is missing as to what level of
state weakness we are talking about in order to expect the outbreak of non-state armed
conﬂict. In addition, linking extreme state weakness and state failure to the outbreak
of non-state warfare runs the risk of being tautological because a state actor who could
participate in internal warfare does not exist any more. If collapsed state structures are
even included in the deﬁnition (and the measurement) of non-state warfare the argument
turns entirely absurd.
19For a formalized version of this argument see Azam (2001), who also states that violent conﬂicts in
Africa are due to the failure of governments to redistribute public resources within and among ethnic
groups which generates grievances and incentives for rebellion.
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In light of these theoretical weaknesses, I will later propose a slight modiﬁcation of
the argument which states that the nature (instead of the degree) of state weakness is
important in order to explain the kind of warfare that emerges.
Overall, empirical testing of the above mentioned main trends and hypotheses across
a large number of cases, all types of internal armed conﬂict and over an extended period
of time never took place. This is partly due to the fact that the concept of New Wars
has mainly been discussed within the qualitative literature. Partly, however, the lack
of large-N empirical analyses is due to a lack of suitable data. Only recently, scientists
at the Free University of Berlin and the UCDP started to collect systematic data on
sub-state or non-state armed conﬂicts. After all, some data on the production of certain
conﬂict resources and zones of warfare are also available. The following analytical part
of this book describes the available data sets and indicators measuring the incidence,
the nature and the context of non-state and state-based internal armed conﬂicts. While
these data sets are chosen because of their advantages over other existing data sets,
their limits shall also be mentioned. After having clariﬁed the potential of available
data sets the section closes with a listing of all trends and hypothesis (including the
above mentioned) that shall and can be tested within the subsequent empirical analysis.
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13. Data on Internal Fighting and Armed
Actors
13.1. The “New List of Wars”/“Consolidated List of Wars”
In July 2005, Sven Chojnacki and his colleagues from the Free University of Berlin
published the ﬁrst edition of their “New List of Wars”. For data collection, the authors
relied on existing and well-accepted quantitative data sets1 but also identiﬁed their
weaknesses. Consequently, they proposed and applied some changes in deﬁning criteria
which shall now be elaborated further.
The authors of the “New List of Wars” criticize conventional armed conﬂict data sets
for only gathering information on conﬂicts taking place within or between recognized
members of the international state system.2 Conﬂicts happening in de facto indepen-
dent entities which lack international recognition but nevertheless constitute relatively
autonomous entities over some territory (e.g. conﬂicts within the Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus or the Republic of Somaliland) are not considered. The same holds for
armed conﬂicts taking place in post-colonial quasi-states or in situations of state failure.
Secondly, the authors of the “New List of Wars” criticize that conventional conﬂict
data sets per deﬁnition exclude cases of non-state ﬁghting (e.g. rebel on rebel violence
or warfare between warlords). In order to close this gap, Chojnacki and his colleagues
add the missing category of “sub-state wars” to their data set. These are deﬁned as wars
between non-state or non-recognized quasi-state groups3, whether within or across formal
state boundaries. This deﬁnition of a “sub-state war” is consistent with what I have been
1Data sources are the Correlates of War Project, UCDP, data from the “AG Kriegsursachenforschung”
(AKUF) at the University of Hamburg, the Heidelberg Institute for International Conﬂict Research
(HIIK), the State Failure Task Force, the Armed Conﬂict Database from the International Institute
for Strategic Studies (IISS), the Armed Conﬂict Report from the Project Ploughshares, Keesing’s
Record of World Events and the “Archiv der Gegenwart” (Chojnacki and Reisch 2008, pp. 2, 3).
2A political entity which is classiﬁed as a member of the post-Word War I state system must be a
member of the League of Nations/the United Nations or it must have a population greater than
500,000 and received diplomatic missions from two major powers. This deﬁnition by the Correlates
of War Project is widely accepted within the research community. See Codebook of the Correlates of
War Project 2008: State System Membership List, v2008.1., online at http://correlatesofwar.org
(visited on 2010-11-25) or Chojnacki (2006b, p. 54).
3Quasi-state groups are left-overs from regular armed forces or from governmental security forces as
169
13. Data on the Incidence and Actors
labeling a “new”, “non-conventional” or “non-state” war. For this reason, the following
continues to use these terms interchangeably. In addition, the authors also suggest that
sub-state actors are able to ﬁght bloody intra-state wars amongst each other because
a functioning monopoly of violence of the aﬀected state(s) does not exist because the
state(s) collapsed or is/are unwilling to enforce it against combating local groups (e.g.
in Nigeria or parts of Pakistan), because the monopoly of violence is restricted to the
capital or narrowly deﬁned territories (e.g. in Chad or Afghanistan) or because it is
temporally not enforced in the conﬂict region (e.g. in Somalia and Lebanon) (Chojnacki
2006b, pp. 60 sq.).
Thirdly, Chojnacki (2006b, p. 55) criticizes existing eﬀorts of data collection for only
counting direct military deaths. According to him, this leads to a bias favoring classical,
state-sanctioned forms of violence. He does not consider this practice eﬀective or satis-
factory to determine the intensity of armed conﬂicts in which civilians are the strategic
targets of sustained combat. Therefore, his “New List of Wars” explicitly counts battle-
related military and civilian deaths. At least 100 people need to be killed per year on
both sides in order to qualify as bilateral armed conﬂict. This criterion rules out sporadic
and one-sided acts of violence (e.g. terrorist attacks or genocide).
In order to determine whether the observed case constitutes “warfare” (generally un-
derstood as the most extreme type of military violence between at least two politically
organized groups), any quantitative data set needs to identify a certain threshold of vi-
olence.4 The “New List of Wars” uses a comparatively low overall threshold of violence
of at least 1,000 (military and civilian) battle-related deaths over the entire duration of
combat while others have chosen the rather high number of 1,000 battle-related military
deaths per year in order to speak of warfare. Chojnacki (2006b, p. 60) argues that the
latter threshold is appropriate to capture intensive inter-state wars but misses many of
the comparatively low-intensive internal armed conﬂicts.
The criterion of 1,000 battle-related deaths during the entire conﬂict (vs. per year)
also is the main distinguishing feature between the “New List of Wars” and a seem-
ingly similar data set: The “Non-State Wars Dataset” of the Correlates of War (COW)
Project, which since the end of the 1990s, has tried to better include non-state wars
in its data collection eﬀort, too. For the sake of completeness, this data set shall at
least be mentioned. Version 4.0 of COW’s “Non-State-Wars Dataset” lists wars among
non-state entities, i.e. quasi-state actors (troops of non-recognized geopolitical units
well as parts of the army intervening as third parties on behalf of their own interests. Such quasi-state
groups have been involved in non-state warfare in Bosnia (1992-1995), Chad (1978-1993), the DRC
(1998-2009), Indonesia (1999-2002), Liberia (1990-1996), Lebanon (1975-1990), Nigeria (1999-2009),
Pakistan (1994-1995, 1991-2009), Sierra Leone (1991-2000) and Tajikistan (1995-1996). The fact that
in non-state wars private actors are sometimes ﬁghting on behalf of (internal or external) state actors
cannot be ruled out.
4The determination of such a threshold to distinguish minor or intermediate conﬂicts from intense
warfare is common practice in quantitative conﬂict research. For more information see Chojnacki
(2006b, pp. 58–60).
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such as dependencies or non-state autonomous entities, that do not meet the criteria
of system membership), between troops of non-territorial entities or between non-state
armed groups that have no deﬁned territorial base.5 All non-state wars mentioned in
the data set take place outside the territory of a recognized state. They either happen
between non-state entities on non-state territory, i.e. territory that is in pre-state for-
mation, a colony or other dependency (so-called “type 8 wars”) or they happen between
non-state entities across state borders (so-called “type 9 wars”). The authors of the data
set point out that wars between non-state actors appear within the COW category of
conventional intra-state wars, too, and in this case are referred to as inter-communal or
regional internal wars. Contrary to the type 8 and type 9 non-state wars, these wars
between non-state actors take place within recognized states. This leads to the objection
that the COW Project sometimes diﬀerentiates types of civil warfare according to the
motives of the combatants (e.g. intra-state wars for central control vs. intra-state wars
for local issues) while at the same time it also diﬀerentiates in regard to the political
status of entities involved in warfare (e.g. intra-state wars vs. non-state wars). This
renders a comparison of and clear distinction between sub-types of civil warfare diﬃ-
cult. In addition and as already mentioned, COW’s “Non-State-Wars Dataset” only
reports battle-related deaths among combatants (civilian fatalities are excluded) and
like all other COW data sets applies the rather high threshold of 1,000 battle-related
deaths per year.6 For these reasons, I prefer to rely on the above presented “New List
of Wars” which uses a lower threshold of violence, includes battle-related civilian deaths
and clearly diﬀerentiates non-state from state-based armed conﬂicts according to the
actors’ political status.
The “New List of Wars” also provides information on external, military interventions
in ongoing conﬂicts. Again, the practice of an established data set, the UCDP/PRIO
“Armed Conﬂict Dataset”, is criticized. This data set distinguishes between “internal
armed conﬂicts” and “internationalized internal armed conﬂicts” where the government,
the opposition or both receive support from other governments. According to Chojnacki
and Reisch (2008, p. 4) such a strict distinction is problematic for at least two reasons.
“Firstly, from the moment when outside interventions occur, wars which obviously have
similar internal causes and conditions fall into diﬀerent categories. Secondly, military
interventions can occur in diﬀerent war constellations (e.g. intra-state, extra-state or
inter-state)”. Accordingly, the “New List of Wars” does not treat unilateral or mul-
tilateral military interventions as a distinct type of warfare but as a “special form of
5A Non-State Armed Group (NSA) “can be considered a war participant if it either commits 100 armed
personnel to the war or suﬀers 25 battle-related deaths. Thus non-state wars involve combat between
two or more non-state armed groups that are organized for combat, are capable of eﬀective resistance,
and commit a minimum of 100 troops to the war or suﬀer 25 battle-related deaths”. See the codebook
v4.0 for the “Non-State War Data Set” which is available online at http://correlatesofwar.org
(visited on 2013-07-02) .
6For more information on the COW “Non-State-Wars Dataset” see Sarkees and Wayman (2010) or
Chojnacki (2006b, pp. 54 sq.). The “Non-State Wars Data Set” (v4.0) and Codebook (as well as
general information on the COW typology of war) are available online at http://correlatesofwar.
org (visited on 2013-07-02) .
171
13. Data on the Incidence and Actors
conﬂict behavior” which can be combined with or occur in any kind of warfare. Military
interventions are deﬁned as “active violent interferences (involving military personnel
and combat action) in an ongoing war from outside by at least one member of the
state system” (Chojnacki 2006b, p. 57). This deﬁnition excludes humanitarian interven-
tions, UN-mandated peacekeeping or peace-enforcement eﬀorts, non-military interven-
tions (e.g. military training, supplies and ﬁnancial support) by external actors, actions
that are exclusively directed or assisted by intelligence services, military interventions
by non-members of the state system and military interventions by external non-state
actors.
In order to supplement data on the latter kind of intervention, the “Mercenaries and
War Dataset” might be helpful. A ﬁrst version of this data set measures the military
activities of mercenaries in all kinds of internal wars between 1946 and 2003 (Chojnacki,
Metternich, and Münster 2009, p. 14). Mercenaries are deﬁned as individual soldiers or
groups of ﬁghters who receive rewards to actively engage in ﬁghting a particular armed
conﬂict. They are driven by a desire for private gain, recruited locally or abroad and
they are not part of any regular armed forces. This deﬁnition includes employees of
private military companies (Chojnacki, Metternich, and Münster 2009, pp. 4–6). Within
the annex of their paper which relies on these data, Chojnacki, Metternich, and Münster
(2009) list 43 (out of 126) state-based and non-state internal wars that happened between
1946 and 2003 and where one or the other warring faction hired mercenaries. So far,
however, data beyond 2003 are not publicly available, information is lacking on military
involvement of mercenaries in internal armed conﬂicts that do not reach the intensity
of warfare and more ﬁne grained information is also missing (e.g. on the number of
intervening troops/the size of the intervention). But a ﬁrst version of the “Private
Security Database” is now available covering the period from 1990 to 2007. This data
set contains information on the use of private security companies (by public actors and
in areas of limited statehood) which are also believed to be often deployed in New Wars.7
Likewise, data on the involvement of (UN) peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions
(at least in conventional state-base civil wars) could be added as soon as the earlier
mentioned “Peacekeeping Operations Location and Event Dataset (PKOLED)” becomes
available. In the meanwhile, the “IPI Peacekeeping Database” has been launched which,
however, also only covers a short period of time.8
For now, I rely on the “New List of Wars” and an unpublished but consolidated version
of this data set (described in more detail below) which contains information on external
interventions (unilateral, multilateral and UN interventions) in state-based as well as
non-state internal wars.
7For the more information, the data and codebook see, http://www.conflict-data.org/psd/index.
html (visited on 2014-11-03) or Branovic (2008).
8The dataset provides information on the total uniformed personnel contributions of each contributing
country by month, by type (troop, police, or expert/observer) and by mission, from November 1990
to the present. See http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/contributions/ (visited on 2014-
11-03) .
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It remains to be said that the “New List of Wars” does not include indirect civilian and
military deaths who lost their lives due to the consequences of war (e.g. due to diseases
or hunger). Although these victims might be relevant in order to determine the overall
brutality of warfare, this and other available conﬂict data sets for practical reasons count
direct, battle-related deaths only. Finally, the “New List of Wars” does not provide any
information on the exact geographical location of active warfare and only measures the
most severe type of armed conﬂict. Conclusions drawn from any analysis using these
data do not necessarily apply to conﬂicts with less than 1,000 battle-deaths over their
entire duration.
Nevertheless, this new data set greatly adds to our understanding of internal warfare.
It clearly discriminates between four types of warfare: 1.) inter-state wars (fought be-
tween internationally recognized states), 2.) extra-state wars (between a state and one
or more non-state groups outside its territorial boundaries), 3.) conventional intra-state
wars (between a government and one or more non-state parties within the boundaries of
an internationally recognized state) and 4.) “new”, sub-state wars (between non-state
or non-recognized quasi-state groups, whether within or across formal state boundaries).
The authors rightly claim that this categorization adds a missing part to the puzzle of
possible combinations of state and non-state actors. Through this data set, wars be-
tween sub-state armed groups are made accessible for empirical and systematic analyses
(Chojnacki 2006b, p. 56). Their list of sub-state wars includes cases which have pre-
viously and wrongly been categorized as conventional (state-based) civil wars (despite
their non-state nature) as well as cases which prior data collection failed to include at
all.9 In addition, the above categorization leaves room for the dynamic nature of war-
fare because any case can move from one to another type of warfare over time given
“substantial change in the structural conditions of statehood and in the constellation of
actors”.10 Besides mentioning the names of the involved actors, the “New List of Wars”
also informs about external military interventions and the duration of state-based and
non-state internal wars in years.
The latest (and for the time being last) public version of the “New List of Wars,
version 1.3” covers the period from 1946 to 2006.11 An unpublished re-check of the
post-Cold War cases further extended the temporal reach of the data set up to 2009.
9The use of existing and well accepted quantitative data sets supports the reliability of the “New List
of Wars”. In addition, every case of warfare was observed and coded by at least two project staﬀ
members. A third independent person consolidated the data. Event data gathered by the “Event
Data Project on Conﬂict and Security (EDACS)” allowed for further alignment especially in regard
to the number of victims (of non-African wars, too) (Chojnacki and Metternich 2007; Chojnacki,
Ickler, et al. 2012). The project director ﬁnalized the coding process by again comparing the data
with battle-deaths data compiled by well established conﬂict research institutes (most importantly
IISS and UCDP).
10Chojnacki and Reisch (2008, p. 3). For examples from Somalia, Angola or Columbia see Chojnacki
(2006b, pp. 57, 59 fn 20).
11See Chojnacki and Reisch (2008) and http://www.conflict-data.org/colow/about/ (visited on
2014-08-07) for information on the history of this data project.
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This consolidated version of the “New List of Wars”, which is also referred to as the
“Consolidated List of Wars (CoLoW)” (version 1.1, November 2009), was made available
upon request by the authors and, with some reservations12, shall be used within the
following empirical analysis. In comparison with the earlier “New List of Wars”(v.1.3),
the “Consolidated List of Wars” (v.1.1) extended the duration of ongoing cases of warfare
up to 2009, corrected some start and/or end dates of warfare and added ﬁve additional
recent cases of internal warfare. The “Consolidated List of Wars” (v.1.1) also informs
more clearly on the number of parties to the conﬂict. Especially relevant in the context
of this study is the information whether third parties with unclear positions exist who
follow their own interests instead of supporting side A or B. Information on foreign
military interventions has also been updated and changed in a number of cases.13 Finally
and unlike any earlier version of this data set, the “Consolidated List of Wars” (v.1.1)
gives a minimum and maximum estimate of the total number of civilian and military
battle-related deaths at least for most of the post-Cold War cases. This information is
necessary in order to ﬁgure out whether state-based and non-state internal wars diﬀer
in terms of their intensity.
13.2. The “Non-State Conﬂict Dataset”
The above described “New/Consolidated List of Wars” only captures wars, i.e. very
intensive ﬁghting in terms of battle-deaths. This does not hold for UCDP’s “Non-State
Conﬂict Dataset”.14 This data set deﬁnes a non-state conﬂict as the use of armed force
between two organized groups, neither of which is the government of a state, which results
in at least 25 battle-related deaths per year and per warring dyad.15 Thus, like the “New
List of Wars”, this data set covers non-state or sub-state ﬁghting amongst militias, rival
12The “Consolidated List of Wars” (v.1.1) is compiled on a conﬂict-year basis. Although annual data
on battle-deaths and the involved actors has been mostly re-checked, many data points are still
missing. If yearly information is available, it is often marked as “critical” because only a few (and
even contradicting) sources exist, because the case is extremely complex or because data for the
year 2009 is still missing and the re-check of the data is incomplete. Annual (and total) numbers
of battle-deaths for cases of warfare before 1990 are entirely missing. Due to these shortcomings,
the later analysis only uses the more reliable aggregate ﬁgures of overall battle-deaths and the total
number of involved actors per conﬂict (instead of conﬂict-year).
13Please see appendix A on page 379 for a summary of the changes and additions that were made.
14The most recent update of this data set (v. 2.5-2014) covers the 1989 to 2013 period. For the latest
presentation of the data see Sundberg, Eck, et al. (2012). The data set and codebook are available
online at http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_non-state_conflict_dataset_
/ (visited on 2014-11-02) . For earlier versions see Eck, Kreutz, et al. (2010), Sundberg (2010),
Pettersson (2010), Kreutz and Eck (2005) or Kreutz, Eck, et al. (2005).
15The “use of armed force” to promote the parties’ general position in the conﬂict includes the usage
of arms which can be of any material means, e.g. manufactured weapons but also sticks or stones
(Sundberg 2010, p. 2).
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guerrilla groups, clans, warlords or organized communal groups.16 However, contrary
to the “New List of Wars”, it includes low intensity, non-state ﬁghting (in the following
also referred to as “new” or “non-conventional” internal armed conﬂicts). In addition,
this data set estimates the number of battle-related deaths for each non-state armed
conﬂict. Country names and the regional contexts of the conﬂicts are also given though
information on the exact geographical locations or zones of conﬂict is again not provided.
Such geographically disaggregated data would be desirable, e.g. to match the occurrence
of non-state armed conﬂicts with the production of conﬂict resources.
Information on the exact geographical location of non-state ﬁghting cannot simply
be imputed by using one of the currently available georeferenced conﬂict event data
sets, namely PRIO’s “Armed Conﬂict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED)”, data
compiled by the “Event Data Project on Conﬂict and Security in Areas of Limited
Statehood (EDACS) at the Free University of Berlin or UCDP’s “Georeferenced Event
Dataset” (GED), because these data sets are of only limited temporal and geographical
coverage and/or do not fully include non-state armed conﬂicts.17 ACLED only covers
all African countries from 1997 to the end of 2013 (version 4)18 and just disaggregates
UCDP/PRIO’s conventional (state-based) armed conﬂicts into their constituent (violent
and non-violent) conﬂict events. Rebel-on-rebel violence is explicitly included as long as
it happens within the context of a conventional (state-based) armed conﬂict. Because
there is no causality minimum necessary for inclusion, ACLED also collects informa-
16Organized groups consist of 1.) formally organized groups (deﬁned as any non-governmental group
of people having announced a name for their group and using armed force against another similarly
formally organized group) and 2.) informally organized groups (deﬁned as any non-governmental
group of people without an announced name who uses armed force against another similarly organized
group and where the violent activity meets the following requirements: there is a clear pattern of
violent incidents that are connected and in which both groups use armed force against the other).
Only recently, the deﬁnition of an “organized group” has been modiﬁed to make the categories of non-
state conﬂict and one-sided violence mutually exclusive and to better include conﬂicts between very
broad groups such as religious collectives. For more information see Pettersson (2012a) or Sundberg
(2010, pp. 2–4).
17For a comparison of the event data quality, the data collection and coding processes of these three
data sets see Chojnacki, Ickler, et al. (2012).
18Some real-time data (i.e. weekly or monthly updates) are available for a number of additional non-
African countries (Raleigh, Linke, and Dowd 2012, p. 3). An earlier version of this data set covered
slightly diﬀerent and less countries but a longer period of time (1960-2006). Seven types of conﬂict
events were listed: battles where either rebels or governments win the control of a location, the
establishment of rebel bases/headquarters, non-violent rebel presence (e.g. recruitment or partial
control of territory at night), gain of territory by the rebels at an unknown date and one-sided violence
by rebels or government forces on unarmed civilians (PRIO/CSCW 2006). An update of the data set
covered more recent conﬂict events but only from 1997 onwards. Some countries were dropped and
the categorization of conﬂict events slightly changed. Since then, events of rioting/protesting, battles
where territorial control did not change and events of non-violent transfer of territorial control are
included (PRIO/CSCW 2010). A battle is deﬁned as “a violent interaction between two politically
organized armed groups at a particular time and location”. Because the authors cannot verify the
fatality numbers reported from their sources, they refrain from using fatalities as the basis for event
inclusion (Raleigh, Linke, and Dowd 2012, pp. 8, 16). See also Raleigh and Hegre (2005); Raleigh,
Linke, and Hegre (2009); Raleigh, Linke, Hegre, and Karlsen (2010).
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tion before conﬂicts are coded as being active in other conﬂict data sets. This means
that only “occasionally” ACLED includes information on rebel-on-rebel violence that
is not listed elsewhere (Raleigh, Linke, and Dowd 2012, p. 17). The fact that ACLED
disaggregates state-based armed conﬂicts into their constituent conﬂict events relates
to another limitation in light of this analysis: ACLED emphasizes the political nature
and intentions of its violent non-state actors.19 The EDACS data set is also of limited
value to this study because so far it only contains geographically disaggregated data on
violent events in seven sub-Saharan African countries (Somalia, Burundi, DRC, Congo-
Brazzaville, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Rwanda) between 1990 and 2009 (Chojnacki,
Ickler, et al. 2012, p. 4).20 However, and contrary to ACLED, this data set includes
violent conﬂict events between two or more non-state armed groups – whether they oc-
curred within conventional civil warfare or not. UCDP’s most recent and innovative
data project, the “Georeferenced Event Dataset” (GED) delivers event-based and geo-
referenced data on state-based armed conﬂicts, non-state armed conﬂicts and acts of
one-sided violence (through the “UCDP GED Point Dataset”) as well as geographically
mapped data on the respective conﬂict areas (through the “UCDP GED Conﬂict Poly-
gons Dataset”). Again, however, the latest version of this data set (v.1.5.-2011) only
includes all African countries from 1989 to 2010.21
Unfortunately, the temporal reach of UCDP’s “Non-State Conﬂict Dataset” remains
restricted, too. The version I am relying on (v.2.4-2012) only covers the post-Cold War
era (1989 to 2011). But this data set provides global coverage. In those years when
UCDP’s “Non-State Conﬂict Dataset” and the previously described “Consolidated List
of Wars” overlap (1989-2009), the coding of cases also mainly concurs. Countries that
experienced non-conventional (non-state) wars according to the “Consolidated List of
Wars” also experienced at least one non-conventional (non-state) armed conﬂict ac-
19For instance, rebels are deﬁned as “political organizations whose goal is to counter an established
national governing regime by violent acts” and who “have a stated political agenda for national
power”. Militias are included insofar as they are “operating in conjunction or in alliance with a
recognized government, political elite, and rebel organization or opposition group”. Militias are
“typically supported, armed by, or allied with a political elite and act towards a goal deﬁned by
these elites or larger political movements”. A small category called “other” actors includes hired
mercenaries, security ﬁrms and their employees, UN or external forces who, like all other actors
recorded in this data set, need to have “an oﬃcial name, a political purpose and use violence or
protest for political means. [. . . ] Further, the events in which they are involved must be connected
to each other as a means to achieve a larger political purpose” (Raleigh, Linke, and Dowd 2012,
pp. 4 sq.).
20EDACS collects information on the dates, exact locations, military actors and targets of individual
violent events, i.e. ﬁghting between two or more organized armed groups and one-sided attacks aimed
at civilian or military targets that result in at least one casualty from the direct use of armed force. See
the EDACS Codebook (version 3.7 from November 2012), available online at http://www.conflict-
data.org/edacs/downloads/EDACS_Codebook_Version3_7_20121128.pdf (visited on 2014-11-02) ,
Chojnacki, Ickler, et al. (2012) or Chojnacki and Metternich (2007). Data can be downloaded at
http://www.conflict-data.org/edacs/downloads/ (visited on 2014-11-02) .
21See Melander and Sundberg (2013) for the latest presentation, Sundberg, Lindgren, et al. (2010) for
the codebook of the UCDP “GED Point Dataset”, and Croicu and Sundberg (2012) for the codebook
of the UCDP “GED Conﬂict Polygons Dataset”.
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cording to UDCP’s “Non-State Conﬂict Dataset” within the respective time frame.22
The other way round, several countries (and even entire regions) exist that have not
been involved in non-state wars but nevertheless experienced a signiﬁcant number of
low-intensity non-state conﬂicts. For example, the Americas did not see any non-state
war between 1946 and 2009. But, according to UCDP, the region has almost continu-
ously been involved in low-intensity non-state armed conﬂicts within the post-Cold War
era. Non-state conﬂicts took place in Columbia, Mexico, Bolivia, Guatemala, Brazil,
Ecuador, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica and Canada23. The two most hard-hit countries
in this region are Mexico and Columbia, where UCDP estimates that 23 and 13 such
non-state conﬂicts resulted in over 7,000 and 2,000 deaths respectively between 1989 and
2011. Likewise, single countries (e.g. South Africa, Uganda, Ethiopia or Sudan) have
not experienced non-state warfare since the Second World War but, within the post-Cold
War era, have seen 17, 23, 52 and 72 non-state armed conﬂicts respectively. (Although
these high numbers of non-state armed conﬂicts are somewhat put into perspective if
one keeps in mind that UCDP compiles its data at the dyad level. Every violent conﬂict
mentioned by the “New/Consolidated List of Wars” might therefore split up into several
dyadic violent events in UCDP’s “Non-State Conﬂict Dataset” between two non-state
actors each.)
22Only in ﬁve cases, the coding signiﬁcantly diﬀers: The “Consolidated List of Wars” reports non-state
warfare in Bosnia (1992-1995), Sierra Leone (1991-2000) and Tajikistan (1995-1996) while UCDP
classiﬁes violent conﬂicts in these countries during the respective years as state-based armed conﬂicts.
In Chad, the “Consolidated List of Wars” reports non-state warfare between 1978 and 1993. UCDP
counts several non-state conﬂicts only later (in 2000, 2006 and 2007) and reports state-based armed
conﬂict during the 1990s. In the case of Pakistan, non-state warfare happened from 1994 to 1995 and
2001 to 2009. In the latter case, both data sets concur (i.e. UCDP also reports multiple non-state
conﬂicts). During the early 1990s, however, UCDP only reports state-based armed conﬂicts. In other
cases, minor diﬀerences between the two data sets exist. For instance, the “Consolidated List of Wars”
codes a non-state war in Indonesia (Maluku Islands) from 1999 to 2002 while UCDP reports non-
state armed conﬂicts only in 1997, 1999, 2000 and 2001. For the year 2002 (and subsequent years),
UCDP only reports state-based armed conﬂicts in Indonesia. These discrepancies might be due to
diﬀerences between both data sets in the coding of start and end dates of ﬁghting. In addition, the
two data sets seem to disagree on the role of the Indonesian army in this otherwise non-state conﬂict
between Muslim and Christian groups. The Project Ploughshares informs that state troops were
ﬁghting alongside non-state Muslim militias. Private, economic interests also seem to have played
an important role. See http://ploughshares.ca/pl_armedconflict/indonesia-molucca-maluku-
islands-1999-2006/ (visited on 2013-02-16) . For information on the privatization or outsourcing
of security functions to non-state actors by the Indonesian state see Heiduk (2005). Another case
to illustrate minor diﬀerences between both data sets is the DRC. While the “Consolidated List of
Wars” reports non-state warfare from 1993 to 1994 and from 1998 to 2009, the non-state conﬂicts
listed by UCDP only partly cover these periods. In 1994, 2005, 2006 and 2009, UCDP fails to report
non-state armed conﬂicts in the DRC. However, at least in one of these years (in 2006), state-based
armed conﬂicts occurred. Again, the role of the state as an actor to this conﬂict might be disputable.
The “Consolidated List of Wars” mentions “government leftovers” as one party to the 1998-2009 case
of non-state warfare. In addition, UCDP might classify this case as an internationalized state-based
internal armed conﬂict. Overall, only a comparison of the actors and exact locations of ﬁghting would
help to clarify whether both data sets capture the exact same cases.
23Among rivaling motorcycle gangs.
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Last but not least, UCDP’s “Non-State Conﬂict Dataset” not only mentions the names
of the involved actors but also indicates the level of organization of each dyad. The
data set diﬀerentiates dyadic conﬂicts between formally organized groups from conﬂicts
between two kinds of informally organized groups. The organizational level of formally
organized groups is comparatively high. They have announced a name for their group
and use armed force to promote the group’s general position in a conﬂict (i.e. they are
permanently organized for combat). Every actor engaged in conventional state-based
armed conﬂict has to fulﬁll these criteria to be included in UCDP/PRIO’s “Armed
Conﬂict Dataset”. Within the “Non-State Conﬂict Dataset”, the category of formally
organized groups comprises unrecognized states and formally organized rebel groups.
In contrast, informally organized groups do not have an announced name but also use
armed force against a similar organized group. They are composed of members or
supporters of political parties or of members of broader categories of identiﬁcations,
such as clans, ethnic or religious groups. In either case, the informally organized groups
are not permanently organized for combat but use their organizational structures for
such purposes only at times.24
This distinction between formally and informally organized groups is especially inter-
esting in the context of the study at hand which argues that the internal structures of
armed organizations might help to explain the kind and level of violence seen in internal
warfare. For instance, these data could be used to explore whether non-state armed
conﬂicts between informally organized groups result in signiﬁcantly more or less battle-
related deaths than non-state armed conﬂicts between formally organized groups. The
implicit assumption would be that informally organized groups (whose members have
not even agreed on a name and who lack permanent structures) also exhibit compara-
tively weak internal structures of management and control which aﬀects the level and
nature of the applied violence. UCDP’s “Actors Dataset” even lists the organizational
level of all state and non-state actors who have been involved in every kind of organized
violence compiled by the institute (i.e. state-based armed conﬂicts, non-state armed
conﬂicts and acts of one-sided violence). In addition, this data set informs about how
non-state armed groups came into existence (e.g. whether they were created by breaking
away from another actor listed in UCDP’s data sets or by a temporary split in the origi-
nal movement).25 However, when comparing the organizational levels of actors involved
24Within UCDP’s “Non-State Conﬂict Dataset”, formally organized groups are assigned an organiza-
tional level of 1. Informally organized groups are either assigned an organizational level of 2 or 3.
Level 2 groups are composed of “supporters and aﬃliates to political parties and candidates” who at
times ﬁght similar organized groups. “This level of organization captures ﬁghting between political
parties/candidates and lethal electoral violence”. An organizational level of 3 is assigned to informally
organized groups who share a common identiﬁcation along ethnic, clan, religious, national or tribal
lines. Again, these groups are not permanently organized for combat but only at times organize
themselves along these lines to engage in ﬁghting. “This level of organization captures aspects of
what is commonly referred to as ‘communal conﬂicts’, in that conﬂict stands along lines of communal
identity” (Pettersson 2012a).
25I am using v.2.1-2012 of UCDP’s “Actor Dataset”. All data (including the most recent update, v.2.2-
2014) and the codebook are available online at http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/
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in diﬀerent kinds of internal armed conﬂicts, UCDP’s coding rules have to be taken into
account. As already mentioned, UCDP requires actors in state-based armed conﬂicts
(as well as those who committed acts of one-sided violence) to be formally organized in
order to be included in its data sets while actors involved in non-state armed conﬂicts
can also be informally organized. For this reason, the organizational level of groups in-
volved in state-based armed conﬂicts exhibits zero variance and per deﬁnition surpasses
the organizational level of actors involved in non-state armed conﬂicts. Still, the above
mentioned data could be used to explore whether non-state armed conﬂicts between for-
mally organized dyads resulted in signiﬁcantly more or less battle-related deaths than
state-based armed conﬂicts (that are also fought between formally organized groups).
In addition, it would be possible to investigate whether factionalization (e.g. measured
through the share of actors who broke away from another armed group or emerged after
a temporary split) is more common amongst formally organized actors involved in non-
state armed conﬂicts (as opposed to formally organized actors involved in state-based
armed conﬂicts). Or these data could be used to ﬁgure out whether formally organized
actors who have been involved in non-state armed conﬂicts are more likely to commit
acts of one-sided violence against unarmed civilians than formally organized actors who
have been involved in state-based armed conﬂicts.
First and simple descriptive analyses using UCDP’s “Non-State Conﬂict Dataset” were
published by the Human Security Center in its 2005 Human Security Report and the
2006 Human Security Brief. Although both analyses only covered the periods from 2002
to 2003/2005, they nevertheless provided some interesting hints. They revealed that
many actors had been involved in several non-state conﬂicts, that most of the non-state
conﬂicts were active for a rather limited period of time, that non-state conﬂicts seemed
to cluster in relatively few and often African countries and that, contrary to common
beliefs, the number of non-state conﬂicts declined instead of increased – especially in sub-
Saharan Africa.26 This declining trend in the number of non-state conﬂicts is especially
surprising because structural factors increasing the risk of armed conﬂict (e.g. poverty,
low growth rates or lack of state capacity) have changed little or even worsened (HSC
2006, p. 2). One reason for this trend might be the increasing eﬀectiveness of international
conﬂict prevention and peacekeeping eﬀorts. This, however, remains pure speculation
ucdp_actor_dataset/ (visited on 2014-11-02) . The version I am relying on covers all actors who
have been involved in state-based armed conﬂicts (between 1946-2011), in non-state internal armed
conﬂicts (between 1989-2011) or in acts of one-sided violence against civilians (between 1989-2011),
i.e. all actors included in UCDP/PRIO’s “Armed Conﬂict Dataset v.4.2012”, UCDP’s “Dyadic
Conﬂict Dataset v.1.2012”, UCDP’s “Non-State Conﬂict Dataset v.2.4.2012”, UCDP’s “One-sided
Violence Dataset v.1.4.2012” and UCDP’s “Battle-related Deaths Dataset v.5.2012”.
26The number of non-state conﬂicts dropped from 34 in 2002 to 25 in 2005 while there was only little
change in the number of conﬂicts involving a government. Thus, the net eﬀect of 15 percent less armed
conﬂict worldwide and throughout the entire 4 year period seems to be largely driven by a decrease
in the global number of non-state armed conﬂicts. Interestingly, sub-Saharan Africa experienced the
most important decline: between 2002 and 2005 the number of state-based conﬂicts declined by about
60 percent (from 13 to ﬁve) and the number of non-state conﬂicts declined by about 42 percent (from
24 to 14). See HSC (2006, pp. 2, 6 sq., 10).
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as long as information on the outcome (success or failure) and exact target location of
interventions and support eﬀorts is not given. Even if the settlement of armed conﬂicts
can be attributed to more successful international eﬀorts, it remains to be proven whether
peace is durable. Alternative explanations might stress decreasing prices in certain
resources that had been ﬁnancing non-state armed conﬂicts (which would render ﬁghting
less proﬁtable and peace more likely). After all, sub-Saharan Africa was the only region
in the world to see such a clear decline in the number of state-based and non-state armed
conﬂicts within the respective period of time (HSC 2006, p. 2). This illustrates how
global ﬁgures mask regional diﬀerences or even contrary regional trends. Furthermore,
changes in the (relative) intensity of non-state armed conﬂicts might be of greater interest
than changes in their absolute numbers. In order to contrast the intensity of non-
conventional (non-state) armed conﬂicts with the intensity of conventional (state-based)
armed conﬂicts, comparable (dyadic) cases of state-based armed conﬂicts need to be
identiﬁed as well as indicators to measure the intensity of ﬁghting. Such data are also
provided by UCDP and shall now be discussed in more detail.
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14. Data on the Intensity of Internal
Fighting
By now, several data sets exist that are measuring the intensity of internal armed con-
ﬂicts. UCDP’s “Battle Deaths Dataset” certainly is the most comprehensive and widely
used data set in this ﬁeld of research.1 The Human Security Center relied on these
data for its Human Security Brief 2006. This report informs that between 2002 and
2005 the overall worldwide battle-death toll did not increase but declined by as much
as 40 percent. In 2005, there were fewer battle-deaths than in any year since 1946.
Again, sub-Saharan Africa experienced the greatest decline. The estimated state-based
battle-death toll in the region for 2005 was only 2 percent of the highest post-Cold War
battle-death toll measured in 1999. Two regions (Central and South Asia and the Middle
East and North Africa) accounted for over 60 percent of the global toll in battle-deaths
in 2005. This was largely due to the conﬂict in Iraq, which caused almost 20 percent
of the worldwide battle-deaths. Central and South East Asia suﬀered both the great-
est number of state-based conﬂicts and the greatest number of associated battle-deaths.
Still, the death toll from state-based armed conﬂict in this region was at its lowest point
since 1984 (HSC 2006, pp. 2–8). I used v.5-2012b of UCDP’s “Battle Deaths Dataset”
which provides information on the number of military and civilian battle-related deaths
(per conﬂict- and dyad-year) for every state-based armed conﬂict between 1989 and 2011
(Sundberg 2008; Sundberg 2012).2
New data and ideas on how to measure changes in the severity of ﬁghting at the sub-
state level were also presented, e.g. by Restrepo et al. (2006) in their case study on the
Columbian Conﬂict. Others came up with alternative, national-level data. For instance,
Milton Leitenberg (2003) reports death ﬁgures for wars and conﬂicts which happened
between 1945 and 2000. None of these data sets, however, counts the casualties of non-
state armed conﬂicts. In addition, they either exclude armed conﬂicts below the level of
warfare and/or focus on military deaths only.
1See Lacina and N. P. Gleditsch (2005) and Lacina, Russett, et al. (2006) who ﬁrst presented and used
these data for their statistical analyses.
2The most recent update (v.5-2014) covers the 1989-2013 period and is available online at http://www.
pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_battle-related_deaths_dataset/ (visited on 2014-11-
02) .
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The question how to better account for civilian casualties inspired several other data
collection eﬀorts. Again, the most comprehensive and widely used data set which aims to
capture the worldwide extent of intentional deadly violence against civilians is UCDP’s
“One-Sided Violence Dataset”. This data set by now also covers the period from 1989 to
2013 (v.1.4-2014). It counts the number of deadly campaigns as well as the associated
fatalities perpetrated by either the government of a state or by a formally organized group
against civilians per country-year. At least 25 civilians must be killed in the course of a
calender year and by the same violent actor for the event to be included in the data set
(Pettersson 2012b; Sundberg 2009). According to Eck and Hultman (2007), this data set
contributes signiﬁcantly to the present state of quantitative research on violence against
civilians for the following three reasons: ﬁrstly, it provides actual estimates of civilians
killed during one-sided acts of violence, secondly, data are collected annually and, thirdly,
data are provided for both governments and rebel groups. The authors relied on this
data set for their analysis which was published in the Journal of Peace Research. They
found that the post-Cold War era (1989 to 2004) was characterized by periods of fairly
low-scale violence against civilians punctuated by occasional sharp increases. Rebels
were more violent on the whole while governments committed relatively few one-sided
acts of violence against civilians except in those few years which had seen mass killings.
In addition, they identiﬁed a U-shaped correlation between regime type and one-sided
violence indicating that while autocratic governments undertake higher levels of one-
sided violence than other regime types, rebels are more violent in democratic countries.3
Simple descriptive statistics of this data set read as follows: The number of intentional
violent campaigns against civilians increased by more than half (55 percent) between
1989 and 2005. There is a sharp increase in the number of violent campaigns against
civilians in the Middle East and North Africa that began in the new millennium and that
is mostly driven by Iraq and Darfur. Still, sub-Saharan Africa remains the region which
endured the most campaigns of one-sided violence against civilians (143 cases) between
1989 and 2005, committed by ﬁfty-three diﬀerent actors in 19 diﬀerent countries (HSC
2006, p. 13). The most fatalities from acts of one-sided violence against civilians have
also been concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa. This holds true even if the huge death
toll from the 1994 genocide in Rwanda is excluded. However, despite the fact that
more attacks are taking place, the data also show a clear, albeit very uneven, decline in
reported deaths from one-sided violence since the mid-1990s (HSC 2006, pp. 3, 11, 13 sq.).
Again, particularly sub-Saharan Africa has experienced a steep, though uneven, decline
in civilian deaths since the Rwandan genocide. Thus, while the number of campaigns of
one-sided organized violence against civilians recently increased, their average brutality
in terms of fatalities has been decreasing or at least remained constant. Though, without
comparable ﬁgures for the Cold War and pre-Cold War era it remains unclear whether
civilians are indeed less likely victimized after 1989/1990. At least one pattern does
not seem to change much: one-sided acts of violence against civilians remain strongly
associated with armed conﬂict. “The data show that three quarters of the perpetrators
of violent campaigns against civilians were also involved in ongoing state-based armed
3For this interpretation see HSC (2006, p. 14).
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conﬂicts. Civil wars and assaults on civilians are strongly interrelated” (HSC 2006, p. 12).
The puzzle remains why the number of campaigns of intentional low-level violence against
civilians has increased while the number of state-based armed conﬂicts (with which such
campaigns are so often associated) has declined by as much as 40 percent between 2002
to 2005. A compelling explanation is still missing. This study suggests that part of the
answer might lie in the emergence of a new kind of internal armed conﬂict that very
much associates with one-sided acts of violence against civilians but has been overlooked
so far. While data on the number of armed conﬂicts systematically excludes this new
kind of armed conﬂict, data on one-sided acts of violence probably capture some of the
civilian victims of bilateral non-state warfare as well as the civilian victims of acts of
one-sided violence committed during non-state armed conﬂicts.
The above described data certainly help to better picture the scale and quality of
violence applied in internal armed conﬂicts. I nevertheless refrain from using UCDP’s
“One-Sided Violence Dataset” to measure the intensity of armed conﬂicts due to the
following weaknesses: Firstly, UCDP’s deﬁnition of one-sided violence explicitly includes
“incidents considered to be ‘terrorist’ in nature (such as the 11 September attacks on
the World Trade Center)” if they are directed towards civilians (Eck and Hultman 2007,
pp. 235 sq.). Secondly, UCDP’s deﬁnition of one-sided violence against civilians does
not necessarily require such attacks to happen within the context of armed conﬂict.4 In
order to determine and then compare the severity of non-conventional (non-state) armed
conﬂicts with the severity of conventional (state-based) armed conﬂicts, a separation
would be needed between conﬂict-related acts of one-sided violence and acts of one-sided
violence that happened within the same country and year but were not conﬂict-related.
A similar diﬃculty arises if a country experiences multiple but diﬀerent kinds of internal
armed conﬂicts simultaneously. This would require separating acts of one-sided violence
that happened within the context of non-conventional (non-state) armed conﬂicts from
those that were committed during conventional (state-based) warfare. In other words,
the fact that a speciﬁc rebel group committed acts of one-sided violence against civilians
in a certain country and year neither tells us whether this violence occurred within (or
was related to) a situation of warfare (of any kind) nor does it tell us whether these
acts of violence were committed within the context of conventional (state-based) or
non-conventional (non-state) armed conﬂicts. For these reasons, UCDP’s “One-Sided
Violence Dataset” is of limited use for this study.5
4See Eck and Hultman (2007, p. 237). Footnote 12 on the same page lists those countries where one-
sided violence was coded but where there was no armed conﬂict, namely Armenia (1992), Cameroon
(1994), China (1989), Honduras (2004), Morocco (2003), Nigeria (2002-2003), Saudi Arabia (2004),
South Africa (1990, 1992-1995), Tanzania (2001) and Thailand (1992, 2003-2004).
5UCDP has also been criticized for its stringent coding rules that most likely result in under-counting.
For instance, the perpetrators of acts of one-sided violence must be identiﬁed before the deaths of
their civilian victims can be recorded, and UCDP requires the perpetrators to be formally organized
in order to include their acts of one-sided violence in the data set. In addition, “in war zones many
deaths go unreported or unrecorded, often because reporters are physically denied access to the killing
zones, or are intimidated from publishing what they know” (HSC 2006, p. 16). While this point of
critique applies to every data collection eﬀort in zones of conﬂict, the fact that insurgents and militia
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The “Konstanz One-Sided Violence Event Dataset” (KOSVED) seems to overcome
some of these constraints by providing information on the exact locations of acts of
one-sided violence. This new and ambitious project aims to collect geographically dis-
aggregated data on acts of one-sided violence perpetrated by either a rebel organization
or government troops against a group of unarmed noncombatants which result in the
immediate physical harming or death of more than one noncombatant. Unfortunately,
KOSVED only covers acts of one-sided violence that are perpetrated during major in-
ternal armed conﬂicts or internationalized internal conﬂicts as deﬁned by UCDP/PRIO,
i.e. during conventional (state-based) armed conﬂicts. The authors’ initial intention has
been “to construct an event-based dataset which covers at least two dozen recent civil
wars” (Bussmann et al. 2008, p. 8). At the end of 2013, KOSVED only covered 17 cases
of conventional civil warfare Schneider and Bussmann (2013).
In order to capture the severity of internal warfare, the “Genocide/Politicide Dataset”,
as originally compiled by Barbara Harﬀ and now published by the Political Instability
Task Force (PITF), is also worth considering. This data set covers trends in genocides
and politicides deﬁned as sustained campaigns of political mass murder directed pri-
marily against civilians and intended to exterminate in whole or in part a communal or
political group. Politicide refers to situations where civilians are targeted because of their
political convictions rather than their ethnicity and religion as in the case of genocides.6
The tactics that are used to achieve genocides and politicides (massacres, unrestrained
bombing and shelling of civilian inhabited areas, starvation by prolonged interdiction
of food supplies, forced expulsion or ethnic cleansing accompanied by extreme privation
and killings7) very much resemble Kaldor’s description of the violent strategies and tac-
tics applied in New Warfare. The authors of the data set also emphasize that genocides
and politicides are distinct from state repression and terror. In the latter cases, only a
few members of a group are attacked in order to terrorize the majority of the group into
passivity or acquiescence while in the case of genocide and politicide “enough ([but]not
necessarily all)” members of a group are perpetually targeted in order to physically ex-
terminate that group so that it can no longer pose any conceivable threat to the rule
or interests of the perpetrators (Marshall, Gurr, et al. 2013, p. 15). Several parts of this
deﬁnition, however, are diﬃcult to operationalize. How sustained are these policies of
physical extermination of a certain group supposed to be in order to qualify as geno-
cide or politicide? What is a substantial portion of a communal group that needs to be
targeted? The authors of the data set note that “[t]he physical destruction of a people
ﬁghters rarely wear uniforms (which renders the task of distinguishing civilian from combatant bodies
almost impossible) might be a source of bias especially in the context of New Warfare.
6“Genocide and politicide events involve the promotion, execution, and/or implied consent of sustained
policies by governing elites or their agents or in the case of civil war, either of the contending
authorities that result in the deaths of a substantial portion of a communal group or politicized non
communal group. [. . . ] In genocides the victimized groups are deﬁned primarily in terms of their
communal (ethnolinguistic, religious) characteristics. In politicides, by contrast, groups are deﬁned
primarily in terms of their political opposition to the regime and dominant groups” (Marshall, Gurr,
et al. 2013, pp. 14,15).
7Marshall, Gurr, et al. (2013, p. 15).
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requires time to accomplish: it implies a persistent, coherent pattern of action. Thus,
only sustained episodes that last six months or more are included in the ﬁnal data set”.
Still, they admit that this six month requirement is “to a degree arbitrary” (Marshall,
Gurr, et al. 2013, pp. 10, 15). In addition, the “Genocide/Politicide Dataset” has been
criticized for including at least some non-violent civilian deaths from war-exacerbated
diseases and malnutrition in its genocide death counts (HSC 2006, pp. 14, 17). Finally,
genocides and politicides are again often conﬂict-related but also happen outside of war-
fare. Separating conﬂict-related acts of genocide/politicide from those that were not
conﬂict-related again comes with the above mentioned practical diﬃculties. Still, the
HSC (2006, p. 14) believes the “Genocide/Politicide-Dataset” to mirror the recent de-
cline of high-intensity civil conﬂicts because most genocides and politicides take place in
the context of heavy internal warfare and because the number of genocides was declining
sharply from 1989 onward. Up to 2005, their number had dropped by 90 percent when
only one genocide (in Sudan/Darfur) was taking place (HSC 2006, p. 2).
Besides the UCDP data and the “Genocide/Politicide Dataset”, the Human Security
Brief 2006 relies on the “Terrorism Knowledge Base” to measure the intentional killing
of civilians and therefore the changing nature of internal warfare. This online portal,
which was compiled at the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT),
contained information on thousands of domestic and international terrorist incidents,
leaders, groups and related court cases but ceased its operations in March 2008. However,
it shall nevertheless be mentioned because New Wars are often conﬂated with (new forms
of) terrorism.8 The data set’s proﬁles of terrorist organizations are now hosted by the
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at
the University of Maryland which itself maintains the “Global Terrorism Database”. This
open-source data base includes information on more than 125,000 cases of domestic and
international terrorist attacks around the world from 1970 to 2013. The data set provides
information on the dates and locations of the incidents, the weapons used and the nature
of the targets, the numbers of casualties and the groups or individuals responsible. These
and other terrorism data sets count many of the same events as the previously mentioned
one-sided violence data sets but exclude the killing of civilians by governments. However,
in order to measure the intensity of armed conﬂicts (i.e. battle-related violence) they are
inappropriate as well. The fundamental diﬀerences between one-sided acts of violence
(like terrorism, genocide or politicide) and bilateral acts of warfare have been laid-out in
chapter 8. Others noted that the available terrorism data sets are “likely to undercount
civilian deaths perpetrated by rebel groups in rural insurgencies” (HSC 2006, p. 16).
8The “Terrorism Knowledge Base” coded and collated data that was provided by the RAND Cor-
poration. The data set contained two separate terrorist incident databases, the RAND “Terrorism
Chronology” (1968 to 1997) and the RAND-MIPT “Terrorism Incident Database” (1998 to 2008).
While the former tracked acts of international terrorism, the latter included both domestic and in-
ternational attacks. The “Terrorism Knowledge Base” contained historical information on terrorism
dating back to 1968, with over 29,000 incident proﬁles, 900 group proﬁles and 1,200 leader biographies.
See Houghton (2008) and http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/ (visited on
2013-02-21) .
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The Human Security Brief 2006 still refers to these data to once more support the claim
of a declining risk of death in battle. The report argues that from 1968 to 1991, MIPT’s
trend data reveal a fourfold increase in international terrorist incidents, followed by an
almost fourfold decline and a renewed increase starting in 2001. In 2005 there were three
times as many terrorist incidents as in 2002 causing ﬁve times as many fatalities (HSC
2006, p. 2). However, this increase was primarily driven by incidents in only two regions
(the Middle East and South Asia) and one country (Iraq). When terrorist incidents
in these regions are deleted from the global data, it becomes apparent that the decline
in the number of international terrorist incidents in the rest of the world that started
in 1991 has continued (HSC 2006, p. 16). In addition and compared with civil conﬂict,
international terrorism has, on average, killed relatively few people over the past four
decades (HSC 2006, p. 16). The report concludes that these developments contradict
those who link today’s warfare with increasing (international) terrorism. Nevertheless,
it is important to keep in mind that the global, overall death toll from terrorism has
been rising over the years (although it remained low in comparison to the number of
deaths caused by armed conﬂicts). Today, there are fewer but increasingly lethal terrorist
incidents.
Certainly, more indirect measures to capture the degree of civilian victimization in in-
ternal warfare would also be desirable. For instance, the number of war-related refugees
or internally displaced persons (IDPs) could be taken into account. However, orga-
nizations collecting respective data (most importantly the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) and the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) of the
Norwegian Refugee Council) only gather annual data on those forced migrants who are
falling under their mandate. Geographically disaggregated information is missing all
together. Where available, UNHCR’s annual report mentions the names of major lo-
cations (cities or provinces) where populations of concern to the agency resided at the
end of the respective year.9 Such detailed information on the major locations of origin
(which could then be matched with the incidence of armed conﬂicts in these areas) are
not provided.10 In addition, UNHCR’s data on IDPs only cover a fraction of the entire
IDP population (UNHCR 2010, p. 23). Because UNHCR does not have a mandate to
protect or assist all IDPs, the number of IDPs and people in IDP-like situations who
directly or indirectly received protection and assistance from UNHCR (and who were
counted by the organization) stood at only 15.6 million out of an estimated total of 27
million IDPs at the end of 2009. UNHCR was helping these IDPs mainly through the
so-called “Cluster Approach”. Within this approach, UNHCR took over the lead role in
the protection of conﬂict-induced IDPs in situations meeting the UN criteria for “com-
9See e.g. UNHCR (2010, table 15, Annex).
10Similar aggregated data on the number of refugees hosted by/originating in a certain country and year
is also provided by the “Forcibly Displaced Populations Dataset” compiled by Monty G. Marshall at
the Center for Systemic Peace (online at http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html (visited
on 2014-11-02) . This data set is based on the World Refugee Survey (Annual Series) of the United
States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI) and, in its latest version, covers the period
from 1964 to 2008.
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plex humanitarian emergencies” only.11 Non-emergency situations with nevertheless
signiﬁcant numbers of conﬂict-induced IDPs and protracted displacement crises remain
beyond its scope.12 Data provided by the IDMC at least cover all conﬂict-induced IDPs.
However, this institution has been collecting data on internal displacement situations
caused by armed conﬂict or generalized violence since 1998 only. It’s IDP database fea-
tures “some 50 countries”.13 So far, reliable indicators on conﬂict-induced refugees and
IDPs on a conﬂict level and by type of warfare are not collected (Benz and Hasenclever
2010). Likewise, eﬀorts to count those dying in the aftermath of armed conﬂicts due to
conﬂict-related injuries or war-exacerbated diseases are in their ﬂedgling stages.14
This also holds for more innovative ideas on how to capture the extent of violence
against civilians in internal warfare, e.g. as proposed by Lidow (2010). He uses satellite
images of crop land from various stages of Liberia’s civil war in order to analyze the
spatial variation in civilian abuse within territories controlled by three of Liberia’s rebel
groups. Lidow argues that these satellite imagery “can shed light on the situation on
the ground. Crop land is a suitable proxy for civilian abuse because the incentive to
clear crop land depends on the security of the surrounding area: a farmer will not spend
the energy to clear land if he expects his crops to be looted upon harvest or if he might
be killed or displaced in the meantime” (Lidow 2010, p. 19). Where signs of crop land
use cannot be detected, the author assumes a higher level of civilian abuse (which he by
the way also attributes to the failure of rebel group leaders to exert control over their
commanders due to group-level characteristics). Although the approach of this study is
promising, the kind of data used is neither publicly available nor manageable for research
that reaches beyond a single or a few cases.15
Due to these data constraints and the above mentioned objections against existing
data sets, the following analysis is left with no choice but to rely on the number of
battle-related (civilian and military) deaths as the best available indicator to measure
the intensity of bilateral state-based and non-state internal armed conﬂicts. I stick to
UCDP’s “Non-State Conﬂict Dataset”, which provides information on the number of
battle-deaths in non-state armed conﬂicts at least for the post Cold War era.
11For a deﬁnition of this term see IDMC (2009, p. 31, fn 29).
12IDMC expects the Cluster Approach to be applied to a maximum of around 20 countries considered
by the UN as conﬂict-related humanitarian emergencies (IDMC 2008, p. 20).
13The Global Overview 2014 report of the IDMC just covers 58 countries (IDMC 2014, p. 6).
14See Ghobarah et al. (2003), Iqbal and Zorn (2010) or Plümper and Neumayer (2006) for quantitative
analyses. An early overview of the theoretical relationship and empirical studies is provided by
Murray et al. (2002) and D. Davis and Kuritsky (2002).
15Lidow (2010) complains about the lack of reliable micro-level data which hinders continued progress in
this ﬁeld of analysis. See also Kalyvas who notes that “[m]ost available indicators of political violence
tend to be unreliable and inconsistent across nations and over time; and, the available data are overly
aggregate”. He complains about the fact that “[d]ata on the exact circumstances surrounding the
violence (who, where, when, how, by whom) is usually missing” although “research that proceeds in
a disaggregated manner – in terms of the data it uses as well as theory building” – is mostly needed
(Kalyvas 2006, pp. 48–51).
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Because of the varying certainty of fatality reports, low, best and high estimates of
battle-related deaths are given for each year. The authors of the data set emphasize
that due to their coding procedure it is possible that there are more fatalities than their
high estimate, but it is very unlikely that there is fewer than their best estimate (Kreutz
and Eck 2005, p. 4). UCDP’s best estimates can therefore be considered conservative.
Luckily, compatible data on the intensity of state-based armed conﬂicts are provided
through the dyadic version of UCDP’s “Battle Deaths Dataset”.
Earlier versions of both data sets were ﬁrst compared by the Human Security Project.
This comparison revealed that non-state conﬂicts have been much less deadly than state-
based armed conﬂicts causing only a quarter as many battle-deaths between 2002 and
2005. The average death toll in 2005 for each non-state conﬂict was just 82 (compared to
388 for state-based conﬂicts) (HSC 2006, p. 9). As over half of all non-state conﬂicts in
this period took place in sub-Saharan Africa, the region also accounted for the majority of
deaths from this type of conﬂict. It has already been mentioned that the number of non-
state conﬂicts declined by as much as 42 percent between 2002 and 2005. Surprisingly,
however, there was an even more dramatic 80 percent decline in the death toll from
non-state armed conﬂict in the region within the same period of time. Although the
number of non-state conﬂicts remained almost constant in Central and South Asia, this
region experienced an even greater decline with the corresponding death toll dropping
some 88 percent. This, however, might be related to the fact that the Sudan/Darfur is
included in the Middle East and North Africa region instead of the sub-Saharan African
region (HSC 2006, p. 9). Overall, the Human Security Brief 2006 informs that “there
was a 71 percent [worldwide] decline in the number of reported and codable deaths from
non-state conﬂict between 2002 and 2005”. However, these ﬁgures should be treated
with caution “given the challenges in counting and coding battle deaths, particularly in
Iraq” (HSC 2006, p. 10) and given the rather short period of time covered by this study.
In addition to the UCDP data and as already mentioned, I wish to again rely on the
“Consolidated List of Wars” to measure the intensity of internal warfare. At least for the
post-Cold War era, this data set provides the overall numbers of fatalities for state-based
as well as non-state internal wars.
Overall, the following analysis is taking its information on the number and nature of
actors and the intensity of state-based and non-state internal armed conﬂicts from the
“New/Consolidated List of Wars”, UCDP’s “Non-State Conﬂict Dataset” and UCDP’s
data sets on state-based armed conﬂicts compatible therewith. Both, UCDP’s “Non-
State Conﬂict Dataset” and the “New/Consolidated List of Wars” also contain informa-
tion on the duration of ﬁghting which shall now be discussed.
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Fighting
The “New/Consolidated List of Wars” and UCDP’s data sets on non-state and state-
based armed conﬂicts provide more or less precise information on the start and end dates
of ﬁghting. According to the “New List of Wars” the start of any internal war (whether
sub-state or state-based) is the ﬁrst year in which at least 100 military or civilian battle-
related deaths occurred. Accordingly, a war is rated as having ended only if the intensity
of warfare has remained below this threshold of violence for a certain period of time (for
at least two years), if actors give up ﬁghting or if an eﬀective peace agreement is signed.
A new war start is coded if a main party to the conﬂict drops out or a regime collapses
but the ﬁghting continues. The data set reports multiple ongoing wars if ﬁghting occurs
in distinct regions and between diﬀerent rebel groups (Chojnacki and Reisch 2008, p. 4).
While the information provided by the “New List of Wars” and its consolidated version
can only be used to count the duration of internal warfare in years, UCDP’s “Non-State
Conﬂict Dataset” (v.2.4-2012) is more ambitious in measuring the exact duration of
active ﬁghting. In addition to the year of observation of any dyadic non-state armed
conﬂict, this data set provides a precise start date (a year, month and day) which corre-
sponds to the ﬁrst time when the dyadic conﬂict reached 25 battle-related deaths in one
calendar year. This original start date remains the same for all years in which the conﬂict
has been active (regardless of whether the conﬂict has been active in several episodes
or not). Even the level of certainty for this date is reported. In the following, every
conﬂict might experience episodes of inactivity.1 If this is the case for at least one year,
a “conﬂict-episode” is ending and the last date of recorded combat is reported – again
as precisely as possible (Sundberg 2010, pp. 5 sq.). The same holds for any subsequent
instance when violence re-erupts.2 Thus, every dyadic non-state armed conﬂict might
split into several conﬂict episodes for which precise start and end dates are reported.
Communal conﬂict in Nigeria between Christians and Muslims serves as an example.
Within UCDP’s “Non-State Conﬂict Dataset”, this dyadic conﬂict (which holds the ID
number 373) was observed in 1991, 1992, 2000, 2006 and 2011. The ﬁrst conﬂict-episode
between these two groups took place between the 22nd of April, 1991 and the 13th of
March, 1992 (causing 158 battle deaths in 1991 and 200 in 1992). The conﬂict cooled
1Non-activity means that the criteria with regard to incompatibility, level of organization and 25 battle-
related deaths are not met.
2See the “StartDate2” variable in the data set.
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down but intensiﬁed again in the year 2000. On one single day (the 24th of May) 53
people died on the battle ﬁeld. Later, between the 20th and the 24th of February 2006,
UCDP reports a third conﬂict-episode between this dyad which resulted in the killing
of 149 people. The last conﬂict-episode started on the 17th of April, 2011 (and was
reported ongoing as of December 30th, 2011 when the data set had been compiled).
Since then another 830 people had died. This example illustrates that the data provided
by UCDP’s “Non-State Conﬂict Dataset” can be used to calculate the duration of every
non-state conﬂict-episode in months or even days (given precise start and end dates are
available). Because the year of observation of armed conﬂict is provided, this data set
can also be used to simply count the number of calendar years in which a non-state con-
ﬂict was active (i.e. when it caused at least 25 battle-related deaths per year) regardless
of whether ﬁghting took place every day of the year or just happened during a few and
not necessarily consecutive days.
For the purpose of comparison, compatible information on the precise start and end
dates of state-based conﬂict episodes is needed. Up to the year 2009, this information can
be taken from UCDP’s “Conﬂict Termination Dataset” (v.2010-1, 1946-2009) which is
available at the dyad level.3 Again, violence might have stopped because a peace treaty
or diﬀerent kinds of cease-ﬁre agreements were signed, because one side is defeated,
eliminated or otherwise succumbs to the power of the other, because conﬂict activity
continues but does not reach the required threshold with regard to fatalities, because
the conﬂict does not fulﬁll the UCDP criteria anymore with regard to organization or
because one dyad ceases to exist as an independent organization, e.g. in order to form
a new, joint organization (Kreutz 2010).
At ﬁrst sight, the above data on the duration of internal armed conﬂict rather contra-
dict the concept of New Wars. An early empirical analysis by Chojnacki (2006a) uses
the ﬁrst version of his “New List of Wars”4 which identiﬁed a total of 164 wars between
1946 and 2002. During this period, only 23 inter-state wars with a very short average
duration of 2 years and 17 extra-state wars with an average duration of 8.5 years took
place. The remaining two-thirds of all wars were internal in nature. Within this period,
3See Kreutz (2010). In order to analyse the precise duration of armed conﬂict, this data set is superior
to the dyadic version of UCDP/PRIO’s “Armed Conﬂict Dataset” which would also be available up to
the year 2011 but fails to provide precise end dates of state-based conﬂict episodes (see Themnér and
Wallensteen (2014) for the latest presentation of the data, N. P. Gleditsch et al. (2002) for the original
version and Harbom et al. (2008) for the dyadic version. UCDP’s “Georeferenced Event Dataset”
is neither a viable alternative. It mentions the start and end dates for all its events of organized
violence (state-based armed conﬂicts, non-state armed conﬂicts and acts of one-sided violence) but
only covers African countries within the post-Cold War era. Please also note that the dyadic versions
of UCDP’s “Conﬂict Termination Dataset” (v.2010-1) and UCDP/PRIO’s “Armed Conﬂict Dataset”
(v.4-2012) do not seem to be fully compatible – not even in those years (1989-2009) where both data
sets overlap. The numbering of some dyads varies (see e.g. dyad ID 42, 110, 112 or 338) and in
some cases the names of actors diﬀer (see e.g. dyad ID 307, 793, 128, 770 or 771). Due to these
inconsistencies I will later stick either to the one or the other data set when switching between levels
of analysis.
4See Chojnacki (2005).
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the average duration of a non-conventional (sub-state) war was 6.6 years. Whether that
is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent in a statistical sense from the slightly higher average duration of
conventional (state-based) internal warfare remains to be tested.5 UCDP’s “Non-State
Conﬂict Dataset” does not seem to support the claim, either, that non-conventional
(non-state) armed conﬂicts are of a particularly long duration. At least the Human
Security Report 2006 informs that only about a quarter of the 25 non-state armed con-
ﬂicts in 2005 had already been active the year before. An exception among the more
recent armed conﬂicts is the one between FARC and AUC forces in Columbia which had
already been ongoing for some years (HSC 2006, pp. 4, 9).
5The data set’s coding rules for a war start and ongoing warfare diﬀer between inter- and intra-state
warfare. Inter-state wars need to result in at least 100 military deaths in order to be coded as started
and ongoing while internal warfare needs to result in at least 100 military or civilian deaths. This
renders a comparison of the average duration of inter- and intra-state warfare problematic. However,
the coding criteria for diﬀerent kinds of internal warfare concur which enables a comparison of the
average duration of non-state internal warfare with the average duration of state-based internal
warfare.
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16. Data on Conﬂict Resources
In order to explore the hypothesis of an “economization of motives”, the role of conﬂict
resources in internal warfare needs to be measured. Gilmore et al. (2005) deﬁne conﬂict
resources as those materials that are of high economic value, that are of strategic impor-
tance and that are mentioned in the conﬂict literature. In addition, conﬂict resources
must be lootable, which means they need to be of high value-to-weight ratio, they need
to be easy to transport and they must not require skilled labor and sophisticated equip-
ment to be exploited. Apart from diamonds, the authors identify gold, other gemstones,
chromites, tantalites (coltan: tantalum and columbium), oil, oil pipelines, natural gas,
timber and drugs as conﬂict relevant resources (Gilmore et al. 2005, pp. 259 sq.). Due
to a lack of systematic data on many of these resources, I exemplarily rely on a data set
which measures the occurrence and production of diamonds.1 Later, I will supplement
data on other gemstones, hydrocarbon deposits and drugs.
PRIO’s “Diamond Dataset (DIADATA)” delivers geographically disaggregated data on
1.175 diamond deposits in 53 countries that have been reported between 1946 and 2005
(Gilmore et al. 2005, p. 264). Because DIADATA focuses on this single resource, it avoids
a lumping together of diﬀerent kinds of conﬂict resources. Furthermore, DIADATA dis-
tinguishes between the mere occurrence and the actual production or exploitation of
diamonds. Decisive dates (the discovery year and the ﬁrst year of production) and the
mining status are also provided. Most importantly, however, DIADATA distinguishes
between non-lootable diamonds (primary diamonds mined through kimberlite shafts or
oﬀshore sites) and lootable diamonds (mostly secondary diamonds from alluvial deposits
or beach sites).2 This diﬀerentiation is especially important for conﬂict research because
the production of lootable, secondary diamonds is less capital- and technology-intensive
than the production of non-lootable, primary deposits. Secondary diamonds are scat-
tered over alluvial plains and can be extracted by small teams of artisanal miners. For
the same reason, they are also easily and cheaply looted by rebels, child soldiers or small
1Chojnacki, Metternich, and Münster (2009, p. 11) also focus on diamonds (and oil). They justify
this choice by referring to empirical evidence derived from case studies showing that these resources
have been used to ﬁnance rebel organizations and to remunerate mercenaries. In addition, there is
suﬃcient variation in the occurrence of these resources to get decent estimates of their impact. Both
resources do not only occur in a few countries, they have been available throughout the entire time
period under study and good data are available.
2In the following, the term “lootable diamonds” is used interchangeably with the term “secondary
diamonds” and the term “non-lootable diamonds” is used interchangeably with the term “primary
diamonds”.
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groups of forced laborers during wartime and therefore more likely to promote conﬂict
(Gilmore et al. 2005, pp. 262 sq.). Of the 1.175 diamond deposits reported in the data
set, 247 are categorized as non-lootable and 844 as lootable diamond deposits. Due to
insuﬃcient information 84 records were classiﬁed as Errata.3
In 2005, Lujala et al. published a ﬁrst statistical analysis using DIADATA. This
study explores whether the outbreak and duration of conventional (state-based) inter-
nal armed conﬂicts correlates with the occurrence and production of diamonds. The
authors argue (and ﬁnd support) for oppositional eﬀects of non-lootable and lootable
diamonds especially on the duration of internal conﬂicts. In addition, they run their
model separately for ethnic wars, and they study whether the impact of diamonds has
increased after the end of the Cold War. Results concerning the incidence or duration
of civil wars suggest that even though ethnicity and secondary diamond production do
not increase the risk of conﬂict onset, they form a dangerous mix that prolongs conﬂicts.
In a country where secondary diamond production and ethnic heterogeneity are present,
this may provide both the ﬁnancial means for ﬁghting and an ethnic pool from which
the rebel organization can draw new recruits. The authors argue that the latter assures
a better cohesion of rebel groups while the presence of lootable, secondary diamonds
and the promise of rents further strengthens group identities (Lujala, N. P. Gleditsch,
et al. 2005, p. 552). When replicating their analysis for ethnic conﬂicts only, the authors
again ﬁnd that the production of lootable diamonds signiﬁcantly increases the duration
of ethnic warfare while the production of non-lootable diamonds has a decreasing eﬀect
(Lujala, N. P. Gleditsch, et al. 2005, p. 556). Thus, the real eﬀects of the two geological
forms of diamonds pull into opposite directions. The authors explain this opposite ef-
fect as follows: Non-lootable, primary or “kimberlite diamonds” occur in underground
rock formations and are often mined by large (multinational) companies that are able
to bear the investment costs and risk involved in underground mining. In terms of their
geographical distribution, primary diamonds are point resources. Their concentration
makes it easy for the government to control the site. The revenue ﬂow is therefore likely
to support the (often corrupt and repressive) regime which uses the revenues from these
resources to better defend itself and to crush possible uprisings. This actually decreases
the risk for rebellion. Even if the prospects of primary diamonds might motivate the
rebels to start a rebellion, they have to overthrow the government to exploit the dia-
mond riches. An enduring conﬂict would be an obstacle to the rebels: the longer the
conﬂict, the longer they would have to wait to get the diamonds under their control.
The government, on the other hand, depends on providing a secure environment to the
foreign diamond companies to ensure their presence in the country and to tax them.
3Four subsets of the original “Diamond Dataset” are available and used in the following analysis: a
subset which comprises non-lootable diamond sites (primary and oﬀshore sites) (DIANL), a sub-
set which contains non-lootable diamond sites with known production (DIANLyp), a subset which
comprises lootable diamond sites (mostly secondary and beach sites) (DIAL) and a subset which
comprises lootable diamond sites with known production (DIALyp). The empirical analysis also
includes Errata cases if all information that is needed for this study is available on the respective
records.
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This gives an incentive to the government to squash possible rebel movements fast and
eﬀectively. Therefore, rebels have an incentive to overthrow the government as quickly
as possible, while the government has an incentive to quickly pacify the country to avoid
scaring away foreign investors (Lujala, N. P. Gleditsch, et al. 2005, p. 544). Thus, the
expected duration of any civil war in the context of primary diamond production is
rather short. Contrary to this, secondary diamonds are easy to loot by the rebels. Their
presence strengthens the opportunity element especially in a conﬂict motivated by ethnic
grievances or in a context of poverty. In countries with low per capita income, rebel
groups may use revenues from secondary diamond mining to hire or attract potential
rebel soldiers that have very low opportunity costs to join the rebel movement (Lujala,
N. P. Gleditsch, et al. 2005, p. 545). Thus, the outbreak of violence becomes more likely.
As revenue ﬂows from lootable diamond production are more likely to go to the rebels,
the already mentioned war-logic applies which positively correlates with the expected
duration of ﬁghting. In summary, the geological form of the diamond deposits matters a
great deal when explaining the duration of ﬁghting. In addition, Lujala, N. P. Gleditsch,
et al. (2005) ﬁnd that the lengthening eﬀect of secondary diamond production on the
duration of civil warfare is dependent on the income level of the country and decreases
the more economically developed the country is (Lujala, N. P. Gleditsch, et al. 2005,
p. 556). Finally, the eﬀect of secondary diamond production on the duration of warfare
is especially strong for a certain sub-type of internal armed conﬂict (ethnic civil wars)
taking place within the post-1985 period.
These interaction eﬀects and ﬁndings lend some support to the New Wars theses.
However, this and similar studies only take conventional (state-based) internal armed
conﬂicts into account. Whether these results can be upheld if new (non-state or sub-
state) armed conﬂicts are included in the analyses remains to be tested. In addition,
the conﬂict data set used by Lujala, N. P. Gleditsch, et al. (2005) excludes internal
armed conﬂicts with less than 1,000 combat deaths and instead focuses on civil warfare
only. Finally, the authors do not fully take advantage of the disaggregated nature of
DIADATA. Instead of using the spatial and temporal information provided by this data
set, they measure diamond production at the country level. Only the recent analyses by
Lujala control for the spatial and temporal overlap of resources and conﬂict (Lujala 2009;
Lujala 2010). The author also adds newly collected location data on other gemstones
(e.g. rubies, sapphires and jade) and on hydrocarbon localities. The results of these
studies conﬁrm that secondary diamond production and other gemstones are related to
the duration and the severity of conventional (state-based) armed conﬂicts. In addition,
these studies point to the importance of disaggregating resource data – geographically,
temporally and in terms of their geological form.4
4Lujala (2010) ﬁnds that the location of resources is crucial to their impact on conﬂict duration. If
the resources are located inside the actual conﬂict zone, the duration of warfare is doubled (while
the resources are seemingly unrelated to the duration if their occurrence/production is measured at
the country level). Again, the author ﬁnds that secondary diamond production increases the risk of
conﬂict onset by more than 40 percent. The eﬀect of secondary diamonds (measured at the country
level) on conﬂict onset is especially salient for low-intensity conﬂicts. This result contrasts with other
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The Diamond Dataset itself also has some limitations. For instance, information on
the size of the mines or deposits is lacking. Likewise, no information is provided on the
diamond quality and therefore on the value of the deposits which varies by a factor of
more than eight, ranging from the industrial diamonds of Ghana (sold for 25 US dollars a
carat in 2001) to the high quality gemstones of Namibia (sold for a prize of 215 US dollars
in the same year) (Ross 2006, p. 277). In addition, only the ﬁrst years of production are
reported regardless of whether production has been continuous or intermittent since that
time. Production end dates are missing. This might be problematic as closures of mining
sites might be due to a declining market value of the diamonds, to the depletion of the
reserve but also to armed conﬂict. This renders the production end dates endogenous
to the dependent variable in conﬂict research. Generally, listings of mining activities
are poor for less developed, conﬂict-ridden countries, for rebel held areas and for remote
rural areas. Illegal diamond production and smuggling are also not covered. Finally,
falsiﬁcation of records is prevalent in many countries. This is indicated by the fact
that several countries with insigniﬁcant diamond deposits (e.g. Congo-Brazzaville) have
been exporting substantial quantities of diamonds that came from war-torn neighbors
(the DRC). Governments may also misrepresent the potential of a diamond deposit
(e.g. in order to attract foreign investment). Some countries simply do not widely
release information on their mineral production. Finally, the authors of the data set
complain that language barriers are hindering their data collection eﬀorts (Gilmore et al.
2005, pp. 265 sq.). Despite these limitations, however, DIADATA delivers disaggregated
resource data. This data set allows for studying whether (and if yes, which type of)
diamond deposits occur and are produced in war-torn countries in general and in New
Wars countries in particular.
Three additional and already mentioned data sets could be used to complement the
above presented diamond data.5 Firstly, the “Gemstone Site Dataset”(GEMDATA) de-
livers information on gemstone deposits throughout the world. The data set includes
1022 gemstone sites in 61 countries of the following kinds: ruby, sapphire, emerald,
aquamarine, heliodor, moganite, goshenite, nephrite, jadeite, lapis lazuli, opal, tourma-
line, periodit, topaz, pearl, garnet, zircon, spinel, amber and quartz. Again, deposits
are accompanied by latitude and longitude coordinates, information on the type of gem-
quantitative studies which failed to distinguish between primary and secondary diamonds and for
this reason did not ﬁnd such a link. Lujala (2009) ﬁnds that the availability of natural resources also
aﬀects the total number of combat-related deaths and the average combat death rate (the intensity)
of internal armed conﬂicts. Again, the location of the resources as well as the type of resources are
crucial. Drug cultivation (coca bush, opium poppy and cannabis) inside the conﬂict area associates
with less severe conﬂicts while gemstone mining more than doubles the total number of combat
deaths (which is explained by the longer duration of these conﬂicts) but does not necessarily relate to
more intensive conﬂicts as measured by the average combat death rate. Most violent are secessionist
conﬂicts in regions with hydrocarbon production. Interestingly, oil and gas production that is located
oﬀshore or outside the conﬂict zones is related to less severe conﬂicts. Measured at the country level,
none of the resource variables has an eﬀect on conﬂict severity.
5All three data sets are available online at http://www.svt.ntnu.no/iso/Paivi.Lujala/home/
DataProjects.htm (visited on 2014-11-02) .
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stone found, the discovery year and the ﬁrst year of production.6 Unfortunately, this
data set only reﬂects information that was available in 2004 when the data set was
originally compiled. In addition, there is some bias in the number of localities recorded
because the quality of reporting varies between countries and regions7 and end dates
of production are again not reported. Still, including information on gemstones other
than diamonds adds value to this study. If they occur inside conﬂict zones, gemstones
are easy prey for all kinds of violent actors because they are simple to loot. “[M]any of
the deposits can be mined [. . . ] with the help of a pick, spade, shovel and basket. Gem
gravels are exposed either by removing the topsoil or, if located more than a couple of
metres deep, by digging shallow shafts (up to 10 metres or more) to access gems. Gems
are also located in existing riverbeds. Naturally, more sophisticated methods can be and
are used, but most deposits can be mined with more primitive methods as well” (Lujala
2010, p. 19, fn 7). Exploiting gemstones requires little technology and skills. Thus, “[i]n
gemstone mining, there are usually very few impediments to production starting” also
during times of conﬂict (Lujala 2009, p. 65). Because gemstone sites are scattered, they
are diﬃcult to control (and to tax) for governments even during peacetime. For this
reason and at least in comparison with oil ﬁelds and pipelines, state actors are expected
to show little interest in pacifying or defending these production areas “because part
or most of the revenue ﬂows would not accrue to [them] anyway” (Lujala 2009, p. 54).
This renders the exploitation of secondary diamonds and other gemstones especially at-
tractive to non-state forces involved in conventional (state-based) and non-conventional
(non-state) armed conﬂicts.
Drugs have been mentioned as another conﬂict-relevant resource on which some sys-
tematic data are available through the “Drug Cultivation Dataset” (DRUGDATA). This
data set contains information on coca bush, opium poppy and cannabis cultivation
throughout the world. Besides the locations or cultivation areas, the data set lists the
approximate year when large-scale commercial/export-oriented production in the region
started as well as the approximate year when signiﬁcant cultivation ended. The latter
information is indispensable in order to measure whether drug cultivation had been on-
going during armed conﬂict. Only if production end dates are available it can be ruled
out that production had already ended before armed conﬂict started.8 In addition, the
“Drug Cultivation Dataset” informs whether there has been traditional production for
local use prior to intensive export-oriented cultivation.9 Again, however, the “Drug Cul-
tivation Dataset” has not been updated since 2002. Because drugs classify as conﬂict
resources, they of course share certain characteristics with diamonds and other gem-
6For more information on the data set see Lujala (2009).
7For instance, the larger the gemstone producer, the more information is available due to better docu-
mentation by commercial actors (Flöter et al. 2005, p. 11).
8For all the other resources covered by this analysis, production end dates are not available. For this
reason, these data only allow to ﬁgure out whether the production of these resources had been ongoing
prior to or during armed conﬂict). In other words, at least the case can be ruled out that production
only started after armed conﬂict had already ended.
9For more information on this data set see Buhaug and Lujala (2005).
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stones. For instance, drug cultivation and gemstone mining both require low capital
investments and yield high value-to-weight products that can be stored and that are
easy to transport and smuggle even in a context where streets have not been developed
or are destroyed due to warfare. However, drugs and gemstones also diﬀer in some im-
portant regard which aﬀect their impact on armed conﬂict. Unlike gemstone production,
drug cultivation is extremely labor intensive and requires some skill. In addition, drug
cultivation is very dependent on the time of the year when the plants can be harvested.
Any interruption of the rather short harvesting seasons leads to a massive decline in
revenues. Therefore, drug cultivation needs a more stable environment than gemstone
mining and a tighter collaboration with the local population. This leads to the expec-
tation that drug cultivation rather relates to low-intensity internal armed conﬂicts. In
addition and unlike gemstone mining, drug cultivation is always strictly illegal. Like
any illicit activity, it very much proﬁts from the lawless environment created by conﬂict
and entirely remains beyond a state’s taxation control. Drug cultivation is also diﬃcult
to control for the government because it can relocate easily, because many areas are
suitable for production and because it covers large areas (Lujala 2009, pp. 54 sq.; Lujala
2002). This renders drug cultivation as a source of income during warfare especially at-
tractive for non-state actors involved in low-intensity non-conventional internal armed
conﬂicts and operating in a context of state failure with little interest in challenging the
state.
Finally, global data on crude oil and natural gas reserves are made available through
the “Petroleum Dataset” (PETRODATA), which covers the period from 1946 to 2003
(v.1.2.). The data set contains information on the discovery years, the ﬁrst years of
production and the exact locations of 890 onshore and 383 oﬀshore areas in 114 coun-
tries. Oil and gas are actually produced in 92 of these countries. Again, the data set has
some known shortcomings that are discussed in more detail by Lujala, Rød, et al. (2007,
pp. 248 sq.). For instance, it does not provide estimates for reserve sizes and production
volumes because this information is either lacking or inaccurate for a number of ﬁelds.
Once more, end dates of production are not reported and the allocation of oﬀshore ﬁelds
to a speciﬁc country was also sometimes diﬃcult, e.g. in cases where sea boundaries
are contested or where ﬁelds are operated jointly by several states. In terms of theory,
the point-source character of hydrocarbon deposits matters. It increases the state’s ca-
pacity to control and tax production which explains the special value of these resources
to states – at least in comparison with other conﬂict-relevant resources (e.g. secondary
diamonds) where production sites are scattered and more diﬃcult to control. In addi-
tion, insecurity will scare away foreign companies who in most cases are extracting the
hydrocarbons and who are paying substantial amounts of taxes. Therefore, governments
are likely to use their military force more intensively to defend hydrocarbon production
sites during conventional civil conﬂicts. From the perspective of violent non-state actors,
keeping civilians out of diamond mining ﬁelds claims less military deaths than securing
control over oil and gas reserves which are vigorously defended by superior government
forces (Lujala 2009, p. 55). Even in a context where the state has collapsed, hydrocarbon
deposits are less likely to be exploited by non-state actors who are lacking the neces-
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sary technology and skills. Hydrocarbon “[p]roduction requires signiﬁcant investment
in production technology and transport, and in many cases involves large multinational
companies. This makes it almost impossible for rebels to commence production during a
conﬂict for the ﬁrst time” (Lujala 2009, p. 65). For these reasons, I expect hydrocarbons
to be especially relevant as a source of income in (comparatively short but intensive)
state-based internal armed conﬂicts. Theoretically, hydrocarbons might contribute to
the outbreak and duration of such conﬂicts directly (because they provide incentives
and opportunities to violent actors) and indirectly (because their production might ad-
versely impact state institutions). Still, the possibility of accumulating wealth through
the looting of pipelines or the extortion of oil companies as well as the promise of future
revenues, e.g. after a successful secession, might associate with the emergence of greed-
based movements ﬁghting conventional state-based as well as non-state armed conﬂicts.
If hydrocarbon production negatively aﬀects economic growth, if it results in a political
Dutch disease or if it causes environmental degradation, grievance-based insurgencies
might also emerge. Rebel organizations with objectives that are entirely unrelated to
the availability or production of these resources might also resort to oil and gas deposits
as a source of funding if they manage to overcome the government (Lujala, Rød, et al.
2007, p. 240).
Early empirical studies, e.g. by Fearon and Laitin (2003), DeSoysa (2002), or Collier
and Hoeﬄer (2004) found that oil dependent states indeed face a greater risk of civil war
onset. Though the measures used have been criticized for good reason10, this ﬁnding
is mostly conﬁrmed by more sophisticated studies which distinguish between the eﬀects
of onshore and oﬀshore deposits and fully use the temporal and the spatial information
provided by the Petroleum Dataset. According to Lujala (2010, p. 16) and Lujala, Rød, et
al. (2007, p. 254), onshore oil production increases the risk of conﬂict onset by 50 percent
(while oﬀshore production does not seem to have an eﬀect). A corresponding duration
analysis ﬁnds that oil and gas production inside the conﬂict zone makes conventional
civil conﬂicts over governmental control longer (while having no eﬀect on the length of
state-based conﬂicts that are fought over territory). Interestingly, “production is not
necessary for the adverse eﬀect on duration; it is enough that hydrocarbon ﬁelds are
located in the conﬂict region” (Lujala 2010, p. 23). Finally, Fjelde (2009b, p. 18) ﬁnds
that in Nigeria, areas with onshore oil production have a higher risk of non-state conﬂict
events than locations without onshore oil production. In her empirical analysis, she uses
GIS software and new, unique event data based at the sub-national level in order to
10E.g. reverse causation needs to be taken into account. Armed conﬂict (or even approaching armed
conﬂict) might have an “substantial eﬀect on production volumes and exports. For example, a
government may increase the production to ﬁnance the military. A corrupt government may simply
increase production to reap personal income as fast as possible in the face of a looming regime change.
In addition, most studies [exploring the relationship between hydrocarbons and armed conﬂict] use
relative measures for oil and gas production and normalize production volume, exports, or rents
by the size of total economy or total exports. Approaching conﬂict, however, is likely to have a
negative impact on GDP and trade, making the country look more resource dependent. Therefore,
the causality between [oil] dependency and conﬂict may run both ways” (Lujala, Rød, et al. 2007,
p. 242). For more points of critique see Lujala, Rød, et al. (2007, pp. 241 sq.).
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explore the local determinants of non-state conﬂicts in this single country between 1991
and 2005. Interestingly, the risk of conventional (state-based) armed conﬂict is rather
low in Nigeria despite the fact that the country scores high on a number of predictors
of civil conﬂict, including a high level of corruption which normally associates with an
increased likelihood of political instability. Fjelde (2009b, pp. 5–7) describes how the
Nigerian political elite “used the oil rents to bribe and domesticate the leaders of strong
[oppositional] groups” which explains the absence of a strong, nationally-based armed
opposition group. For this reason, no major civil war has occurred since the end of the
Biafran war. However, non-state armed conﬂict is very common in Nigeria and, since
the early 1990s, has claimed the lives of more than 8,000 people. While the political elite
manages to stay in power thanks to its “carefully crafted clientelist systems” built on oil
money, the country seems prone to non-state armed conﬂict which the author attributes
to the possibility of high local pay-oﬀs from predation: In Nigeria, the illegal tapping of
oil-pipelines by sub-state actors (also known as “oil bunkering”) has an estimated value
of hundreds of billions of dollars every year. The BBC reports that illegal oil-bunkering
in Nigeria is a 60 million dollar per day business and describes how it relates to non-
state armed conﬂict in the region. For instance, “[i]t is likely” that the tankers which
are supposed to up-load the bunkered oil “arrived partly loaded with guns, cocaine to be
traﬃcked into Europe and cash, which [the buyers] will use to pay for the oil”. It is also
mentioned that “the bunkering syndicates operate under the cloak of the conﬂict between
militants and oil companies in the Niger Delta”. The government in the Delta “armed
militias to carry out widespread rigging during the 2003 elections. But the militiamen
say they were abandoned, so they turned to oil theft to fund their activities. [. . . ]
Although they are referred to in the media as ‘militants’, there are few coherent groups.
[. . . ] Most are gangs, led by commanders who are perpetually at war with each other”
(BBC NEWS/Andrew Walker) 2008). In addition to the oil-bunkering, Fjelde (2009b,
pp. 8 sq.) notes that the sheer presence of international companies also associates with
spoils that are up for grab among locals. “Direct compensation to aﬀected areas comes
in the form of infra-structural investments etc. representing high-value to elites in the
beneﬁting societies”. The author refers to Fearon (2005) when stating that “previous
research has questioned the appropriability, and thus the direct value of oil for non-state
actors [. . . ]. The Nigerian case illustrates, however, that oil [more precisely, oil-pipelines]
can be a lootable resource”.
The results from these and other more ﬁne-grained analyses speak in favor of my sug-
gestion to distinguish between the eﬀects of certain kinds of conﬂict-relevant resources.
Some of them (e.g. secondary diamonds, other gemstones, oil-pipelines and drugs) are
easily accessible to rebel exploitation and for this reason especially important in non-
conventional (non-state) armed conﬂicts. Such resources can be produced or looted by
individuals using simple means without requiring greater expertise. Production sites are
spread over larger territories which means these resources are diﬃcult to control and to
tax for governments even during peacetime. Therefore, these resources are of compar-
atively low extraction value to states. At least states are expected to more vigorously
defend point-source resources (e.g. primary diamond or oﬀshore oil and gas deposits)
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that are easier to control and to tax. In addition, these resources are diﬃcult to loot
for non-state actors especially in failed states because exploitation requires technical
expertise and advanced technology. For these reasons, secondary diamond production,
gemstone production, the looting of oil-pipelines/onshore oil deposits and drug cultiva-
tion are expected to provide a lucrative source of income to non-state actors involved
in non-conventional (non-state) armed conﬂicts and, to a lesser extent, to non-state
actors involved in conventional (state-based) armed conﬂicts, while primary diamond
deposits and oﬀshore oil deposits should, if anything, be associated with conventional
(state-based) civil warfare. The above even gave some hints in regard to the nature of
relationship: The relationship between resource-wealth derived from point resources and
the incidence of conventional (state-based) armed conﬂict is expected to be non-linear
in nature because governments that are richly endowed with such resources are able to
use this source of revenue to eﬀectively avoid violent opposition. From a certain point
on, wealth in point-source resources helps to stabilize regimes. In addition, these re-
sources are often produced by foreign companies paying large amounts of taxes. This
requires a certain level of stability that needs to be provided by the national security ap-
paratus (sometimes assisted by external security agencies). Thus, the more strategically
important and lucrative these resources are, the more able and willing the government
to provide national security to enable national and foreign actors to produce these re-
sources. In contrast, the relationship between easily lootable conﬂict resources and the
risk of outbreak of non-conventional (non-state) armed conﬂict seems to be more linear
in nature: The more possibility of private enrichment, the more violent rent-seeking
behavior amongst non-state actors. Even the governments of resource-rich states have
little incentive to take costly measures to suppress this kind of ﬁghting as long as it does
not threaten the existence of the state.11
Overall, the following empirical analysis relies on the “Diamond Dataset”, the “Gem-
stone Site Dataset”, the “Drug Cultivation Dataset” and the “Petroleum Dataset”
(v.1.2.) in order to assess whether conﬂict resources in general (and certain kinds of
conﬂict resources in particular) are especially relevant within non-conventional (non-
state) armed conﬂicts. Besides the discovery years and the start years of production
(and, in the case of drugs, the end years of production), these data sets assign geo-
graphic coordinates to every hydrocarbon reserve, gemstone deposit and area of drug
cultivation. If similar geographic information would be available on the conﬂict zones of
state-based and non-state internal armed conﬂicts, even the extent of the geographical
overlap between the occurrence and production of these resources and the occurrence
of internal armed conﬂicts could be studied. Unfortunately, data on the exact loca-
tions of non-conventional (non-state) armed conﬂicts are not provided – neither by the
“Non-State Conﬂict Dataset” nor by the “New/Consolidated List of Wars”.
11Because the argument relates to the issue of state weakness and corruption levels, I am going to
elaborate further on this matter below when discussing state fragility data. For a large-N quantitative
analysis (1985-1999; N=123) on this matter see Fjelde (2009a).
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Even for cases of conventional (state-based) internal armed conﬂicts, data on zones
of conﬂict are only available for the post Cold War era only.12 Therefore, the following
analysis only relies on country-level resource data. It is, however, possible to assess
whether there exists a temporal overlap between the occurrence and production of con-
ﬂict resources and the occurrence of internal armed conﬂicts. In most war-torn countries
this diﬀerentiation is crucial. For instance, although Bolivia and Kenya possess gem-
stone deposits, internal warfare in these countries during the 50s and 60s cannot be
linked in any meaningful way with the occurrence or production of this speciﬁc conﬂict
resource because at that time gemstones had neither been discovered nor produced in
both countries. If ever, it only makes sense to argue in favor of a linkage between in-
ternal warfare and the production of gemstones in Kenya in the later cases of internal
warfare (1991-1993, 2007-2009) after gemstone deposits had been discovered and pro-
duction had started. In the case of Guatemala, gemstones had already been discovered
when the ﬁrst internal war took place in 1954. However, at that time, Guatemala had
not entered commercial production yet. Only during the second Guatemalan internal
war (1962-1995) were gemstone deposits known and also produced. Although inter-
nal warfare in Zimbabwe (1973-1979 and 1983-1984) happened at times when primary
diamonds had already been discovered, the production of non-lootable diamonds only
started later in 1992. Linking the early cases of internal warfare in the DRC to the
occurrence or production of onshore oil or gas deposits does not make much sense, ei-
ther, because DRC’s onshore oil and gas deposits were only discovered in 1972. Onshore
oil exploitation started even later in 1979. Of course, other kinds of natural resources
(copper, cobalt, uranium or gold in the province of Katanga or diamonds in the South
Kasai region) already mattered a great deal during the so-called Congo Crisis in the
1960s. In Jordan, onshore oil or gas deposits had neither been discovered nor produced
when the civil war happened in 1970-1971. In India, drugs (opium) had already been
produced on a large-scale basis when warfare took place during the 50s. Later cases of
internal warfare, however, are unlikely to be related to the commercial production of
opium which, according to the “Drug Cultivation Dataset”, had stopped by 1960. These
examples demonstrate that although conﬂict resources are known to occur in many war-
torn countries, in several places production simply never started (which is, for instance,
the case with primary diamonds in Liberia and Mozambique or secondary diamonds in
Colombia, Nigeria and Paraguay). Other countries that are by now known to possess
and also exploit such resources had not yet discovered their deposits at the time when
warfare happened. In these cases, production only started after warfare had already
ended.
12An extension of UCDP/PRIO’s “Armed Conﬂict Dataset”, the “Conﬂict Site Dataset” (v.3) provides
coordinates for the conﬂict zones of conventional (state-based) internal armed conﬂicts which hap-
pened between 1989 and 2008, only. The conﬂict zones are coded with center-point coordinates plus
a radius variable to denote spatial extent (see Hallberg (2012)). Data on the exact location of state-
based armed conﬂicts, non-state armed conﬂicts and acts of one-sided violence are also provided by
the already mentioned “Georeferenced Event Dataset” (GED) which, however, only covers African
countries and the time period from 1989 to 2010.
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Many countries which experienced several internal wars had been aware of the existence
of deposits or produced these resources only during some of their wars (mostly the more
recent cases of warfare). In order to ﬁgure out whether warfare is fought over (or ﬁnanced
through) conﬂict resources, each case of internal warfare needs to be evaluated separately.
Only a conﬂict or a war level analysis (instead of a country level analysis) can ﬁgure out
whether secondary or primary diamonds, other gemstones, drugs or oil/gas deposits had
actually been known or exploited prior to or during warfare (see Hypothesis 4, 4a and
4b).
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17. Data on the Political Context of
Internal Fighting
This section presents a number of indicators and indices which shall later be used to
measure the concept of state weakness. Again, I am going to argue in favor of my
selection of indices and indicators without neglecting their weaknesses. For the sake of
completeness, I also mention alternative but inferior measures before turning to the state
of the art within peace and conﬂict research.
While there seems to be much agreement on the aforementioned theoretical arguments
linking state weakness to the outbreak of internal armed conﬂict, things get a bit fuzzier
when it comes to the issue of measurement. As mentioned earlier, Kaldor (1999, p. 92)
believes New Wars to emerge in “weak states” that, according to her, are characterized
by “a loss of control over and fragmentation of the instruments of physical coercion” and
a narrow functional and geographic reach of political institutions. This explains all sorts
of government ineﬃciencies, e.g. the inability of weak states to properly collect taxes
which aﬀects their ability to provide public services and to eﬀectively counter economic
decline, high levels of corruption and criminality. The author also speaks of a “downward
spiral of loss of revenue and legitimacy, growing disorder and military fragmentation”
that create the context in which New Wars arise. According to this understanding,
state weakness primarily means the failure of state institutions. Others believe New
Wars to emerge in situations where the coercive power of the state is weak and where
“consensual values” or a “sense of national unity” do not exist, i.e. in weak societies
(Snow 1996, p. 35). This corresponds with the common practice in development policy
to refer “to two diﬀerent entities as fragile: states and their institutions on the one hand,
and societies as a whole on the other” (Fabra Mata and Ziaja 2009, p. 5). According to
this understanding of state weakness, it would be insuﬃcient to only measure the quality
of (formal and informal) governmental institutions. Indicators e.g. on the strength of
civil society institutions and shared core values would be desirable, too, in order to
capture the context of New Warfare.
In general, the New Wars advocates seem to disagree on the background concept of
state weakness and the comprehensiveness of the term – as does the entire research
community. This results in the term being used interchangeably with related concepts
like “weak state capacity”, “state fragility”, “state failure”, “state collapse”, states with
“bad governance”, “states in crisis”, “rogue” and “poorly performing states” or “low
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income countries under stress” (Stepputat and Engberg-Pedersen 2008, pp. 21 sq.). Of
these terms, I am going to use the most encompassing, namely “fragile states” or “state
fragility”, in order to refer to the political context of NewWarfare. Fabra Mata and Ziaja
(2010, p. 2) deﬁne fragile states as all countries with “dysfunctional, deteriorating, or col-
lapsed central authorities”. Thus, the concept includes weak, failing and failed/collapsed
states that represent diﬀerent stages along the fragility spectrum. Still, this deﬁnition
remains comparatively narrow. Unlike other deﬁnitions, it avoids a lumping together of
the characteristics and the socio-economic consequences of state fragility. For instance,
the OECD deﬁnes state structures as fragile when they are unwilling or unable to pro-
vide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development and to safeguard the
security and human rights for their populations. Fabra Mata and Ziaja (2010, pp. 2 sq.)
comment that measuring such a concept is not only problematic because very diﬀerent
countries will receive the same scores on a respective index (e.g. strong and unwilling
states vs. weak and willing states). The inclusion of economic and social indicators that
are thought to be causally related to fragility also restricts the application of such an
index in research. “[O]rigins and consequences of fragility are already assumed in the
[index] which can thus not be used to investigate these relationships”. The following
analysis intends to explore the relationship between state fragility and the outbreak of
(a certain kind of) internal armed conﬂict. In line with the above concern, this requires
a measure of state fragility which does not itself contain violent conﬂict as one dimen-
sion in order to avoid circular argumentation. Otherwise, any correlation between state
fragility and (new) warfare would be “trivially true” because the theoretical argument
would reduce itself to the claim that “an insurgency broke out because the state lacked
the capacity to prevent an insurgency” (Kocher 2010). In this sense, the fact that vi-
olent conﬂict is often conceptualized as a cause, a symptom or a consequence of state
fragility and therefore included in most state fragility indices hampers the search for a
meaningful index. Several institutes, however, publish data on the single dimensions of
their state fragility indices. Thus, it is possible to disaggregate some of these indices into
their constituent parts and then to choose only those sub-indices or single indicators that
seem most appropriate. This strategy has also been proposed by Kocher (2010) in order
to circumvent circular argumentations and tautologies of the above presented kind. In
addition, the decision to disaggregate existing measures and to use multiple diﬀerent
indices is based on the empirical ﬁnding that existing indices seem to measure rather
diﬀerent things. “[A] comparison between diﬀerent instruments expose[s] a troubling
lack of convergence. Countries that rank high in one index may be absent from another,
and even in regard to the same dimensions [. . . ] there are huge diﬀerences”. Only “a few
states score high on more than a few dimensions of state fragility [. . . ] [S]tates are very
uneven across diﬀerent dimensions and seldom show signs of fragility across the board”
(Stepputat and Engberg-Pedersen 2008, pp. 25, 23).1
1See also Hegre and Nygard (2012, pp. 13 sq.) for a correlation and scatter plot matrix of seven
widely used governance indices or Hendrix (2010), who compares 15 diﬀerent deﬁnitions and oper-
ationalizations of state capacity that are used within the civil wars literature. He critically assesses
these measures on the basis of construct validity and employs principal factor analysis to identify
their underlying dimensionality. His results indicate that state capacity is characterized by low di-
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Another source of bias when using state fragility indices stems from the fact that most
of them rely on social and socio-economic data that are usually derived from household
surveys or produced by governments. While the former are diﬃcult to conduct in failing
or failed states, the latter requires functioning state institutions. “[I]n fragile settings,
[. . . ] factors such as widespread social mistrust, hidden dynamics and agendas, regime
secrecy and lack of infrastructure and capacity seriously hamper any attempt to gather
reliable and representative information” (Fabra Mata and Ziaja 2009, p. 16). Thus, the
more fragile a country, the more likely data is missing which results in a systematic
selection bias.2
One of the most popular indices, the “State Fragility Index (SFI)”, to some degree
circumvents this problem by using content analysis of electronic media to generate its
data. The SFI is produced at the George Mason University’s Center for Global Policy.
The version I am using within the upcoming analyses covers all independent countries
with a total population greater than 500,000 between 1995 and 2011.3 The index com-
prises 14 indicators measuring state fragility on an overall scale from zero to 25 (best
to worst). A state is deﬁned as fragile and likely to fail if it lacks eﬀectiveness and
legitimacy in four “performance dimensions”: security, political, economic and social.4
The authors of the SFI note that according to their understanding a country’s fragility is
“closely associated with the state capacity to manage conﬂict, make and implement pub-
lic policy and deliver essential services and its systemic resilience in maintaining system
coherence, cohesion, and quality of life, responding eﬀectively to challenges and crises,
and sustaining progressive development” (Marshall and Cole 2014, p. 7). The attempt
to capture the eﬀectiveness and legitimacy of state institutions very much resembles
Kaldor’s understanding of state weakness as a “downward spiral of loss of revenue and
legitimacy, growing disorder and military fragmentation”. To distinguish between these
mensionality. Only three dimensions of state capacity (bureaucratic and administrative capacity,
rentier-autocraticness and neopatrimoniality) explain over 90 percent of the variance in the 15 mea-
sures. He also identiﬁes survey measures of bureaucratic quality and measures of revenue-generating
capacity (rather than measures of military strength or institutional coherence) as the most theoreti-
cally and empirically justiﬁed indicators of state capacity. Hanson and Sigman (2013) even include
24 measures of state capacity into their study. They ﬁrst identify three common dimensions of state
capacity (extractive, coercive and administrative capacity) and present and critically discuss the most
common measures before they use Bayesian latent variable analysis to assess the extent to which these
dimensions are discernible in the available measures of state capacity.
2Missing data on single indicators and diﬀerent methods to deal with this problem also eﬀect the relia-
bility and validity of the overall measure. “Any fragility index will most probably be confronted with
missing data in one or more of [its] indicators. To maintain a suﬃciently large sample, indices either
impute missing data, that is, estimate missing observations with available ones through statistical
models or expert judgments, or they delete missing observations case-wise. [. . . ] If missing data is
imputed, the reliability of an index suﬀers, as values for certain countries rely on guessing. If missing
data is deleted case-wise, the validity of an index suﬀers, as certain attributes considered relevant are
not included in the overall scoring of some countries.” (Fabra Mata and Ziaja 2009, p. 16).
3See Marshall and Cole (2011b) for this interim version of the just published 2014 update which covers
the 1995 to 2013 period.
4For more information on the single indicators and the method of aggregation see Marshall and Cole
(2014) or Marshall and Cole (2011a).
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two dimensions is considered a major strength of this index as well as the fact that its
sub-categories remain relatively parsimonious (using one to three indicators each). In
addition to the overall SFI score, the Center for Global Policy also publishes each coun-
try’s scores on the single performance dimensions (i.e. on security eﬀectiveness, political
eﬀectiveness, social eﬀectiveness, economic eﬀectiveness, security legitimacy, political
legitimacy, social legitimacy and economic legitimacy). Those who use a more narrow
concept of state fragility are therefore able to pick their most favorite indicator(s) or to
construct their own sub-index. For the following empirical analysis, the SFI provides
all necessary information to construct “SFI sub-Index I” that contains all dimensions
of the SFI (legitimacy as well as eﬀectiveness scores5) with the exception of “security
eﬀectiveness” in order to keep the measure conceptually independent from armed con-
ﬂict.6 Likewise, it is possible to build “SFI sub-Index II” which – in comparison to the
overall SFI score and the “SFI sub-Index I” – is based on a more narrow concept of
state fragility. It remains conceptually independent from armed conﬂict and from social
and economic phenomena by also excluding the economic and social indicators. The
measure only combines the security legitimacy score with the political eﬀectiveness and
legitimacy scores.7 Finally, I wish to include a “SFI State Legitimacy Index” (which
just combines the legitimacy scores) and a “SFI State Eﬀectiveness Index” (which only
covers the eﬀectiveness scores – again with the exception of security eﬀectiveness). I
also did not touch the weighting decision of the original SFI (which means the economic
dimension is given more weight). For this reason, the “SFI State Eﬀectiveness Index”
ranges from 0 (best) to 3.33 (worst) while the “SFI State Legitimacy Index” ranges
from 0 (best) to 3 (worst). Luckily, the SFI data cover a comparatively high number
of countries (165 in 2011) and – at least in relation to other fragility measures – a long
period of time (1995 to 2011). The scoring system of the SFI, however, has been crit-
icized for being not as user friendly as, for instance, a zero to ten scale. In addition,
the parsimonious operationalizations of the sub-categories renders them comparatively
vulnerable to data problems. Finally, it is diﬃcult to assess the reliability of this index
because information on the level of uncertainty is not provided Fabra Mata and Ziaja
(2009, pp. 73–75).
5The index includes the SFI “security legitimacy” score (which captures the level of state repression),
the SFI “political legitimacy” score (which measures the level of regime/governance inclusion), the
SFI “economic legitimacy” score (which measures the share of export trade in manufactured goods)
and the SFI “social legitimacy” score (which relates a country’s actual level of human capital care (as
indicated by the infant mortality rate) to the expected value given its poverty level). In addition, the
index includes the SFI “political eﬀectiveness” score (which captures the level of regime/governance
stability), the SFI “economic eﬀectiveness” score (which is measured by GDP per capita) and the SFI
“social eﬀectiveness” score (which captures the degree of human capital development as indicated by
a country’s score on the Human Development Index).
6The authors of the SFI explain that their security eﬀectiveness score is in fact a country’s “residual
war” score which captures the number of involved wars, the length of interim periods of “no war”
between armed conﬂicts and the years spent in peace after warfare had ended (Marshall and Cole
2014, p. 8).
7Thus, the “SFI sub-Index II” only includes a state repression measure and measures for
regime/governance stability and inclusion.
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In 2005, the SFI was the ﬁrst cross-country index on state fragility to gain worldwide
attention.8 At the end of 2010, Fabra Mata and Ziaja (2010) already list eleven global
fragility indices – including some that do not explicitly claim to be fragility indices but
which are used as such (e.g. the “Country Policy and Institutional Assessment” of the
World Bank) and some that only measure closely related concepts (e.g. the “Global
Peace Index”).9
One of these “widely quoted and used” fragility indices is a sub-index (the “BTI State-
ness Index”) of the Bertelsmann Tranformation Index (BTI). Every two years, the BTI
is produced at the Center for Applied Policy Research of the University of Munich on
behalf of the Bertelsmann Foundation. It consists of two rankings, the “Status Index”
(which ranks countries according to the state of their democracy and market economy)
and the “Management Index” (which ranks countries according to their political lead-
ership’s management performance). In order to produce both indices, country experts
are asked to conduct in-depth assessments on a total of 130 countries “that have yet to
achieve a fully consolidated democracy and market economy, have populations of more
than two million (excepting eight states chosen as particularly interesting cases), and
are recognized as sovereign states” (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012a, p. 4). In their assess-
ment, the experts use 17 criteria that are subdivided into 49 questions. The “Status
Index” inter alia aims to identify each country’s “Democracy Status”. In order to do
so, each country is judged on its level of “stateness” and four other dimensions.10 The
Bertelsmann Foundation explains that “stateness” is seen as a precondition to political
transformation and therefore included in the BTI’s deﬁnition of democracy. The level
of stateness is examined through four questions/indicators. Question number one asks
for an evaluation of the extent to which the state’s monopoly on the use of force covers
the entire territory of the country. The second question examines the prevalence of a
state identity, i.e. the extent to which all relevant groups in society agree about citizen-
ship and accept the nation-state as legitimate.11 The third question assesses the extent
8State fragility only entered mainstream foreign policy and development discourses after the terrorist
attacks on 11 September 2001 when failed states were identiﬁed as security threats to Western nations
(because they provide an ideal breeding ground for national and international terrorism, organized
crime and armed conﬂicts that might destabilize entire regions). The issue of state failure also gained
further attention in light of the recent ﬁnancial crisis and with the increasing attention to other
transnational problems that require eﬀective international governance (e.g. climate change). This
resulted in a “re-emergence of ‘the state’ as a central actor in developing countries” and, in return,
a growing concern for situations where functioning states do not exist. See Fabra Mata and Ziaja
(2010, p. 2); Fabra Mata and Ziaja (2009, foreword, p. 6 sq.).
9The authors describe the concepts and methods behind these eleven indices and compare their results.
For a list of controversially rated countries on these diﬀerent indices see Fabra Mata and Ziaja (2010,
p. 3). For an alternative listing of the “leading ‘conceptualizers’ of state weakness” see Rice and
Patrick (2008, pp. 5–7).
10These are “political participation”, “rule of law”, “stability of democratic institutions” and “political
and social integration”. The overall democracy status is derived from assessments made in response
to 18 individual questions on these ﬁve dimensions.
11“The question seeks to assess the extent to which major groups in society accept and support the
oﬃcial/dominant concept of the nation-state and the extent to which access to citizenship and nat-
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to which the legal order and political institutions are deﬁned without interference by
religious dogmas while question number four explores the existence of basic administra-
tive structures, i.e. the provision of jurisdiction, tax authorities and law enforcement,
the administration of communication, transport and basic infrastructure like water, ed-
ucation or health (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012a, p. 16).12 Since 2003, the Bertelsmann
Foundation publishes the combined stateness scores as well as each country’s scores on
the individual indicators. As part of its management assessment, the BTI also asks its
experts to evaluate the “level of diﬃculty” a country’s leadership is facing when instilling
political reform and change. They are asked to do so by assessing the extent to which
there are traditions of civil society. More speciﬁcally, they are asked whether there has
been a “long-term presence of public or civic engagement” and whether there exists “a
civic culture of participation in public life”, “numerous and active civic associations” and
“social trust (social capital)” (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012a, p. 35). This shall later be
referred to as the “BTI Traditions of Civil Society Indicator”. Concrete numbers of civil
society organizations per country (N=190) or per million inhabitants (N=169) have been
collected by Grimes (2008).13 Depending on the baseline concept, the above mentioned
indicators can be used to build more comprehensive measures of state fragility that also
capture the weakness of society as well as rather parsimonious measures with a narrow
focus on the functioning of central state authority or basic administration.14
The Bertelsmann Foundation itself uses the BTI data to construct the “BTI Failed
State Index”, which is based on only two of its four questions assessing the level of
stateness. Each country is assigned the arithmetic mean of its scores on the questions
assessing the existence and scope of a monopoly on the use of force and basic admin-
istration. With equal weight, the “BTI Failed State Index” therefore only covers two
dimensions (the security and political dimension) as opposed to the four-dimensional
“State Fragility Index (SFI)” or the ﬁve-dimensional overall “BTI Status Index” (which
also take social/societal, economic and (environmental) sustainability aspects into ac-
count). Because the index is conceptualized as independent from other socio-political
phenomena, it “is a valid measure of state fragility in a narrow sense and may thus be
used to investigate the relationship with phenomena that other, more broadly designed
indices include into their very concepts of fragility” Fabra Mata and Ziaja (2009, p. 45).
uralization is denied to particular groups on the basis of race, gender, language, religion, political
or other opinions, national or social origin, property, place of birth or other status” (Bertelsmann
Stiftung 2012a, p. 16).
12“This question seeks to examine whether the basic civil functions of a state apparatus are fulﬁlled in
terms of regulation, administration and implementation. It does not refer to basic security functions
like keeping the peace or maintaining law and order, and it does not address the quality of the
administrative structures, solely their existence and scope” (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012a, p. 17). For
more information see also the website of the BTI project at http://www.bti-project.org/index/
methode/ (visited on 2013-05-21) .
13Both indicators are available through the Quality of Government (QoG) Project at the University
of Gothenburg (QoG Institute 2013, pp. 201 sq.) and in the following referred to as the “Grimes
measures”.
14I rely on BTI data for the period from 2003 to 2012. These data (and the most recent 2014 update)
are available online at http://www.bti-project.org/index/ (visited on 2014-11-02) .
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The “BTI Failed State Index” assigns values on a scale from one to ten from worst to
best (with minimal steps of plus-minus 0.5). Countries with values of less than three on
the index are categorized as failed states.15 As in the case of other fragility indices, this
threshold to determine the categories of failing vs. failed states is neither theoretically
nor empirically justiﬁed.16 In addition, the authors do not provide any information
on country-speciﬁc uncertainty (but at least publish the comprehensive country reports
that serve as the basis for all BTI numerical scores). The fact that this index is based
on expert surveys minimizes the previously mentioned problem of missing data in fragile
contexts. However, the risk of expert bias increases. Subjective judgments that cannot
be controlled for probably inﬂuence the scoring of the experts.17 Finally, critics argue
that an ideological bias exists because “[t]he BTI overall publication assumes that mar-
ket oriented democracy is the best system to be adopted by all countries. This might
inﬂuence coders’ judgments on those two questions used by the BTI State Weakness
Index [aka BTI Stateness Index]” (Fabra Mata and Ziaja 2009, p. 45).
Ideology certainly also matters in regard to measures provided by the World Bank.
For instance, the “Country Policy and Institutional Assessment/IDA Resource Alloca-
tion Index (CPIA/IRAI)” – another widely used and quoted fragility index – is criticized
for being “a strongly value-oriented index where a particular set of policies (e.g. trade
liberalization) and a distinct state model are encouraged” (Fabra Mata and Ziaja 2009,
p. 52). Also, the index is criticized for its strong focus on poverty and for covering only
those countries eligible for assistance under the Bank’s International Development As-
sociation (Rice and Patrick 2008, p. 6). This is hardly surprising given the fact that the
15Failed states are deﬁned as “countries in which the state’s monopoly on the use of force and basic
administrative structures are either lacking overall or encompass only a part of the territory or
population, so that the government is severely limited in its capacity to act (the average of scores given
for questions 1.1 and 1.4 is less than three)”. See http://www.bti-project.org/index/methode/
(visited on 2013-05-21) or the BTI Report 2012 (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012b, p. 139).
16Another example would be the “Failed States Index (FSI)” produced by the Fund for Peace. Fabra
Mata and Ziaja (2009, p. 20) accuses the producers of “arbitrary categorization [that] can mislead
users. In its presentation in the Foreign Policy magazine, the FSI categorizes countries into ‘critical’,
‘in danger’, ‘borderline’, ‘stable’, and ‘most stable’. A table shows the top sixty countries with the
highest risk. The top twenty countries are critical, the following twenty in danger, no matter what the
scores are. This procedure is misleading in at least two ways: ﬁrst, the overall risk of the international
system appears to be constant, as there are always twenty critical states listed. Second, a country
with a certain score in one year (Yemen, 95.4 in 2008) may be termed ‘in danger’ while a country with
a lower score in a previous year had been termed ‘critical’ (Timor-Leste, 94.9 in 2007), even though
scores are intended to be time invariant and thus allow comparison over time”. See also Fabra Mata
and Ziaja (2010, p. 3).
17“The BTI Country Assessments are expert surveys, which makes them naturally vulnerable to expert
bias. The risk of bias is increased due to the limited number of experts involved. Reliability is further
decreased by the phrasing of the questionnaire which leaves considerable room for interpretation by
the coders. The risk of bias increases even more when using only a limited number of indicators from
an expert survey since diﬀerent understandings of speciﬁc concepts cannot level out as they might
with a large number of indicators. This is the case for the BTI Failed States Index, which relies
on only two questions from the survey. In this aspect, validity and reliability rival each other out”
(Fabra Mata and Ziaja 2009, p. 45).
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index is produced by the World Bank for corporate purposes. Nevertheless, external
actors (e.g. the European Commission and single governments) also rely on it for aid
allocation purposes in fragile settings. The CPIA/IRAI “assesses the extent to which
a country’s policy and institutional framework supports sustainable growth, poverty
reduction, and the eﬀective use of development assistance” (Hegre and Nygard 2012,
p. 12). It comes with the advantage of conceptual independence from armed conﬂict but
covers much more than the functioning of state institutions. Because the following anal-
ysis primarily aims to capture Kaldor’s narrow understanding of state fragility, I prefer
the World Bank’s “Government Eﬀectiveness Indicator”, which is part of the “World
Governance Indicators (WGI)”. The WGI version I am relying on provides aggregate
and individual governance indicators for 215 economies and the period from 1996 to
2011. The indicators cover six dimensions of governance (“voice and accountability”,
“political stability and absence of violence/terrorism”, “government eﬀectiveness”, “reg-
ulatory quality”, “rule of law” and “control of corruption”). In order to measure these
dimensions of governance, the World Bank uses several hundred individual variables
from 31 separate data sources constructed by 25 diﬀerent organizations (QoG Institute
2013, pp. 121–123; Teorell et al. 2013). The “WGI Government Eﬀectiveness Indicator”
captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and
the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation
and implementation and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies.
Its estimates range from -2.5 (worst) to +2.5 (best). It has been criticized that this indi-
cator (as well as all the other WGI) is measured relative to the global mean in each time
period which would make it extremely diﬃcult to use them for comparisons over time.18
However, the authors of the WGI replied to this and several other points of critique and
convincingly argued that these objections are either based on misinterpretations of their
indicators or of the empirical evidence involving them (Kaufmann et al. 2007). Overall,
the geographical and temporal coverage of the data set, the availability of most of the
single indicators/sources and the transparent and professional way of constructing the
measures speak in favor of the WGI.19
Freedom House collects similar data as part of its annual “Freedom in the World Sur-
vey”. However, the overall purpose of this survey is not to assess state fragility but to
rate countries according to their state of freedom. The index therefore aggregates seven
sub-indices measuring basic political rights and civil liberties.20 One of these sub-indices,
18For this and other points of critique see e.g. Hanson and Sigman (2013, p. 9) and Kaufmann et al.
(2007).
19For each country and estimate, the WB provides standard errors and the number of sources. The
governance estimates are normally distributed with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of
one. For detailed information on the WGI see http://www.govindicators.org (visited on 2013-
05-28) and Kaufmann et al. (2010). All data are available online at http://info.worldbank.org/
governance/wgi/index.aspx (visited on 2014-11-02) . The 2014 update of the data set covers the
1996 to 2013 period.
20These are “Electoral Process”, “Political Pluralism and Participation”, “Functioning of Government”,
“Freedom of Expression and Belief”, “Associational and Organizational Rights”, “Rule of Law”,
“Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights”.
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the “FH Functioning of Government Index”, focuses on a single aspect of government
eﬀectiveness as deﬁned above by the WGI: the degree to which governments operate
independently of undue inﬂuences and pressures. More precisely, the “FH Functioning
of Government Index” assesses whether a freely elected head of government and a na-
tional legislative representative determine the policies of the government, whether the
government is free from pervasive corruption, whether it is accountable to the electorate
between elections and whether it operates with openness and transparency. Countries
are graded on a scale from 0 (worst) to 12 (best). The data I am using cover the period
from 2005 to 2012 and a total of 193 countries. They are available through the Quality
of Government (QoG) Project at the University of Gothenburg in Sweden or can be
downloaded from the website of Freedom House.21
The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) publishes data on the functioning of govern-
ment institutions, too, as part of its “Index of Democracy”.22 In addition to expert
assessments and if available, the EIU uses public opinion data from surveys23 to eval-
uate the functioning of governments.24 Because this index covers fewer countries and
years it remains, however, inferior to the above described Freedom House measure.25
Furthermore, the purpose of the overall index is to rate countries according to their
state of democracy. The sub-index therefore also runs the risk of being value-driven. At
the same time it is important to keep in mind that despite some conceptual similarity,
the concepts of democracy and state fragility are not congruent: Flawed democracies or
even autocracies are not necessarily fragile countries. The other way round, the most
stable countries are not necessarily the most democratic. For instance, Taiwan is one of
the most stable countries in the world according to the “State Fragility Index (SFI)”,
covering the period from 1995 to 2011. However, it is not a full democracy but ranked
only number 35 on the “EIU Democracy Index”. Likewise, the most autocratic countries
21The original data set by Freedom House covers slightly more countries (195 countries and 14 “related”
and “disputed territories”). Although the “Freedom in the World Survey” has been published annually
since 1972, the sub-category scores have been made available for the last nine years, only. The
latest version covers the 2006 to 2014 period. See http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
world-aggregate-and-subcategory-scores (visited on 2014-11-02) .
22This index is based on the ratings for 60 indicators grouped into ﬁve sub-categories: “civil liberties”,
“democratic political culture”, “electoral process and pluralism”, “functioning of government” and
“political participation”. Each sub-category is measured by a separate sub-index ranging from 0 to
10 (worst to best). The overall “Index of Democracy” is the simple average of the ﬁve sub-indices.
23The World Values Survey, Gallup polls, the Eurobarometer surveys, the Asian and the Latin American
Barometer, the Afrobarometer and national surveys.
24The respondents are asked to assess the level of public conﬁdence in the government, the extent
to which freely elected representatives determine government policy free of undue inﬂuence by the
military and the security services, by certain groups or by foreign powers and organizations, whether
there exists an eﬀective system of checks and balances on the exercise of government authority,
whether the government’s authority extends over the full territory of the country, whether corruption
is pervasive or whether the civil service is willing and capable of implementing government policy.
For more information see EIU (2013).
25The “EIU Functioning of Government Index” covers 165 independent states plus two territories (ex-
cluding micro states) and has ﬁrst been produced for the year 2006, with updates for 2008, 2010,
2011, 2012 and 2013.
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(e.g. North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Syria or Turkmenistan) are strong states that manage
to control (or repress) their populations and territories. At least none of these countries
are considered to be extremely fragile. On a scale from 0 (best) to 25 (worst) on the SFI
they rank somewhere in the middle (9 to 10 points). The other way round, East Timur
and India (and to a lesser degree Uganda and Malawi) are doing comparatively well in
terms of democracy but still remain rather fragile.26
Finally, the “ICRG Quality of Government Indicator” shall at least be mentioned. This
measure is based on data provided by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) of
the Political Risk Services (PRS) Group. It ranges from zero to one (with higher values
indicating higher quality of government) and is composed of the mean values of the
ICRG variables “Corruption”, “Law and Order” and “Bureaucracy Quality”. The latter
component aims to capture the level of autonomy, the stability and professionalism
of the bureaucratic systems (QoG Institute 2013, p. 92). Including this dimension of
state fragility as a separate measure would be interesting. However, the single ICRG
component variables are not available free of charge.27 Only the overall “ICRG Quality
of Government Indicator” is available through the Quality of Government (QoG) Project.
It covers a comparatively long period of time (1984 to 2012) but just 146 countries. For
these reasons, I consider the above presented “WGI Government Eﬀectiveness Indicator”
and the “FH Functioning of Government Index” superior which cover the same three
dimensions.
Corruption levels (or the eﬀective control of corruption by government institutions)
are included in all of the above mentioned indices measuring the eﬀectiveness, qual-
ity or functioning of governments (which are themselves common dimensions of state
fragility).28 Within the following empirical analysis, I therefore intend to include a
corruption measure to assess the separate eﬀect of this widely accepted dimension of
state dysfunction on the risk of internal armed conﬂict. For this purpose, I rely on the
most widely used, national-level corruption index: The “Corruption Perception Index
(CPI)” published by Transparency International (TI). Since 1995, the CPI ranks coun-
tries according to the perceived level of public sector corruption as determined by expert
assessments and opinion surveys.29 In 2012, the index covers 176 countries and territo-
26For the same argument and further examples see Rice and Patrick (2008, p. 14).
27They can be purchased at http://www.prsgroup.com (visited on 2013-05-28) . For an empirical
analysis using this indicator see Hegre and Nygard (2012). See also Hendrix (2010) on the validity of
this measure.
28The “WGI Government Eﬀectiveness Indicator” of the World Bank is the only exception. In this case,
corruption is covered by a separate measure of the WGI (the “WGI Control of Corruption Indicator”).
29“The CPI focuses on corruption in the public sector and deﬁnes corruption as the abuse of public oﬃce
for private gain. The surveys used in compiling the CPI tend to ask questions in line with the misuse
of public power for private beneﬁt, with a focus, for example, on bribe-taking by public oﬃcials in
public procurement. The sources do not distinguish between administrative and political corruption.
The CPI Score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people, risk
analysts and the general public [. . . ].” (QoG Institute 2013, pp. 116 sq.).
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ries around the world with corruption scores ranging from 0 (worst) to 100 (best).30 The
2012 scores comprise data from 13 diﬀerent sources, including several of the above men-
tioned indices. Although data are available for eighteen consecutive years, the samples
and methodology of the index have changed over time. Year to year comparisons will
only be possible from 2012 onwards. For this reason, the following analysis just includes
the 2012 score instead of the 18 years average. Unfortunately, information on the single
indicators used for this index is also lacking.31
As brieﬂy mentioned, the World Bank (WB) publishes an alternative measure: the
“WGI Control of Corruption Indicator” which is again part of the “Worldwide Gover-
nance Indicators (WGI)”. This index “captures perceptions of the extent to which public
power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption,
as well as the ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests”. The estimate ranges
from approximately -2.5 to 2.5 and, in the version I am using, covers 215 countries
between 1996 and 2011.32
The example of corruption very well demonstrates how state weakness in general (and
corruption as one indicator thereof) links with armed conﬂict through negative eﬀects on
economic variables. High levels of corruption not only scare away foreign investors but
also undermine the ability of governments to implement public policies that generate
economic growth. Corruption often leads to unrealistic or ineﬃcient policies (e.g. in
the form of controls on the state economy) and a ﬂourishing black market which means
further loss of tax revenue (Le Billon 2003; Fjelde and Soysa 2009; Fjelde 2009a).33 Those
who argue in favor of a linkage between corruption and the outbreak of violent conﬂict
in addition refer to the bureaucratic ineﬃciency and the loss of public welfare that
associate with corrupt practices like the soliciting or oﬀering of bribes and extortion.
Such practices also compromise popular faith in the legitimacy of the involved state
institutions and cause real grievances that might lead to demands for change. The
“greatest risk” in corruption is “that [. . . ] at some time [it] will become so overweening,
or some major scandal will be suddenly revealed, so as to provoke a popular backlash,
resulting in a fall or overthrow of the government, a major reorganizing or restructuring of
30In prior years, the scale ran from 0 to 10.
31For more information and data see Transparency International (2012); http://cpi.transparency.
org/cpi2012/results/ (visited on 2013-06-04) . For the 2013 update see http://www.
transparency.org/research/cpi/overview (visited on 2014-11-02) .
32The 2014 update is now online available at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.
aspx (visited on 2014-11-02) .
33Two research papers which appeared in the European Physical Journal in 2007 and 2008 examine
the economic consequences of corruption perception as deﬁned by the “Corruption Perception Index
(CPI)” of Transparency International (TI). Both papers found that the lower the level of perceived
corruption the higher long-term economic growth. More speciﬁcally, for the period of 1999 to 2004
and for all countries in the world, a unit increase in a country’s CPI score results in an increase of GDP
per capita growth rates of 1.7 percent. In addition, the authors ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant power-
law functional dependence between foreign direct investment and corruption: low levels of corruption
relate to high levels of direct foreign investment per capita. See Shao et al. (2007); Podobnik et al.
(2008).
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the country’s political institutions, or, at worst, a breakdown in law and order, rendering
the country ungovernable” (QoG Institute 2013, p. 91). Morris (1991, pp. 17 sq.) agrees
that “the constant abuse of authority has the potential to undermine authority to such
an extent that there may no longer be authority, that is legitimate power, to abuse”.
Countries with high levels of corruption might well be in a pre-stage to state failure.
From the opposite perspective, the rents generated by corruption might be a tempting
prize for those who are willing to topple the government.
Empirical support for a positive relationship between corruption and internal armed
conﬂict comes from Fjelde (2009a). Her large-N quantitative study ﬁnds that increasing
corruption from the 5th to the 95th percentile more than triples a country’s risk of conﬂict
onset. However, the author also detects the aforementioned conditional eﬀect, namely
that the relationship between corruption and the outbreak of state-based armed conﬂict
is diﬀerent in oil-rich countries where public money derived from oil production can easily
be used to buy oﬀ key segments of society that might otherwise challenge the state and
its authority (Fjelde 2009a). The author ﬁnds this interaction eﬀect to be signiﬁcant,
consistent across diﬀerent models and robust to a number of changes in speciﬁcations.
She concludes that “[p]olitical corruption has prolonged poverty and bred economic
and political inequality in many oil-rich states, but it has also helped cement powerful
alliances with a stake in the continuation of the corrupt regimes” (Fjelde 2009a, p. 199).
Morris (1991, pp. 17 sq.) argued that corruption might contribute to organizational
stability “by helping foster accommodation, a stable, ‘co-optive system of spoils’, and by
discouraging the mobilization of opposition”. He has already noted that in order to have
a stabilizing eﬀect, “corruption must be maintained within certain limits” and that “the
abundance and availability of resources condition corruption’s contribution to stability”
because “[a] large pool of resources not only provides the spoils needed to sustain the
system, but a growing economic pie [also] determines the degree of public acceptance
of corruption” (Morris 1991, p. 19). Further support for a more complex relationship
between corruption and violent conﬂict comes from single or comparative case studies
according to which diﬀerent forms of corruption have diﬀerent eﬀects on society or the
political system. For instance, Morris (1991, p. 16) reports that in Mexico, extortion
helped to solidify the elite and enhance centralized control while bribery undermined
elite unity and political stability. Similarly, Khan (1998) shows that diﬀerent forms of
corruption have had very diﬀerent economic outcomes across Asian countries (India,
Malaysia, Thailand and South Korea). In some North East Asian countries, widespread
corruption has accompanied decades of very high growth. In others, e.g. the South
Asian countries, corruption associated with relatively low growth. In South East Asia,
high levels of corruption came along with moderately high long-run growth rates (Khan
1998, p. 16). The author attributes these varying eﬀects to the diﬀerent types of patron-
client networks within which diﬀerent forms of corruption are embedded in this region.
Finally, Bardhan (2006) mentions that high levels of political corruption do not always
go together with high levels of bureaucratic corruption.34
34See Morris (2011, pp. 10 sq.) for a summary of categories of corruption and a distinction between
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This variance again oﬀers room for the argument that diﬀerent kinds of corruption
might be associated with diﬀerent kinds of internal armed conﬂict. In line with the
grievances argument, upper-level corruption (that is practiced by the political elite and
perceived as a waste of public welfare and injust by the remaining societal actors) might
especially be related to the outbreak of conventional (state-based) armed conﬂict – at
least in countries without large oil revenues that could be used to buy oﬀ the opposition.
While political corruption refers to the corrupt practices of a small, policy-making elite,
lower-level bureaucratic corruption or systemic corruption aﬀect larger segments of so-
ciety. Such kinds of corruption might be an indicator of the inability or unwillingness
of governments to control this and other kinds of criminal behavior including the illegal
exploitation of mineral resources by non-state actors as well as ﬁghting among them
over the rents derived from resource extraction. Governments might be willing to accept
such conditions as long as non-state ﬁghting remains of low intensity and is carried out
in remote rural areas so that it does not destabilize the entire country or as long as the
survival of the state does not depend on control over these resources. Alternatively, the
state might be already weakened to such an extent that it is simply unable to defend
strategically important mining sites. High levels of bureaucratic or even systemic cor-
ruption can then be interpreted as signs of wider state weakness and are expected to
be signiﬁcantly and positively correlated with the incidence of non-conventional (non-
state) armed conﬂicts – especially in countries where easily lootable conﬂict resources
occur and are produced. Unfortunately, existing large-N data sets on corruption are far
from allowing the necessary distinction between political and administrative, petty or
grand/systemic corruption.35 Despite these data constraints, research on the nature and
direction of the relationship between corruption (or state fragility in general) and armed
conﬂict continues to confront a number of theoretical and methodological challenges.
Some of the diﬃculties stem from the fact that the relationship runs in both directions:
corruption might lead to the outbreak of armed conﬂict as much as political instability
– especially the entire break-down of law and order during warfare – advantages the
spread of corruption. Furthermore, recent empirical research suggests that the eﬀect is
conditioned by other factors and varies between diﬀerent forms of corruption.
Lastly, the following analysis includes a “Polity Fragmentation Indicator” as the most
parsimonious measure of state fragility. This single indicator is part of the Polity IV
project data series compiled at the Center for Global Policy of George Mason University
“upper-level” and “lower-level” corruption. The former, which is also referred to as political corrup-
tion, involves “presidents, ministers, members of the legislature, governors and other high-ranking
oﬃcials” (i.e. corruption at the policymaking stage), while “lower-level” corruption (also referred to
as “bureaucratic” or “administrative” corruption) relates to the implementation of policy carried out
by lower-level civil servants. Other categorizations of corruption distinguish between the direction
(“bribery” vs. “extortion”) or between the size and frequency of the transaction (“grand corruption”
vs. “petty corruption”).
35“Much of the corruption literature exploring the underlying causes and consequences of corruption
fail[s] to diﬀerentiate forms of corruption. Corruption [. . . ] is treated generically as a singular class
of political behavior. This is especially true of the bulk of the quantitative, cross-national studies
because of the way corruption is normally measured” (Morris 2011, p. 12).
217
17. Data on the Political Context
which serves as a source of data for several of the above mentioned indices.36 The 2012
update of this data project informs about global and regional trends in governance in
167 countries. The “Polity Fragmentation Indicator” codes “the operational existence
of a separate polity, or polities, comprising substantial territory and population within
the recognized borders of the state and over which the coded polity exercises no eﬀective
authority (eﬀective authority may be participatory or coercive)”.37 Unfortunately, Polity
IV has collected data on polity fragmentation only since the year 2000.
Of course, many other measures of state fragility exist besides the above mentioned.
Most alternatives, however, remain either restricted in terms of their geographical cov-
erage (e.g. the “Index of African Governance” of the Kennedy School of Government
at Harvard University or data provided by the “World Value Survey” and the World
Economic Forum38) or in terms of their temporal coverage (e.g. the “Fragility Index”
of the “Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP)” produced at Carlton University).
Country rankings of the latter index only cover the years of 2010, 2011 and 2012 (pre-
liminary ﬁndings). Disaggregated data below the level of the six categories included in
the “CIFP Fragility Index” are also not provided which prevents users from modifying
and replicating the index (Fabra Mata and Ziaja 2009, p. 49). In addition, the fact that
this index uses over eighty single indicators in order to measure state fragility points to
a much broader understanding of state fragility than applied in this study. For a similar
reason, the above also leaves aside the “Global Peace Index” which is produced by the
Institute for Economics and Peace and developed by the EIU in collaboration with a
36E.g. various Polity IV measures (also the “Polity Fragmentation Indicator”) are used to capture the
political eﬀectiveness and political legitimacy dimensions of the “State Fragility Index (SFI)”.
37The coding excludes local autonomy arrangements voluntarily established and accepted by both cen-
tral and local authorities. Cases with “no overt fragmentation” are assigned a value of 0, “slight
fragmentation” exists in cases where “less than ten percent of the country’s territory is eﬀectively
under local authority and actively separated from the central authority of the regime” and assumes
a value of 1. “Moderate fragmentation” exists where “ten to twenty-ﬁve percent of the country’s
territory is eﬀectively ruled by local authority and actively separated from the central authority of
the regime” and is assigned a value of 2. “Serious fragmentation”, where “over twenty-ﬁve percent
(and up to ﬁfty percent) of the country’s territory is eﬀectively ruled by local authority and actively
separated from the central authority of the regime” assumes a value of 3. Polities that cannot exer-
cise relatively eﬀective authority over at least 50 percent of their established territory are necessarily
considered to be in a condition of “state failure”. See Marshall, Jaggers, et al. (2013, pp. 12 sq.).
The 2014 update of the Polity IV data series (the time-series data as well as the polity-case format
covering the 1800 to 2013 period) is now online at http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html
(visited on 2014-10-24)
38So far, the “World Value Survey” has conducted six waves of data collection. An aggregated data ﬁle
is published online and includes the surveys conducted from 1981 to 2012 in 87 societies. Individual-
level data provided by the “World Value Survey” could be used to calculate any country’s mean
of the variables included in the survey. In order to measure the strength of a state or its society
the following indicators included in this survey might be of interest: the indicator measuring the
level of public conﬁdence in the armed forces, in the government, in the civil service or in the
police as well as the variables measuring the level of interpersonal trust and the level of corruption.
See http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/ (visited on 2014-11-02) . The World Economic Forum
provides similar data, e.g. on the level of trust in politicians and the reliability of police services for
142 countries.
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panel of international experts. This index does not measure state fragility but only the
related concept of “negative peace”. Very broad measures of state fragility have also
been left aside but, for the sake of completeness, shall at least be mentioned. Institutes
like the World Bank (through its “World Development Indicators”) or the World Eco-
nomic Forum publish data on the percentage of the population with access to adequate
sanitation and improved water source, the quality of overall infrastructure, electricity
supply, primary education or infant mortality rates. Such indicators certainly capture
the degree to which governments (or other actors) are able and willing to provide public
goods and services. However, as already mentioned, indices that include such indicators
conﬂate the symptoms and consequences of state weakness and are based on a much
broader concept of state fragility than intended by this study. Other available mea-
sures very much resemble one of the selected indices without performing much better
in terms of the countries and years covered or in terms of the availability of data. An
example would be the “Peace and Conﬂict Instability Ledger” which is produced at the
University of Maryland. Earlier versions of this index were authored by the same person
(Monty G. Marshall), who is now in charge of the above described “State Fragility Index
(SFI)” at the Center for Global Policy of George Mason University. The underlying
concepts of these two indices mostly concur (Hewitt 2012, pp. 5–7). The “Index of State
Weakness” of the Brookings Institution and the “Failed States Index” of the Fund for
Peace are both very similar to the SFI, too. However, the “Index of State Weakness”
only covers 141 developing countries (Rice and Patrick 2008). At least in this regard,
the “Failed States Index” seems superior (as it includes 178 countries in 2013). But its
temporal reach (2005-2013) remains comparatively limited. Furthermore, the Fund for
Peace uses content analysis to generate its own data on the same four dimensions as
the SFI that are divided into 12 sub-dimensions. Although a list of the indicators mea-
suring these sub-dimensions is published online, data on the single indicators are again
not provided. Disaggregating the overall index is therefore impossible. Furthermore, the
“Failed States Index” again mixes causes and consequences of state failure. For instance,
in order to measure the social dimension of state failure the index aims to capture the
level of “demographic pressure”. For this purpose, it includes “measures related to nat-
ural disasters” (a possible cause of state failure) as well as “measures related to food
and water scarcity” or “mortality” (possible consequences of state failure). In addition,
“armed conﬂict” directly or indirectly ﬂows into several dimensions of this index. For
instance, “refugees and IDPs” are mentioned as one indicator capturing the social di-
mension of state failure. Another social indicator, “group grievance”, is captured by
measures “related to ethnic or religious violence”. Likewise, the “political and military”
dimension of the index contains a sub-dimension called “security apparatus”. In order
to measure the extent to which the security apparatus enjoys a monopoly on the use of
legitimate force, indicators “related to internal conﬂict, rebel activity or fatalities from
conﬂict” are taken into account.39
39See http://ffp.statesindex.org/indicators (visited on 2013-05-24) .
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“State capacity” is another related concept which broadly overlaps with state fragility
and which has enjoyed some prominence in peace and conﬂict research. The term has
been deﬁned as a three-dimensional concept covering the extractive, coercive and ad-
ministrative capacity of states (Hanson and Sigman 2013). Though it only captures one
of these dimensions, the “most widely acknowledged” single proxy for measuring state
capacity is the tax ratio which, for this reason, is also considered “an interesting proxy
indicator for the state capacity dimension of state fragility” (Fabra Mata and Ziaja 2009,
p. 17). It is argued that governments must be able to extract tax-based revenue to im-
plement their policies, e.g. to raise an army, to maintain law and order or to provide
other public goods and services like education or health care. Thus, the ability to collect
and manage taxes and to ensure popular compliance with tax policy is a sign of state
capacity as much as it is a precondition in the fulﬁllment of state functions and therefor
a precondition for high levels of coercive and administrative state capacity. To some
degree, taxation might also represent the willingness on the part of the population to
transfer private resources to the government. For this reason, high levels of tax-revenue
might reﬂect high levels of state legitimacy which ensures political stability. The main
point of critique that has been put forward against this measure of state capacity is that
diﬀerent kinds of taxes require diﬀerent levels of state capacity. “Taxing trade is rela-
tively easy from a bureaucratic standpoint, while taxing personal and corporate income
requires signiﬁcant administrative sophistication” (Hanson and Sigman 2013, p. 15).
“Mineral production or oil proﬁts are [also] an easy target for revenue for a government
that does not require imposition of cost on the population” (Arbetman-Rabinowitz and
Johnson 2007, p. 6). This explains why the tax ratio of fragile but resource-rich states
(such as Iraq, Angola and Equatorial Guinea) is surprisingly high. These countries col-
lect approximately 35 percent of their GDP in tax (Fabra Mata and Ziaja 2009, p. 17).
In addition, endogeneity is again of concern: state capacity rests “on a set of social, eco-
nomic and political factors that are diﬃcult to distinguish analytically from the concept
itself” – most importantly armed conﬂict (Hanson and Sigman 2013, p. 10). Political
instability and especially open warfare aﬀect countries’ ability to extract revenue as
much as weak state capacity as indicated by the inability to extract tax revenue can
be linked with the emergence of armed conﬂict. Likewise, it is important to consider
alternative explanations: For instance, lower tax revenues in wealthier countries might
not be due to a lack of capacity to collect taxes but rather due to political diﬃculties of
raising taxes (Hanson and Sigman 2013, p. 11). These concerns have been taken seriously
by Arbetman and Kugler (1997), who came up with an alternative measure which has
been recently updated by Arbetman-Rabinowitz and Johnson (2007). Their measure of
“Relative Political Capacity” expresses the actual level of tax revenue as a percentage
of the expected level of tax revenue which they construct by taking those variables into
account that determine potential tax collection (i.e. income levels and the economic
structure of a country). More precisely, in predicting the expected level of tax revenue
the authors consider a country’s level of industrialization and its shares of crude oil
exports, mining and total exports in GDP.40 Again, the idea is that “eﬃcient govern-
40See Arbetman-Rabinowitz and Johnson (2007, pp. 6 sq.) or Hanson and Sigman (2013, pp. 6, 16).
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ments are able to meet or exceed their expected extractive capabilities [while] ineﬃcient
governments fail to reach their expected extraction levels” (Arbetman-Rabinowitz and
Johnson 2007, p. 2). The major advantage of this measure of state capacity is that it
“allow[s] for an assessment of the eﬃciency and performance of a government (in relation
to its expected performance) that does not reﬂect resource allocation and is not tied to
institutional design” (Arbetman-Rabinowitz and Johnson 2007, p. 4). Highly capable
political entities are not necessarily stable and democratic systems (i.e. free, represen-
tative, participatory etc.) as implicitly assumed by many other capacity and fragility
measures. Unfortunately, there is seldom reliable data on taxation in countries that are
most fragile (Fabra Mata and Ziaja 2009, p. 17). The problem of incomplete data is also
mentioned by Rice and Patrick (2008, p. 8) as a major obstacle in regard to data on
tax-collection capacity. Hanson and Sigman (2013, pp. 14, 9, 10) complain that data
on taxation “are quite sparse for years prior to 1972”. In general, “available data on
state capacity cover only small groups of countries or small periods of time”. For this
reason, they pessimistically conclude that “there is little possibility at present to conduct
meaningful quantitative research”.
Another dimension of state capacity, the coercive capacity of states, is usually opera-
tionalized as military spending or military personnel per capita.41 Unlike any of the so
far presented indicators, this proxy is endogenous to the risk of internal armed conﬂict.
The level of military expenditure always reﬂects expectations of future violence. For
this reason, plausible theoretical arguments exist linking higher levels in military expen-
diture and employment to more political stability and an enhanced repressive capacity
as well as to higher levels of corruption and therefore to less political stability. A large
and expensive military might reﬂect a strong coercive capacity of the state as much as
the necessity of a huge and costly military apparatus is a sign of weakness/a situation
of instability. Accordingly, the results of studies that are predicting the outbreak, in-
cidence or duration of internal armed conﬂict and that are including these measures as
independent variables are mixed or even contradictory.42
The above intended to provide an overview of existing eﬀorts to measure state fragility.
Because an internationally accepted deﬁnition of state fragility is still missing, multiple
understandings of the concept as well as instruments to measure it have emerged – not
without their limitations. The background concepts (i.e. the basic understandings of
“state” and “fragility”) of these measures diﬀer as much as their comprehensiveness.
More precisely, existing measures disagree on whether fragility refers to society as a
whole or to the state only (and if yes, whether it refers to the functioning of state insti-
tutions or includes ideas of good governance, democratic rule and extensive public service
provision). At least a simple and agreed upon working deﬁnition of state fragility seems
to be emerging which stresses the fact that fragile states lack core state functions like
41See e.g. DeRouen and Sobek (2004); Mason and Fett (1996); Balch-Lindsay and Enterline (2000); J.
Li (2002); Walter (2006); Walter (2009, Chapter 4); Henderson and D. Singer (2000).
42For an overview of the pitfalls of this measure and the State of the Art see Hendrix (2010, pp. 274,
277).
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the maintenance of security and basic administration (Stepputat and Engberg-Pedersen
2008, p. 22). Therefore, they are unable to provide basic public services which in turn
undermines their legitimacy. According to Fabra Mata and Ziaja (2009, p. 6), all exist-
ing deﬁnitions of state failure identify weaknesses or failure in regard to one or several
of the following “central attributes of the state: Eﬀectiveness (referring to the question
how well state functions are performed), authority (understood as the enforcement of
a monopoly on the legitimate use of force) and legitimacy (public, non-coercive accep-
tance of the state)”. Agreement also exists on the fact that state fragility can be present
to a greater or lesser degree and therefore needs to be measured as a continuum. The
recognition of this gradation allows for the creation of indices of state fragility. An index
seems to be the most appropriate instrument to measure state fragility given the mul-
tidimensional nature of the concept. Of course, this comes with the general diﬃculties
associated with the construction of indices, i.e. the question which dimensions should be
taken into account, how the individual indicators that are coming from diﬀerent sources
can be brought to a certain range of values (standardization), how they are then again
combined by mathematical operators (aggregation), how great the impact of single indi-
cators or dimensions of state fragility should be on the ﬁnal score (weighting), how one
should indicate the precision of measurement so that the user can judge the reliability
of the index or whether the ﬁnal scores should be used to categorize countries according
to their fragility, e.g. in failing vs. already failed states. The latter requires the identi-
ﬁcation of (theoretically or empirically justiﬁed) thresholds to determine the respective
categories.43
In light of the ongoing discussion on how to deﬁne and measure the concept of state
fragility, I refrain from identifying “the best” indicator. Instead, the following empirical
analysis relies on several of the most widely used indices (or sub-indices and single in-
dicators thereof). In order to select the most appropriate measures, I used four criteria:
Firstly, each indicator is supposed to at least capture what Kaldor (1999) deﬁnes as weak
or fragile statehood. Secondly, the data are available publicly and free of charge with,
thirdly, a proximate worldwide geographical coverage and a maximum temporal reach.
This implies a preference for narrow and direct measures of state fragility (e.g. indicators
of the eﬀectiveness of government institutions or the quality of the bureaucracy) instead
of indirect ones (e.g. high levels of undernourishment or low literacy rates) which cap-
ture the consequences of such ineﬃciencies. I argue that such development indicators
might indirectly provide information on the eﬀectiveness of state institutions as much
as they measure the eﬀectiveness of local, national and international non-governmental
actors – especially in a context where states are unwilling or unable to provide public
services to their citizens and where the international community or private actors are
stepping in.44 Rice and Patrick (2008, p. 17) address the same concern when noting
43For a discussion of these and other methodological and statistical issues see Fabra Mata and Ziaja
(2009, pp. 17 sqq.); Fabra Mata and Ziaja (2010, p. 3).
44See also Fabra Mata and Ziaja (2009, p. 12), who state that “the attempt to measure state capacity to
provide welfare by the percentage of households with improved water supply may be systematically
biased if there are countries in which other actors had considerable inﬂuence on the expansion of this
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that especially in post-conﬂict countries with an international peacekeeping presence,
measures of state fragility are likely to reﬂect the support these countries are receiving
from international institutions or foreign governments in fulﬁlling one or more govern-
ment functions. Obviously, without appropriate controls broad and indirect measures
of state fragility such as development indicators are likely to overestimate the capacity
and governance performance of fragile states. Finally and as mentioned before, I am
looking for indices that do not themselves contain violent conﬂict as one dimension of
state fragility because otherwise a correlation between state fragility and warfare would
be bound to occur. For the same reason, I avoid state fragility indices that include
strongly correlated indicators (e.g. numbers of refugees and internally displaced people
or the level of military spending and employment).
Applying these criteria resulted in the selection of the following measures that shall
be included in the empirical analysis: Firstly, the “State Fragility Index” (the overall
index score and several sub-indices that are measuring more narrow concepts of state
fragility). Secondly, two sub-indices of the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI):
The “BTI Stateness Index” and the “BTI Failed State Index”. Thirdly, two measures
of the eﬀectiveness and the functioning of governments (the “WGI Government Eﬀec-
tiveness Indicator” and the “FH Functioning of Government Index”) and two corruption
measures (the “Corruption Perception Index” and the “WGI Control of Corruption
Indicator”) to capture these speciﬁc aspects of state dysfunction. Amongst the most
parsimonious measures I wish to use are two indicators capturing the weakness of so-
ciety (the number of civil society organizations as counted by Grimes (2008) and the
“BTI Traditions of Civil Society Indicator”) as well as one single indicator measuring
polity fragmentation (the “Polity Fragmentation Indicator” of the Polity IV project).
Data on these measures are either made available through the Quality of Governance
(QoG) Project at the University of Gothenburg in Sweden45 or through the websites of
the immediate authoring institutions. An overview of these selected fragility measures
is given in table D.1 on page 404.
Using these direct measures of state fragility is a major improvement in comparison
with earlier studies which mostly relied on all sorts of proxies. Within the discipline
of peace and conﬂict research, examples range from Fearon and Laitin (2003) who use
GDP per capita to measure the overall administrative, police and military capabilities of
states46, to DeSoysa (2002) who uses the level of trade over GDP to capture state capac-
service”. In addition to foreign and international actors, national and local actors and structures (e.g.
kinship networks, religious organizations and even armed groups) might also provide authority and
public services in collapsing states or regions (Maedl et al. 2011, p. 64).
45I used the QoG time-series version from 30 April 2013; see Teorell et al. (2013).
46Some major points of objection against this measure have already been mentioned. Obviously, state
fragility cannot simply be equated (or necessarily correlates) with poverty. The Economist (2011)
reports that more than a quarter of countries on the World Bank’s lower-middle income list also
appear on the OECD’s list of fragile and failed states. A number of “once-poor states have grown
richer, but no more functional”. The Economist refers to this “new category of countries that mixes
modest aﬄuence with miserable governance” as “MIFFS” (middle-income but failed or fragile states).
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ity, to Buhaug (2010) who relies on the above mentioned “Relative Political Capacity”
measure to capture state strength. Nevertheless, even the selected more valid and direct
measures of state fragility come with some obstacles – especially for large N-analyses.
So far, the temporal and geographical coverage of most available state fragility indices is
very limited. Time-series data are at best available for single indicators and the post-Cold
War era.47 Furthermore, existing measures of state fragility (including all of the above
presented indices) are limited to countries as their ﬁxed unit of analysis which means
they are unable to capture variance in state fragility at the sub-national level. Only very
recent and innovative research heads towards geographically disaggregated measures of
state fragility. For instance, to explore the variation in state failure in Somalia, Maedl
et al. (2011) use micro-level data derived from quantitative interviews with more than
8,000 (male and female) ex-combatants from all regions and all sorts of militias (Sharia,
warlord, business and other kinds of militias). Their local and individual-level indicators
of state failure capture the existence of ﬂourishing grey and black markets, the availabil-
ity of narcotic drugs (khat, hash, alcohol, banji seeds, sniﬃng substances and tablets)
and levels of drug consumption, levels of education and personal health and the degree
of disbelief of citizens in the benevolence of state authorities. The authors ﬁnd large and
signiﬁcant regional diﬀerences in these measures of state failure (especially the Northern
parts of Somalia are less failed than the Southern regions) and conclude that “micro-
level data are indispensable to understand key players within failed states” (Maedl et al.
2011, p. 75). The idea that state strength is not uniform across national territories is
also central to Camber Warren’s research. He explores the relationship between state
capacity and armed conﬂict by relying on new, geo-coded data (satellite recorded images
of nighttime light emissions and data on the reach of broadcast communication technolo-
gies) which capture geographic variation in the level of state penetration. Preliminary
results indicate that groups living in peripheral regions with weak state penetration face
a heightened risk of armed conﬂict even if previously used national-level indicators would
categorize the entire state as rather strong. When using the disaggregated measures of
state capacity, national-level indicators cease to be signiﬁcant in statistical and substan-
tive terms.48 By now, Arbetman-Rabinowitz and Johnson (2007) have also developed
a sub-national version of their “Relative Political Capacity” measure. Johnson (2007)
uses these data in her dissertation and ﬁnds that regions where state capacity is low
and declining are the most likely to experience the most severe conﬂict. Unfortunately,
Fjelde (2009b, p. 24) lacks such sub-national data on the variations in governance in her
analysis of the sub-national determinant of non-state armed conﬂicts in Nigeria. Others
47The data situation only seems a little better when it comes to related concepts, e.g. the concept
of “good/bad governance”. In their time-series analysis Hegre and Nygard (2012) are able to use
seven disaggregated governance indicators to explore the eﬀect of governance on the risk of conﬂict
recurrence between 1960 and 2008. Hanson and Sigman (2013) note that “taken together” their
annual measures of state capacity span 48 years (1960-2008) and 191 countries. A closer look,
however, reveals that none of their 24 indicators in fact includes 191 countries. Nine measures cover
less than 88 countries (one just 34) which is why they latter drop or impute a large number of missing
cases (Hanson and Sigman 2013, pp. 12–15).
48Camber (2010). See his personal website at http://www.camberwarren.net/ (visited on 2014-08-07)
for more information on additional draft papers, e.g. Camber and Schutte (2012).
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rely on more innovative country-level indicators in order to capture the reach or capac-
ity of states. For instance, Holtermann (2012, p. 56) ﬁnds his measures (road density,
telephone density and the percentage of the urban population) to be more powerful than
depth of poverty and lowered economic opportunity costs in order to explain why civil
wars tended to occur in economically less developed countries during the post-Cold War
era. Within his study, the well-known negative association between GDP per capita and
civil war risk disappears when controlling for state reach.
These outcomes are mostly supported by the results of prior studies using national-level
data on state fragility or related concepts. These studies found high bureaucratic quality
to be strongly associated with civil peace in autocratic regimes (Öberg and Melander
2010), with the ability of governments to avoid rebel victory but also with a long duration
of ﬁghting (DeRouen and Sobek 2004). Hegre and Nygard (2012) report that especially
informal aspects of good governance (the quality of the bureaucratic apparatus and
the level of political corruption) signiﬁcantly aﬀect the risk of a renewed outbreak of
internal armed conﬂict, Fjelde (2009a) concludes that increasing corruption associates
with an increased risk of conﬂict onset (except in oil rich states) while others ﬁnd high
levels of political corruption to be related to political instability (Le Billon 2003; Mauro
1995). So far, research has also found high levels of state capacity (especially extractive
and administrative capacity) to reduce countries’ risk of internal armed conﬂict (Fjelde
2009a) and to determine the location of internal warfare: the stronger the state (in
terms of relative political capacity), the further away from the capital the civil war will
be located (Buhaug 2010). High levels of state capacity also help to avoid that a state
will become infected by a civil conﬂict occurring in neighboring territories (Braithwaite
2010) and high levels of state capacity link with economic factors, e.g. increasing growth
rates, high levels of private investment and decreasing inﬂation49, that have been found
decisive in reducing the risk of armed conﬂict.
Because all of these studies only cover conventional (state-based) armed conﬂicts, it
again remains unclear in how far their results change if all kinds of internal armed conﬂict
are included. The following empirical analysis therefore aims to contribute to this state
of the art by studying whether state fragility correlates with the incidence of a certain
kind of internal armed conﬂict. More precisely, I expect that the more fragile a country
the more likely the outbreak of non-conventional (non-state) internal armed conﬂict.
Because increasing levels of state fragility can be plausibly linked to both state-based
and non-state armed conﬂicts, because the New Wars concept remains imprecise in this
regard and because prior research suggests that diﬀerent types of state fragility exert
diﬀerent eﬀects on political stability, I have announced a slight modiﬁcation of the above
hypothesis. The argument is based on the aforementioned observation that countries
score surprisingly diﬀerent on single state fragility indicators/dimensions. For instance,
the Philippines perform above average on the political and social welfare components
of statehood but within the bottom quintile in terms of security as measured by the
49See Arbetman-Rabinowitz and Johnson (2007, p. 3) for an overview.
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State Weakness Index of the Brookings Institutions in 2008 (Rice and Patrick 2008,
p. 20). Back then, the countries’ overall state weakness score (and its GNI per capita)
almost equaled that of Syria.50 However, in terms of social welfare Syria belonged to
the top quintile and its security score is comparatively good while it ranked among the
bottom quintile in terms of the economic and political dimensions of state weakness.51
Obviously, the nature of state weakness greatly varies between these two countries despite
their equal aggregate scores. Ignoring this variance means a lumping together of rather
diverse cases of state weakness. A more sophisticated way of theorizing the relationship
between state fragility and armed conﬂict which takes this variance into account argues
that the nature of state fragility might be important in order to explain the kind of
warfare that emerges. Accordingly, certain dimensions of state fragility are especially
decisive in order to explain the outbreak of the one or the other kind of internal armed
conﬂict: Failure to provide public services and goods and the resulting lack of state
legitimacy are expected to be necessary conditions for the outbreak of conventional
(state-based) armed conﬂicts. In such contexts, armed groups even aim to replace state
authorities. Within the territories they control, they build infrastructure, collect taxes
and provide public goods and services. Maedl et al. (2011, p. 64) add that they might
mediate conﬂicts and have international representations, be involved in extensive legal
and illegal international trade networks and sponsor “diplomatic” relationships with
sovereign states and other movements. The local population starts to sympathize with
the insurgency, which uses its growing legitimacy to mobilize ﬁghters. Initially, the
situation might stabilize until the insurgency has grown big enough to move to the next
stage (the guerrilla warfare stage). A diﬀerent conﬂict scenario might arise in states that
are doing fairly well in terms of the provision of public goods and services and enjoy
legitimacy but fail to fully provide security. In such a context, popular support for a
grievance-based insurgency is comparatively low. However, the lack of state eﬀectiveness
and authority in combination with the occurrence of conﬂict resources might be suﬃcient
for the emergence of non-state violent actors and ﬁghting between them, e.g. over the
rents derived from resource extraction. Although some of these warlords might start
collecting taxes, too, they do so for the purpose of private enrichment instead of the
provision of public goods and services.52
Two sub-indices of the State Fragility Index (SFI) are especially suitable to explore
whether certain dimensions of state fragility relate to certain types of internal armed
conﬂict. In line with the above stated, I expect a lack of overall state legitimacy and
functionality (as measured by the “SFI State Legitimacy Index” and the SFI sub-Index
II) to be signiﬁcantly and positively correlated with the incidence of conventional (state-
based) armed conﬂict while the “SFI State Eﬀectiveness Index” (which measures the
50The Philippines rank 58 and Syria 59 (out of 141 states) on this index.
51See http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2008/02/weak-states-index (visited on 2013-
08-20) .
52E.g. Maedl et al. (2011, p. 65) report that warlords in Somalia “were able to collect taxes and tolls
from the local population in the areas under control. However, most of them were not committed to
providing any public goods and services in return”.
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overall level of state eﬀectiveness and authority independent from armed conﬂict) should
be signiﬁcantly and positively related to the incidence of non-conventional (non-state)
armed conﬂict. The “BTI Failed State Index” and the Polity IV “Polity Fragmentation
Indicator” measure the existence and scope of a state monopoly on the use of force. For
this reason, both seem valid measures of a lack of authority and state eﬀectiveness, too,
and are also expected to especially relate to the outbreak of non-state armed conﬂicts.
I would like to close this section on state fragility measures with some remarks on the
issue of reverse causation. The fact that state fragility and armed conﬂict are endogenous
to each other has repeatedly been mentioned as a theoretical challenge. Endogeneity,
however, also violates the core assumptions of regression models and for this reason
aﬀects any empirical analysis on this matter. Research exploring the eﬀect of state
weakness on armed conﬂict needs to include an “instrumental variable”, i.e. a measure
of the explanatory variable (state fragility) that remains entirely independent from the
outcome variable (e.g. conﬂict experience, the duration of warfare etc.) in order to
rule out reverse causation. A more simple and common solution to the problem is the
introduction of a suﬃciently large time-lag between both variables and to assume that
the lagged variable does not anticipate civil warfare and adjusts accordingly. If one
wishes to study the eﬀect of state fragility on armed conﬂict this means to measure state
fragility prior to/at the outbreak of armed conﬂict.
Only some quantitative studies in this ﬁeld of research are taking the matter of en-
dogeneity seriously and are choosing the appropriate statistical technique to adequately
address the issue. The results of these studies are mixed. For instance, Hegre and Ny-
gard (2012) intend to work with a 20-year time-lag between their formal institutions
index and their conﬂict measure. Because back in time they are lacking governance
data, they are forced to switch to an alternative index. Their ﬁnal results indicate
that the endogeneity bias in their original model is only “moderate”. They “reach the
same conclusions using the instrumented governance variable” (Hegre and Nygard 2012,
pp. 28 sq.). Thies (2010) also argues that common measures of state capacity (the total
revenue/GDP ratio, the total tax/GDP ratio and relative political capacity) could be
endogenous to conﬂict. For this reason, he employs a simultaneous equations model with
the result that his state capacity measures are not signiﬁcantly related to civil war onset
any more.53
53Prior research by the same author found that ﬁscally-based measures of state capacity do not aﬀect
civil war onset but civil war onset reduces state capacity. In addition, state capacity reduces civil
war incidence just as civil war incidence reduces the capacity of states. Finally, “with the exception
of the oil exporter dummy variable, primary commodities play almost no direct role in civil war onset
or incidence. Instead, primary commodities work their direct eﬀects on state capacity in models of
civil war onset or incidence” (Thies 2007, p. 2).
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The requirement of measuring the level of state weakness prior to the outbreak of
internal armed conﬂict greatly reduces the number of possible state fragility indices and
aﬀects the temporal reach of the respective analysis. Only two of the above presented
state fragility measures (the SFI and the World Governance Indicators) cover a more
extended period of time. Both measures are available from 1995/1996 onwards. Relying
on these measures means a conﬁnement of the sample to those cases of internal armed
conﬂicts which happened afterwards (i.e. between 1996/1997 and 2011). I still follow
this approach – at least at the (dyadic) conﬂict and at the conﬂict episode level where
the sample sizes nevertheless remain impressive.
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18. Interim Summary III: The Master-File
Part IV of this book presented and discussed the available data sets that shall be used
within the upcoming comparative analysis. Data on the incidence and nature of non-
state and state-based internal wars are taken from the “New/Consolidated List of Wars”
compiled at the Free University of Berlin. Similar data on state-based and non-state
internal armed conﬂicts (including low-level violence) are provided by UCDP. Thirdly,
I wish to rely on several resources data sets (compiled at the PRIO or by Päivi Lujala
and her colleagues) which contain information on the occurrence and production status
of diamonds, other gemstones, hydrocarbons and drugs. Finally, I have identiﬁed seven
state fragility measures which I will use in order to capture the political context of
internal armed conﬂict/warfare.
Merging data from these various sources required substantive formatting because some
of the original data sets were available on a dyad- or country-year basis while others were
collected on the (dyadic) conﬂict level or country level. Inconsistent coding of dates and
typing errors in the original data sets also had to be set aright.1 At last, I arrived at the
“Master-File” which provides the basis for the following empirical analyses. All conﬂict
1The start and end dates of conﬂict episodes in UCDP’s “Conﬂict Termination Dataset” (v.2010-1)
and in UCDP’s “Non-State Conﬂicts Dataset”(v.2.4-2012) are formatted inconsistently. Opening the
original ﬁles with Excel caused further changes in the format. I counted ﬁve diﬀerent formats (31-
12-2011, 12-31-2011, 2011-12-31, 2011-31-12 and 31-Dec-2011) which I standardize into ISO 8601,
i.e. YYYY-MM-DD (the internationally agreed way to represent dates). This is important in order
to correctly calculate the duration of episodes in days. In addition, the start and end dates of ﬁve
conﬂict episodes were mixed up in the original data sets which I corrected (this concerned the ﬁrst
episodes of the state-based conﬂict with the dyad ID 251 and the non-state conﬂicts with the conﬂict
IDs 155, 379, 174 and 33). Furthermore, the number of episodes was incorrect in the case of the
state-based conﬂict with the dyad ID 433. This conﬂict splits in two episodes (instead of one) which I
also corrected manually. Typing errors resulted in incorrect information about the precision of start
dates in three cases of state-based armed conﬂict (see dyad ID 209, 411 and 243). The respective
parameters have been set aright and now assume the values of 5, 2 and 1 (instead of 15, 12 and
11). Another manual change I made concerns the non-state armed conﬂicts with the conﬂict IDs
150, 128 and 378. In two of these cases, the location of ﬁghting shifted to a neighboring country over
time: Fighting between the Toposa and Turkana started in Sudan and later erupted in Kenya while
the Ogaden and Sheikal Clans ﬁrst fought each other in Somalia and later in neighboring Ethiopia.
In the third case, ﬁghting between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks continued in Kyrgyzstan (in 2010) after the
original location of ﬁghting in 1990 (the Soviet Union) had ceased to exist. In all three cases, the
dyads involved in ﬁghting stayed the same which is why the dyad IDs do not change. In order to
account for the changes in location, I introduced a “country2” variable which contains the additional
country names while the “country” variable now mentions the location of origin of all conﬂicts.
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and resources data sets used in this analysis depart from K. S. Gleditsch and Ward
(1999, p. 398) list of independent states. For this reason, the Master-File also contains
all independent states (175 at the end of 20122) deﬁned by these authors as polities
(excluding so-called “microstates” with less than 250,000 inhabitants) that enjoy “an
independent and relatively autonomous administration over some territory” and that
are “considered a distinct entity by local actors or the states they are dependent on”.3
I then added information on the incidence of internal warfare at the country level.
I used the “New/Consolidated List of Wars” (v.1.3/v.1.1) to count the number of state-
based and non-state internal wars a country has been involved in, the number of country-
years spent in state-based and non-state internal warfare as well as the temporal overlap
of diﬀerent kinds of internal warfare (i.e. the number of country-years spent in multiple
state-based internal wars or in both kinds of internal warfare) between 1946 and 2009.
For each independent state and the post-Cold war era (1989-2009), I added UCDP
data on the incidence of armed conﬂicts. More precisely, I relied on UCDP’s “Non-
State Conﬂict Dataset” (v.2.4-2012) and UCDP’s “Battle-Related Deaths Dataset” (v.5-
2012b)4 to count the number of state-based and non-state dyadic armed conﬂicts a
country has been involved in and to obtain the corresponding (best, high and low)
2From Gleditsch/Ward’s list of independent states I excluded more than thirty historical cases that
had ceased to exist before 1946 (e.g. Prussia 1816-1945 or Orange Free State 1854-1910). Six for-
merly independent states (Zanzibar 1963-1964, Tibet 1913-1950, The German Democratic Republic
1949-1990, The People’s Republic of Yemen 1969-1990, The Republic of Vietnam 1954-1975 and
Czechoslovakia 1919-1992) ceased to exist during the period under study. By now, the territories
of these states are part of the countries of Tanzania, China, Germany, Yemen, Vietnam and The
Czech Republic and included as such. The Former Republic of Yugoslavia 1918-2006 is included
in the Gleditsch/Ward’s list of independent states as well as the smaller states into which this na-
tion disintegrated in 2006. Cases like Greenland (an autonomous country within the Kingdom of
Denmark), French Polynesia and French Guiana (overseas regions of France), Hong Kong (a spe-
cial administrative region of China), Puerto Rico (an unincorporated territory of the US), several
semi-autonomous small islands that remain under foreign administration (e.g. American Samoa, An-
guilla„ the Cayman Islands, the Cook Islands or Martinique) as well as West Bank and Gaza are per
deﬁnition excluded from the Gleditsch/Ward list of independent states. Newly independent states
with more than 250,000 inhabitants (South Sudan 2011-present, Kosovo 2008-present, Montenegro
2006-present, Serbia 2006-present and East Timor 2002-present) are covered by the Gleditsch/Ward
list and part of this study as well.
3This understanding of an independent state is slightly more encompassing than UCDP/PRIO’s deﬁni-
tion of a sovereign state. According to UCDP/PRIO, “a state” is either an internationally recognized
sovereign government controlling a speciﬁc territory or an internationally unrecognized government
controlling a speciﬁed territory whose sovereignty is not disputed by another internationally recognized
sovereign government previously controlling the same territory (see e.g. the UCDP/PRIO “Armed
Conﬂict Dataset Codebook, v.4-2014”, at http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_
prio_armed_conflict_dataset/ (visited on 2014-07-20) ). If microstates are taken into considera-
tion Gleditsch/Ward’s list of independent states and UCDP/PRIO’s list of sovereign states mostly
concur. Only the sovereignty dates diﬀer in a few cases and UCDP/PRIO include one additional
microstate (Hyderabadh) which Gleditsch/Ward do not consider independent as they were unable to
ﬁnd evidence of any states recognizing this polity. For version 5.0 of the Gleditsch/Ward list of inde-
pendent states see http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/statelist.html (visited on 2013-06-25)
. This version is updated through 31 December 2012 and was posted on 14 March 2013.
4I used the dyad-year version of this data set and included internal armed conﬂicts only.
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estimates of battle-related deaths per country. I again included indicators measuring
the duration of both kinds of internal armed conﬂict and their temporal overlap (i.e.
the number of country-years aﬀected by (at least one) state-based armed conﬂict, the
number of country-years aﬀected by (at least one) non-state armed conﬂict and the
number of country-years aﬀected by both kinds of internal armed conﬂict). Despite the
conﬂict data, I added PRIO data on the occurrence and production of conﬂict resources
(primary and/or secondary diamonds, other gemstones, drugs and onshore and oﬀshore
oil/gas) also at the country level. Dummy variables indicate whether these resources
were known to occur or produced within the respective country prior to/during the
occurrence of the ﬁrst internal war (of any kind).5 Finally, each country was assigned its
level of state weakness as provided by the averages of the above-mentioned measures.6
Thewar-level version of the Master-File is based on data provided by the “New/Con-
solidated List of Wars” and covers all cases of internal warfare between 1945 and 2009.
Dummies indicate whether warfare was non-state or state-based in nature and whether
government troops or leftovers are mentioned as one of the violent actors. Minimum and
maximum estimates of the number of battle-related deaths are available for most of the
post-1989 cases, only. In addition, the number of involved actors (and their names) as
well as the number of parties to each case of internal warfare are given. The duration of
warfare is also provided (in years) in addition to information on the level of state fragility
in the country where warfare took place (I again used the average values of the available
indicators7) and information on the occurrence and production of conﬂict resources. At
this level of analysis, it is possible to account for a temporal overlap between the known
occurrence or the actual production of conﬂict resources and the incidence of internal
warfare. The data set therefore captures whether conﬂict resources had been known to
occur or had been produced prior to/during each case of internal warfare.
The conﬂict-level version of the Master-File contains UCDP/PRIO data on all
(dyadic) internal armed conﬂicts happening between 1989 and 2011. Dummies indicate
whether an internal armed conﬂict belongs to UCDP’s category of a non-state, state-
based or internationalized state-based armed conﬂict. Best, high and low estimates of
battle-related deaths measure the intensity of ﬁghting. Again, the data set provides
information on the occurrence and production of conﬂict resources at the national level
and prior to/during each case of internal armed conﬂict. Information on the level of
5Data on the occurrence and production of conﬂict resources is entirely missing for ﬁve newly
independent states (South Sudan, Kosovo, East Timor, Montenegro and Serbia). I added in-
formation at least on oil/gas and diamond deposits by relying on the CIA World Factbook (
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ (visited on 2014-11-02) ) and,
in the case of East Timor, more detailed information provided by the Revenue Watch Institute
( http://www.revenuewatch.org/countries/asia-pacific/timor-leste/extractive-industries
(visited on 2014-11-02) ).
6Again, SFI data on one newly independent state (South Sudan) was entirely missing. I imputed the
average value of the country (Sudan) from which South Sudan has broken away in 2011.
7State weakness data do not reach back to the 1940s. For this reason, it is impossible to identify the
level of state weakness prior to/at the outbreak of each case of internal warfare.
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state fragility is also given – if data allow one year prior to the outbreak of ﬁghting to
minimize the possibility of reverse causation.8 Finally, the data set gives the actors’
names, their organizational level and for each case of internal armed conﬂict counts the
active years of ﬁghting.
In order to measure the duration of ﬁghting, the latter, however, is a rather rough
indicator. It ignores the fact that within a conﬂict or war-aﬀected year, active ﬁghting
often only happens during one or several short period(s) of time – sometimes just a few
days. In many cases, ﬁghting between two actors quickly results in 25 battle-related
deaths and reaches the yearly threshold in order to be included in UCDP’s data sets.
After a short while ﬁghting levels-oﬀ though it might re-escalate later. Each dyadic
conﬂict then splits into several conﬂict episodes (as deﬁned by UCDP’s “Conﬂict Ter-
mination Dataset”) of various length. For each dyadic conﬂict, I therefore count the
number of conﬂict episodes and, in a next step, further disaggregate each case of dyadic
armed conﬂict into single conﬂict episodes in order to more precisely measure the du-
ration of ﬁghting. For this purpose, I use the exact start and end dates of state-based
conﬂict episodes and the respective precision variables provided by UCDP’s “Conﬂict
Termination Dataset”(v.2010-1). Compatible information on the exact duration of non-
state conﬂict episodes is provided by UCDP’s “Non-State Conﬂict Dataset” (v.2.4-2012).
Unfortunately, the former data set has not been updated since 2009 which is why the
conﬂict-episode version of the Master-File only covers the period from 1989 to 2009.
Because the data ﬁle also indicates whether ﬁghting is non-state or state-based in nature,
it can later be used to compare the duration (in days, months and years) of state-based
and non-state conﬂict episodes which happened during these twenty years.9 Again, the
names of both actors involved in each conﬂict-episode and their organizational levels are
reported. Besides, the data set informs about the occurrence and production of con-
ﬂict resources prior to/during each conﬂict-episode and, if available, the level of state
weakness prior to/at the outbreak of each conﬂict-episode.
8The SFI and WGI measures of state weakness fairly cover the post-Cold War era and can therefore be
used to provide for this kind of information at the conﬂict level where the corresponding Master-File
only covers the 1989-2011 period.
9Several cases of internal armed conﬂict were still ongoing at the point of time when the original UCDP
data had been compiled. I assigned December 31st, 2009 as the episode end date to all ongoing
state-based conﬂict episodes because the source (UCDP’s “Conﬂict Termination Dataset”, v.2010-
1) covers such cases up to the end of 2009. Likewise, I assigned December 31st, 2011 as a ﬁctive
episode end date to all ongoing non-state conﬂict episodes because the source (UCDP’s “Non-State
Conﬂict Dataset”, v.2.4-2012) covers such cases up to the end of 2011. One month/year lasts for
30/365 days. If a state-based conﬂict-episode is assigned a start and an end date with a precision of
one, the quality of data allows for the calculation of the duration of this conﬂict-episode in days. If
both precision variables assume a value of three (or lower), the duration can at best be calculated in
months. Any value above allows for the calculation of the duration of state-based conﬂict episodes
in years, only. If a non-state conﬂict-episode is assigned a start and an end date with a precision of
one, three (or lower) or ﬁve (or lower), the quality of data allows for the calculation of the duration
of this conﬂict-episode in days, months or years. In the remaining cases (if the precision variables
assume a value of six or seven) even the year is assigned based on subjective judgment or entirely
missing. For information on the coding of the precision variables see the respective codebooks.
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Lastly, some information on internal armed conﬂicts is available at the actor level
through UCDP’s “Actor Dataset” (v.2.1-2012). The actor-level version of the Master-
File lists all violent groups that have been involved in at least one state-based internal
armed conﬂict, in at least one non-state internal armed conﬂict as well as those violent
groups who have committed one or several acts of one-sided violence between 1989 and
2011. The data set reports the actors’ names, the country/countries where they had been
active and their levels of organization.10 In addition, the data set provides information
on how these actors were created (whether they broke away from another violent group,
whether they were created by a temporary split in the original movement or whether
they had entered into an alliance with another non-state actor to create a new non-state
actor). I supplemented data on the political context in which these actors were operating,
i.e. on the national and average level of state weakness of the country/countries where
they had been ﬁghting.11 Finally, dummies indicate whether a violent group had been
active in at least one country where conﬂict resources occur or are produced.
Overall, the Master-File contains ﬁve sub-sets of data that diﬀer in terms of their level
of analysis. This conditions the number of observations and the kind of variables they
include. The country-level version of the Master-File covers the period from 1946 to 2009
and 175 independent states, the war-level version of the Master-File covers the period
from 1946 to 2009 and 138 cases of internal warfare, the conﬂict-level version of the
Master-File covers 690 cases of dyadic internal armed conﬂict between 1989 and 2011,
the conﬂict-episode version of the Master-File includes 815 conﬂict episodes happening
between 1989 and 200912 and the actor-level data set provides information on 1,110
violent groups who have been involved in internal armed conﬂict and/or acts of one-
sided violence between 1989 and 2011. Several variables are only available at certain
levels of analysis (e.g. only the war-level version counts the number of parties to each
case of internal warfare and includes a dummy indicating whether an external military
intervention took place while information on the organizational level of the involved
actors can only be provided at the conﬂict, at the conﬂict episode and at the actor
level. Information on the exact duration of ﬁghting in days, months and years is only
included in the conﬂict-episode version of the Master-File). Of course, all observations
contained in the Master-File and its sub-sets are assigned unique identiﬁers (e.g. war
names or conﬂict, dyad or actor IDs) and the regional aﬃliation of each country, war,
armed conﬂict, conﬂict episode and violent actor is reported. A codebook of all variables
and indicators that are included in the Master-File is given by appendix D.1 on page 385
while appendix D.2 on page 398 lists all data sources.
10UCDP requires all actor who engaged in state-based armed conﬂict and who committed acts of one-
sided violence against unarmed civilians to be formally organized in order to be included in its data
sets. The level of organization therefore only varies for those actors who engaged in non-state armed
conﬂict.
11In cases where violent groups had been active in several countries, I used the respective averages of
these two countries. However, more than 90 percent of the violent non-state groups had been active
in one country, only.
12In addition, the conﬂict-episode version of the Master-File contains 234 state-based episodes happening
before the end of the Cold War.
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Data on armed conﬂicts are currently collected and analyzed on the basis of well-
established criteria like the participation of an (internationally recognized) state as one
of the warring parties, a political objective and the exchange of violence in battles.
Recent trends in warfare, however, imply that the importance of all three elements is
decreasing. Today, ﬁghting is often taking place between non-state actors in failing
or already failed states, the objectives of warfare and low-intensity armed conﬂicts are
often economic instead of political and warring factions are frequently targeting unarmed
civilians instead of military opponents. The recognition of these phenomena or changes
not only lead to the development of new theoretical concepts as discussed earlier but also
gave rise to the collection of new data sets on non-state or sub-state wars and conﬂicts,
on the occurrence and production of conﬂict resources, on one-sided violence against
civilians and state failure. These data which I have also described and discussed in
detail signiﬁcantly improve scientiﬁc research in this ﬁeld of study – though major gaps
in data collection persist.
The following empirical analysis uses two of these innovative data sets that provide
information on the incidence of violent battle between exclusively non-state actors. If
there is some truth to the concept of New Wars, these non-conventional (non-state)
armed conﬂicts should rather match the ideal type of New Warfare as compared with
conventional (state-based) armed conﬂicts. This should hold for their political context
as well as for all dimensions of internal ﬁghting because New Wars and Conﬂicts are be-
lieved to be characterized by the coincidence of speciﬁc characteristics. More precisely,
the following empirical analysis tries to uncover whether non-conventional (non-state)
internal wars and conﬂicts tend to occur in more fragile states, whether they are char-
acterized by a comparatively high number of involved actors whose nature (e.g. their
level of organization) also diﬀers, whether they stand out in terms of economic motives,
whether they are more brutal in terms of overall battle-deaths, whether violence is espe-
cially directed against civilians and whether they last signiﬁcantly longer compared with
conventional (state-based) internal wars and conﬂicts. In addition, the above presented
new data sets are used to investigate changes over time, e.g. in the incidence and signif-
icance of non-state and state-based internal ﬁghting. Does the downward trend in the
incidence and intensity of internal armed conﬂict between the mid-1990s and the begin-
ning of the 21st century as indicated by conventional conﬂict data sets reﬂect a genuine
worldwide decline or is it a reﬂection of the deﬁnition and codiﬁcation of internal armed
conﬂict? Does it persist if all kinds of internal armed conﬂict, state-based and non-state,
are taken into account? Along the way, I have also reﬁned some of the main theses of
the concept of New Wars and aimed to better link the dimensions of New Warfare. This
resulted in several additional associative hypotheses which are part of the now following
full list of trends and hypotheses that shall and can be explored within the upcoming
empirical analysis (for an overview see table C.1 on page 383).
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Main Trend and Comparative Hypotheses
Overall Trend
H1/H1a Over time, especially in the post-Cold War era, non-state internal
wars/conﬂicts/conﬂict episodes became the dominant kind of internal ﬁghting [H1] or
are at least of growing signiﬁcance [H1a].
Comparative Hypotheses on the Quantity and Quality of Violent Actors
H2 The number of national armed groups involved in non-state internal wars is sig-
niﬁcantly higher as compared with state-based internal wars.
Hypothesis 2 only applies to the war level, because at the conﬂict and at the conﬂict
episode level an internal armed conﬂict is deﬁned as “dyadic”, i.e. the number of involved
groups of actors always equals “2” and displays no variance.
H3 The likelihood of an external military intervention is signiﬁcantly higher in non-
state internal wars as compared with state-based internal wars.
H3a Formally organized violent non-state groups who engage in non-state internal
conﬂict emerged signiﬁcantly more often by breaking away from another violent group
or by a temporary split in the original movement as compared with formally organized
violent non-state groups who engage in state-based internal conﬂict.
Violent non-state actors who engaged in non-state conﬂict per deﬁnition diﬀer from
those who have been involved in state-based ﬁghting: UCDP requires the latter to be
formally organized in order to be included in its data sets whereas the level of organi-
zation of those actors who engaged in non-state conﬂict varies between informally and
formally organized groups. In order not to compare apples with oranges, it is therefore
necessary to restrict Hypothesis 3a to formally organized non-state actors only.
Comparative Hypotheses on the Role of Conﬂict Resources
H4/H4a Conﬂict resources (especially easily accessible and lootable conﬂict resources
like secondary diamonds, other gemstones or drugs) occur/are produced signiﬁcantly
more often in countries that are experiencing non-state ﬁghting as compared with
countries that are experiencing state-based ﬁghting. | Conﬂict resources (especially
easily accessible and lootable conﬂict resources) are known to occur/produced signif-
icantly more often prior to or during non-state ﬁghting as compared with state-based
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ﬁghting. | Violent non-state groups who engage in non-state internal conﬂict are
signiﬁcantly more likely to operate in a country/countries where conﬂict resources
(especially where easily accessible and lootable conﬂict resources) occur or are pro-
duced as compared with violent non-state groups who engage in state-based internal
conﬂict.
H4b Conﬂict resources that are diﬃcult to access and to loot (primary diamonds or
hydrocarbons) occur/are produced signiﬁcantly more often in countries that are ex-
periencing state-based ﬁghting as compared with countries that are experiencing non-
state ﬁghting. | Conﬂict resources that are diﬃcult to access and to loot are known
to occur/produced signiﬁcantly more often prior to or during state-based ﬁghting as
compared with non-state ﬁghting. | Violent non-state groups who engage in state-
based internal conﬂict are signiﬁcantly more likely to operate in a country/countries
where conﬂict resources that are diﬃcult to access and to loot occur/are produced as
compared with violent non-state groups who engage in non-state internal conﬂict.
Comparative Hypotheses on the Scale and Nature of Violence
H5 Non-state ﬁghting results in signiﬁcantly more direct, battle-related deaths as
compared with state-based ﬁghting.
Within the data section I have mentioned that information on the nature of applied
violence is mostly lacking especially if one wishes to study a large number and all kinds
of internal armed conﬂict. The share of civilian battle-related deaths in overall battle-
deaths remains unknown as well as the number of indirect victims as opposed to direct
ones. Only at the actor level, UCDP informs whether violent groups committed acts
of one-sided violence against unarmed civilians during or besides their engagement in
state-based or non-state internal armed conﬂict. Because UCDP just counts acts of one-
sided violence if they are committed by formally recognized and permanently organized
violent groups, Hypothesis 5a again restricts itself to this kind of actors:
H5a Formally organized violent non-state groups who engage in non-state armed
conﬂict commit acts of one-sided violence against unarmed civilians signiﬁcantly more
often as compared with formally organized violent non-state groups who engage in
state-based armed conﬂict.
Comparative Hypothesis on the Duration of Fighting
H6 Non-state ﬁghting lasts signiﬁcantly longer as compared with state-based ﬁghting.
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Comparative Hypotheses on the Political Context
H7 The degree of state fragility is signiﬁcantly worse in countries experiencing non-
state ﬁghting as compared with countries experiencing state-based ﬁghting. | The
degree of state fragility is signiﬁcantly worse prior to/at the outbreak of non-state
ﬁghting as compared with state-based ﬁghting. | Violent non-state actors who engage
in non-state conﬂict are operating in signiﬁcantly more fragile countries as compared
with violent non-state actors who engage in state-based conﬂict.
Furthermore, I suggested that the nature of state fragility matters in order to explain
the kind of internal warfare that arises. This leads to Hypotheses 7a and 7b:
H7a The degree of state fragility in terms of state eﬀectiveness and authority is signif-
icantly worse in countries experiencing non-state ﬁghting as compared with countries
experiencing state-based ﬁghting. | The degree of state fragility in terms of state
eﬀectiveness and authority is signiﬁcantly worse prior to/at the outbreak of non-state
ﬁghting as compared with state-based ﬁghting. | Violent non-state actors who engage
in non-state conﬂict are operating in signiﬁcantly more fragile countries in terms of
state eﬀectiveness and authority than violent non-state actors who engage in state-
based conﬂict.
H7b The degree of state fragility in terms of state functionality in the delivery of
public goods and services and state legitimacy is signiﬁcantly worse in countries ex-
periencing state-based ﬁghting as compared with countries experiencing non-state
ﬁghting. | The degree of state fragility in terms of state functionality in the delivery
of public goods and services and state legitimacy is signiﬁcantly worse prior to/at
the outbreak of state-based ﬁghting as compared with non-state ﬁghting. | Violent
non-state actors who engage in state-based conﬂict are operating in signiﬁcantly more
fragile countries in terms of state functionality in the delivery of public goods and
services and state legitimacy than violent non-state actors who engage in non-state
conﬂict.
At times, I have already dared to take a ﬁrst and quick glance at the data sets that
are available in order to systematically explore the above presented hypotheses. The
results of earlier studies neither seem to speak in favor of the overall trend nor do
proposed diﬀerences between sub-types of internal armed conﬂict ﬁnd much support.
Contrary to the concept of New Wars the number of non-state armed conﬂicts seems
to be declining (most notably in sub-Saharan Africa) and numbers of battle-deaths are
decreasing particularly (but not exclusively) for non-state armed conﬂicts which also
do not seem to last very long. Nevertheless, caution is appropriate given the fact that
these insights are derived from empirical studies that are not only of a limited temporal
reach but also tend to report highly aggregate ﬁgures. Worldwide averages might mask
real diﬀerences within and across regions. In addition, earlier empirical research only
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investigates some of the trends and theses of interest to this analysis, it almost exclusively
relies on UCDP or PRIO data and rarely is comparative in nature. To overcome these
shortcomings, the following aims to tap the full potential of popular13 and less popular
new data sets14, experiments with the measurement of variables and concepts and covers
diﬀerent levels of analysis.
Associative Hypotheses Linking the Dimensions of Fighting
Two of the above theses (H1 and H1a) are predicting temporal trends. The others are
specifying diﬀerences in means between sub-groups of countries, actors, wars, armed con-
ﬂicts or conﬂict episodes (e.g. between non-state and state-based internal wars) in regard
to a single dimension of internal ﬁghting. These hypotheses will be explored within the
comparative cross-sectional study presented below. A long the road, however, I have
also mentioned a couple of associative or even causal hypotheses that are specifying the
relationship between at least two variables (one dependent and at least one independent
variable) representing diﬀerent dimensions of internal ﬁghting. These hypotheses will
be subject to regression analysis later on and are kept as general as possible. Only if
they include the “level of organization” or “acts of one-sided violence” as the dependent
or independent variable they restrict themselves to sub-sets of actors or conﬂicts, i.e.
to formally organized groups who have been involved in state-based and/or non-state
internal armed conﬂicts or to formally and informally organized groups who engaged in
non-state armed conﬂict, only. These restrictions are again due to UCDP’s coding rules.
As already mentioned, UCDP’s data sets only cover state-based armed conﬂicts between
one (or several) formally organized non-state actor(s) and government troops while the
organizational level of those who engage in non-state armed conﬂict is allowed to vary
between “1” (formally recognized rebel groups who are permanently organized for com-
bat), “2” (informally and non-permanently organized groups composed of members or
supporters of political parties and candidates) and “3” (informally and non-permanently
organized groups composed of members of broader categories of identiﬁcation, e.g. clans,
ethnic or religious groups). A similar bias in the data arises from the fact that UCDP
only counts acts of one-sided violence against unarmed civilians if they are committed
by formally organized groups. Such data cannot be used to explore whether informally
organized armed groups are more likely to engage in acts of one-sided violence against
unarmed civilians as compared with formally organized armed groups.
13UCDP/PRIO’s data on violent actors, non-state and state-based internal armed conﬂicts, diamond
deposits and oil/gas reserves.
14The “New/Consolidated List of Wars”, data on gemstones other than diamonds and drugs, as well as
various state weakness measures.
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If the nature of applied violence constitutes the dependent variable, the analysis there-
fore needs to be conﬁned to formally organized groups. Then, it is however possible to
explore whether formally organized violent non-state actors who are operating in a coun-
try/countries where conﬂict resources occur or are produced are more likely to commit
acts of one-sided violence against unarmed civilians as compared with formally orga-
nized violent non-state actors who are operating in a country/countries where no such
resources occur or are produced (Hypothesis 8). The level of state-weakness serves as
an alternative explanation because the weaker the state in which formally organized
violent non-state groups are operating, the more likely they might be to commit acts of
one-sided violence against unarmed civilians (Hypothesis 9).
Associative Hypotheses Explaining the Nature of Violence
H8 Formally organized violent non-state actors who are operating in a coun-
try/countries where conﬂict resources occur/are produced are more likely to commit
acts of one-sided violence against unarmed civilians as compared with formally or-
ganized violent non-state actors who are operating in a country/countries where no
such resources occur/are produced.
H9 The weaker the state in which formally organized violent non-state groups are op-
erating, the more likely they are to commit acts of one-sided violence against unarmed
civilians.
In addition, I suggested that the level of state fragility impacts upon the duration of
internal ﬁghting – though the eﬀect might diﬀer between kinds of conﬂict. So far, two
reasons have been mentioned supporting the expectation that the more fragile the state,
the longer the duration of non-state armed conﬂicts (Hypothesis 10). I argued that weak
states act less timely and take less rigorous measures to stop ongoing ﬁghting between
non-state forces. In addition, weak statehood facilitates the mobilization of ﬁghters
based on ethnic or religious grounds and in this way links with the use of identity
politics and a long duration of warfare. The eﬀect of state fragility on the duration of
ﬁghting might, however, be diﬀerent in the case of state-based armed conﬂict where state
fragility is more than just a context factor. There, weak states are an active party to
the conﬂict. Thus, the weaker the state, the shorter the duration of state-based armed
conﬂicts (Hypothesis 10a) because weak statehood increases the chances for the rebels
to win quickly. The weaker the government, the sooner the rebels dare to openly attack
state forces in their eﬀort to topple the government whereas in situations where they
face strong governments they apply their hit and run tactic. If they suﬀer setbacks they
retreat and regain strength. Their inability to beat the relatively strong government
once and for all, combined with their strong motivation to keep on ﬁghting until they
ﬁnally win, then explains the long duration of conventional (state-based) internal armed
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conﬂicts.15 Despite the level of state fragility, the occurrence and production of conﬂict
resources might also explain the duration of internal ﬁghting. Especially countries with
a known occurrence or production of easily accessible and lootable conﬂict resources
are expected to spend signiﬁcantly more time in internal ﬁghting as compared with
countries without a known occurrence or production of such resources. Likewise, wars,
armed conﬂicts or conﬂict episodes are expected to last signiﬁcantly longer if at the same
time conﬂict resources are known to occur or are produced within the respective country
(Hypothesis 11). Thirdly, the number of involved groups of actors might matter in this
regard: the larger the number of national armed groups involved in an internal war,
the longer the duration of warfare (Hypothesis 12). Finally, the organizational level of
the involved groups of actors has previously been linked with the duration of ﬁghting.
Due to the above mentioned bias in the data, the corresponding hypothesis restricts
itself to non-state internal armed conﬂicts or conﬂict episodes which I expect to be of a
signiﬁcantly longer duration if they are fought amongst informally organized groups as
opposed to formally organized groups (Hypothesis 13).
Associative Hypotheses Explaining the Duration of Fighting
H10 The more fragile a state before/at the outbreak of ﬁghting, the shorter the
duration of state-based internal wars, conﬂicts or conﬂict episodes [H10] but the longer
the duration of non-state internal wars, conﬂicts or conﬂict episodes [H10a].
H11 At the war level, the (dyadic) conﬂict level and at the conﬂict episode level,
internal ﬁghting lasts signiﬁcantly longer if at the same time conﬂict resources are
known to occur/produced within the respective country.
H12 The larger the number of national armed groups involved in an internal war, the
longer the duration of warfare.
H13 Non-state internal conﬂicts or conﬂict episodes are of a signiﬁcantly longer du-
ration if they are fought amongst informally organized groups as opposed to formally
organized groups.
The organizational level of actors might also help to explain the scale of applied violence.
More precisely, I expect non-state internal armed conﬂicts between informally organized
groups to be signiﬁcantly more intense than non-state internal armed conﬂicts between
formally organized groups (Hypothesis 14).
15“Paradoxically, [. . . ], a strong army, or state, may increase the chances that the rebels will decide
to quit engaging in direct combat, which prolongs the war and limits the ability of the government
to gain a decisive victory. [. . . ] In addition, a strong army may increase the grievance against the
government, which increases the viability of the rebels. This translates into state capacity having
a limited eﬀect on the probability of government victory, while it increases the duration to that
outcome” (DeRouen and Sobek 2004, pp. 307 sq.).
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Associative Hypothesis Explaining the Intensity of Fighting
H14 Non-state internal conﬂicts between informally organized groups are signiﬁcantly
more intense (in terms of battle-related deaths) as compared with non-state internal
conﬂicts between formally organized groups.
Lastly, the quality and quantity of involved actors are interesting dependent variables
themselves that well connect with the political context of internal ﬁghting as well as
with structural factors like the occurrence or production of conﬂict resources. This
leads to the expectation that non-state conﬂicts or non-state conﬂict episodes which are
happening at times when conﬂict resources are known to occur or produced are signif-
icantly more likely to be fought amongst informally organized dyads as compared with
non-state armed conﬂicts or non-state conﬂict episodes which are happening at times
when no such resources are known to occur or produced. Likewise, violent non-state
groups who are ﬁghting non-state armed conﬂicts in a country/countries where conﬂict
resources occur or are produced are signiﬁcantly more likely to be informally organized
as compared with violent non-state groups who are ﬁghting non-state armed conﬂicts
in a country/countries where no such resources occur or are produced (Hypothesis 15).
In addition, the level of state weakness is expected to be positively correlated with the
number of involved violent actors: the weaker the state where internal warfare is taking
place, the larger the number of national armed groups involved in warfare (Hypothesis
16).
Associative Hypotheses Explaining the Quality and Quantity of Violent
Actors
H15 Non-state conﬂicts or conﬂict episodes which are happening at times when con-
ﬂict resources are known to occur/produced are signiﬁcantly more likely to be fought
amongst informally organized dyads as compared with non-state conﬂicts or non-state
conﬂict episodes which are happening at times when no such resources are known to
occur/produced within the conﬂict-aﬀected state. | Violent non-state groups who are
ﬁghting non-state conﬂicts in a country/countries where conﬂict resources occur/are
produced are signiﬁcantly more likely to be informally organized as compared with
violent non-state groups who are ﬁghting non-state conﬂicts in a country/countries
where no such resources occur/are produced.
H16 The weaker the state where internal warfare is taking place, the larger the
number of national armed groups involved in warfare.
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19. Methods of Analysis
For the most part, the following presents the outcome of a comparative cross-sectional
study. This class of research method involves two subsets of a population (e.g. non-state
internal wars vs. state-based internal wars) which are at the same point of time com-
pared with respect to diﬀerent independent variables (e.g. their intensity or duration
of ﬁghting). Depending on the level of measurement of the independent variables and
the number of observations in the sample, I calculate non-parametric or parametric tests
(Student t-Tests for two independent groups with unequal and equal variances, Wilcoxon-
Matt-Whitney tests, Chi-squared-tests or F-tests)1 in order to ﬁgure out whether dif-
ferences in means between the two subsets of the population are statistically signiﬁcant,
e.g. whether non-state ﬁghting is characterized by a signiﬁcantly larger number of in-
volved actors, whether it happens signiﬁcantly more often in a context where conﬂict
resources are known to occur or are produced, whether it happens in signiﬁcantly weaker
states, whether it causes signiﬁcantly more battle-related deaths or whether it is of a
signiﬁcantly longer average duration as compared with state-based internal ﬁghting.
Later on, (OLS or logistic) regression analysis is used in order to explore the relation-
ship between variables (in this case the linkages between dimensions of internal ﬁghting,
e.g. the question whether the number of involved actors signiﬁcantly and positively
correlates with the duration of internal warfare).2
1For two independent groups, the means of continuous variables are compared by Student t-Tests.
This parametric test requires at least interval data, assumes that the data are normally distributed
and that the variances of the two sub-samples are suﬃciently similar. If these assumptions are not
met because data are not normally distribute they can be normalized by transformation (in the case
of positively skewed data, the logarithmic values of the observations are taken and in the case of
negatively skewed data, the squared values of the observations are taken). If an acceptable level
of normality cannot be achieved through transformation or in the case of small samples, a non-
parametric test of signiﬁcance can be performed (e.g. Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Tests, also known as
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test or Mann-Whitney U-Test). Non-parametric tests make no assumption of
the distribution of the data and at least requires ordinal data (i.e. data that can be ranked). If the
two groups that shall be compared are not independent from each other, a paired t-test is used. This
is the appropriate statistical method to compare a change in outcomes before and after a treatment is
applied. If more than two group means shall be compared an analysis of variance (ANOVA) would be
the appropriate statistical method for interval/ratio variables (and a Kruskal-Wallis H-test for ordinal
variables). The means of discrete or dichotomous variables are compared by Chi-squared tests. In
these cases the observed frequency of a measurement is compared with the expected frequency if
the null hypothesis were true. Because the test is inappropriate for small samples, a Fisher’s Exact
Probability Test (F-test) is used in cases where the expected frequencies are very low (< ﬁve percent).
2Regression analysis is applied in order to explore the relationship between a dependent variable and
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For all tests, the respective null hypothesis states that there is no statistical diﬀerence
in means between the two groups being compared or that there is no statistically signiﬁ-
cant correlation between the dependent and the respective independent variable. Unless
otherwise noted, p-values< 0:05 are referred to as statistically signiﬁcant. All empirical
outcomes are provided within the Appendix at the very end of this study.3 Stata/SE
8.0 is the statistical software package used for all data analyses.4
Before presenting the results of the comparative and regression analyses, the empirical
part of this book starts by tracking changes over time in the incidence and signiﬁcance
of diﬀerent kinds of internal ﬁghting with the purpose of ﬁguring out whether non-state
internal wars, armed conﬂicts or conﬂict episodes are the dominant type of internal
ﬁghting or at least of growing signiﬁcance. In order not to lose sight of them, the
corresponding hypotheses are mentioned again at the beginning of each of the belonging
chapters or paragraphs.
two or more independent variables. The signiﬁcance of the relationship is given by the correlation
coeﬃcient (r). Again, non-parametric alternatives exist (e.g. Spearman’s Rank Coeﬃcient) or data
can be transformed if basic assumptions are not met. In the case of a dichotomous dependent variable,
e.g. the kind of armed conﬂict that arises (state-based vs. non-state warfare) or the organizational
level of involved actors (formally vs. informally organized groups), logistical regression analysis is
applied. If the dependent variable is recorded on at least an interval scale, e.g. if the number of
actors involved in warfare or the intensity of ﬁghting in terms of battle-deaths shall be explained, I
use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression
3For an overview of the descriptive statistics supporting or disproving Hypotheses 1 and 1a see table E.1
on page 409 (continuing on the following pages). A schematic overview of the results in support of (or
against) all the remaining hypotheses see table H.1 on page 420 (continuing on the following page).
The regression results in numbers of the selected ﬁnal models are presented in table G.3 on page 416
(continuing on the following pages). A schematic overview of the signiﬁcance of the regression results
of all baseline models and of all reﬁned models (the selected ﬁnal models and their variations) are
given in table G.1 on page 414 and table G.2 on page 415.
4During the analysis I installed several add-ons (e.g. a program called collin to detect multicolinearity)
which can be downloaded from within Stata by using the ﬁndit command. See http://www.ats.
ucla.edu/stat/stata/webbooks/ (visited on 2014-08-05) .
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20.1. The Incidence and Signiﬁcance of Non-State Wars
H1/H1a Over time, especially in the post-Cold War era, non-state internal wars be-
came the dominant kind of internal warfare [H1] or are at least of growing signiﬁcance
[H1a].
The dominance of non-state internal warfare will be measured by the absolute number
of non-state internal wars and the number of countries aﬀected by this kind of internal
ﬁghting within the respective study period as opposed to the number of state-based
internal wars and the number of countries aﬀected thereof.1 Changes in the share of
non-state internal wars capture the growing signiﬁcance of this kind of internal warfare
over time.
Between 1946 and 2009, the “New/Consolidated List of Wars” identiﬁes 138 internal
wars: 120 state-based internal wars in 60 countries and only 18 non-state internal wars
taking place in 16 countries, namely in Cyprus (1964), Burundi (1972-73), Lebanon
(1975-90), Chad (1978-93), Liberia (1990-96), Kenya (1991-93), Sierra Leone (1991-
2000), Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992-95), Afghanistan (1992-2002), Somalia (1992-2009),
DRC/Zaire (1993-94; 1998-2009), Pakistan (1994-95; 2001-2009), Nigeria (1999-2009),
Indonesia (1999-2002), India (2002) and in Tajikistan (1995-1996) (see table B.1 on
page 382). Thus, from a global, cross-sectional perspective non-state wars are by no
means the dominant type of internal warfare – neither in terms of their total number,
nor in terms of their spatial expansion (the number of aﬀected countries).
However, this rather rough statement can be put into perspective by considering
changes over time in the share of non-state internal wars in all annually ongoing in-
ternal wars (instead of only looking at the absolute number of non-state wars within
the entire study period). A regional analysis as well as a comparison of the pre- and
post-Cold War periods also slightly adjusts the above impression.
1This measure does not take country or population sizes into account and considers the total number
of countries as a ﬁxed unit. To study the true spatial expansion of non-state ﬁghting (whether it
aﬀects single provinces or the entire nation) data on the size of the war or conﬂict zones would be
needed.
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Despite their small number, the increasing signiﬁcance of non-state internal wars,
measured by their share in internal warfare, cannot be denied (see ﬁg. 20.1 on the
current page). This trend started before the end of the Cold War.
Figure 20.1.: Share of Non-State Internal Wars in All Annually Ongoing Internal Wars
(1946-2009), in percent and worldwide. Source: own calculation.
After the end of the Cold War, the signiﬁcance of non-state internal wars increased
stepwise: Between 1989 and 1993 the share of non-state wars in internal warfare grew
drastically because this type of warfare gained ground – in absolute as well as relative
terms. This supports Hypothesis 1a. In 1995, the share of non-state internal wars
reached its all time high of 24 percent. Afterwards it shortly dropped (to 13 percent
in 1997) but increased again (to 23 percent in 2002). These more recent developments
are not only explained by increasing numbers of annually ongoing non-state wars but
also by the decreasing or stagnating incidence of conventional state-based civil wars:
The number of annually ongoing state-based internal wars sharply and continuously felt
(from 32 in 1992 to 21 in 1996/97) and afterwards stabilized at around 24 while the
number non-state wars per year remained high until the mid 1990s, shortly dropped but
experienced the just mentioned second phase of growth: Between 1997 and 2002 the
number of non-state internal wars per year more than doubled (from three to seven)
while the number of state-based internal wars had rarely changed since the mid 1990s.
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A comparable leveling-oﬀ process in regard to non-state internal wars only set in after
2003. Since then, 14 to 15 percent of internal warfare is non-state in nature (see ﬁgs. 20.1
and 20.2 on pages 251–250).2 Worldwide and during the entire post-Cold War period,
about 17 percent of all annually ongoing internal wars have been carried out amongst
non-state actors.3
Figure 20.2.: Number of Annually Ongoing Internal Wars and Aﬀected Countries (1946-
2009), by type of warfare and worldwide. Source: own calculation.
2After the end of the Cold War, the number of annually ongoing non-state internal wars increased from
two (in 1989) to seven or eight in (1992-1995). It again dropped to three (in 1997) before reaching
a second high in 2002 of seven ongoing cases. Afterwards, the global number of non-state internal
wars per year stabilized at four.
3In comparison, before the end of the Cold War (between 1946 and 1988) only three percent of all
annually ongoing internal wars have been non-state in nature.
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After the end of the Cold War, most non-state internal warfare happened in sub-
Saharan Africa and in Central and South Asia. Within these two regions, decreasing or
stagnating numbers of annually ongoing state-based internal wars at the beginning or
mid 1990s were accompanied by simultaneously increasing numbers of non-state internal
wars (see ﬁg. 20.3 on the facing page).4 Still, even in these two regions, the total numbers
of annually ongoing non-state wars stayed comparatively low.
At the global level, within the entire post-Cold War period and in every single country-
year between 1989 and 2009, the number of annually ongoing non-state internal wars
remained far from the number of annually ongoing state-based internal wars.5 Only
in two country-years (1993 and 1996) in sub-Saharan Africa, the number of ongoing
non-state wars equaled the number of ongoing state-based wars. If the incidence of
state-based internal wars continues to decrease in this region while the number of non-
state internal wars stabilizes or even increases, this might be the future scenario. At least
in sub-Saharan Africa, non-state internal wars might then dominate internal warfare.
After the end of the Cold War, on average 67 percent of the worldwide and annually
ongoing non-state internal wars but only 28 percent of the annually ongoing state-based
internal wars happened in sub-Saharan Africa. Prior to the end of the Cold War (within
the 1946 to 1988 period), both average annual shares stood at about 17 percent (see
ﬁg. 20.4 on page 254). Diﬀerences in pre- and post-1989 numbers are also grave in the
case of Central and South Asia: Before the end of the Cold War, ﬁve percent of the
annually ongoing state-based internal wars happened in Central and South Asia. For
the period from 1989 until 2009, the region’s average annual share stands at 28 percent.
In addition, during the post-Cold War era and on average 23 percent of the annually
ongoing non-state internal wars took place in this region which experienced its ﬁrst
non-state internal war only in 1992 (in Afghanistan). The rather high average share in
annually ongoing non-state wars of the Middle East and North African region prior to
the end of the Cold War is due to the non-state war in Lebanon (from 1975 to 1990).
Just one other long-lasting non-state war (the one in Chad from 1978 to 1993) and two
short non-state wars (one in Cyprus in 1964 and one in Burundi from 1972 to 1973) also
aﬀected the pre-1989 era.
4In sub-Saharan Africa, the number of non-state internal wars per year grew from one to six between
1989 and 1993 (while the number of state-based internal wars remained high but mostly constant)
before it declined again (to just two ongoing cases in 1997) and stabilized abound three to four
ongoing cases per year. In Central and South Asia, the number of non-state internal wars per year
increased from zero (between 1989 and 1991) to three in 1995. It then also dropped (while the number
of state-based internal wars had already started to decline in 1992). Despite the years of 2001 and
2002, the region has seen just one non-state internal war per year since 1997.
5Within the post-Cold War era, the world has seen just 5 non-state (but 23 state-based) internal wars
per year on average. Sub-Saharan Africa has seen 3.2 non-state (but 6.5 state-based) internal wars
per year on average, Central and South Asia has seen 1.2 non-state (but 6.4 state-based) internal
wars per year on average, East and Southeast Asia and Oceania and Europe have seen 0.2 non-state
(but 4.5/1 state-based) internal wars per year on average, the Middle East and North Africa has seen
0.1 non-state (but 4 state-based) internal wars per year on average and the Americas have seen zero
non-state (but 2.1 state-based) internal wars per year on average.
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Figure 20.3.: Numbers of Annually Ongoing Internal Wars and Aﬀected Countries in
sub-Saharan Africa and in Central and South Asia (1946-2009), by type of
warfare. Source: own calculation.
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Figure 20.4.: Average Regional Shares (1946–1988 vs. 1989–2009) in All Annually On-
going Internal Wars, by type of warfare and in percent. Source: own
calculation.
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This explains why on average 20 percent of the annually ongoing non-state wars took
place in the Middle East and North Africa before the end of the Cold War while after
the end of the Cold War the region’s average share stands at four percent, only.
Obviously, the small number of observations – particularly of non-state internal wars
happening before 1989 – does not allow for a deduction of real patterns over time. Still,
the above examination well reveals a post-Cold War concentration of especially non-state
internal wars in sub-Saharan Africa (and to a lesser extent in Central and South Asia).
This impression is conﬁrmed by other indicators: For instance, after the end of the Cold
War, sub-Saharan African countries accounted for 66 percent of all country-years spent
in non-state internal warfare while the region’s 1946-1988 share stood at 46 percent only.
Again, Central and South Asia is also of concern: this region’s share in country-years
spent in non-state internal warfare increased from zero percent (1946-1988) to 24 percent
(1989-2009) while the regional share of the Middle East and North Africa decreased from
50 percent prior to the end of the Cold War to two percent afterwards. Though sub-
Saharan Africa’s share in new outbreaks of non-state wars appears less dramatic it still
is comparatively high: Before and after 1989, the region accounted for 50 percent of the
new outbreaks while Central and South Asia’s share increased from 25 percent (1946-
1988) to 36 percent (1989-2009). The Middle East and North Africa accounted for 25
percent of the new outbreaks before 1989. After the end of the Cold War, the region
has not experienced any further non-state war. Finally, within sub-Saharan Africa and
Central and South Asia the shares of non-state internal wars in all annually ongoing
internal wars are also steadily increasing or remain comparatively and constantly high
(see ﬁg. 20.5 on the following page). Obviously, empirical developments in these two
regions determine the overall – and therefore not at all global – trend in the incidence
of non-state warfare.
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Figure 20.5.: Inner-Regional Shares of Non-State Internal Wars in all Annually Ongoing
Internal Wars (1977-2009), in percent. Source: own calculation.
After the end of the Cold War, the regions most hit by non-state internal warfare also
experienced the most state-based internal wars. In addition, state-based internal wars
tend to cluster within certain countries. Between 1946 and 2009, 36 out of 120 state-
based internal wars happened in 18 sub-Saharan African states, only, 24 took place in
the Middle East and North Africa (within ten countries), 21 in East and Southeast Asia
and Oceania (in eight countries), 19 in Central and South Asia (in eight countries) and
15 in the Americas (in 12 countries).6 The average number of annually ongoing state-
based internal wars in Central and South Asia almost equals that of sub-Saharan Africa
(6.4 versus 6.5). In fact, the number of annually ongoing state-based wars in this region
seems to be on a long-term rise while in sub-Saharan Africa it has been decreasing since
2002 (see also ﬁg. 20.5). Accordingly, the regional share of Central and South Asia in
the global number of annually ongoing state-based internal wars has been constantly
growing while that of sub-Saharan Africa recently declined (see ﬁg. 20.6).
6If UCDP’s regional coding is used, Africa has seen 40 state-based wars (in 19 countries), Asia 27 (in
14 countries), the Middle East 20 (in eight countries), the Americas 15 (in 12 countries) and Europe
eight (in six countries).
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Since 2004, Central and South Asia is seeing most state-based internal wars per year
in the world. Indonesia and Iraq both experienced seven state-based internal wars which
is more than the total number of European civil wars (ﬁve within four countries) during
the entire post-WW II period.
Figure 20.6.: Regional Shares in the Number of All Annually Ongoing State-Based In-
ternal Wars (1946-2009), in percent. Source: own calculation.
Because geographic clustering seems to be a common phenomenon, the following dis-
cusses the likelihood of a simultaneous experience of several internal wars (of the same or
of diﬀerent type) within a certain country. Between 1946 and 2009, approximately half
of all war-torn countries (33 out of 63) experienced more than one internal war. Thir-
teen states have seen both sub-types of internal warfare (state-based as well as non-state
internal wars) while 20 countries experienced several but exclusively state-based internal
wars. Especially non-state warfare seems to go hand in hand with state-based internal
warfare. Out of those 60 states that have been involved in at least one state-based
war, 22 percent experienced at least one additional non-state war. Contrary to this,
81 percent of those 16 countries with non-state war experience have also been involved
in at least one state-based internal war. Without implying an immediate temporal se-
quence, in almost every of these cases a conventional state-based war preceded non-state
warfare.7
7Only Liberia and Burundi had experienced non-state internal wars before state-based wars broke
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Just one third of those countries that have been involved in several internal wars
have seen these wars being carried out simultaneously (i.e. with a temporal overlap
of at least one year). However, more than half of those states that experienced both
types of internal warfare have been involved in these wars at the same time.8 Countries
which have seen simultaneous state-based and non-state internal warfare remained in
this condition for three to four years on average. Contrary to this, states which have
been involved in several but exclusively state-based internal wars at the same time have
experienced this kind of condition for a comparatively long average duration of ten to
eleven years.9 Within the period of examination, three countries (Bosnia10, Sierra Leone
and Cyprus) have been involved in non-state warfare only. No single country experienced
several non-state wars at the same time.
These results do not support Münkler (2003, p. 21) who, like his colleagues, suggests
that New Wars will “determine the course of violence in the twenty-ﬁrst century in
many parts of the world”. Non-state internal wars are not the dominant type of warfare.
However, in comparison with conventional state-based internal wars their signiﬁcance
is increasing – especially within post-Cold War sub-Saharan Africa. This supports Hy-
pothesis 1a although a global validity seems questionable. In addition, non-state wars
often emerge in post-civil war environments. In such contexts, violent actors are able
to resort to already established structures, e.g. (illegal) channels of supply and trade,
(ethnic or religious) hatred, weapons, well-trained and war-experienced soldiers as well
as new recruits facing low opportunity costs. In such situations state structures might
also have collapsed or are at least severely weakened which facilitates the emergence of
non-state violent actors who battle each other for the control over resources.
out. Afghanistan, Chad, DRC, Indonesia, Kenya, Nigeria and Pakistan started with one or several
state-based internal wars, then experienced non-state warfare and afterwards either continued with
or experienced a new outbreak of one or several state-based internal wars. Lebanon, Somalia and
Tajikistan have ﬁrst seen state-based warfare, than non-state warfare but afterwards no more wars.
8Afghanistan, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, Pakistan and Tajikistan experienced a temporal overlap of at
least one year of non-state and state-based internal warfare. In Chad, the DRC and Somalia non-
state wars broke out immediately (i.e. within one year or less) after conventional state-based wars
had ended. Burundi, Kenya, Lebanon and Liberia experienced both types of warfare though never
within the same year and with a more extensive period of time in between.
9In 1995 and 1996, Tajikistan has been involved in one non-state and one state-based internal war while
Afghanistan has experienced the same scenario twice (in 1992 and 2002). Each year from 1999 to
2002, Indonesia experienced a state-based and a non-state internal war (and, for an overall period of
six years from 1976 to 1978 and from 1990 to 1992, has been involved in several state-based internal
wars). State-based and non-state internal wars also happened at the same time in Nigeria for a total
of eight years (from 2002 to 2009) and in Pakistan for a total of four years (from 2006 to 2009). India
is the only country that has experienced several state-based internal wars at the same time with
non-state warfare (in 2002). This country has been involved in multiple state-based internal wars for
21 years without interruption (from 1989 to 2009). The Philippines, Ethiopia and Sudan are also
especially hard-hit in this regard. They carried out two or more conventional civil wars at the same
time for as much as 38, 16 and 7 consecutive years.
10The “New List of Wars” categorizes Bosnia as a case of non-state warfare (fought between national as
well as external militias with military interventions by Serbia and the NATO). This is in line with
Kaldor (2007, pp. 33–71) who treats Bosnia as a sample case of New Warfare.
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Kreutz (2005) speciﬁcally refers to the close linkage between state-based and non-
state armed conﬂict in Africa. He explains that oftentimes competing parties in civil
conﬂicts were organized along ethnic or geographically distinct dividing lines. Both
sides to the conﬂict not only fought their military rival but also committed acts of
one-sided violence. As a response to these attacks many local communities formed
self-defense militias. The formation of these armed groups has often been encouraged
by the governments as a low-cost means to ﬁght the insurgencies. Later, these self-
defense units also turned against each other. For instance, “[d]uring the conﬂict in
southern Sudan, the government created or armed at least 25 diﬀerent militias to ﬁght
the SPLM, creating numerous non-state conﬂicts [. . . ]. [Another] example of the possible
consequences of such an approach is the situation in Darfur region. Following one-sided
attacks by SPLM on ‘Arabs’ in Gardud in the mid-1980s, local communities started
forming self-defense militias. The government started supporting these militias a few
years later when ‘African’ tribes in the region complained about the lack of response
to famine. After government deliveries of arms to the ‘Arab’ militias, these started
attacking civilians of the critical Fur, Zagawa, and Mazalit tribes in the region. These
groups quickly responded by forming ‘African’ self-defense militias and both non-state
conﬂict and one-sided violence escalated throughout the following decade” (Kreutz 2005,
p. 155). Elsewhere, the author notes that for decades, African governments have relied
on military force and local allies with shared ethnic, political or geographic connections
in order to impose their policies. As a consequence, the primary focus of new rulers
has been on revenge for previous atrocities and to attack potential rivals. Again, such
attacks “tend to create new self-defense militias, and possible non-state conﬂict, as well
as the formation of new rebel groups and state-based conﬂict” (Kreutz 2005, p. 156).
Even though the argument seems plausible, Kreutz (2005, p. 157) rightly stresses the
need to further explore the mechanisms explaining why and when state-based conﬂict
can lead to one-sided violence and non-state conﬂict (and vice versa).
20.2. The Incidence and Signiﬁcance of Non-State Conﬂicts
H1/H1a Over time, especially in the post-Cold War era, non-state internal con-
ﬂicts became the dominant kind of internal ﬁghting [H1] or are at least of growing
signiﬁcance [H1a].
The above analysis relies on the “New/Consolidated List of Wars” which only captures
very intensive ﬁghting in terms of battle-deaths. For this reason, the number of obser-
vations (especially of non-state wars) is very low. In the following, I therefore compare
state-based with non-state armed conﬂicts as deﬁned by UCDP’s “Non-State Conﬂict
Dataset” and UCDP/PRIO’s “Armed Conﬂict Dataset”. Armed conﬂicts included in
these data sets resulted in as little as 25 or more battle-deaths per year and warring
dyad. Unfortunately, the data only allow to trace changes in the incidence and signif-
icance of internal armed conﬂicts since the end of the Cold War until the end of 2011.
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Within this period, however, non-state armed conﬂicts were a lot more common than
state-based armed conﬂicts: UCDP counts 271 state-based armed conﬂicts aﬀecting 53
countries as opposed to 419 non-state armed conﬂicts within 76 countries. If these con-
ﬂicts were evenly distributed throughout the world, each independent state would have
experienced 2.4 non-state armed conﬂicts on average as opposed to just 1.6 state-based
armed conﬂicts. Thus, non-state internal ﬁghting seems to dominate the picture if low
intensity conﬂicts are taken into account.
This impression is reinforced by the fact that over time the global annual number of
new outbreaks of state-based armed conﬂict decreased enormously while the number of
new outbreaks of non-state conﬂicts per year tripled within the ﬁrst decade after the
end of the Cold War and recently seems to be rising again (see ﬁg. 20.7)11
Figure 20.7.: Number of New Outbreaks of Internal Armed Conﬂict (1990-2011), by type
of armed conﬂict and worldwide. Source: own calculation.
Accordingly, the share of non-state conﬂicts in all new outbreaks of internal conﬂict
increased from about 30 percent in 1990 to almost 90 percent in 2000 and still 70 percent
in 2011 (see ﬁg. 20.8 on the next page) while the share of state-based conﬂicts in all new
outbreaks of internal conﬂict decreased from 71 percent in 1990 to just 12 percent in
2000 and 30 percent in 2011.
11I on purpose excluded the year 1989 from this part of the analysis which is the ﬁrst year covered by
the UCDP data. Within this speciﬁc year, it is impossible to diﬀerentiate truly new outbreaks of
internal conﬂict from ongoing cases which had started before.
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Already since the early 1990s and especially since 1998, new outbreaks of non-state
armed conﬂict are much more frequent than new outbreaks of state-based armed conﬂict.
Within the entire post-Cold War era (1990-2011) and on average, two thirds of all new
outbreaks of internal armed conﬂict have been non-state in nature.12 This also speaks
in favor of Hypotheses 1 and 1a.
Figure 20.8.: Share of Non-State Internal Armed Conﬂicts in All New Outbreaks of In-
ternal Armed Conﬂict (1990-2011), in percent and worldwide. Source: own
calculation.
Though non-state armed conﬂicts are superior in terms of their total number within
the entire post-Cold War period and in terms of new outbreaks of armed conﬂict, they
are again in the inferior position when it comes to the number of annually ongoing cases.
This relates to their short duration in comparison with state-based armed conﬂicts that
tend to stretch over several years or even decades. The longer the duration of ﬁghting,
the more likely a situation where multiple armed conﬂicts overlap within certain country-
years. Thus, numbers of annually ongoing state-based armed conﬂicts pile up more easily
and score impressively high.
12The post-Cold War average share of non-state conﬂicts in new outbreaks of internal armed conﬂict
within the single regions is especially high in sub-Saharan Africa (72 percent) and the Americas (71
percent), followed by the Middle East and North Africa (62 percent), Central and South Asia (59
percent), East and Southeast Asia and Oceania (44 percent) and Europe (19 percent). Country
years without any new outbreak of internal armed conﬂict are excluded from this calculation. Over
time, the respective numbers/shares ﬂuctuate greatly. Real (increasing) trends are only observable
in sub-Saharan Africa and Central and South Asia.
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In this sense, “the number of annually ongoing armed conﬂicts” as an indicator privi-
leges the longer-lasting state-based armed conﬂicts over the short-lived non-state armed
conﬂicts. Still, between 1989 and 2011 the numbers of annually ongoing state-based and
non-state internal armed conﬂicts are much closer to each other than the above given
numbers of annually ongoing state-based and non-state internal wars (see ﬁgs. 20.2
and 20.9 on pages 262–251). In 2003, the world has even seen as many non-state armed
conﬂicts as state-based armed conﬂicts.
Figure 20.9.: Number of Annually Ongoing Internal Armed Conﬂicts and Aﬀected Coun-
tries (1989-2011), by type of armed conﬂict and worldwide. Source: own
calculation.
Furthermore, the annual number of state-based internal armed conﬂicts has been de-
clining while the number of non-state internal armed conﬂicts per year does not seem
to follow such a clear downward trend. Until the year 2000 it was increasing, decreased
again until 2007 before another increase set in – though numbers ﬂuctuate greatly be-
tween years.
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Again, worldwide developments are not mirrored by the developments in every of the
single regions. Interestingly, in more than half of the country-years within the post-Cold
War era (in 57 percent), sub-Saharan Africa has seen more annually ongoing non-state
armed conﬂicts than state-based armed conﬂicts. The number of annually ongoing non-
state armed conﬂicts rapidly increased from 12 to 33 between 1997 and 2000/2003 before
decreasing again to as little as six in 2007. The number of annually ongoing state-based
armed conﬂicts experienced a similar decline though less pronounced and earlier (from
1998 till 2005). Recently, both curves have been rising. In 2011, 11 state-based and
15 non-state internal armed conﬂicts were ongoing in this region. Numbers of yearly
ongoing non-state and state-based internal armed conﬂicts are also converging in Central
and South Asia and in the Americas (where recently stable or decreasing numbers of
state-based internal armed conﬂicts are facing increasing numbers of non-state armed
conﬂicts) and in the Middle East and North Africa (where state-based and non-state
armed conﬂicts have been on the rise throughout the last ten years) (see ﬁg. 20.10 on
the following page).
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Figure 20.10.: Number of Annually Ongoing Internal Armed Conﬂicts (1989-2011), by
type of armed conﬂict and region. Source: own calculation.
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Despite the rapid decrease in non-state armed conﬂicts between 2003 and 2007, sub-
Saharan Africa remains the region with the worldwide largest number of annually ongo-
ing non-state conﬂicts at the end of the decade (see ﬁg. 20.11 on the current page) and
the region with the by far greatest share in the number of annually ongoing non-state
conﬂicts and aﬀected countries within the post-Cold War era (see ﬁgs. 20.12 and 20.13
on pages 266–267)
Figure 20.11.: Number of Annually Ongoing Non-State Internal Armed Conﬂicts (1989-
2011), by region. Source: own calculation.
Between 1989 and 2011, the whole region experienced four to 33 non-state conﬂicts per
year which aﬀected three to 11 countries. In 2003, 33 non-state conﬂicts in sub-Saharan
Africa happened in seven countries only (seven in Somalia, six in Nigeria, Ethiopia,
Uganda and the DRC and one in Ivory Coast and Burundi). Thus, within Africa most
of the non-state conﬂicts are concentrated in three sub-regions: the Great Lakes, the
Horn of Africa (if Sudan is included) and West Africa. In fact and until 2011, Somalia,
Nigeria, Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya and the DRC had experienced the most non-state
conﬂicts of all countries in the world, namely 59, 47, 44, 36, 26 and 22. The average
post-Cold War number of yearly ongoing non-state armed conﬂicts in sub-Saharan Africa
is as high as 16. Also on average, these non-state conﬂicts aﬀected 6.52 sub-Saharan
African countries per year.
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Interestingly, the Middle East and North Africa is the region with the second-highest
average number of annually ongoing non-state armed conﬂicts (5.04) aﬀecting 2.26 coun-
tries per year (mostly Sudan and Iraq), followed by Central and South Asia (where
Afghanistan and Pakistan have seen 15 and 18 non-state conﬂicts between 1989 and
2011), the Americas (where especially Mexico and Columbia are aﬀected by this kind
of internal armed conﬂict), East and Southeast Asia and Oceania and ﬁnally Europe.
With the exception of 2010, the latter region has been free of non-state conﬂict since the
mid-1990s.
Figure 20.12.: Regional Shares in All Annually Ongoing Non-State Internal Armed Con-
ﬂicts (1989-2011), in percent. Source: own calculation.
While the regional aﬃliation of most of the above mentioned countries is clear, the
Sudan can either be included in a “Middle East and North Africa” region (as done above
and by PRIO) or it can be included in an “all-Africa” region (as done by UCDP). Due
to the sheer number of non-state conﬂicts in this single country13 the decision on how
to categorize Sudan aﬀects the results of any regional analysis:
13See the above numbers or the 2012 Human Security Report which also notes that between 1989 and
2009, “Sudan alone, with less than 1 percent of the world’s population, has experienced nearly a ﬁfth
of all reported global battle deaths attributable to non-state conﬂicts. Many of the conﬂicts in Sudan
were caused or exacerbated by its government’s deliberate strategy of weakening opposition groups
by pitting them against one another” (HSC 2012, p. 194).
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If the world is divided into ﬁve UCDP regions (namely Europe, the Middle East, Asia,
Africa and the Americas) instead of the above six PRIO regions, the concentration of
non-state internal ﬁghting within Africa and Asia becomes even more apparent. Without
Sudan, however, the Middle East is primarily plagued by state-based conﬂict.14 The
remaining regional shares are not substantially aﬀected by a change from PRIO’s to
UCDP’s regional coding (see ﬁg. 20.14 on the following page).
Figure 20.13.: Post-Cold War Average Regional Shares in All Annually Ongoing Non-
State Internal Armed Conﬂicts and Aﬀected Countries (1989-2011 aver-
ages, PRIO regional coding). Source: own calculation.
14Between 1989 and 2011, UCDP’s Middle East region has seen 91 state-based conﬂicts (mostly in
Turkey, Israel, Iran and Iraq) and 18 non-state conﬂict (mostly in Iraq and Lebanon).
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Figure 20.14.: Post-Cold War Average Regional Shares in All Annually Ongoing Non-
State Internal Armed Conﬂicts and Aﬀected Countries (1989-2011 aver-
ages, UCDP regional coding). Source: own calculation.
The clustering of non-state armed conﬂicts in (sub-Saharan) Africa is again conﬁrmed
by other indicators. On average, a sub-Saharan African country has experienced 5.7
non-state armed conﬂicts within the entire post-Cold War era as opposed to 3.3, 3.1,
0.8, 0.7 and 0.2 non-state armed conﬂicts per country in Central and South Asia, the
Middle East and North Africa, the Americas, East and Southeast Asia and Oceania
and ﬁnally Europe.15 Finally, between 1989 and 2011 ten non-state conﬂicts crossed
international borders. For instance, rival ethnic groups battled each other in an area
joining Ethiopia, Sudan and Kenya during the 1990s and 2000s. Fighting between two
rebel forces in Liberia also spilled over into neighboring Ivory Coast in 1994 and 1995.
Most of these non-state conﬂicts that aﬀected additional countries have occurred in
sub-Saharan Africa, too.
15If UCDP’s regional coding is used, these numbers read as follows: 5.9 non-state armed conﬂicts per
African country (including Sudan), 1.8 per Asian country, 1.2 per Middle Eastern country (without
Sudan), 0.8 per American country and 0.3 per European country.
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It provides for a certain amount of relief that this hard-hit region has at least seen a
short-lived but dramatic decline in the number of annually ongoing state-based armed
conﬂicts. Between 1998 and 2005, their number dropped from 22 to just ﬁve ongoing
cases. Unfortunately, sub-Saharan Africa is the only region that experienced such a
steep cut in the number of state-based armed conﬂicts per year.
Within the same period of time, the numbers of yearly ongoing state-based armed
conﬂicts only decreased slightly in Central and South Asia (from 13 to 10), remained
comparatively low and stable in three other regions (the Americas, Europe and East and
Southeast Asia and Oceania) or even increased rapidly (in the Middle East and North
Africa from 6 in 1998 to 15 in 2006). Due to these more recent developments, other
regions even got ahead of sub-Saharan Africa (see ﬁgs. 20.15 and 20.16 on pages 269–
270). Since 2010, most state-based armed conﬂicts per year are happening in the Middle
East and North African region, e.g. in (South) Sudan, Libya, Yemen or Turkey.
Figure 20.15.: Number of Annually Ongoing State-Based Internal Armed Conﬂicts
(1989-2011), by region. Source: own calculation.
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Figure 20.16.: Regional Shares in All Annually Ongoing State-Based Internal Armed
Conﬂicts (1989-2011), in percent. Source: own calculation.
Within the entire post-Cold War period, however, sub-Saharan Africa still holds the
largest share in all annually ongoing state-based armed conﬂicts – though other regions
are coming comparatively close: on average 27 percent of the annually ongoing state-
based armed conﬂicts that happened between 1989 and 2011 took place in sub-Saharan
Africa (i.e. 13.65 state-based conﬂicts aﬀecting 9.22 countries per year and on average),
followed by Central and South Asia with a post-Cold War average share of 24 percent
(i.e. 12 state-based conﬂicts aﬀecting 4.87 countries per year on average), the Middle
East and North Africa with a share of 21 percent (i.e. 10.04 state-based conﬂicts aﬀecting
6 countries per year on average) and East and Southeast Asia and Oceania with a share
of 15 percent (i.e. 7.35 state-based conﬂicts aﬀecting 3.74 countries per year on average)
(see ﬁg. 20.17 on the next page).
The average numbers of state-based armed conﬂicts per country in each of the six
PRIO regions also diﬀer comparatively little: Within the entire post-Cold War era,
each Central and South Asian country has experienced three to four state-based armed
conﬂicts on average, outperforming the Middle East and North Africa which ranks second
(with 2.3 state-based armed conﬂicts per country) as well as sub-Saharan Africa (with
an average of 2.2 state-based armed conﬂicts per country).
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East and Southeast Asia and Oceania ranks fourth (with 1.3 state-based armed con-
ﬂicts per country), followed by the Americas (0.7) and Europe (0.6).16
Figure 20.17.: Post-Cold War Average Regional Shares in All Annually Ongoing State-
Based Internal Armed Conﬂicts and Aﬀected Countries (1989-2011 aver-
ages, PRIO and UCDP regional coding). Source: own calculation.
16Using UCDP’s regional coding results in the usual regional ranking of 2.3 state-based armed conﬂicts
per African country (including Sudan), 2.1 per Asia country, 1.9 per Middle Eastern country (without
Sudan) and 0.7 per American and per European country.
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These numbers indicate that state-based armed conﬂicts are spreading more evenly be-
tween countries and regions than non-state armed conﬂicts. Nevertheless, both kinds of
armed conﬂict favor the same world regions and oftentimes the same countries. Whether
the ranking of regions in terms of their aﬀectedness diﬀers between kinds of internal
armed conﬂict, however, depends on the regional coding that is used.17 Thirdly, the
ranking of aﬀected countries within the single regions diﬀers between types of internal
ﬁghting: During the post-Cold War era (1989-2011), most non-state armed conﬂicts
in sub-Saharan Africa happened in Somalia (59), Nigeria (47) and Ethiopia (36) while
most state-based armed conﬂicts in this region took place in Chad (17), Somalia (9) and
Ethiopia (8). Within Central and South Asia, most non-state armed conﬂicts happened
in Pakistan (18), Afghanistan (15) and India (8) while India ranks ﬁrst within this region
(and worldwide) in terms of state-based armed conﬂicts (20), followed by Afghanistan
(9) and Pakistan (6). In the Middle East and North Africa far most non-state armed
conﬂicts happened in Sudan (44) followed by Iraq (8) and Lebanon (6) while most state-
based armed conﬂicts took place in Sudan (11), too, followed, however, by Israel (9) and
Iraq (7). Most non-state armed conﬂicts in the Americas happened in Mexico (12) while
most state-based armed conﬂicts in this region took place in Haiti (4). In both cases,
Columbia ranks second. Most non-state conﬂicts in East and Southeast Asia and Ocea-
nia are counted in the Philippines (5) while Myanmar ranks ﬁrst in terms of state-based
conﬂicts (15). In Europe, most non-state armed conﬂicts took place in Russia (6) while
most state-based armed conﬂicts happened in Bosnia (5). In either case Serbia comes
second.
It remains to be said that within the post-Cold War period, countries are again likely
to face both kinds of internal armed conﬂict. As previously, however, only every second
state that has been involved in at least one state-based armed conﬂict also experienced
at least one additional non-state armed conﬂict (41 out of 76 states) while 77 percent
of those countries with non-state armed conﬂict experience have also been involved in
at least one state-based armed conﬂict (41 out of 53 states). Eight countries have been
involved in internal armed conﬂict throughout the entire post-Cold War period.18 India
serves as an example. The country has experienced multiple state-based armed conﬂicts
in every of the 23 years between 1989 and 2011. Multiple non-state armed conﬂicts at
the same time happened in India within 6 years out of the 23 years period. Below the
line 15 country-years have been aﬀected by both kinds of internal armed conﬂict – in this
case even by multiple state-based and at least one or several non-state armed conﬂict(s).
17If UCDP’s regional coding is used, both non-state and state-based armed conﬂicts seem to favor African
countries over Asian countries over Middle Eastern countries. If PRIO’s regional coding is applied,
the ranking of regions diﬀers between kinds of internal ﬁghting: Sub-Saharan Africa ranks ﬁrst in
terms of the average number of non-state armed conﬂicts per country, followed by Central and South
Asia and then the Middle East and North Africa while Central and South Asia ranks ﬁrst when
it comes to state-based armed conﬂicts, followed by the Middle East and North Africa and thirdly
sub-Saharan Africa.
18Columbia, Turkey, the Philippines, Somalia, Afghanistan, Israel, Sudan and India.
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The global averages of these indicators19 are masking great regional divergence: (sub-
Saharan) African countries spent the most country-years in non-state internal ﬁghting
(three to four years on average within the study period) as well as the most country-years
in multiple non-state conﬂicts (almost two years on average) – which is in both cases
about twice as much as the respective global average. The Middle East (with or without
Sudan) also performs above average in terms of country-years lost in internal armed
conﬂict in general and in state-based armed conﬂict in particular. In addition, the latter
kind of internal armed conﬂict tends to overlap especially in this region.20 Whole of Asia
only stands out in terms of its average number of country-years spent in both kinds of
internal armed conﬂict at the same time while the numbers of Central and South Asia
are much more eye-catching: this PRIO sub-region scores ﬁrst in the average number of
country-years spent in multiple state-based armed conﬂicts or in both kinds of internal
armed conﬂict as well as in the average number of country-years aﬀected by state-based
conﬂict and internal armed conﬂict in general. Because the issue again touches upon the
duration of internal ﬁghting it shall be discussed in more detail later.
This section concludes by presenting changes in the signiﬁcance of non-state armed
conﬂict over time (see ﬁg. 20.18 on the following page). With some ups and downs the
share of non-state internal armed conﬂicts in overall internal armed conﬂicts increased
from 20 to 44 percent between 1989 and 2011. Thus, Hypothesis 1a also ﬁnds support
at the conﬂict level. As mentioned before, every second internal armed conﬂict in the
world was non-state in nature in 2003. Worldwide and within the entire post-Cold War
period, 30 percent of all internal armed conﬂict were fought amongst non-state actors,
only.
19Worldwide, within the post-Cold War era and on average any country has spent 4.5 years in internal
armed conﬂict (3.7 years in state-based and 1.7 years in non-state armed conﬂict), has seen multiple
state-based conﬂicts for an average duration of 1.5 years, multiple non-state conﬂicts for an average
duration of 0.8 years and both kinds of internal armed conﬂict for an average duration of just one
year.
20On average, a Middle Eastern country has spent more than seven years of the post-Cold War era in
internal armed conﬂict (as opposed to the global average of 4.5 years), 6.6 years in state-based armed
conﬂict (as opposed to the global average of 3.7 years) and 2.5 years in multiple state-based armed
conﬂicts (as opposed to the global average of 1.5 years).
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Figure 20.18.: Share of Non-State Internal Armed Conﬂicts in All Annually Ongoing
Internal Armed Conﬂicts (1989-2011), in percent and worldwide. Source:
own calculation.
Furthermore, the shares of non-state conﬂicts in all internal conﬂicts are rising within
most of the world’s regions. In Central and South Asia and in the Middle East and North
Africa the signiﬁcance of non-state conﬂicts has been clearly growing since 2000/2001.
Despite a sharp drop in 2006, the share of non-state conﬂicts in all internal conﬂicts
has also been increasing in the Americas since the mid 1990s reaching almost 80 percent
in 2011. Up to 2005, non-state conﬂicts assumed about the same level of signiﬁcance
in sub-Saharan Africa. Though the share of non-state conﬂicts in all internal conﬂicts
dropped in 2007 it quickly recovered. At the end of 2011, almost 60 percent of all internal
conﬂicts in this region were non-state in nature (see ﬁg. 20.19 on the next page).
This explains why the post-Cold War average share of non-state conﬂicts in all internal
conﬂicts is as high as 52 percent in sub-Saharan Africa. Similarly impressive numbers
are reported for three other regions. In Central and South Asia, in the Middle East and
North Africa and in the Americas, 22, 32 and 30 percent of all post-Cold War internal
armed conﬂicts had been carried out amongst non-state actors. Thus, at this level of
analysis the overall global trend seems to be driven by empirical developments in more
than just one or two world regions.
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Figure 20.19.: Inner-Regional Shares of Non-State Internal Armed Conﬂicts in All An-
nually Ongoing Internal Armed Conﬂicts (1989-2011), in percent. Source:
own calculation.
Furthermore, I have mentioned that the annual share of non-state conﬂicts in all new
outbreaks of internal armed conﬂict has also been rising enormously over the years. Like
much of the above, such developments do not support the claim of an increasingly more
peaceful world.21 This assertion can only be maintained if certain indicators are used
and if low-intensity ﬁghting, non-state armed conﬂicts and/or the more recent empirical
developments are not taken into consideration. Moving the analysis to the conﬂict
episode level, the smallest unit of analysis in the context of this study, conﬁrms this
impression.
21See e.g. Straus (2013); HSC (2006); N. P. Gleditsch (2002).
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20.3. The Incidence and Signiﬁcance of Non-State Conﬂict
Episodes
H1/H1a Over time, especially in the post-Cold War era, non-state conﬂict episodes
became the dominant kind of conﬂict episodes [H1] or are at least of growing signiﬁ-
cance [H1a].
At the conﬂict episode level the above results more or less repeat themselves: The total
number of non-state conﬂict episodes within the entire post-Cold War era (between 1989
and 2009) by far exceeds the total number of state-based conﬂict episodes: UCDP counts
366 state-based conﬂict episodes that can be attributed to 242 dyadic state-based armed
conﬂicts (i.e. 1.5 episodes per state-based conﬂict). During the same period of time, 449
non-state conﬂict episodes are reported that are attributed to 380 diﬀerent non-state
armed conﬂicts (1.2 episodes per non-state conﬂict).22 Because non-state conﬂicts are
of a shorter average duration than state-based conﬂicts, it is hardly surprising that they
are less likely to split into multiple conﬂict episodes. Having this in mind, the diﬀerence
in the above mentioned average numbers of episodes per conﬂict appears even strikingly
small.
Again, within the post-Cold War era (1989-2009) the large majority of all annually
ongoing non-state conﬂict episodes happened in sub-Saharan Africa (56 percent, 1989-
2009 average), followed by the Middle East and North Africa (19 percent) and Central
and South Asia (14 percent). In comparison, the geographical distribution of state-based
conﬂict episodes is more even. The most hit region is Central and South Asia where
on average one third of all annually ongoing state-based conﬂict episodes took place (30
percent), followed by sub-Saharan Africa (24 percent), the Middle East and North Africa
(16 percent), the Americas (14 percent) and East and Southeast Asia and Oceania (12
percent) (see ﬁg. 20.20 on the facing page).23 Changing from PRIO’s to UCDP’s regional
coding again points to the inﬂuential role of Sudan. It clearly reveals a concentration of
non-state conﬂict episodes ﬁrst in Africa (68 percent) and second in Asia (17 percent)
and of state-based conﬂict episodes ﬁrst in Asia (41 percent) and second in Africa (29
percent) (see ﬁg. 20.21).24
22To arrive at these numbers I used the episode version of the Master-File from which I excluded 234
state-based conﬂict episodes with an end date before 1989. The remaining sample then includes state-
based and non-state conﬂict episodes aﬀecting the period from 1989 to 2009, i.e. episodes happening
entirely within this period, episodes starting before 1989 but still ongoing in 1989 or later as well
as episodes starting 2009 or earlier but continuing beyond this date. This approach is based on the
impression that UCDP’s coding of non-state conﬂict episodes (that I merged with the state-based
episodes and that need to be compatible therewith) follows the same reasoning.
23Within the entire post-World War II era, East and Southeast Asia and Oceania scores ﬁrst. The
regions average share in the number of annually ongoing state-based conﬂict episodes is 33 percent,
followed by sub-Saharan Africa (17 percent), the Middle East and North Africa and Central and
Southeast Asia (both 16 percent) and ﬁnally the Americas (13 percent) (PRIO regional coding).
24Within the entire post-World War II era, almost half of all annually ongoing state-based conﬂict
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Figure 20.20.: Post-Cold War Average Regional Shares in All Annually Ongoing Non-
State/State-Based Conﬂict Episodes and Aﬀected Countries (1989-2009
averages, PRIO regional coding). Source: own calculation.
episodes happened in Asia (49 percent), 21 percent took place in Africa (including Sudan) and 13
percent in the Middle East and in the Americas (UCDP regional coding).
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Figure 20.21.: Post-Cold War Average Regional Shares in All Annually Ongoing Non-
State/State-Based Conﬂict Episodes and Aﬀected Countries (1989-2009
averages, UCDP regional coding). Source: own calculation.
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Throughout the years, however, there seems to be quite some variation in the regional
shares of at least three world regions: Sub-Saharan Africa’s share in the global number of
annually ongoing non-state conﬂict episodes increased enormously from just 27 percent
in 1989 to as much as 85 percent in 2003. Afterwards, it decreased equally rapidly to 32
percent in 2007 and since than varies between 30 and 50 percent. Sub-Saharan Africa’s
recent decrease is counter-balanced by about the same level of increase in the combined
shares of Central and South Asia and the Middle East and North Africa. In 2000/2001,
only zero/three percent of all annually ongoing non-state conﬂict episodes happened
there. Eight years later, Central and South Asia accounts for over 20 percent of the
annually ongoing non-state conﬂict episodes while in 2007/2009 around 40 percent of
the world’s annually ongoing non-state conﬂict episodes happened in the Middle East
and North Africa (see ﬁg. 20.22 on the current page).
Figure 20.22.: Regional Shares in All Annually Ongoing Non-State Conﬂict Episodes
(1989-2009), in percent. Source: own calculation.
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Compared to this, state-based conﬂict episodes have always been more equally dis-
tributed amongst regions. In addition, the regional shares in annually ongoing state-
based conﬂict episodes remained rather stable over time (see ﬁg. 20.23 on this page).
Figure 20.23.: Regional Shares in All Annually Ongoing State-Based Conﬂict Episodes
(1989-2009), in percent. Source: own calculation.
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Changes in the absolute numbers of annually ongoing state-based and non-state con-
ﬂict episodes also mirror that of state-based and non-state armed conﬂicts. The global
number of annually ongoing state-based conﬂict episodes sharply increased from less
than ten ongoing episodes per year during the mid 1950s to as many as 74 in 1990/1992.
After the end of the Cold War, it decreased signiﬁcantly (to 49 in 2005) before rising
again (to 58 in 2009) (see ﬁg. 20.24 on the current page).
Figure 20.24.: Number of All Annually Ongoing Conﬂict Episodes and Aﬀected Coun-
tries (1946-2009, state-based/1989-2009, non-state), by type of armed con-
ﬂict and worldwide. Source: own calculation.
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Comparable numbers on the incidence of non-state conﬂict episodes only exist for
the post-Cold War period. Between 1989 and 2000, the worldwide number of annually
ongoing non-state conﬂict episodes grew from 15 to 42, then dropped (to 19 in 2007) but
also seems to be on the rise again. Due to greater ﬂuctuation in recent numbers it is,
however, diﬃcult to detect a similar clear trend as seen in the case of state-based conﬂict
episodes. Still, it is evident that the initially steady and rapid increase in the number of
annually ongoing non-state conﬂict episodes lasted a bit longer. The global number of
non-state conﬂict episodes per year was still rising when the number of annually ongoing
state-based conﬂict episodes had already started its decrease (see ﬁg. 20.25 on this page).
This explains the growing signiﬁcance of non-state conﬂict episodes especially between
1989 and 2003 (see ﬁg. 20.26 on the next page)
Figure 20.25.: Post-Cold War Numbers of All Annually Ongoing Conﬂict Episodes and
Aﬀected Countries (1989-2009), by type of armed conﬂict and worldwide.
Source: own calculation.
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Figure 20.26.: Share of Non-State Conﬂict Episodes in All Annually Ongoing Conﬂict
Episodes (1989-2009), in percent and worldwide. Source: own calculation.
Within regions, non-state conﬂict episodes have been of growing signiﬁcance in sub-
Saharan Africa (between 1989 and 2005) as well as in Central and South Asia and in
the Middle East and North Africa (throughout the last ten years of the study period).
These developments are due to increasing numbers of annually ongoing non-state conﬂict
episodes at times when numbers of state-based episodes had been decreasing, stagnating
or only modestly increasing (see ﬁgs. 20.27 and 20.28 on pages 284–285). In the Americas,
the share of non-state conﬂict episodes in all annually ongoing conﬂict episodes has also
been rising (from zero percent in 1989 to 36 percent in 2001 and still 30 percent in 2009)
though the overall annual numbers of conﬂict episodes remain comparatively low.
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Figure 20.27.: Inner-Regional Shares of Non-State Conﬂict Episodes in All Annually On-
going Conﬂict Episodes (1989-2009), in percent. Source: own calculation.
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Figure 20.28.: Number of Annually Ongoing Conﬂict Episodes (1989-2009), by type of
armed conﬂict and region. Source: own calculation.
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21. Interim Summary IV: Main Results of
the Descriptive Analysis
The above challenges the optimistic messages of the 2005 Human Security Report and
the 2006 Human Security Brief which used the same UCDP data but only covered the
2002 to 2003/2005 periods. Due to its limited temporal scope the latter report comes
to the conclusion that worldwide decreasing numbers of internal armed conﬂicts were
mainly due to decreasing numbers of non-state conﬂicts, in particular in Africa. The
update report (the 2012 Human Security Report) still misses the two most recent years
(2010 and 2011) covered above. The authors refrain from deducing a clear trend in the
incidence of non-state ﬁghting but still note that the number of non-state armed conﬂicts
per year “does not appear to be increasing overall”. They again conclude optimistically
that there is “no real support for claims that non-state conﬂicts are becoming more
widespread than state-based conﬂicts” (HSC 2012, p. 186).
In contrast, I would like to emphasize the fact that the number of annually ongoing
non-state conﬂicts has not experienced the same downward trend as the number of state-
based conﬂicts per year which has declined clearly and substantially since 1989. This in
itself is concerning as much as the fact that only the global number of annually ongoing
non-state armed conﬂicts appears rather stable. In the Americas, in sub-Saharan Africa,
in Central and South Asia and in the Middle East and North Africa numbers of annually
ongoing non-state armed conﬂicts have been clearly rising throughout the last ﬁve to ten
years. Because numbers of annually ongoing state-based armed conﬂicts increased less
rapidly, remained stable or even decreased at the same time, the numbers of non-state
and state-based armed conﬂicts per year are converging in these four out of six world
regions. Furthermore, the most aﬀected region (sub-Saharan Africa) has seen more
non-state than state-based armed conﬂicts/episodes per year during the entire post-
Cold War era and in most of its single country-years. After 1989, sub-Saharan African
countries have also spent more years on average in multiple non-state armed conﬂicts
than in multiple state-based armed conﬂicts. Both empirical ﬁndings are surprising
given the comparatively short duration of non-state armed conﬂicts and therefore their
reluctance to pile up within country-years over extended periods of time. I have raised
the general concern that the number of yearly ongoing conﬂicts as an indicator privileges
the more extensive state-based armed conﬂicts over non-state armed conﬂicts. Yet, it
is the indicator of choice of the above mentioned publications. At least other measures
clearly speak in favor of a dominance of non-state over state-based armed conﬂicts.
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For instance, the overall numbers of non-state armed conﬂicts and episodes within the
entire post-Cold War era are immense and much higher than the numbers of state-based
armed conﬂicts and episodes. Between 1989 and 2011, UCDP identiﬁes almost twice as
many non-state as state-based internal conﬂicts. Though non-state armed conﬂicts might
be comparatively short and less intense, their overall and relative number is remarkable.
Another indicator which takes the size of the world’s regions into account (the number
of armed conﬂicts per country) also speaks in favor of a dominance of non-state internal
ﬁghting – worldwide, in sub-Saharan Africa, in the Americas and in the Middle East
and North Africa – as do the numbers of new outbreaks of non-state versus state-based
armed conﬂicts. Already since 1992, the world is seeing (far) more new outbreaks of
non-state than state-based armed conﬂicts per year.
However, non-state armed conﬂicts/episodes have to give in when it comes to their
geographical reach (the number of aﬀected countries) due to their greater (and increas-
ing) tendency to cluster within certain regions and countries. In addition, there is little
danger of a dominance of non-state internal ﬁghting at the war level. During the entire
post-World War II era, in every single country-year between 1946 and 2009, globally
speaking and in every single world region, non-state warfare has been far less frequent
than state-based warfare and aﬀected far less countries. The global and the regional
average numbers of non-state wars per country are also much smaller than the average
numbers of state-based wars per country. Anyways, non-state warfare seems to be a
phenomenon which is mostly conﬁned to post-Cold War sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, non-
state warfare is not the dominant type of internal warfare – no matter which indicator is
used and not even in the most aﬀected regions. In addition, it is noteworthy that non-
state internal wars tend to follow state-based internal wars – oftentimes with a (short)
temporal overlap.
Overall, a dominance of non-state ﬁghting seems debatable (or at least depends on
the geographical perspective, the indicator used and the level of analysis). The growing
signiﬁcance of non-state ﬁghting (at all levels of analysis, worldwide and within most
single regions) is, however, undeniable. Furthermore, the above leads to the conclusion
that covering not only internal wars but low-intensity internal armed conﬂicts is decisive
in catching the entire picture. It allows for interesting since partly contradictory insights.
Patterns in the incidence of non-state and state-based internal wars do not necessarily
seem to be identical with patterns in the incidence of non-state and state-based internal
armed conﬂicts. For instance, non-state warfare did not happen in every world region
– not even if the entire World War II period is taken into consideration – while after
1989 non-state conﬂicts happened in all six regions of the world. Only if both levels of
analysis are taken into consideration the overall number of non-state conﬂicts (419 in 53
countries between 1989 and 2011) appears impressively high and sharply contrasts with
the relatively low number of non-state wars (18 in 16 countries between 1946 and 2009).
Only then it becomes apparent that non-state warfare has been far less frequent than
state-based warfare while non-state conﬂicts/episodes by far outnumbered state-based
conﬂicts/episodes also in their average numbers per country.
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This holds worldwide and within most of the world’s regions, i.e. in sub-Saharan
Africa, Central and South Asia, the Middle East and North Africa and – depending on
the indicator – also in the Americas. Only if low-level violence is considered, it becomes
evident that the post-Cold War numbers of annually ongoing non-state and state-based
internal conﬂicts have always been much closer to each other than the numbers of an-
nually ongoing non-state and state-based internal wars. In other words, the share of
non-state internal conﬂicts in all internal conﬂicts has always been much higher than
the share of non-state internal wars in all internal wars – worldwide as well as within
the single regions. At both levels of analysis, the non-state shares are however increas-
ing. Finally, non-state wars almost exclusively happened in sub-Saharan Africa where
their recent annual numbers remained rather stable or even decreased. In contrast, the
number of non-state armed conﬂicts per year has been on the rise within the last ﬁve to
ten years not only in sub-Saharan and North Africa but also in Central and South Asia
and to a lesser extent in Southern America. Empirical developments in these regions in
the incidence of non-state ﬁghting are critical and deserve further attention.
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22. Comparative Analysis
22.1. Comparison of the Quantity and Nature of Actors
Contrary to conventional civil wars where the number of parties had always been clear,
the authors of the “New/Consolidated List of Wars” were unable to identify clear lines
of opposed parties for about one third of all non-state internal wars. This relates to
the fact that non-state wars are much more likely to involve third parties (who neither
support side A or B but follow their own agenda1) and it links with the expected number
of groups of actors involved in ﬁghting. The corresponding hypothesis reads as follows:
H2 The number of national armed groups involved in non-state internal wars is sig-
niﬁcantly higher as compared with state-based internal wars.
Within the 1946-2009 period and on average, the “New/Consolidated List of Wars”
reports six groups of national actors (median 4) per non-state internal war (N=18) but
only 3.75 groups of national actors (median 3) per state-based internal war (N=120).2
The diﬀerence in means is statistically signiﬁcant (p-value< 0:05). Thus, non-state
internal wars are characterized by a signiﬁcantly higher average number of involved
groups of national actors. This especially holds if extreme outlier cases3 are dropped
1Just about 13 percent of all state-based wars but 56 percent of all non-state wars involved such third
parties (p-value< 0:01).
2The “New/Consolidated List of Wars” does not claim to provide a complete list of actors who have
been involved in state-based and non-state internal wars. Systematic diﬀerences between the two
types of warfare in the data collection cannot be detected. Regular state troops always constitute
one group of national actors in conventional civil warfare. Quasi-state actors (i.e. left-overs from the
national army or splinter groups thereof) are mentioned as an actor in 61 percent of all non-state
internal wars.
3Observations with values equal or beyond the third quartiles by one-and-a-half interquartile ranges are
deemed outliers. Out of all 18 non-state wars, the one in DRC (1998-2009) that involved 17 groups
of national actors is identiﬁed as such an extreme case. Out of all 120 state-based wars, 13 cases that
involved seven or more national groups of actors qualify as extreme outliers. These are the state-based
war in Myanmar (1948-2009, involving 17 groups), four state-based wars in India (1992-2009, 1990-
2009, 1989-2009 and 1996-2009 involving 16, 11, 11 and 7 groups), the state-based war in Uganda
(1987-2009, involving 11 groups), in Iraq (2004-2009, 8 groups), in Ivory Coast (2002-2005, 8 groups),
in Sudan (1983-2009, 8 groups), in Chad (1997-2009, 8 groups), in Colombia (1965-2009, 7 groups),
in the Philippines (1972-2009, 7 groups) and in Ethiopia (1976-1991, 7 groups). An exclusion of these
cases reduces the average number of groups of national actors involved in both types of warfare to
5.35 per non-state war and 3.03 per state-based war (p-value< 0:01).
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from the analysis (see ﬁg. 22.1 on this page), it holds worldwide within the entire study
period but also if only those internal wars are considered that were ongoing after the
end of the Cold War4 or that only erupted in 1989 or later (if four extreme outliers are
excluded)5.
Figure 22.1.: Outliers in the No. of Involved National Armed Groups, by type of warfare
(1946-2009) and worldwide. Source: own calculation, stata 8.0 Graph.
The latter is especially remarkable because the average number of actors involved in
state-based civil wars also increased with the end of the Cold War or even earlier6: On
average, conventional state-based wars that ended before 1989 (N=57) had been fought
amongst 2.53 (median 2) groups of national actors, only. In 1989 or later, 41 state-based
internal wars broke out which on average involved 4.39 (median 3) groups of national
actors. For the same period of time, 14 non-state internal wars are reported that on
average involved 5.5 (median 4) groups of national actors.
4The overall sample then contains 79 internal wars that either erupted in 1989 or later or that had
erupted earlier but were still ongoing in 1989 or later. Diﬀerences between non-state and state-based
wars in the average number of involved groups of national actors are signiﬁcant (p-value< 0:1).
5The overall sample then contains 51 cases of internal warfare. The four identiﬁed outliers are the non-
state war in the DRC (1998-2009, involving 17 groups) and three state-based wars in India (1990-2009,
involving 11 groups; 1992-2009, involving 16 groups and 1989-2009, involving 11 groups). Diﬀerences
between non-state and state-based wars in the average number of involved groups of national actors
are signiﬁcant (p-value< 0:1).
6See also Harbom et al. (2008) for a quantitative study.
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Mean diﬀerences in the quantity of actors between the two sub-types of internal warfare
are particularly large and statistically signiﬁcant in sub-Saharan Africa (p-value< 0:1).7
Other regions either have not seen both kinds of internal warfare or the respective
diﬀerences in means stay statistically insigniﬁcant due to great variances and very small
sample sizes. For this reason, the following results on the quality of involved actors also
primarily apply to sub-Saharan Africa.
Firstly, I wish to explore whether external actors are more likely to engage in non-
state as opposed to state-based internal wars. The transnational character of internal
warfare shall be proxied by the likelihood of an external military intervention, previously
deﬁned as active violent interference (involving military personnel and combat action)
in ongoing warfare from outside by at least one member of the state system (Chojnacki
and Reisch 2008, p. 4). The corresponding hypothesis reads as follows:
H3 The likelihood of an external military intervention is signiﬁcantly higher in non-
state internal wars as compared with state-based internal wars.
Throughout the entire period from 1946 to 2009 and worldwide, military interventions
by external forces in internal wars have been rather unlikely: 64 percent of all internal
wars (N=138) did not see such interventions. However, every second non-state internal
war but only every third state-based internal war experienced an external military in-
tervention. This seems to support the concept of New Wars (Chojnacki 2006b, pp. 52,
63–66). The diﬀerence in these numbers is, however, statistically insigniﬁcant – also if
only those internal wars are taken into account that were ongoing/that broke out after
the end of the Cold War. Even more so, the numbers are blending in. External military
interventions in state-based internal wars are getting more likely while the chances of
such an intervention in non-state internal warfare seem to decrease. About 41 percent of
the state-based and 43 percent of the non-state internal wars with an outbreak in 1989 or
later have seen external military interventions (as opposed to the above mentioned one
third versus 50 percent if the entire 1946-2009 period or those cases that had happened
before 1989 are considered).
Furthermore, there exist large regional diﬀerences. Because most internal wars took
place in sub-Saharan Africa, this region also experienced by far the most external military
interventions. Throughout the entire period from 1946 to 2009, external military forces
intervened in 44 percent of all sub-Saharan African internal wars (i.e. in 20 out of 45
cases of internal warfare). This ﬁgure increases to 59 percent if only those internal wars
with an outbreak in 1989 or later are taken into consideration. Thus, within the entire
study period and after the end of the Cold War the chances of an external military
intervention in any kind of internal warfare are higher in this region as compared with
the global changes of 36 percent (1946-2009) and 43 percent (1989-2009).
7In sub-Saharan Africa, only three percent of all state-based wars (N=36) were fought amongst ten or
more groups of national actors. Contrary to this, one third of this region’s non-state wars involved
ten or more groups of national actors; just one third involved less than four groups.
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Within the entire post-World War II period, 42 percent of the sub-Saharan African
state-based internal wars and 56 percent of the non-state internal wars have seen an
external military intervention. Both shares increase if only those cases with an outbreak
of violence after the end of the Cold War are compared. However, the chances of an
external intervention in state-based internal wars have grown disproportionately fast
leading to the ﬁnding that now external military interventions are even a little bit more
likely in state-based than in non-state internal wars (60 percent likelihood of intervention
versus 57 percent). Still, the diﬀerence remains marginal and statistically insigniﬁcant.
External military interventions are less frequent in the other regions where internal
warfare in general is comparatively seldom. The small number of cases does not allow
for a meaningful comparison of means and a ﬁnal judgment. It shall, however, at least
be mentioned that Europe seems to take a special position. There, external military
interventions in (both kinds of) internal warfare are extremely likely whereas the opposite
applies to Asia. In the latter region, over 70 percent of all internal wars have seen no
external military intervention. The shares of state-based internal wars with such an
intervention (around 30 percent throughout the entire period and even less if only post-
Cold War outbreaks are considered) are much smaller than the respective sub-Saharan
African shares of 42 percent (for the entire period) and 60 percent (for cases with an
outbreak in 1989 or later).
Overall, only disaggregated data will help to fully clarify the role and signiﬁcance of
certain actors in internal warfare. We do not only need to know who has been involved
in ﬁghting, but also when, where and how this involvement took place. Furthermore,
the signiﬁcance of certain groups of actors is better measured by the actual size of their
troops, their relative strength/their share in overall troops or their active participation
in ﬁghting (rather than their mere presence). For a large number of cases, all kinds of
actors and both types of warfare such data are dreams of the future. Despite these data
limitations, however, the above allows some interesting ﬁrst insights in regard to the
number and nature of actors involved in non-state as opposed to state-based internal
wars. In accordance with the concept of New Wars, compared with state-based civil wars
and on average, non-state internal wars involve a signiﬁcantly larger number of national
groups of actors. The signiﬁcance of mean diﬀerences is rather robust. But, non-state
internal wars do not seem to be especially transnational in terms of their actors. At
least external military involvement is also very likely in conventional state-based civil
wars with an outbreak of violence after the end of the Cold War. Thus, at the war level,
Hypothesis 2 ﬁnds support while Hypothesis 3 needs to be rejected.
I close this section with a comparison of the structure and origin of armed groups. This
moves the analysis from the war to the actor level. First of all, I exclude 157 formally
organized state armies from the actor-level version of the Master-File which is based on
UCDP’s “Actors Dataset (v.2.1.2012)”.
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This reduces the sample to a total of 953 non-state armed groups who have been
involved in state-based armed conﬂicts (between 1946 and 2011) and/or in non-state
armed conﬂicts (between 1989 and 2011) and, in many cases, also in acts of one-sided
violence against civilians (between 1989 and 2011). More precisely, 487 of the 953 non-
state armed groups have been involved in non-state internal conﬂicts only, 387 exclusively
engaged in state-based internal conﬂicts and 79 have been involved in both kinds of
internal ﬁghting.
Just one third (32 percent) of those actors who exclusively engaged in non-state armed
conﬂicts were formally organized while the remaining 68 percent were informally orga-
nized. This raises the conjecture that groups involved in non-state ﬁghting are especially
likely to be informally organized. Unfortunately, their level of organization cannot be
compared in any meaningful way with other groups of non-state violent actors (i.e. with
those who engaged in both kinds of internal ﬁghting or with those who engaged in state-
based armed conﬂict, only) because UCDP/PRIO’s coding rules do not allow for any
variance in their level of organization. Groups who engaged in state-based conﬂict always
need to be formally organized in order to be included in the respective data sets. For
this reason it remains an interesting but unresolvable question whether ﬁghting formally
organized government armies actually correlates with (or even requires) some degree
of formalization on the side of the rebels whereas non-state conﬂicts tend to be fought
by informally organized groups or whether this impression is just due to heavily biased
data. At least in theory, there might exist informally organized non-state armed groups
who are ﬁghting formally organized governments whose armed struggle simply does not
qualify to be included in UCDP/PRIO’s data collection eﬀort. What is known from the
above data is that 331 of the 953 non-state actors were informally organized groups (who
exclusively engaged in non-state armed conﬂict) and 622 were formally organized groups
(who either engaged in state-based internal conﬂicts or in non-state internal conﬂicts or
in both kinds of internal ﬁghting).
In addition, only 115 (12 percent) of all 953 non-state armed groups were created
by breaking away from another actor listed in UCDP’s data sets or by a temporary
split in the original movement.8 Thus, a “history of factionalization” is rather unlikely.
Though, it might be more or less common amongst certain sub-groups of violent actors
which leads to Hypothesis 3a:
H3a Formally organized violent non-state groups who engage in non-state conﬂict
emerged signiﬁcantly more often by breaking away from another violent group or
by a temporary split in the original movement as compared with formally organized
violent non-state groups who engage in state-based conﬂict.
8The vast majority (104 of the 115 cases) emerged by breaking away from another group while just 11
emerged by a temporary split in the original movement.
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A ﬁrst look at the data reveals that about the same percentage (11 percent) of actors
had emerged by breaking away from another group or by a temporary split in the
original movement if those actors who exclusively engaged in non-state armed conﬂict are
compared with those who exclusively engaged in state-based armed conﬂict. A history
of factionalization is only more frequent amongst actors who had been involved in both
kinds of internal ﬁghting (22 percent). Again, however, the above mentioned bias comes
into play because these sub-groups of violent actors do not only diﬀer in their history
of factionalization and in the kind(s) of conﬂict they engaged in. They also diﬀer in
their level of organization. Hypothesis 3a therefore controls for this intervening factor
by just comparing formally organized non-state armed groups. This reduces the number
of observations to 543 formally organized non-state armed groups who either engaged
in non-state or in state-based armed conﬂict. If the level of organization is controlled
for, the results clearly speak in favor of Hypothesis 3a: A “history of factionalization”
is signiﬁcantly more likely amongst those formally organized groups who exclusively
engaged in non-state armed conﬂict (N=156) as opposed to those formally organized
groups who exclusively engaged in state-based armed conﬂict (N=387) (p-value< 0:01).
About 35 percent of the former but just 11 percent of the latter had broken away from
another armed group or had emerged after a temporary split in the original movement.9
22.2. Comparison of the Role of Conﬂict Resources
After having explored the number and nature of actors involved in certain kinds of
internal warfare, the following section is dealing with the role of conﬂict resources at
various levels of analysis. Hypothesis 4 states that
H4 Conﬂict resources occur/are produced signiﬁcantly more often in countries that
are experiencing non-state ﬁghting as compared with countries that are experiencing
state-based ﬁghting. | Conﬂict resources are known to occur/produced signiﬁcantly
more often prior to or during non-state ﬁghting as compared with state-based ﬁghting.
| Violent non-state groups who engage in non-state internal conﬂict are signiﬁcantly
more likely to operate in a country/countries where conﬂict resources occur/are pro-
duced as compared with violent non-state groups who engage in state-based internal
conﬂict.
9These results more or less stay the same if the 79 formally organized groups who engaged in both kinds
of internal ﬁghting are included in the analysis, i.e. if actors who exclusively engaged in state-based
armed conﬂict are compared with those actors who engaged in non-state armed conﬂict (sometimes
in addition to state-based ﬁghting).
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Hypothesis 4a and 4b modify the above thesis by restricting it to certain kinds of
conﬂict resources: those that are easy to access and to loot (secondary diamonds, other
gemstones or drugs) and those that are diﬃcult to access and to loot (primary diamonds
or (oﬀshore) oil/gas). The former are expected to especially matter in the context of
non-state ﬁghting (Hypothesis 4a) while the latter are expected to be more relevant in
state-based ﬁghting (Hypothesis 4b). In the following I present and summarize the main
results in regard to Hypothesis 4, 4a and 4b by level of analysis starting with the actor
level.
Most of the violent non-state actors who are listed in UCDP’s “Actors Dataset” and
who engaged in some kind of internal armed conﬂict have been operating in a country/in
countries where some kind of conﬂict resource occurs or is produced.10 Of those actors
who exclusively engaged in non-state armed conﬂict, 99 percent were operating in a
context where conﬂict resources are known to occur or produced as opposed to 94 or
91 percent of those actors who exclusively engaged in state-based conﬂict. Though the
diﬀerence between these two sub-groups of actors appears small in real numbers, it is
highly signiﬁcant (p-values< 0:01). Thus, violent non-state actors who engaged in non-
state ﬁghting are signiﬁcantly more likely to operate in a country/in countries where
conﬂict resources occur or are produced as opposed to those actors who engaged in
state-based ﬁghting.
If only easily accessible and lootable conﬂict resources (secondary diamonds, other gem-
stones or drugs) are taken into consideration, the diﬀerence between these two groups of
actors further increases: about 86 (or 85) percent of the non-state actors who engaged
in non-state ﬁghting were operating in a context where such resources are known to
occur (or are produced) as opposed to 76 (or 74) percent of those actors who engaged
in state-based armed conﬂict (p-values< 0:01). This result seems to be mostly driven
by gemstones and drugs.11 Against expectation, the occurrence and production of (sec-
ondary) diamonds is not especially related to involvement in non-state internal ﬁghting.
Even in the contrary: A signiﬁcantly larger share of those actors who have been engaged
in state-based armed conﬂict were operating in a country/in countries where (secondary)
diamonds occur or are produced.12
10More precisely, 97 percent have been operating in a context where some kind of conﬂict resource
(diamonds, gemstones or oil/gas) occurs and 95 percent have been operating in a context where some
kind of conﬂict resource (diamonds, gemstones, drugs or oil/gas) is produced. In a few cases infor-
mation is lacking on the occurrence or production of conﬂict resources within the country/countries
where a violent actor had been active. These cases are treated as true missings and dropped from
the respective analysis. Depending on the resource, the number of missings varies between zero and
14 (out of 953 non-state actors). If actors who engaged in both kinds of internal conﬂict are excluded
from the analysis, the overall sample comprises 874 groups of violent actors (minus missings).
11Seventy percent of those actors who exclusively engaged in non-state conﬂict (but just 49 percent of
those actors who exclusively engaged in state-based conﬂict) were operating in a country/in countries
where gemstones occur and are produced (p-values< 0:01). Fifty-ﬁve percent of those actors who
exclusively engaged in non-state conﬂict (but just 46 percent of those actors who exclusively engaged
in state-based conﬂict) where operating in a drug producing country/countries (p-value< 0:01).
12Forty-six/forty-one percent of those actors who exclusively engaged in state-based conﬂict but just
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Diﬀerentiating the mere occurrence from actual production of easily accessible and
lootable conﬂict resources does not really aﬀect the results which is hardly surprising
given the fact that little is required to also produce these resources once they are discov-
ered. This changes if resources that are rather diﬃcult to access and to loot (primary
diamonds or hydrocarbons) are considered: In comparison with those actors who ex-
clusively engaged in state-based ﬁghting, those who exclusively engaged in non-state
conﬂict are signiﬁcantly more likely to be operating in a context where such resources
occur (91 versus 85 percent; p-value< 0:01). This contradicts Hypothesis 4b. But, they
are signiﬁcantly less likely to be operating in a context where primary diamonds or hy-
drocarbons are actually produced (66 versus 74 percent; p-value=0.013). The latter is
in line with Hypothesis 4b and the expectation that these resources are of special value
to states – at least in comparison with other conﬂict-relevant resources – because their
point-source character makes it easier for states to control and to tax production. In any
case, the exploitation requires know-how and technology that violent non-state actors
are lacking. Point-source resources are therefore often produced by foreign companies or
at least by large national enterprises. Because insecurity scares away these businesses,
the governments use their tax revenue to stabilize the country and to vigorously defend
these resources in the unlikely event that non-state actors dare to arise and to challenge
the state.13
Most of the above supports Hypothesis 4, 4a and 4b: Compared with the group of
violent non-state actors who exclusively engaged in state-based ﬁghting, those actors
who exclusively engaged in non-state conﬂict are signiﬁcantly more likely to operate in
a context where 1.) some kind of conﬂict resource occurs or is produced, 2.) where
easily accessible and lootable conﬂict resources (especially gems and drugs) occur or are
produced and 3.) where oil/gas deposits are known to exist. Furthermore, actors who
engaged in state-based ﬁghting are signiﬁcantly more likely than actors who engaged in
non-state ﬁghting to operate in a country/in countries where those conﬂict resources are
produced that are diﬃcult to access and to loot (i.e. primary diamonds or (oﬀshore)
oil/gas). Obviously, a distinction between the kind of conﬂict resource and between the
mere occurrence and actual exploitation/production does make sense. Some outcomes,
however, are also against expectation: those actors who exclusively engaged in non-state
ﬁghting are signiﬁcantly more likely than those actors who exclusively engaged in state-
based ﬁghting to operate in a context where conﬂict resources that are diﬃcult to access
and to loot occur. Excluding onshore oil helps to adjust the direction of relationship
which, however, stays insigniﬁcant.
38/24 percent of those who exclusively engaged in non-state conﬂict were operating in a context
where diamonds occur/are produced (p-value< 0:05/p-value< 0:01). Forty-ﬁve/thirty-nine percent
of those actors who exclusively engaged in state-based conﬂict but just 37/24 percent of those who
exclusively engaged in non-state conﬂict where operating in a context where secondary diamonds
occur/are produced (p-value< 0:05/p-value< 0:01).
13If onshore oil/gas reserves are excluded from the measure, the eﬀect persists: In comparison to actors
who exclusively engaged in non-state armed conﬂict, a signiﬁcantly larger share of actors who ex-
clusively engaged in state-based armed conﬂict was operating in a country/countries where primary
diamonds or oﬀshore oil/gas are produced (41 versus 47 percent; p-value=0.061).
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Also against expectation, those actors who exclusively engaged in non-state ﬁghting
are signiﬁcantly less likely to operate in a context where diamonds occur (whether both
kinds of diamonds are grouped together or analyzed separately) and they are signiﬁcantly
less likely to operate in a context where (secondary) diamonds or (onshore) oil/gas are
produced.
Some of these conﬂicting results might vanish within the following section which moves
on to the next level of analysis. At the war, conﬂict and conﬂict episode level the
quality of measurement signiﬁcantly improves because the timing of ﬁghting can be
matched with the dates of discovery and ﬁrst production of conﬂict resources. This is
important as most of the mechanisms linking the occurrence and production of conﬂict
resources with the incidence of (certain kinds of) internal ﬁghting are assuming that
both happened at about the same time. Only if conﬂict resources are known to occur at
times of internal ﬁghting the two factors can be linked with each other in a meaningful
way. Likewise, it does not make much sense to directly link the exploitation of conﬂict
resources with internal ﬁghting if the production of such resources only started within the
conﬂict- or war-aﬀected country after ﬁghting had already ended. This reasoning seems
especially justiﬁed at the war level where the data set covers the entire post-World War
II period and, without this constriction, would include many cases of internal warfare
that happened before conﬂict resources had even been discovered or produced within
the respective countries.14 This leads to the reﬁned question whether conﬂict resources
(and especially easily accessible and lootable conﬂict resources) are known to occur or
produced signiﬁcantly more often prior to or during times of non-state ﬁghting (H4, H4a)
whereas conﬂict resources that are diﬃcult to access and to loot are again expected to
be known to occur or produced signiﬁcantly more often prior to or during times of
state-based internal ﬁghting (H4b).
14The number of such cases, however, greatly varies depending on the kind of resource. For instance,
just one internal war happened in a country where secondary diamonds are in fact produced but
where the exploitation of this resource only started after warfare had already ended. In regard to
the production of primary diamonds, gemstones (other than diamonds), drugs, onshore oil/gas and
oﬀshore oil/gas this applies to 5, 6, 19, 11 and 18 cases of internal warfare out of a total of 138
internal wars.
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The data indicate that of all internal wars between 1946 and 2009 (N=135)15 83
percent happened at times when some kind of conﬂict resource (i.e. diamonds, other
gemstones or oil/gas) had already been discovered within the respective countries.16 In
the remaining 17 percent of all cases of internal warfare, conﬂict resources either do
not occur at all within the respective countries or they occur within the war-aﬀected
countries but were only discovered after the ﬁghting had been over.17
Diﬀerentiating the known occurrence from the actual production of conﬂict resources
during times of warfare again matters – at least in regard to certain conﬂict resources18
and at the regional level (especially in sub-Saharan Africa): 53 percent of all sub-Saharan
African internal wars happened at times when diamonds had been discovered but only
37 percent took place at times when they were actually produced. In the case of sec-
ondary diamonds the later ﬁgure drops to 27 percent, only. One third of all sub-Saharan
African internal wars happened at times when primary diamonds had been discovered
while only about one fourth happened at times when they were actually produced within
the war-aﬀected countries. Finally, about every second sub-Saharan African internal
war happened at times when (onshore) oil/gas had been discovered while only about one
third happened at times when (onshore) oil/gas was actually produced within the respec-
tive countries. Of all internal wars that happened between 1946 and 2009 (N=134)19
83 percent happened at times when some kind of conﬂict resource (diamonds, other
gemstones, drugs or oil/gas) had been produced within the respective countries.
15Three cases – the non-state war in Bosnia (1992-1995) and the state-based wars in Paraguay (1947) and
Vietnam (1960-1975) – needed to be dropped. These wars happened in countries that possess some
kind of conﬂict resource (onshore oil/gas in the case of Bosnia and Vietnam and secondary diamonds
in the case of Paraguay) but the discovery dates of these resources are unknown. Therefore, it is
impossible to ﬁgure out whether conﬂict resources had already been known to occur during times of
internal warfare. In the following, the number of missing cases varies between zero and ten depending
on the kind of resource(s) whose production is considered.
16Of all sub-Saharan Africa internal wars (N=45) 76 percent happened at times when conﬂict resources
were known to occur within the respective countries while the same applies to 71 percent of the
American internal wars (N=14), to 67 percent of the European internal wars (N=6), to all of the
East and Southeast Asian and the Central and South Asian internal wars (N=22 and 24) and to 76
percent of the Middle East and North African internal wars (N=25).
17The latter applies to the following six cases of internal warfare: Greece (1946-1949), Yemen (1948;
1962-1970), Jordan (1970-1971), Kenya (1963-1967) Sudan (1956-1972).
18Especially diamonds and oil/gas: Within the entire study period and worldwide 35 percent of all
internal wars happened at times when secondary diamonds had been discovered but only 27 percent
happened at times when they were actually produced within the respective countries. Only 18
percent of all internal wars happened at times when primary diamonds had been discovered and just
10 percent happened at times when primary diamonds were actually produced. Likewise, 65 percent
of all internal wars happened at times when onshore oil/gas deposits had been discovered but only
57 percent happened at times when onshore oil/gas was actually produced. Finally, 36 percent of
all internal wars happened at times when oﬀshore oil/gas had been discovered but only 25 percent
happened when oﬀshore oil/gas was actually produced.
19Four cases – the wars in Oman (1946), in Somalia (1992-2009; 1988-1991) and in Ethiopia (1976-1983)
– were dropped due to missing information on the production dates of at least one of the conﬂict
resources that are considered (diamonds, other gemstones, drugs or oil/gas).
300
The remaining 17 percent of all internal wars, happened at times when conﬂict re-
sources were not produced within the respective countries – either because production
had already stopped or only started later20 or because production never started, e.g.
because these resources do not occur within the respective countries.
In regard to the main research question, however, signiﬁcant diﬀerences between sub-
groups of internal wars cannot be detected or are based on unacceptably small sample
sizes.21 Non-state internal wars are not signiﬁcantly more likely than state-based internal
wars to take place at times when conﬂict resources were already discovered or produced
within the respective countries – neither worldwide, nor within certain regions, neither
within the entire study period, nor within certain sub-periods thereof, neither if all kinds
of conﬂict resources are taken into consideration nor if the analysis conﬁnes itself to cer-
tain kinds of conﬂict resources. One rare exception are post-Cold War internal wars in
sub-Saharan Africa: In this region, about two thirds of all state-based internal wars but
every non-state internal war that erupted after the end of the Cold War (N=22) or that
was ongoing in 1989 or later (N=30) happened at times when conﬂict resources (dia-
monds, other gemstones or oil/gas) were known to occur within the respective countries
(p-values< 0:01; Chi-squared tests). Still, F-tests fail to reach an acceptable level of
signiﬁcance as does a comparison which is based on UCDP’s instead of PRIO’s regional
coding.
Worldwide and within the entire study period, 66 percent of all internal wars (N=130)
happened at times when easily accessible and lootable conﬂict resources (secondary di-
amonds, other gemstones or drugs) had been produced.22 Again, however, non-state
internal wars are not signiﬁcantly more likely than state-based internal wars to happen
at times when easily accessible and lootable conﬂict resources were produced. This only
changes if the analysis is conﬁned to post-Cold War cases: Worldwide 64 (or 72) percent
of all state-based internal wars but 92 (or 93) percent of all non-state internal wars that
erupted after the end of the Cold War (or that were ongoing in 1989 or later) happened
at times when easily accessible and lootable conﬂict resources were produced within the
respective countries (p-values< 0:01; Chi-squared and F-tests). Signiﬁcant results are
also obtained for sub-Saharan African internal wars with an outbreak in 1989 or later
(N=19). Finally, state-based internal wars are never signiﬁcantly more likely than non-
state internal wars to happen at times when conﬂict resources that are diﬃcult to access
and to loot (primary diamonds or hydrocarbons) were produced.
20This applies to the following nine cases of internal warfare: Greece (1946-1949), Yemen (1948; 1962-
1970), Lebanon (1958), Jordan (1970-1971), Kenya (1963-1967), Sudan (1956-1972) and Uganda
(1966; 1981-1986).
21All internal wars in East and Southeast Asia and in Central and South Asia happened at times when
conﬂict resources had already been discovered. Therefore, a distinction between kinds of internal
warfare does not make any sense. Zero, just one or two non-state internal wars took place in the
Americas, the Middle East and North Africa and in Europe.
22The corresponding regional numbers are 71 percent for sub-Saharan Africa, 96 percent for Central
and South Asia, 100 percent for East and Southeast Asia, 46 percent for the Americas, 29 percent
for Europe and 21 percent for the Middle East and North Africa.
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Thus, at the war level there is at best modest support for Hypotheses 4 and 4a while
nothing speaks in favor of Hypothesis 4b. This changes within the next paragraph.
There, the analysis is moving from the war to the conﬂict level which brings about
two important modiﬁcations: First of all, low-level violence is now taken into account
which signiﬁcantly increases the sample size although, secondly, the temporal scope of
the analysis is shrinking from the entire post-Wold War II period (1946-2009) to the
post-Cold War era (1989-2011). Again, the timing of armed conﬂict can be matched
with the discovery and production dates of the resources to assure that the latter had
already been known to occur or were even produced during times of internal ﬁghting.
As before, most internal armed conﬂicts (91 percent of a total of 682 cases23) happened
at times when some kind of conﬂict resource (diamonds, other gemstones or oil/gas) had
already been discovered within the respective countries. For instance, between 1989
and 2011, 352 internal armed conﬂicts took place in sub-Saharan Africa. Of these, 88
percent happened at times when at least one of the above conﬂict resources was known
to occur within the respective countries. The same applies to 79 percent of the American
internal armed conﬂicts (N=42) and to 93 percent of the Middle East and North African
internal armed conﬂicts (N=114). Because all of the Asian and European internal armed
conﬂicts took place at times when some kind of conﬂict resource had been discovered,
a distinction in this regard between kinds of internal armed conﬂict becomes obsolete.
However, in sub-Saharan Africa and in the Americas non-state armed conﬂicts were
signiﬁcantly more likely than state-based armed conﬂicts to happen in countries where
conﬂict resource had been discovered.24 In the Middle East, the opposite applies but
only if UCDP’s regional coding is used, i.e. if the Sudan is excluded from the sub-
sample.25 These contrary regional eﬀect explain why at the global level, the diﬀerence
between state-based and non-state armed conﬂicts in this regard remains insigniﬁcant.
If the focus of the analysis moves to the actual production of conﬂict resources (instead
of their mere occurrence) or to the production of certain kinds of conﬂict resources,
the signiﬁcance of results improves considerably. Now and worldwide, non-state armed
conﬂicts were signiﬁcantly more likely than state-based armed conﬂicts to happen at
times when conﬂict resources were produced within the respective countries (96 versus
87 percent; p-value< 0:01), when easily accessible and lootable conﬂict resources were
23Eight cases of internal armed conﬂict needed to be dropped due to missing data. In the following, the
size of the global sample varies between 562 and 690 cases, depending on whether the production or
the occurrence of conﬂict resources is analyzed and which kind of conﬂict resource(s) is/are considered.
Most data are missing on the occurrence of gemstones during times of armed conﬂict. The least data
are missing on the production of drugs during times of armed conﬂict.
24In sub-Saharan Africa and in the Americas 81 and 61 percent of all state-based internal armed conﬂicts
(N=97 and 18) but 91 and 92 percent of all non-state internal armed conﬂicts (N=255 and 24)
happened at times when some kind of conﬂict resource (diamonds, other gemstones or oil/gas) was
known to occur within the respective countries (p-values=0.018 and 0.017).
25This reduces the sample size to just 47 cases of internal armed conﬂict (29 state-based and 18 non-state
armed conﬂicts). A signiﬁcantly larger share of the state-based armed conﬂicts happened at times
when conﬂict resources were known to occur (93 versus 67 percent; p-value=0.019).
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exploited (79 versus 63 percent; p-value< 0:01), when drugs were produced (44 versus
25 percent; p-value< 0:01) and when gemstones other than diamonds were produced or
just occurred within the respective countries (54 or 55 percent versus 38 or 39 percent;
p-values< 0:01). These highly signiﬁcant results are echoed at the regional level within
sub-Saharan Africa but also in most cases within the Americas and Central and South
Asia. This strongly supports Hypotheses 4 and 4a.
At the global level, Hypothesis 4b also holds: State-based internal armed conﬂicts
were signiﬁcantly more likely than non-state armed conﬂicts to happen at times when
conﬂict resources that are diﬃcult to access and to loot (primary diamonds or hydro-
carbons) were produced within the respective countries (p-value< 0:01). However, a
closer look reveals that this relationship is primarily driven by the Middle East and
North African region. Within sub-Saharan Africa the diﬀerence between state-based
and non-state armed conﬂicts in this regard stays insigniﬁcant while even the opposite
applies within the Americas and Europe: there non-state armed conﬂicts occurred signif-
icantly more often in countries where primary diamonds or hydrocarbons were produced
(p-values=0.027 and 0.067). If the more restrictive measure is used (i.e. if resources
that are diﬃcult to access and to exploit are deﬁned as primary diamonds and oﬀshore
oil/gas, only) things are equally confusing: Within two world regions (in sub-Saharan
Africa and the Americas), non-state armed conﬂicts were signiﬁcantly more likely than
state-based armed conﬂicts to happen at times when primary diamonds and/or oﬀshore
oil/gas was produced within the respective countries (p-values< 0:05) while in two other
regions (in Central and South Asia and in the Middle East and North Africa) state-based
armed conﬂicts turn out to be the kind of internal armed that happened signiﬁcantly
more often in such a context (p-values< 0:01). These inconsistencies repeat themselves
if oil/gas is analyzed separately. At the global level and in the Middle East and North
Africa, state-based conﬂicts were signiﬁcantly more likely than non-state conﬂicts to oc-
cur at times when oil/gas in general and onshore oil/gas in particular had been produced
within the respective countries (p-values< 0:01 and < 0:05; Chi-squared and F-tests).
This speaks in favor of Hypothesis 4b. In the Americas and in Europe (UCDP regional
coding), however, the opposite applies (p-values< 0:05 and < 0:1) while no signiﬁcant
results are obtained for sub-Saharan Africa. When it comes to the production of oﬀshore
oil/gas the diﬀerence between state-based and non-state internal armed conﬂicts stays
insigniﬁcant even at the global level. Contrary eﬀects within the single regions seem to
oﬀset each other entirely.26 Likewise, at the global level the mere occurrence of oil/gas
is not signiﬁcantly related to a certain kind of internal armed conﬂict. Again, this seems
to be the result of contrary eﬀects within the single regions: In sub-Saharan Africa
and in the Americas non-state conﬂicts are signiﬁcantly more likely than state-based
26In sub-Saharan Africa and the Americas, non-state internal armed conﬂicts were signiﬁcantly more
likely than state-based internal armed conﬂicts to happen at times when oﬀshore oil/gas was produced
(p-values< 0:01 and < 0:05; Chi-squared and F-tests) while in the Middle East and North Africa
and in Asia (UCDP regional coding) 20 and 40 percent of all state-based armed conﬂicts happened
in such a context as opposed to just 2 or 18 percent of all non-state armed conﬂicts (p-values< 0:01
or < 0:05; Chi-squared and F-tests).
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conﬂicts to happen at times when onshore and/or oﬀshore oil/gas had been known to
occur while the opposite applies in the Middle East and North Africa (if UCDP’s re-
gional coding is applied) and in Central and South Asia (at least in regard to oﬀshore
deposits). More consistent but still unexpected are the results in regard to diamonds:
State-based internal armed conﬂicts were signiﬁcantly more likely than non-state armed
conﬂicts to happen in countries where diamonds in general but also secondary diamonds
had been produced. This holds at the global level (p-values< 0:01) as well as within sub-
Saharan Africa (p-values< 0:01) and within Central and South Asia (p-values< 0:05).
Just Europe is falling out of line.
Carrying the analysis to the episode level increases the size of the global sample from
a total of 690 armed conﬂicts (419 non-state and 271 state-based) between 1989 and
2011 to a total of 815 conﬂict episodes (449 non-state and 366 state-based) that were
ongoing between 1989 and 2009.27 In many cases, the above results nevertheless repeat
themselves.28 However, several additional signiﬁcant eﬀects in support of the hypotheses
are also found – within single regions (mostly the Americas)29 as well as if the entire
sample is used.30 Only in rare cases, signiﬁcant outcomes at the conﬂict level turn out
to be insigniﬁcant at the episode level.31
27The number of 366 state-based conﬂict episodes includes 44 cases that were still ongoing in 1989 or
later but that had erupted earlier. Due to missing data, the size of the global sample varies between
653 and 815 conﬂict episodes, depending on whether the production or the occurrence of conﬂict
resources is analyzed and which kind of conﬂict resource(s) is/are considered. The most and the least
missing cases again occur when measuring the known occurrence of gemstones and the production of
drugs during conﬂict episodes.
28The outcomes at the conﬂict level and at the conﬂict episode level are basically equivalent in regard to
the following variables: the production of some kind of conﬂict resource (diamonds, other gemstones,
drugs or oil/gas), the discovery and the production of diamonds, the discovery and the production of
secondary diamonds and the production of easily accessible and lootable conﬂict resources (secondary
diamonds, other gemstones or drugs).
29In the Americas a signiﬁcantly larger share of non-state than state-based conﬂict episodes happened at
times when some kind of conﬂict resource (diamonds, other gemstones or oil/gas) had been discovered
within the respective countries, when oil/gas had been known to occur or when (onshore) oil/gas had
been produced, when oﬀshore oil/gas had been discovered or produced and when conﬂict resources
that are diﬃcult to access and to loot (primary diamonds or (oﬀshore) oil/gas) had been produced. In
the Americas and in Central and South Asia a signiﬁcantly larger share of non-state than state-based
conﬂict episodes happened at times when gemstones other than diamonds had been known to occur or
were produced. Likewise, in Central and South Asia and in the Middle East (UCDP regional coding)
a signiﬁcantly larger share of non-state than state-based conﬂict episodes took place at times when
drugs where produced within the respective countries. Finally, in sub-Saharan Africa a signiﬁcantly
larger share of state-based than non-state conﬂict episodes happened at times when (onshore) oil/gas
was produced. In all of these cases, the respective outcomes had remained insigniﬁcant at the conﬂict
level.
30Primary diamonds are known to occur signiﬁcantly more often during state-based conﬂict episodes as
opposed to non-state conﬂict episodes. Likewise, oﬀshore oil/gas is known to occur and also produced
signiﬁcantly more often during state-based conﬂict episodes as opposed to non-state conﬂict episodes.
These diﬀerences had remained insigniﬁcant at the conﬂict level.
31In sub-Saharan Africa and in the Americas, the known occurrence of oil/gas is not any more signiﬁ-
cantly related to a certain kind of conﬂict episode. Likewise, in sub-Saharan Africa the production
of conﬂict resources that are especially diﬃcult to access and to loot (primary diamonds or oﬀshore
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The following summary of results therefore applies to the conﬂict, and even more so, to
the conﬂict-episode level: In line with Hypotheses 4 and 4a, conﬂict resources (especially
easily accessible and lootable conﬂict resources, gemstones other than diamonds and
drugs) are produced signiﬁcantly more often prior to or during non-state ﬁghting as
opposed to state-based ﬁghting. The eﬀects are highly signiﬁcant at the global level,
robust against changes in the regional coding and mostly consistent across regions.32
If analyzed separately, however, the production of (secondary) diamonds is – against
expectations – observed signiﬁcantly more often during state-based instead of non-state
ﬁghting.33 Hypothesis 4b also ﬁnds support at the global level: Conﬂict resources that
are diﬃcult to access and to loot (primary diamonds or (oﬀshore) oil/gas) are produced
signiﬁcantly more often prior to or during state-based internal ﬁghting. However, this
eﬀect seems to be mainly driven by oil/gas (the production of primary diamonds itself
fails to be signiﬁcantly related to a certain kind of internal ﬁghting) and by the Middle
East and North African region while it remains insigniﬁcant or even contrary in other
areas of the world.34
This section concludes with presenting the results of a country level analysis investi-
gating whether conﬂict resources in general (and easily accessible and lootable conﬂict
resources in particular) are signiﬁcantly more likely to occur or to be produced in coun-
tries experiencing non-conventional (non-state) ﬁghting as compared with countries ex-
periencing conventional (state-based) ﬁghting (Hypotheses 4 and 4a). Conﬂict resources
that are diﬃcult to access and to loot (primary diamonds and hydrocarbons) are again
expected to be signiﬁcantly more likely to occur or to be produced in countries expe-
riencing conventional (state-based) ﬁghting as opposed to non-conventional (non-state)
ﬁghting (Hypothesis 4b).
Examining these questions at the national level comes with a major advantage in com-
parison to the above: at the country level, independent states without conﬂict experience
can be taken into consideration. This avoids a selection bias that is inherent in the above
analyses which only cover instances of internal ﬁghting or armed groups who in any case
engaged in armed battle. Conﬂict resources, however, often occur and are produced in
countries which have not seen any internal armed conﬂict. Whether peaceful states are
in fact more likely to possess or to exploit conﬂict resources than countries that have
been involved in a certain kind of internal ﬁghting cannot be studied if such cases are
excluded from the overall sample. The downside of a country level analysis is a mat-
oil) does not signiﬁcantly relate to a certain kind of conﬂict episode.
32Only the Middle East and North Africa steps out of line.
33With the only exception of Europe.
34In regard to the production of oﬀshore oil/gas, sub-Saharan Africa and the Americas at least share the
same direction of relationship as opposed to Central and South Asia and the Middle East and North
Africa on the other side. In regard to the production of onshore oil/gas the dividing line seems to
run between sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East and North Africa on the one hand and Europe
and the Americas on the other. Reasons for these diverging outcomes might be diﬀerences in the
production status or diﬀerences in the relative importance and in the actual value of the production
for the local and national economies.
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ter of measurement: the discovery and production dates of conﬂict resources cannot be
matched any more with the timing of internal ﬁghting. Thus, neither the geographical
nor the temporal availability of conﬂict resources to violent actors is guaranteed even
if conﬂict resources and armed conﬂict might signiﬁcantly correlate with each other at
the national level. In addition, the size of the global sample shrinks to 175 independent
states which impedes a meaningful comparison at the regional level.
Worldwide, however, much seems to speak in favor of the main research question. First
of all, countries that have seen (any kind of) internal warfare are signiﬁcantly more likely
than countries without any internal war experience to produce some kind of conﬂict re-
source (diamonds, gemstones, drugs or oil/gas), to possess and to produce secondary
diamonds or gemstones other than diamonds, to produce drugs and to produce easily
accessible and lootable conﬂict resources (secondary diamonds, gemstones or drugs) (all
p-values< 0:01). Likewise, countries that have seen internal armed conﬂict are signiﬁ-
cantly more likely than countries that have not experienced any internal armed conﬂict
to possess conﬂict resources (diamonds, gemstones or oil/gas) (p-value=0.056), to pos-
sess and to produce secondary diamonds (p-values< 0:01) and gemstones other than
diamonds (p-values< 0:05) as well as to produce drugs, easily accessible and lootable
conﬂict resources (secondary diamonds, gemstones or drugs) or conﬂict resources in gen-
eral (diamonds, gemstones, drugs or oil/gas) (p-values< 0:01).
Signiﬁcant diﬀerences between sub-groups of countries in regard to the occurrence
and production of conﬂict resources also exist. I compared the following groups of in-
dependent states: Firstly, countries that have been involved in exclusively non-state
ﬁghting as opposed to countries that have been involved in exclusively state-based inter-
nal ﬁghting.35 Secondly, countries that have seen non-state internal ﬁghting (sometimes
in addition to state-based ﬁghting) as opposed to countries that have not engaged in
this kind of internal ﬁghting (because they just experienced state-based ﬁghting or no
internal ﬁghting at all).36 Thirdly, countries that have seen non-state internal ﬁghting
(sometimes in addition to state-based ﬁghting) as opposed to entirely peaceful countries
that have not seen any kind of internal ﬁghting.37
This comparison reveals that a signiﬁcantly larger share of those countries that have
been involved in exclusively non-state armed conﬂicts possess and produce gemstones as
opposed to those countries that engaged in state-based armed conﬂict only (67 percent
versus 27 and 29 percent, p-values=0.019). Half of all countries that have been involved
in exclusively non-state armed conﬂicts engage in drug production. The corresponding
35Countries that have been involved in exclusively non-state internal wars (N=3) or armed conﬂicts
(N=12) are compared with countries that have been involved in exclusively state-based internal wars
(N=47) or armed conﬂicts (N=35).
36Countries that have seen non-state internal wars (N=16) or armed conﬂicts (N=53) are compared with
countries that have not seen any non-state internal war (N=159) or armed conﬂict (N=122).
37Countries that have seen non-state internal wars (N=16) or armed conﬂicts (N=53) are compared with
countries that have not seen any kind of internal war (N=112) or armed conﬂict (N=87).
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number for those countries that just experienced state-based armed conﬂict is signiﬁ-
cantly smaller (23 percent) (p-value=0.076). Thirdly, 83 percent of all countries that
have been involved in exclusively non-state armed conﬂicts produce easily accessible and
lootable conﬂict resources as opposed to just half of those countries that engaged in
state-based armed conﬂict only (p-value=0.044).
A number of additional signiﬁcant outcomes are obtained if those countries that have
seen non-state ﬁghting (sometimes in addition to state-based ﬁghting) are compared
with those countries that have not seen this kind of internal ﬁghting: 91 percent of
those countries that have seen non-state internal armed conﬂict produce at least one
kind of conﬂict resource as opposed to just 69 percent of those countries that have
not experienced non-state internal armed conﬂict (p-value=0.002). The former are also
signiﬁcantly more likely to possess and to produce gemstones other than diamonds (51
percent versus 27 percent; p-values< 0:01), to produce drugs (43 percent versus 11
percent; p-value< 0:01) and to possess and to produce diamonds (42 percent versus 24
percent; p-values=0.018) – though the latter outcome is entirely driven by secondary
diamonds (38 percent versus 18 percent; p-values< 0:01). The production of drugs is
also signiﬁcantly more likely in those independent state that have seen non-state internal
warfare as opposed to those states that have not experienced this kind of internal warfare
(38 percent versus 19 percent; p-value< 0:1). In addition, the former are signiﬁcantly
more likely to possess and to produce secondary diamonds (44 percent versus 20 percent;
p-values< 0:05). Overall, 81 percent of those countries that have seen non-state warfare
and 74 percent of those that have experienced non-state internal armed conﬂict produce
easily accessible and lootable conﬂict resources as opposed to just 45 and 37 percent
of those states that have not seen this kind of internal warfare and armed conﬂict (p-
values< 0:01).
Similar outcomes are obtained if those countries that have seen non-state internal
ﬁghting are compared with those countries that have not seen any internal ﬁghting.
Countries that experienced non-state internal armed conﬂict are signiﬁcantly more likely
than entirely peaceful states to possess and to produce at least one kind of conﬂict
resource (87 and 91 percent versus 74 and 67 percent) (p-values=0.064 and 0.002). In
addition, countries that have seen non-state internal armed conﬂict are signiﬁcantly more
likely than entirely peaceful states to possess and to produce diamonds in general (42
percent versus 23 percent) (p-values=0.020) and secondary diamonds in particular (38
percent versus 13 percent) (p-values=0.001), to possess and to produce gemstones other
than diamonds (51 percent versus 26 percent) (p-values=0.003), to produce drugs (46
percent versus 6 percent) (p-value=0.000) and to produce easily accessible and lootable
conﬂict resources (74 percent versus 32 percent) (p-value=0.000). The last four ﬁndings
also hold if those countries that have seen non-state internal warfare are compared
with those countries that have not seen any kind of internal warfare: 44 percent of
the former but only 15 percent of the latter possess and produce secondary diamonds
(p-values=0.007), 50 percent of the former but only 27 percent of the latter possess
and produce gemstones other than diamonds (p-values=0.057), 38 percent of the former
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but only 11 percent of the latter produce drugs (p-value=0.000) and 81 percent of the
former but only 38 percent of the latter possess and produce easily accessible and lootable
conﬂict resources (p-value=0.001).
All of the above country-level results strongly support Hypotheses 4 and 4a. Involve-
ment in non-state internal ﬁghting signiﬁcantly correlates with the occurrence and even
more so with the production of conﬂict resources in general and easily accessible and
lootable conﬂict resources in particular. Only the production of conﬂict resources that
are diﬃcult to access and to loot (primary diamonds and onshore or oﬀshore oil/gas)
is not signiﬁcantly correlated with a certain kind of internal armed conﬂict or warfare
– no matter which countries are compared with each other and independent from the
fact whether these resources are grouped together or analyzed separately. In fact, these
resources are about as often produced in war-torn as in peaceful countries.38 Just one
signiﬁcant country level eﬀect runs against expectation39 and a number of non-signiﬁcant
results of course also exist.
Overall and in tendency, more signiﬁcant outcomes are obtained if the categorization
of sub-groups of countries that are compared with each other is less restrictive (i.e. if
countries that experienced non-state internal ﬁghting are compared with those that have
not seen this or any kind of internal ﬁghting instead of a comparison of countries that
engaged in exclusively non-state internal ﬁghting with those that engaged in exclusively
state-based internal ﬁghting).40 Secondly and as before, the signiﬁcance of diﬀerences
improves if the production of conﬂict resources is analyzed instead of the mere occur-
rence and, thirdly, if easily accessible and lootable conﬂict resources are considered
(especially gemstones, drugs or secondary diamonds) instead of oil/gas or primary di-
amonds. Finally, the signiﬁcance of results improves if low-level violence is taken into
consideration, e.g. if countries are compared that have seen diﬀerent kinds of internal
armed conﬂict instead of internal warfare.41 This provides some support for the thesis
38For instance, conﬂict resources that are diﬃcult to access and to loot (primary diamonds or hydro-
carbons) are produced in 68 percent of those countries that experienced internal warfare but also in
60 percent of those countries without any war experience. This diﬀerence is statistically insigniﬁ-
cant. Primary diamonds occur in about 20 percent of those countries with internal conﬂict or war
experience but also in 20 percent of those countries without conﬂict or war experience.
39Thirty-three percent of those countries that engaged in exclusively non-state internal warfare produce
conﬂict resources (diamonds, gemstones, drugs or oil/gas) as opposed to 89 percent of those coun-
tries that engaged in state-based wars only (p-value=0.007 Chi-squared test; p-value=0.048 F-test).
Because just three countries engaged in non-state wars only, I handle this outcome with care.
40For instance, countries that have only seen non-state internal armed conﬂict are not signiﬁcantly more
likely to produce some kind of conﬂict resource than countries that have only seen state-based armed
conﬂict. However, countries that have seen non-state internal armed conﬂict (maybe in addition to
state-based armed conﬂict) are signiﬁcantly more likely to produce some kind of conﬂict resource than
countries that have not engaged in this kind of internal armed conﬂict (because they just experienced
state-based armed conﬂict or no internal armed conﬂict at all).
41For instance, countries that have been involved in non-state internal wars are not signiﬁcantly more
likely than countries that have not engaged in this kind of internal warfare to produce some kind of
conﬂict resource. However, countries that have been involved in non-state internal armed conﬂict are
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that ﬁghts over natural resources rather manifest themselves as low intensity struggles
instead of intense or bloody warfare. It also leads to the main conclusion that the level
of analysis matters in regard to the question whether conﬂict resources associate with a
certain kind of internal ﬁghting. In other words: the above presented ﬁndings are only
partly consistent across levels of analysis. Some eﬀects are statistically signiﬁcant at
certain levels of analysis, only. For instance, at the country level secondary diamonds
are produced signiﬁcantly more often in countries that experienced non-state internal
armed conﬂict as opposed to countries that have not seen this kind of internal ﬁghting.
If only countries are compared that engaged in the one or the other kind of internal
ﬁghting, the eﬀect remains insigniﬁcant. In contrast, at the actor, the conﬂict and the
conﬂict episode level the production of secondary diamonds clearly and signiﬁcantly as-
sociates with state-based internal ﬁghting. Another example are conﬂict resources that
are diﬃcult to access and to loot. At the country level, their occurrence and production
neither signiﬁcantly associate with a certain kind of internal ﬁghting nor with internal
ﬁghting in general. At the conﬂict and at the conﬂict episode level, however, such re-
sources have been produced signiﬁcantly more often during times of state-based internal
ﬁghting as opposed to non-state internal ﬁghting. Overall, most ﬁndings at the actor,
the conﬂict, the episode and the country level speak in favor of the concept of New Wars.
Despite some exceptions, especially the outcomes in regard to hypotheses 4 and 4a are
(highly) signiﬁcant and rather robust against changes in the regional coding or in the
categorization of groups of countries that are compared with each other. However, at
the country level, no signiﬁcant eﬀects are found in terms of Hypothesis 4b while at the
war level even Hypothesis 4 and 4a are mostly failing. An explanation for these diverg-
ing outcomes that immediately comes to mind are the diﬀerent time periods covered by
the corresponding analyses. But even if the war level analysis is also conﬁned to the
post-Cold War era, signiﬁcant global eﬀects do not appear.
This section closes by reminding the reader that a signiﬁcant bivariate correlation
must not be mistaken for a causal relationship. In addition, a statistically signiﬁcant
and robust eﬀect is not necessarily large or important. This in particular applies to
the study at hand. Bilateral internal ﬁghting, especially intense warfare, is a rare event
while conﬂict resources are comparatively often found within countries. For this reason,
around 75 percent of those countries that have not seen any internal armed conﬂict or
war nevertheless possess conﬂict resources and about two thirds of all peaceful countries
also produce them.42 Obviously, the occurrence and production of conﬂict resources
not necessarily correlates with internal ﬁghting. The destabilizing eﬀect of conﬂict re-
signiﬁcantly more likely than countries that have not engaged in this kind of internal armed conﬂict
to produce some kind of conﬂict resource.
42See also Ross (2006, pp. 286 sq., 296) who ﬁnds a robust association between (primary) diamonds and
state-based internal warfare but also warns that small changes in the data can alter the statistical
signiﬁcance of the correlation because civil warfare in diamond producing states is a rare event. Only
12 of the 90 civil wars that began between 1960 and 1999 took place in countries that produced
diamonds in non trivial quantities (measured by the value of diamonds produced per capita in the
year of war onset).
309
22. Comparative Analysis
sources might rather depend on the signiﬁcance, the size or the quality of the deposits
or other, interacting variables such as the level of economic development or political
factors (Lujala, N. P. Gleditsch, et al. 2005, p. 556). The quality of the available re-
sources data also remains an issue that has been discussed elsewhere. At least the above
used data sets provide spatial information. In theory, this allows for measuring the
distance between the deposits/production sites and decision-making centers, boundaries
or actual conﬂict zones. In practice, however, information on the exact locations of
state-based and non-state internal armed conﬂicts is to a large extent missing. In ad-
dition, geographically disaggregated data is lacking on the occurrence and production
of other conﬂict resources (e.g. coltan). Due to these data constraints, the above only
accounts for whether conﬂict resources are technologically available to violent actors (i.e.
whether they are easily accessible and lootable or not) and whether they were actually
known to occur and produced within the respective countries during times of internal
ﬁghting. If the resources are also geographically available (i.e. if they are located in
areas where the rebels are in control of) remains unknown despite the fact that the
theoretical argument is of course only fully plausible if all three of these conditions are
met. This relates to another diﬃculty, namely the fact that countries often experience
both kinds of internal ﬁghting at the same time. Without geographically disaggregated
data it is impossible to study in which of the wars, armed conﬂicts or conﬂict episodes
conﬂict resources were available to and extracted by violent actors. In the past, the
lack of geographically disaggregated conﬂict data prompted researchers to forgo already
available, geographically disaggregated diamond data. Instead they used simple dummy
variables which only indicate whether a country possesses or produces diamonds.43 The
very few analyses that rely on geographically disaggregated conﬂict and diamond data
only capture conventional (state-based) conﬂicts.44 This also holds for the more recent
and sophisticated large-N analyses published in this ﬁeld of research by Lujala (2009);
Lujala (2010). Fjelde (2009b, p. 18) explores the sub-national determinants of non-state
conﬂict in Nigeria. She uses geographically disaggregated data on oil deposits and ﬁnds
that “areas with on-shore oil-production have a higher risk of non-state conﬂict events
than locations without oil-production” which points to the importance of oil-bunkering
in Nigeria. Whether oil is equally important in explaining state-based armed conﬂicts
within this country cannot be ruled out due to the design of this study. It also remains a
matter of future research to ﬁgure out whether this and other kinds of conﬂict resources
are equally important in explaining non-state ﬁghting elsewhere. Earlier large-N studies
on the question in how far natural resource wealth increases the risk of outbreak as well
as the duration of civil warfare are also of little help. They cover state-based internal
wars, only, and yielded ambiguous evidence.45
43See e.g. Gilmore et al. (2005) and Lujala, N. P. Gleditsch, et al. (2005).
44See e.g. Buhaug et al. (2005) and Lujala (2005).
45For example and contrary to Collier and Hoeﬄer (2001), Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Fearon (2005) do
not ﬁnd any linear or non-linear signiﬁcant eﬀect of natural resource abundance on the risk of conﬂict
onset. Fearon (2005) suggests that the Collier and Hoeﬄer (2001) ﬁndings are an artifact of their
model using ﬁve year periods rather than a country-year format. Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002)
ﬁnd that with diﬀerent model speciﬁcations the resource variable is not signiﬁcant. Hegre (2004)
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22.3. Comparison of the Scale and Nature of Violence
The following section investigates whether the scale of violence diﬀers between kinds of
internal armed conﬂict. The direction of relationship is left undeﬁned:
H5 Non-state internal ﬁghting results in signiﬁcantly more/less direct, battle-related
deaths as compared with state-based internal ﬁghting.
The intensity of bilateral ﬁghting is generally measured by the number of military and
civilian battle-related deaths per conﬂict or conﬂict-year.46 The consolidated version of
the “New List of Wars” added this kind of information at least for those internal wars that
were ongoing or just erupted after the end of the Cold War. Because the authors of the
data set themselves describe the quality of their yearly data as “critical”, the following
just relies on the total numbers of battle-related deaths per war. However, even these
aggregate ﬁgures are missing for most of the non-state internal wars. Only four cases are
covered which over their entire duration and on average resulted in 76,173 battle-related
deaths at most as opposed to a maximum average number of 83,144 battle-related deaths
per state-based internal war (N=51).47 Due to the small numbers of observations and
great variances the diﬀerence in means stays insigniﬁcant.
Luckily, UCDP’s “Non-State Conﬂicts Dataset” is also counting battle-related deaths
and, in addition to cases of minor and intermediate non-state armed conﬂict, covers
all of the above missing cases of non-state internal warfare. Compatible data on the
battle-deaths from state-based armed conﬂicts are available through UCDP’s “Battle-
Deaths Dataset”. These data reveal that non-state internal armed conﬂicts are in fact
less intense than state-based internal armed conﬂicts.
conclude that the measure of primary commodity exports as a percentage of GDP is not robust
to changes in the set of control variables. Reynal-Querol (2002) ﬁnds that the natural-resource-
exports-to-GDP ratio has no explanatory power for ethnic conﬂicts but is signiﬁcant in explaining
ideological or revolutionary civil conﬂicts. Only a few studies explicitly focus on the role of certain
resources in sustaining civil wars. Whereas Collier and Hoeﬄer (2004) conclude that their measure
for the availability of resource (the ratio of primary commodity exports to GDP) does not aﬀect
the duration of civil war, Fearon (2004) shows that conﬂicts where rebels have access to contraband
goods such as opium or gemstones tend to last signiﬁcantly longer. This is supported by Ross (2004);
Ross (2006). Like Gilmore et al. (2005) he criticizes prior research for the reason of endogeneity in
measures, misleading aggregation of lootable and non-lootable goods as well as the failure to control
for the actual location of resources.
46According to Lacina and N. P. Gleditsch (2005, pp. 152 sq.) this is the best available indicator to
measure the scale of violence especially in comparison to combatant deaths because it is oftentimes
impossible to distinguish between military and civilian victims of internal ﬁghting. In addition,
they argue that private military companies are involved in many contemporary internal wars whose
personnel are not combatants in a classical sense. Thus, “a focus on combatant deaths rather than
battle-deaths could seriously underestimate the scope of military combat in many, if not most, of
today’s wars” (Lacina and N. P. Gleditsch 2005, p. 148).
47The minimum estimate of the total number of battle-deaths is 16,946 per non-state war (N=4) and
28,379 per state-based war (N=54).
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22. Comparative Analysis
Worldwide (and also in every single world region), the average number of battle-deaths
per non-state internal armed conﬂict is signiﬁcantly lower than the average number of
battle-deaths per state-based internal armed conﬂict: Between 1989 and 2011, UCDP’s
best estimates of battle-deaths are available for 419 non-state and 271 state-based in-
ternal armed conﬂicts that caused a total of 102,172 and 682,755 civilian and military
battle-deaths.48 The average number of battle-deaths per non-state armed conﬂict is
therefore as low as 244 compared to 2,519 battle-related deaths per state-based inter-
nal armed conﬂict (p-value< 0:01). If extreme outliers on both sides are excluded, the
diﬀerence in means is shrinking but remains highly signiﬁcant. The same applies if the
comparatively intense internationalized state-based armed conﬂicts are removed from
the sample.49 Furthermore, the result is robust against changes in the regional coding
and equally holds if UCDP’s low or high estimates of battle-deaths are used.
Controlling for the duration of ﬁghting conﬁrms the above outcome. The average
number of battle-deaths per conﬂict-year is also signiﬁcantly lower for non-state as
opposed to state-based armed conﬂicts. This holds worldwide (whether extreme outliers
are excluded or not) and for most of the regional sub-samples.50 The global average
number of people that died per non-state conﬂict-year is 121 while the corresponding
number for state-based armed conﬂicts stands at 498 (best estimates; p-value< 0:01). In
sub-Saharan Africa state-based armed conﬂicts cost between 674 and 1,093 battle-related
deaths per conﬂict-year while just 99 to 199 people died per non-state conﬂict-year (low
and high estimates; p-values< 0:01).51 Interestingly, the best estimate of the average
number of battle-deaths per non-state conﬂict-year in sub-Saharan Africa (of 125) barely
reaches the global average (of 120). The average number of battle-deaths per non-state
conﬂict in sub-Saharan Africa even lies below the world average (214 versus 244). Non-
state armed conﬂicts are most intense in the Americas and in the Middle East and North
Africa.52
48The corresponding low and high estimates are 92,556 and 150,725 worldwide battle-related deaths
from non-state armed conﬂicts and 636,329 and 981,246 from state-based armed conﬂicts.
49UCDP reports 2,153 battle-deaths per regular state-based armed conﬂict (N=231) and 4,635 battle-
deaths per internationalized state-based armed conﬂict (N=40). This diﬀerence in means is statis-
tically signiﬁcant (p-value< 0:01; t-Test equal variances and p-values< 0:05; Wilcoxon Rank Sum
Test and t-Test with unequal variances). If the duration of ﬁghting is taken into account, interna-
tionalized state-based armed conﬂicts in sub-Saharan Africa (N=21) are especially intense with 1,051
battle-related deaths per conﬂict-year (as opposed to a global average of 861).
50It holds for those armed conﬂicts that happened in sub-Saharan Africa, in Central and South Asia,
in Europe, in the Middle East and North Africa (PRIO regional coding) and in the Americas (if
the high estimates for battle-related deaths are used). The results are less signiﬁcant or insigniﬁcant
only for armed conﬂicts that happened in the Middle East (UCDP regional coding without Sudan),
in East and South East Asia and Oceania and in the Americas (if the low and best estimates for
battle-related deaths are used).
51The best estimates for the number of battle-deaths per state-based and per non-state conﬂict-year are
702 versus 125 for sub-Saharan Africa, 515 versus 81 for Central and South Asia, 599 versus 92 for
Europe and 362 versus 140 for the Middle East and North Africa (p-values< 0:01 or at least < 0:05).
52In both regions, the post-Cold War average numbers of battle-deaths per non-state conﬂict (412 and
358) and per non-state conﬂict-year (130 and 140) are much higher than the respective world averages
(of 244 and 120). Non-state conﬂicts are least intense in Central and South Asia and Europe.
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Nevertheless, sub-Saharan Africa holds the by far greatest share (53 percent) in the
overall number of battle-deaths from non-state internal ﬁghting simply because the vast
majority of non-state armed conﬂicts happened in this area (see ﬁg. 22.2 on the current
page).
Figure 22.2.: Post-Cold War Average Regional Shares in All Battle-Deaths (1989-2011
averages), by type of internal conﬂict and in percent. Source: own
calculation.
When it comes to state-based conﬂicts, Central and South Asia’s regional share in the
total number of battle-deaths from this kind of internal ﬁghting is as large as sub-Saharan
Africa’s share. Both regions account for about one third of all battle-deaths from state-
based armed conﬂicts (see also ﬁg. 22.2 on this page) – though for diﬀerent reasons:
Sub-Saharan Africa has seen the most state-based internal armed conﬂicts (N=98), each
of a medium intensity and duration, so that their battle-death numbers simply add up.
Central and South Asia experienced far less state-based armed conﬂicts (N=52) than
sub-Saharan Africa. However, state-based armed conﬂicts in this region were almost
twice as intense and long. Thus, most battle-deaths per state-based conﬂict occurred in
Central and South Asia.53 Still, if diﬀerences in the duration of ﬁghting are taken into
consideration, state-based armed conﬂicts in sub-Saharan Africa were the most violent.
There, 702 people died per state-based conﬂict-year as opposed to 599 in Europe, 515
in Central and South Asia and 498 worldwide.
53UCDP reports 4,249 battle-deaths per state-based conﬂict in Central and South Asia as opposed to
2,519 worldwide or 2,339 in sub-Saharan Africa.
313
22. Comparative Analysis
If the number of battle-deaths would have been equally spread throughout the post-
Cold War era, state-based internal ﬁghting in sub-Saharan Africa would have caused
almost 10,000 battle-related deaths each year between 1989 and 2011 as opposed to an
average annual number of 2,368 battle-deaths from non-state internal armed conﬂicts.
In this region and in the Americas, state-based armed conﬂicts resulted in four times
as many civilian and military deaths than non-state armed conﬂicts. In the Middle
East and North Africa, in East and Southeast Asia and Oceania, in Central and South
Asia and in Europe, the total numbers of battle-deaths from state-based armed conﬂicts
are even ﬁve, seven, twenty-ﬁve and thirty-nine times as high as the total numbers of
battle-deaths from non-state armed conﬂicts (see ﬁg. 22.3 on the current page).
Figure 22.3.: Average Annual Number of Battle-Deaths from Internal Armed Con-
ﬂict (1989-2011), by type of internal conﬂict and region. Source: own
calculation.
Because UCDP’s battle-death data are available on a yearly basis, some changes over
time in the annual numbers of total battle-deaths from both kinds of internal ﬁghting
and in the annual average numbers of battle-deaths per non-state/state-based armed
conﬂict shall be brieﬂy mentioned.
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Throughout the post-Cold War era, the worldwide number of annually ongoing state-
based armed conﬂicts varies greatly (between 39 and 65) as does the total annual number
of battle-related deaths that can be attributed to these conﬂicts. The least battle-deaths
per state-based conﬂict are reported for 2005 when 38 state-based conﬂicts caused a total
of 11,457 battle-deaths (i.e. 302 per conﬂict on average). The most battle-deaths per
state-based conﬂict occurred in 1990 when 65 state-based armed conﬂicts killed 79,513
people (i.e. 1,223 per conﬂict on average). Worldwide and in every single year between
1989 and 2011, the corresponding numbers for non-state armed conﬂicts are much lower:
UCDP counts between 15 and 42 non-state armed conﬂicts per year. The total annual
number of battle-deaths from these conﬂicts varies between 1,897 (in 2007) and 10,466
(in 199354). The most battle-deaths per non-state conﬂict and year (338) are reported
in 1993 while the least battle-deaths per non-state conﬂict and year (69) occurred in
2005 (see ﬁg. 22.4 on this page). This conﬁrms the main ﬁnding of the above cross-
sectional analysis: Non-state armed conﬂicts cost less battle-deaths than state-based
armed conﬂicts not only at the conﬂict level and within the entire post-Cold War era,
but also in every single country-year throughout this time-period.
Figure 22.4.: Deadliness of State-Based vs. Non-State Internal Armed Conﬂicts (1989-
2011). Source: own calculation.
54This number is due to very deadly non-state conﬂicts in Sudan, in the DRC and in Nigeria.
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Secondly, time-series data reveal that the deadliness of both kinds of internal ﬁghting
decreased over time. However, state-based internal armed conﬂicts turned less violent
comparatively fast: the annual worldwide number of battle-deaths from state-based
armed conﬂicts (almost continuously) decreased by 86 percent between the all time high
in 1990 and the lowest value in 2005. The decrease in the corresponding number of
battle-deaths per state-based armed conﬂict is equally impressive. These developments
are mainly due to the fact that outbreaks of high intensity state-based conﬂicts became
less frequent.55 The total number of battle-deaths from all state-based armed conﬂicts
and the average number of battle-deaths per state-based armed conﬂict in 2011 were
only half of what they had been in 1989 (see the upper part of ﬁg. 22.5 on the next
page).
The global number of battle-deaths from non-state armed conﬂicts (as well as the
average number of battle-deaths per non-state conﬂict) also decreased by about 80 per-
cent between 1993 and 2007. Again, especially high intensity non-state armed conﬂicts
became less frequent over time.56 Since 2005/2007, however, the global number of
battle-deaths from non-state armed conﬂicts more than tripled. In comparison to the
1989 value, the 2011 ﬁgure is almost twice as high while the average number of battle-
deaths per non-state armed conﬂict came close to reaching the 1989 value (see the lower
part of ﬁg. 22.5 on the facing page). These more recent developments are concerning.
55Between 1989 and 2011, UCDP counts 92 state-based armed conﬂicts that resulted in at least 1,000
battle-deaths over their entire duration. Fifty-nine of these broke out between 1989 and 1994, 25
between 1995 and 2004 and just eight after 2005. Outbreaks of medium or low intensity state-based
armed conﬂicts also became less likely but at a slower rate (85 outbreaks between 1989 and 1994, 48
outbreaks between 1995 and 2004 and still 46 outbreaks after 2005).
56Between 1989 and 2011, UCDP counts 19 non-state armed conﬂicts that resulted in at least 1,000
battle-deaths over their entire duration. Eleven of these broke out between 1989 and 1994, six
between 1995 and 2004 and just two after 2005. The 2012 Human Security Report uses a diﬀerent
deﬁnition of “high intensity” but still ﬁnds that “[. . . ] there have been fewer high intensity non-
state conﬂicts [with at least 1,000 reported battle-related deaths for at least one of the active years]
since the mid-1990s than in the earlier years [. . . ] and none at all since 2005” (HSC 2012, p. 191).
Outbreaks of medium or low intensity non-state armed conﬂicts do not follow the same downward
trend: 85 of these broke out between 1989 and 1994, 194 between 1995 and 2004 and 121 after 2005.
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Figure 22.5.: Battle-Deaths from/per Internal Armed Conﬂict (1989-2011), by type of
armed conﬂict and worldwide. Source: own calculation.
The late increases in the annual numbers of battle-deaths from/per non-state armed
conﬂict are primarily driven by developments in the Americas (almost exclusively in
Mexico), in the Middle East and North Africa (mostly in Sudan but also in Iraq) and
to a lesser extent in Central and South Asia (mainly in Pakistan). An equally clear and
recent upward trend in sub-Saharan Africa cannot be detected due to great ﬂuctuations
in numbers. Europe and East and South East Asia and Oceania have only seen very few
(but intense) non-state armed conﬂicts during the 1990s. Since then, non-state ﬁghting
in these regions as a whole is negligible (see ﬁg. 22.6 on the next page).
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Figure 22.6.: Battle-Deaths from/per Non-State Internal Armed Conﬂict (1989-2011),
selected regions. Source: own calculation.
The above ﬁndings are mostly consistent with prior quantitative studies. Lacina
(2006), Lacina, Russett, et al. (2006), Lacina and N. P. Gleditsch (2005) and Melander
et al. (2006) all report a decreasing trend in the severity of internal ﬁghting especially
after the end of the Cold War. The authors therefore explicitly or implicitly claim to
disprove the concept of New Wars. Unfortunately, their analyses per deﬁnition exclude
non-state internal armed conﬂicts. The 2012 Human Security Report aimed to close
this gap in research. The seventh chapter of the report depicts changes in the number
of battle-deaths from non-state ﬁghting between 1989 and 2009 and for this purpose
also uses UCDP data. The above outcomes therefore mirror at least the main ﬁndings
of the 2012 Human Security Report. For instance, I agree that throughout the post-
Cold War period, the overall death-toll from internal armed conﬂict has been declining
enormously. This trend is mainly due to a large decrease in the total number of battle-
deaths from state-based armed conﬂicts. In addition, the above showed that the annual
average number of battle-deaths per state-based armed conﬂict has also rapidly declined
over the years. This holds for non-state armed conﬂicts, too – though the decrease was
less pronounced. Decreasing numbers of battle-deaths for both kinds of internal armed
conﬂict especially in sub-Saharan Africa throughout most parts of the post-Cold War
period are giving hope.
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The long-term developments in other regions, however, are less clear, greatly inﬂuenced
by extreme outliers and partly even contrary.57
The cross-sectional comparative analysis presented above comes to the conclusion, too,
that conﬂicts involving a government are on average many times deadlier than ﬁghting
amongst non-state groups. That non-state internal ﬁghting causes more direct victims
than state-based internal ﬁghting also holds for every single country-year between 1989
and 2011 if the global numbers of battle-deaths from/per state-based armed conﬂict are
compared with the global numbers of battle-deaths from/per non-state armed conﬂict.
But at the regional level some exceptions do exist: For instance, in the Americas, the to-
tal number of battle-deaths from non-state conﬂicts (almost entirely in Mexico) exceeded
the total number of battle-deaths from state-based conﬂicts in 2008, 2010 and 2011. In
every country-year since 2008, more people died per non-state conﬂict than per state-
based conﬂict in this region. This has also been the case in East and South East Asia
and Oceania in nine out of the 23 years that are covered by this study. In sub-Saharan
Africa, the total number of battle-deaths from non-state armed conﬂicts was higher than
the total number of battle-deaths from state-based armed conﬂicts in 1992, 1995, 2002,
2003 and 2004. The average number of battle-deaths per non-state armed conﬂict almost
equaled the average number of battle-deaths per state-based armed conﬂict in another
ﬁve years out of the 23-years period.
57For instance, in Central and South Asia, the numbers of battle-deaths from/per state-based armed
conﬂict increased over time. In 2009, both indicators reached their all time maximum due to intense
conﬂicts in Pakistan, Afghanistan and India. In the Americas, the numbers of battle-deaths from/per
non-state armed conﬂict seem to be rising over the long-run (due to non-state ﬁghting in Mexico,
Columbia and sporadic violent non-state ﬁghting in other countries) while the intensity of state-based
armed conﬂicts in this region reached a local high in 2001 (due to the beginning of the state-based
armed conﬂict between the US and Al-Qaeda and state-based ﬁghting in Columbia).
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I further agree that sub-Saharan Africa has suﬀered a lot from non-state internal ﬁght-
ing. This region has seen the most non-state armed conﬂicts and (together with Central
and South Asia) holds the largest share in the overall number of battle-deaths from this
kind of internal ﬁghting. However, sub-Saharan African non-state armed conﬂicts are
not the most violent non-state armed conﬂicts – neither in terms of battle-deaths per en-
tire conﬂict nor in terms of battle-deaths per conﬂict-year. The same discrepancies exist
at the regional and at the country level. The latter is illustrated by table 22.1 on the
facing page which is ranking countries according to their values on diﬀerent indicators
that are measuring the deadliness of non-state and state-based internal ﬁghting. Soma-
lia serves as an example. This country instantly comes to mind when thinking about
non-state conﬂict and, without doubt, has been heavily aﬀected by this kind of internal
ﬁghting – at least in terms of the overall number of non-state armed conﬂicts (59) that
happened in this failed state between 1989 and 2011. However, Somalia only ranks third
when it comes to the overall number of battle-deaths from non-state internal ﬁghting,
ﬁfteenth in terms of battle-deaths per non-state armed conﬂict and fourth in terms of
the average number of battle-deaths per country-year that has been aﬀected by this
kind of internal ﬁghting. Amongst the top-ten states on these indicators are the usual
suspects (e.g. the DRC and Somalia), but also some African countries that are rarely
discussed in terms of non-state ﬁghting (Ghana and South Africa) and quite a number of
non-African states (Mexico, India, Indonesia, Columbia, Myanmar, Iraq and Pakistan).
Whether sub-Saharan Africa as a region (or single sub-Saharan African countries) is (or
are) the hardest-hit in terms of the deadliness of non-state internal ﬁghting depends on
the perspective (e.g. a country level versus conﬂict level perspective) and the indicators
that are used. At least other regions that are barely mentioned within the 2012 Human
Security Report (or single countries therein) deserve more attention.
When it comes to the more recent years, especially the developments in Mexico, Sudan
and Pakistan are concerning. Recent changes in the incidence, the duration and the
deadliness of internal armed conﬂicts in these countries to a large extent explain the
recent global ﬁgures: Since 2005, the worldwide numbers of state-based and non-state
armed conﬂicts per year have been increasing.58 As a consequence, the overall annual
numbers of battle-deaths from both kinds of internal ﬁghting but also the annual average
numbers of battle-deaths per state-based and non-state armed conﬂict have been rising.
Again, the increases are comparatively large for non-state armed conﬂicts. Whether
these changes mark the beginning of a renewed upward trend in the intensity of internal
ﬁghting in general and of non-state internal ﬁghting in particular remains a matter of
future research.
58The number of annually ongoing state-based armed conﬂicts grew from 38 in 2005 to 49 in 2011. The
number of annually ongoing non-state armed conﬂicts grew from 29 in 2005 to 38 in 2011.
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22. Comparative Analysis
In any case, the above insights only apply to the 1989 till 2011 period. Extending the
analysis to the entire post-World War II era is impossible due to a lack of battle-deaths
data for non-state armed conﬂicts prior to 1989. In addition, indirect victims of internal
ﬁghting are not covered. The full scale of applied violence therefore remains unknown.
Studying the quality of internal ﬁghting is even more challenging due to missing informa-
tion on the extent of civilian victimization as indicated by the ratio of civilian to military
battle-related deaths. The following therefore only explores whether formally organized
non-state actors who engage in non-state conﬂict are signiﬁcantly more likely to com-
mit acts of one-sided violence against civilians (as compared with formally organized
non-state actors who engage in state-based armed conﬂict) (Hypothesis 5a):
H5a Formally organized violent non-state groups who engage in non-state conﬂict
more often commit acts of one-sided violence against unarmed civilians as compared
with formally organized violent non-state groups who engage in state-based conﬂict.
About 14 percent of the formally organized non-state actors who exclusively engaged
in non-state conﬂicts (N=387) and 12 percent of those who exclusively engaged in state-
based conﬂicts (N=156) committed acts of one-sided violence against civilians. This
diﬀerence is not only small in real terms but also statistically insigniﬁcant.
This changes if a less restrictive categorization of actors is applied, i.e. if formally
organized actors without any non-state conﬂict experience (N=387) are compared with
formally organized actors who engaged in this kind of internal ﬁghting (sometimes in
addition to state-based internal ﬁghting) (N=235). Now, formally organized actors who
have been involved in non-state internal conﬂict are signiﬁcantly more likely to commit
acts of one-sided violence against civilians as compared with formally organized actors
who did not at all engage in this kind of internal ﬁghting. The diﬀerence between
these two groups is substantial and highly signiﬁcant (25 percent versus 12 percent;
p-value< 0:01). Obviously, the now-included group of formally organized actors who
engaged in both kinds of internal armed conﬂict (N=79) seems to make a diﬀerence: 47
percent of them engaged in acts of one-sided violence as opposed to just 13 percent of
those formally organized actors who have been involved in the one or the other kind of
internal ﬁghting (N=543) (p-value< 0:01).
At this point it remains unknown why this group of actors is especially prone to commit
acts of one-sided violence against unarmed civilians. Only the level of organization of
armed groups has been controlled for and therefore drops out as an explanatory factor.
Regional eﬀects seem out of question, too, since the above diﬀerence is signiﬁcant across
most world regions. Another independent factor coming to mind is conﬂict resources.
Compared with those formally organized actors who did not engage in non-state internal
armed conﬂicts, the group of formally organized actors who did engage in this kind
internal ﬁghting is not only signiﬁcantly more likely to commit acts of one-sided violence
but also signiﬁcantly more likely to operate in a country/countries where especially
easily accessible and lootable conﬂict resources occur and are produced. In addition,
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they tend to operate in states that are signiﬁcantly weaker.59 Both factors, access to
conﬂict resources and the quality of state institutions, have previously been linked with
the scale and kind of violence applied in internal warfare. The later multiple regression
analysis therefore controls for these alternative explanatory factors.
When interpreting the above results it is also important to keep the following measure-
ment issues in mind: Firstly, the timing and the location of acts of one-sided violence
are left undeﬁned. It therefore remains unknown whether violent groups committed acts
of one-sided violence during times of bilateral internal ﬁghting (or at some other point
in time) and within zones of internal conﬂict (or somewhere else). Secondly, UCDP
only collects data on attacks on civilians by formally organized armed groups. For this
reason, existing data do not allow to explore whether informally organized groups who
engaged in non-state armed conﬂict are more or less likely to commit acts of one-sided
violence against civilians than the above studied formally organized groups who engaged
in non-state ﬁghting. Thirdly, the above does not permit any statements regarding the
actual number and magnitude of acts of one-sided violence. Finally, the above only com-
pares non-state violent actors who engaged in diﬀerent kinds of internal armed conﬂict in
regard to their likelihood of also committing acts of one-sided violence against unarmed
civilians although many (and very bloody) acts of one-sided violence against civilians
are of course committed by state actors.
Overall, the above still speaks in favor of Hypothesis 5a and the concept of New Wars:
Formally organized actors who engaged in non-state internal armed conﬂict (and espe-
cially those who engaged in both kinds of internal ﬁghting) are signiﬁcantly more likely
to commit acts of one-sided violence against unarmed civilians as compared with those
formally organized actors who did not engage in non-state internal ﬁghting. Further-
more, I presented a comparison of the scale of direct, battle-related violence. The results
in this regard were also very clear: Worldwide and within all regions, non-state internal
armed conﬂicts are signiﬁcantly less brutal than state-based internal armed conﬂicts.
This outcome is robust against changes in the regional coding, it holds if low, best or
high estimates of battle-deaths are used and stays signiﬁcant if extreme outliers or the
group of internationalized state-based armed conﬂicts are dropped from the analysis.
59This will be elaborated further below within the paragraph on Hypothesis 7 and at the end of this
study within the multiple regression analysis.
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22.4. Comparison of the Duration of Fighting
The following section addresses diﬀerences in the duration of ﬁghting at the war, the
conﬂict and the conﬂict episode level. In line with the concept of New Wars, Hypothesis
6 expects non-state internal ﬁghting to be of a signiﬁcantly longer average duration as
compared with state-based internal ﬁghting.
H6 Non-state ﬁghting lasts signiﬁcantly longer as compared with state-based ﬁghting.
At the war level this expectation just ﬁnds limited support. The data provided by the
“New List of Wars” show that between 1946 and 2009 non-state internal wars were of
a slightly shorter average duration than conventional state-based civil wars (7.3 vs. 8.5
years). However, the diﬀerence in means remains statistically insigniﬁcant. In addition,
six extreme outliers (as previously deﬁned) bias the average duration of state-based
wars (N=120)60. Deleting these cases is moving the outcome closer to the concept of
New Wars. The average duration of state-based wars decreases to 6.8 years though
the diﬀerence in means still is insigniﬁcant. Considering the post-Cold War era, only,
also helps. Non-state wars with an outbreak of violence after the end of the Cold War
(N=14) lasted for 6.9 years on average. During the same period, conventional civil wars
lasted for a shorter average duration of 5.3 years but only if ﬁve extreme outliers are
excluded.61 The diﬀerence in means nevertheless stays insigniﬁcant.
Because most internal warfare happened in sub-Saharan Africa a quick glance at this
speciﬁc region seems worth the eﬀort. And indeed: Unlike the global outcome, non-
state wars in sub-Saharan Africa with an outbreak after the end of the Cold War are of
a signiﬁcantly longer average duration when compared with the region’s post-Cold War
state-based internal wars (p-value< 0:01).62 In Central and South Asia, the opposite
seems to be true, although the very small number of cases demands a careful interpre-
tation of the result.63 In general, the average duration of state-based and of non-state
internal wars varies greatly from region to region.64
60Extreme outliers are state-based wars with a duration of more than 24.5 years, i.e. the wars in the
Philippines (1970-2009, 40 years and 1972-2009, 38 years), Colombia (1965-2009, 45 years), Myanmar
(1948-2009, 62 years), Sudan (1983-2009, 27 years) and Guatemala (1962-1995, 34 years). Two-thirds
of all state-based internal wars lasted for 11 or less years and half of them for just ﬁve or less years.
61These are state-based wars with a duration of more than 14.5 years, i.e. the wars in India (1989-2009,
21 years; 1990-2009, 20 years; 1992-2009, 18 years), Algeria (1991-2009, 19 years) and Burundi (1993-
2008, 16 years). Two-thirds of all state-based internal wars with an outbreak of violence in 1989 or
later last for eight or less years and half of them for just three or less years.
62The seven post-Cold War non-state internal wars lasted for nine years on average while the 15 state-
based internal wars only lasted for 5.7 years on average.
63The ﬁve post-Cold War non-state internal wars in this region lasted for ﬁve years on average while the
12 post-Cold War state-based internal wars lasted for 9.4 years on average. However, the diﬀerence
in means stays insigniﬁcant (also if the entire World War II period is taken into account).
64For a quantitative analysis see Fearon (2004) who also refers to the great regional variance in the
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Obviously, at the war level Hypothesis 6 ﬁnds support with major temporal and ge-
ographical limitations, only. Just those non-state internal wars that erupted after the
end of the Cold War in sub-Saharan Africa are of a signiﬁcantly longer average duration
as compared with the corresponding cases of state-based internal warfare.
Interestingly, the above war level results sharply contrast with the outcome at the
conﬂict level. During the post-Cold War era, UCDP counts 271 state-based and 419 non-
state internal armed conﬂicts that on average lasted for 5.4 as opposed to just 2.3 years.
Thus, non-state internal ﬁghting turns out to be of a much shorter average duration if
minor and intermediate armed conﬂicts are taken into consideration. The diﬀerence in
means is highly signiﬁcant whether extreme outliers or the group of internationalized
state-based internal armed conﬂicts are included or not.65 In addition, it holds within
each of the single PRIO as well as UCDP regions.66
Investigating the issue at the conﬂict episode level comes with a major improvement
in terms measurement: If the precision of the start and end dates allows, the duration of
each conﬂict episode can be indicated in aﬀected months or even days instead of aﬀected
years, only. Data on the precise start and end dates of ﬁghting are available for 114
state-based and 162 non-state conﬂict episodes that on average lasted for 1,375 days as
opposed to just 146 days. In fact, half of all non-state conﬂict episodes lasted for six or
even less days while the median duration of state-based conﬂict episodes is 453 days.67
The longest non-state conﬂict episode is reported for South Africa where supporters of
the ANC and the IFP fought each other between the 4th of September 1989 and the 28th
of December 1996. Diﬀerences in the mean duration between state-based and non-state
conﬂicts are substantial in real terms and highly signiﬁcant – with and without extreme
outliers and also within most of the single world regions (p-values< 0:01).68
Measuring the duration of conﬂict episodes in aﬀected months does not require the
same precision of start and end dates. Data are therefore available for many more cases
(164 state-based and 402 non-state conﬂict episodes). Again, the state-based conﬂict
episodes were of a signiﬁcantly longer average duration as compared with the non-state
conﬂict episodes. On average, the former aﬀected 47 and the latter eight months.69
duration of state-based internal wars. In addition, he identiﬁes sub-categories of state-based civil
wars that are of an extremely long duration. Between 1945 and 1999, he identiﬁes 21 so called “Sons
of the Soil Conﬂicts” and 17 “Resources Wars” that on average lasted for 33.7 years (median 48.2)
and 28.1 years (median 28.1). Coups or revolutionary wars, anti-colonial wars or civil wars in Eastern
Europe only lasted for 8.5 years on average (median 5.8) (Fearon 2004, p. 284).
65Internationalized state-based internal armed conﬂicts (N=40) lasted a bit longer than conventional
state-based internal armed conﬂicts (N=231) (namely 5.9 as opposed to 5.3 years on average).
66With the exception of Europe where the diﬀerences in means stay insigniﬁcant.
67If extreme outliers are excluded, the average duration in days of state-based conﬂict episodes (N=93)
still stands at 494 days (median 272 days) while non-state conﬂict episodes (N=131) only lasted for
31 days on average (median one day).
68Diﬀerences in means are less signiﬁcant in the Americas, in Europe and in the Middle East (without
Sudan) which relates to the small sample sizes.
69The median is 15 months in the case of state-based conﬂict episodes and just one month in the case
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Given the above outcome, the number of aﬀected calendar years appears especially
inappropriate in order to measure the duration of non-state internal ﬁghting. UCDP
reports 73 non-state conﬂict episodes (but only eight state-based conﬂict episodes) that
lasted for only a single day. Using the less precise measures (in this case one aﬀected
month or one aﬀected year) therefore results in a systematic overestimation of the du-
ration of non-state conﬂict episodes. But, the less accurate the measure, the more cases
are covered by the data. This aﬀects the signiﬁcance of the obtained results. The over-
all outcome nevertheless persists: If the duration of conﬂict episodes is measured by
the number of aﬀected calender years, state-based conﬂict episodes (N=362) were again
of a signiﬁcantly longer average duration as compared with non-state conﬂict episodes
(N=449). This holds for the global sample as well as all regional sub-samples (no matter
which regional coding is used).
Once more this supports the 2012 Human Security Report which also found internal
armed conﬂicts between non-state actors to be much shorter than state-based internal
conﬂicts. However, in comparison to the 2012 Human Security Report (where internal
armed conﬂicts are the basic unit of analysis) the above also compares the duration of
state-based and non-state conﬂict episodes and of state-based and non-state internal
wars. The former allows to measure the duration of internal ﬁghting in days or at least
in aﬀected months (instead of aﬀected years, only). Using these more precise measures
reveals that most non-state conﬂict episodes just lasted for a few days. If measured
in days, the average duration of state-based conﬂict episodes is about ten times higher
than the average duration of non-state conﬂict episodes. The less precise the measure,
the smaller the diﬀerence in the average duration: If measured in aﬀected months or
years, the average duration of state-based conﬂict episodes is “only” about eight or ﬁve
times higher than the average duration of non-state conﬂict episodes. In other words,
measuring the duration of internal ﬁghting in years results in a systematic overestimation
of the duration of non-state internal conﬂicts and in an underestimation of the diﬀerence
in means between sub-types of internal ﬁghting. In any case, the average duration of
state-based conﬂict episodes is much (and signiﬁcantly) longer than the average duration
of non-state conﬂict episodes. In addition, I found non-state internal wars that erupted
after the end of the Cold War in sub-Saharan Africa to be of a signiﬁcantly longer average
duration when compared with the corresponding cases of state-based internal warfare.
This outcome is missed by the 2012 Human Security Report which fails to diﬀerentiate
high intensity internal wars from minor or intermediate internal armed conﬂicts. This
outcome, however, might suﬀer from the above-mentioned systematic overestimation of
the duration of non-state internal wars which at the war level can only be captured in
aﬀected years.
of non-state conﬂict episodes
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Because data on the duration of internal ﬁghting oftentimes run the risk of being
censored70 I conﬁned the analysis to those cases of internal armed conﬂict that hap-
pened entirely within the study period, i.e. cases of internal ﬁghting that erupted in
1990 (the earliest) and ended in 2010 (the latest). This results in the deletion of 153
cases of internal armed conﬂict (65 percent state-based and 35 percent non-state armed
conﬂicts). Running all tests for the reduced sample does not change the overall out-
come. This speaks against a systematic underestimation of the duration of a certain
kind of internal armed conﬂict due to censored data. Still, the simple bivariate corre-
lation presented above neither implies causation nor can it account for the complexity
of the causes underlying the correlation. Diﬀerences in the average duration between
non-state and state-based internal armed conﬂicts might be due to a number of factors
that are either internal to the kind of armed conﬂict (e.g. the nature, number and mo-
tives of the involved actors or the severity of ﬁghting) or that are external to the kind of
internal ﬁghting (e.g. structural conditions, the existence of prior tensions, the content
of a previously reached peace treaty, or the more or less proactive role of the interna-
tional community to intervene). Any empirical study investigating whether and why
the duration of ﬁghting signiﬁcantly diﬀers between the two sub-categories of internal
armed conﬂict needs to include as many as possible control factors.
22.5. Comparison of the Political Context of Fighting
The comparative cross-sectional analysis concludes with an examination of the political
context in which internal ﬁghting takes place. The corresponding hypothesis applies
to all levels of analysis (the country level, the war level, the conﬂict level, the conﬂict
episode level and the actor level) and reads as follows:
H7 The degree of state fragility is signiﬁcantly worse in countries experiencing non-
state ﬁghting as compared with countries experiencing state-based ﬁghting. | The
degree of state fragility is signiﬁcantly worse prior to/at the outbreak of non-state
ﬁghting as compared with state-based ﬁghting. | Violent non-state actors who engage
in non-state conﬂict are operating in signiﬁcantly more fragile countries as compared
with violent non-state actors who engage in state-based conﬂict.
In addition, I presented Hypotheses 7a and 7b which focus on the quality of state
weakness. They suggest that diﬀerent kinds of state fragility might associate with dif-
ferent kinds of internal ﬁghting.
70The duration of conﬂicts that were still ongoing at the end of the study period is censored if these
conﬂicts in fact lasted beyond these dates. The same applies to conﬂicts which were ongoing in
1989 but in fact had already started earlier. The latter disproportionately often concerns state-
based internal armed conﬂicts while the former also hits non-state internal armed conﬂicts. In either
case, the actual duration of the conﬂicts is only partially known and for this reason tends to be
underestimated.
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More precisely, the levels of state eﬀectiveness and authority are expected to be com-
paratively worse in the context of non-state internal ﬁghting (Hypothesis 7a) while state
functionality in the delivery of public goods and services and state legitimacy are ex-
pected to be especially lacking in a context of state-based internal ﬁghting (Hypothesis
7b).
Exploring these hypotheses requires indicators that are indeed measuring the diﬀer-
ent dimensions of state weakness. For this reason, the section starts by presenting the
correlation matrix of all fragility measures included in the following analysis (see ta-
ble 22.2).71 This well displays the great convergence (as indicated by high correlations)
between fragility indicators that are measuring the same or similar theoretical constructs
as well as a clear discrimination (lower correlations) between indicators that are mea-
suring diﬀerent baseline concepts or dimensions of state weakness.
Table 22.2.: Correlation Matrix of State Weakness Measures. Source: own calculation.
71A correlation matrix describes correlations among M variables. It is a square symmetrical M*M matrix
with the (ij)th element equal to the Pearson Correlation Coeﬃcient (r) between the (i)th and the
(j)th variable. The closer the coeﬃcient is to either -1 (a perfect decreasing linear relationship)
or +1 (a perfect increasing linear relationship) the stronger the correlation between the variables.
Correlation coeﬃcients of +/-0.80 or larger are generally referred to as strong correlations (Schnell
et al. 1999, p. 154). The diagonal elements (correlations of indicators with themselves) are always
equal to +1. See table F.1 for a pairwise correlation matrix of all fragility measures (which in addition
to the pairwise correlation coeﬃcients includes information on the number of observations used for
the calculation of r and the levels of signiﬁcance).
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Narrow measures of state weakness that are focusing on the eﬀectiveness, the func-
tioning or the quality of state institutions (the WGI Governance Eﬀectiveness Indicator,
the BTI Failed State Index, the SFI eﬀectiveness score, the overall SFI score and the
SFI sub-Index I) are strongly correlated with each other.72 Only the Freedom House
Functioning of Government Index stands out in this regard. The degree of convergence
is low between this and the above mentioned narrow measures of state weakness73 as
well as most other indices. This is hardly surprising given the fact that Freedom House
intends to capture a distinct overall concept (the state of freedom instead of state weak-
ness) and in doing so focuses on one speciﬁc aspect of state weakness (the degree to
which governments operate independently of undue inﬂuences and pressures). The over-
all index correlates strongly with just one other state weakness measure, namely the BTI
Traditions of Civil Indicator in such a way that higher values on the BTI indicator (more
numerous and active civic associations, a stronger civic culture of participation in public
life and higher levels of social trust) associate with lower values on the FH Functioning of
Government Index (a less independent but also a less accountable, open and transparent
government) (r=-0.76). At least in regard to the ﬁrst and main dimension of the Free-
dom House measure this makes sense: The more public pressure, the less independent
the government. In addition, the formation of civil society organizations might come
in response to closed, nontransparent and unaccountable government practices (at least
in states where opposition is tolerated) which might explain the signiﬁcant but nega-
tive correlation between the two measures. Finally, the two corruption measures, the
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of Transparency International and the WGI Control
of Corruption Indicator, are strongly correlated with each other (r=0.86) and therefore
could be used interchangeably. Because corruption is a central dimension of state dys-
function and often included even in the most parsimonious indices of state weakness,
both corruption measures also strongly correlate with narrow measures of state weak-
ness (the BTI Failed State Index (r=0.71/0.72) and the WGI Governance Eﬀectiveness
Indicator (r=0.78/0.91) which on purpose is kept conceptually distinct from corruption).
High correlations between overall indices and their sub-indices (e.g. between the BTI
Stateness Index and the BTI Failed State Index or between various SFI measures) are
of course self-explaining.
In comparison, the degree of convergence tends to be much lower between the narrow
and the more comprehensive measures of state weakness (e.g. between the WGI Gov-
ernance Eﬀectiveness Indicator and the BTI Stateness Index which includes a societal
dimension) as well as between the narrow instruments and those that cover legitimacy
aspects (e.g. between the WGI Governance Eﬀectiveness Indicator, the SFI eﬀectiveness
score, the corruption measures or even the BTI Failed State Index on the one hand and
the SFI sub-Index II and the SFI legitimacy score on the other).74 Obviously, these
groups of measures cover distinct aspects of state weakness which justiﬁes their inclu-
72Pearson’s correlation coeﬃcients (r) are ranging from +/-0.71 to +/-0.91.
73Pearson’s correlation coeﬃcients (r) are ranging from +/-0.41 to +/-0.56.
74Pearson’s correlation coeﬃcients (r) are ranging from +/-0.60 to 0.73.
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sion in the upcoming empirical analysis. Especially relevant in this context is the rather
low correlation between the SFI legitimacy measure and the SFI eﬀectiveness measure
(r=0.68) indicating that high scores on the former dimension of state weakness do not
necessarily go hand in hand with high scores on the latter. For instance, Vietnam,
Lesotho or Gambia are doing comparatively well in terms of state legitimacy but are
scoring comparatively low on the state eﬀectiveness measure. The opposite applies to
Saudi Arabia, Columbia and Turkey which are rather eﬀective states that are neverthe-
less lacking state legitimacy. The countries with the greatest discrepancy between their
SFI legitimacy and their SFI eﬀectiveness scores are presented by table 22.3 on the next
page.
Finally, the Polity Fragmentation Indicator, the Grimes measure and the BTI Tradi-
tions of Civil Society Indicator just capture fractions of, or entirely diﬀerent concepts
than, the more comprehensive measures of state weakness as well as than the narrow
instruments that are focusing on the functioning of central state authority and basic
administration.75 The low correlation between the Grimes indicator (the total number
of civil society organizations within a country) and the BTI Traditions of Civil Society
Indicator (r=-0.22) deserves special attention. Obviously, the presence of a large num-
ber of civil society organizations in itself must not be mistaken for a long-term presence
of public and civic engagement, a strong culture to participate in public life and high
levels of social trust.
Using these diverse indicators in order to explore the above mentioned hypotheses pro-
duces the following outcomes: Violent actors who engaged in non-state internal armed
conﬂict were operating in signiﬁcantly more fragile countries than those violent actors
who engaged in state-based armed conﬂict, only. In contradiction with Hypothesis 7b,
this equally holds if those indicators are used that are capturing the level of state func-
tionality and legitimacy. The diﬀerences in state weakness are highly signiﬁcant for
almost all of the fourteen state weakness indicators (p-value< 0:01). Insigniﬁcant dif-
ferences in means are only obtained if the FH Functioning of Government Index or the
BTI Traditions of Civil Society Indicator are used. Thus, at the actor level much speaks
in favor of Hypothesis 7 and 7a while Hypothesis 7b is rejected.
75For instance, the correlation coeﬃcients between the Grimes indicator and all other state weakness
measures are ranging from +/-0.10 to +/-0.26.
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Rank Country SFI State SFI State
Legitimacy* Eﬀectivess*
1. Madagascar + + + +
2. Gambia + + + +
3. Cambodia + + + +
4. Burkina Faso + + + +
5. Saudi Arabia + + + + +
6. Haiti + + +
7. Mali + + +
7. CAR + + +
7. Armenia + + + + +
7. Mozambique + + + +
8. Zimbabwe + + +
8. Lesotho + + + + +
8. Guinea-Bissau + + + +
8. Benin + + +
9. Comoros + + +
10. Vietnam + + + + +
11. Togo + + +
12. Tanzania + + + +
13. Ghana + + + +
13. Burundi + + +
13. Columbia + + + + +
14. Bangladesh + + +
15. Liberia + + +
15. Turkey + + + + +
* sﬁ legitimacy: +++  1; ++ > 1  2; + > 2  3; scale 0 (best)-3 (worst)
sﬁ eﬀectiveness: +++  1:11; ++ > 1:11  2:22; + > 2:22  3:33; scale 0 (best)-3.33 (worst)
Table 22.3.: Countries with the Greatest Discrepancy between State Legitimacy and
Eﬀectiveness. Source: own calculation.
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This repeats itself at the country level. Although state-based internal ﬁghting happens
in fragile states, too, countries which have seen non-state internal warfare or non-state
internal armed conﬂict (sometimes in addition to state-based ﬁghting) are signiﬁcantly
weaker than those states that have not at all experienced this kind of internal ﬁghting and
instead engaged in state-based internal wars or armed conﬂicts, only. Mean diﬀerences
in the level of state weakness between groups of countries that engaged in the one or the
other kind of internal ﬁghting are especially large if narrow measures like the WGI Gov-
ernance Eﬀectiveness Indicator, the WGI Control of Corruption Indicator or the Polity
Fragmentation Indicator are used.76 Countries which have seen non-state internal ﬁght-
ing are also signiﬁcantly more fragile than states that remained entirely peaceful (which
of course applies to the group of war-torn or conﬂict-experienced countries in general).77
Again, diﬀerences in means are signiﬁcant for all state weakness measures with the ex-
ception of the BTI Traditions of Civil Society Indicator. Against expectation, traditions
of civil society are even signiﬁcantly better developed in war-torn or conﬂict-experienced
states as compared with entirely peaceful countries (p-values< 0:05). Countries which
engaged in non-state internal ﬁghting also receive signiﬁcantly better values on the BTI
Traditions of Civil Society Indicator as compared with those states that have seen state-
based internal ﬁghting, only. The diﬀerences in means are, however, less signiﬁcant
(p-values< 0:1). I abandoned the idea of using a more restrictive categorization of coun-
tries, i.e. to compare the level of state weakness of those countries that engaged in
exclusively non-state internal wars or armed conﬂicts (just 3 or 12 countries at maxi-
mum) with those that engaged in exclusively state-based internal wars or armed conﬂicts
(47 or 35 countries at maximum) as this would reduce the sizes of the samples to an
non-acceptable extent.
76The group of countries that engaged in non-state warfare/armed conﬂict (N=16/53) receives an av-
erage value of -0.88/-0.64 on the WGI Governance Eﬀectiveness Indicator as opposed to a mean
of -0.01/0.15 for those countries which exclusively engaged in state-based warfare/armed conﬂict
(N=152/115) (p-values< 0:01). The group of countries that engaged in non-state warfare/armed
conﬂict (N=16/53) receives an average value of -0.88/-0.67 on the WGI Control of Corruption Indi-
cator as opposed to a mean of -0.03/0.14 for those countries which exclusively engaged in state-based
warfare/armed conﬂict (N=158/121) (p-values< 0:01). Both indicators are ranging from -2.5 (worst)
to +2.5 (best). The average level of fragmentation as captured by the Polity Fragmentation Indicator
also diﬀers considerably between these groups of countries: the indicator assumes an average value
of 0.86/0.4 for the group of countries that engaged in non-state warfare/non-state armed conﬂict
(N=16/53) as opposed to an average value of 0.15/0.1 for those countries that engaged in state-based
warfare/armed conﬂict, only (N=152/115) (p-values< 0:01). The overall scale of this indicator ranges
from 0 (best) to 3 (worst).
77For instance, countries which have not seen any internal war between 1946 and 2009 (N=102) receive
an average value of 7.3 on the SFI sub-Index I as opposed to an average value of 11.3 for countries that
engaged in exclusively state-based internal wars (N=47) and an average value of 15 for countries that
have seen non-state internal wars. The index ranges from zero (best) to 22 (worst). The corresponding
averages are 8.1, 7.2 and 5.6 on the BTI Stateness Index which ranges from one (worst) to ten (best)
or 48.4, 33.7 and 28.5 on the Corruption Perception Index which ranges from zero (worst) to 100
(best).
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At the war level, the results are more mixed and less signiﬁcant. In comparison to their
state-based counterparts, non-state internal wars tend to take place in a national context
where especially the level of state eﬀectiveness and authority (as measured by the SFI
eﬀectiveness score, the BTI Failed State Index, the Polity Fragmentation Indicator but
also the WGI Governance Eﬀectiveness Indicator) is signiﬁcantly worse (p values < 0:1
or at least < 0:5). This at least speaks in favor of Hypothesis 7a. The BTI Stateness In-
dex which is based on a broader theoretical concept also performs as expected. However,
if the other state weakness measures are used the mean diﬀerences remain insigniﬁcant.78
This changes considerably when moving to the conﬂict and conﬂict episode level.
Non-state internal armed conﬂicts and conﬂict episodes are happening in signiﬁcantly
more fragile states as compared with state-based armed conﬂicts and state-based conﬂict
episodes. With the exception of the usual subject (the BTI Traditions of Civil Society
Indicator at the episode level), diﬀerences in means of all state weakness measures are
extremely signiﬁcant.79 This clearly supports Hypothesis 7 and 7a while Hypothesis 7b
again needs to be rejected.
Because low-intensity armed conﬂicts are now included in the analysis the samples are
quite large. Unfortunately, time-series data on state fragility are only available for a
short period of time (and for six of the fourteen state fragility indicators or indices80).
Measuring the degree of state fragility prior to the outbreak of internal ﬁghting therefore
cuts the samples in half.81 In addition, the signiﬁcance of results slightly drops at the
conﬂict level. Still, the average level of state weakness (as measured by the SFI sub-
Index I, the SFI eﬀectiveness and legitimacy scores and the WGI Control of Corruption
Indicator), prior to the outbreak of non-state armed conﬂicts is signiﬁcantly worse com-
pared with the average level of state weakness prior to the outbreak of state-based armed
conﬂicts. At the episode level, highly signiﬁcant results in this regard are obtained for all
of the available state fragility measures (i.e. the above measures plus the SFI sub-Index
II and the WGI Governance Eﬀectiveness Indicator).
However, at both levels of analysis the global outcomes are mainly driven by two single
regions, namely Central and South Asia and the Middle East and North Africa. In these
two regions, non-state internal armed conﬂicts and non-state conﬂict episodes indeed
happen in signiﬁcantly more fragile states as compared with state-based internal ﬁght-
ing. This outcome is very consistent across diﬀerent state weakness indicators. It also
persists if the average levels of state weakness prior to the outbreak of state-based and
78The SFI (overall score), the SFI sub-Index I, the FH Functioning of Government Index, the CPI, the
BTI Traditions of Civil Society Indicator, the Grimes measure and the SFI legitimacy score.
79In case of the FH Functioning of Government Index p-value< 0:05; in all other cases p-values< 0:01.
80These are the SFI and WGI measures which cover the years from 1995 or 1996 until 2011.
81Depending on the indicator, the number of non-state conﬂicts then varies between 298 and 312 cases
and the number of state-based conﬂicts varies between 110 and 122 cases. The number of non-state
conﬂict episodes then varies between 323 and 338 cases while the number of state-based conﬂict
episodes varies between 173 and 192.
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non-state conﬂicts or conﬂict episodes are compared with each other – though sensitivity
in regard to the regional coding is an issue.82 Contrary outcomes or at least insigniﬁcant
diﬀerences in the average levels of state weakness between kinds of internal armed con-
ﬂict or conﬂict episodes are found for the Americas as well as for East and Southeast Asia
and Oceania. In these two regions, state-based internal armed conﬂicts and state-based
conﬂict episodes seem to happen in equally or even more fragile contexts than non-
state internal ﬁghting (though the diﬀerences in means are less signiﬁcant). Finally, the
results for Europe and (sub-Saharan) Africa remain mixed. There, it depends on the
indicator used whether the political context of non-state armed conﬂicts and non-state
conﬂict episodes is comparatively and signiﬁcantly worse in terms of state weakness.
For instance, in sub-Saharan Africa (PRIO regional coding) non-state conﬂicts/conﬂict
episodes tend to happen in states that are on average signiﬁcantly more corrupt (p-
value< 0:05/p-value< 0:1), that receive signiﬁcantly worse values on the BTI Traditions
of Civil Society Index (p-values< 0:01) and the BTI Stateness Index (p-value< 0:05/p-
value< 0:1) and whose polities are signiﬁcantly more fragmented (p-values< 0:01). If
UCDP’s regional coding is applied (so that Sudan is part of an all-Africa region) the
signiﬁcance in mean diﬀerences tends to increase and some SFI measures can be added
to this list.83 Comparing the average levels of state weakness prior to the outbreak of
internal ﬁghting nevertheless yields insigniﬁcant results. This is, however, little surpris-
ing given the limited temporal scope of such an analysis and therefore the small number
of state-based and non-state armed conﬂicts or conﬂict episodes that can be compared
with each other – even within this most conﬂict-ridden region.84
The above conﬁrms that the political context of conventional (state-based) and non-
conventional (non-state) internal ﬁghting diﬀers as proposed by Hypothesis 7. I found
the average level of state fragility to be signiﬁcantly worse in those countries that ex-
perienced non-state internal ﬁghting (as compared with those countries that engaged
in state-based internal ﬁghting, only). The degree of state fragility is also signiﬁcantly
worse prior to the outbreak of non-state internal armed conﬂicts or conﬂict episodes (as
compared with state-based armed conﬂicts or conﬂict episodes). Furthermore, violent
non-state actors who engaged in non-state armed conﬂict tend to operate in signiﬁcantly
more fragile countries (as compared with those violent non-state actors who engaged in
exclusively state-based armed conﬂict). The corresponding diﬀerences in means are sta-
tistically signiﬁcant especially if low-intensity ﬁghting is taken into consideration (i.e. at
82For both regions, the signiﬁcance of eﬀects decreases if UCDP’s regional coding is used (especially at
the conﬂict level and if state weakness is measured prior to the outbreak of internal ﬁghting).
83The SFI sub-Index II at the conﬂict level and the SFI (overall score), the SFI sub-Index I and the SFI
legitimacy score at the episode level.
84For sub-Saharan Africa and the period from 1995/1996 until 2011, data on the level of state weakness
prior to the outbreak of ﬁghting are available for 201 (229) non-state and 57 (81) state-based armed
conﬂicts (conﬂict episodes) if the SFI measures are used and for 193 (221) non-state and 52 (75)
state-based armed conﬂicts (conﬂict episodes) if the WGI measures are used. For the Americas, these
numbers are as low as 19 (14) non-state and 4 (8) state-based armed conﬂicts (conﬂict episodes) if the
SFI measures are used and 19 (14) non-state and 3 (7) state-based armed conﬂicts (conﬂict episodes)
if the WGI measures are used.
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the conﬂict and at the conﬂict episode level) and if state-weakness is (in accordance with
Hypothesis 7a) narrowly deﬁned. Because levels of state functionality and legitimacy
also tend to be signiﬁcantly worse in a context of non-state internal ﬁghting, Hypothesis
7b is rejected. There is no indication of opposing eﬀects in such a way that diﬀerent
dimensions of state weakness relate to diﬀerent kinds of internal ﬁghting. Both, the
average level of state eﬀectiveness and authority on the one hand and the average level
of state legitimacy and functionality in the delivery of public goods and services on the
other hand, are signiﬁcantly worse in the context of non-state internal ﬁghting. Real
diﬀerences in the level of state weakness nevertheless vary from indicator to indicator.
Especially at the country level, diﬀerences in the average level of state fragility (between
those countries that have seen non-state internal ﬁghting and those countries that did
not engage in this kind of internal ﬁghting) are not only statistically signiﬁcant but
also substantial – in particular if narrow measures of state weakness (the WGI Control
of Corruption Indicator, the WGI Governance Eﬀectiveness Indicator and the Polity
Fragmentation Indicator) are used. Though the overall outcome holds at all levels of
analysis and is largely robust against changes in the operationalization of state weak-
ness, its global validity has been put into question. At least at the conﬂict and at the
episode level, the global results turned out to be mostly driven by Central and South
Asia, the Middle East and North Africa and (depending on the state fragility measure
used) by sub-Saharan Africa. Sensitivity to regional coding remains an issue, too. I also
found the overall outcome to hold even if the level of state fragility is measured prior to
the outbreak of ﬁghting. Unfortunately, this attempt to account for reverse causation
remains very limited in its temporal scope (so that the sizes of the samples are greatly
reduced) due to a lack of time-series data on state fragility. Finally, some results are un-
expected. Especially the BTI Traditions of Civil Society Indicator yields insigniﬁcant or
inconsistent results across levels of analysis and regions.85 Because the Grimes measure
(the number of civil society organizations within a country) constitutes one dimension
of the BTI Traditions of Civil Society Indicator it might help to clarify this matter.
The empirical results in regard to this single indicator are straightforward: Non-state
internal ﬁghting tends to happen in a context where the average number of civil society
organizations is signiﬁcantly larger. Though the global outcome seems mostly driven by
Africa, it equally holds at the country, the conﬂict and the episode level. The average
number of civil society organization is also much higher in war-torn/conﬂict-experienced
countries as opposed to entirely peaceful states.86 Theoretically, however, the issue is
85Diﬀerences in means stay insigniﬁcant at the war, the actor and the country level. At the conﬂict
and at the conﬂict episode level they are highly signiﬁcant but are pointing into diﬀerent directions:
Non-state armed conﬂicts tend to happen in a national context where traditions of civil society are
signiﬁcantly less developed (as compared with state-based armed conﬂicts) while the opposite applies
at the episode level.
86The average number of civil society organizations within countries that experienced internal warfare
between 1946 and 2009 (N=61) lies at 171 as opposed to just 117 within those countries that did
not see any internal war throughout this period (N=108). The average number of civil society orga-
nizations within countries that experienced internal armed conﬂict between 1989 and 2011 (N=84)
lies at 183 as opposed to an average number of just 90 within those countries that did not see any
internal armed conﬂict throughout this period (N=85).
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less clear. At the one hand, high numbers of civil society organizations could be a sign
of state strength because the formation of such organizations and their participation
in politics requires a certain level of openness, transparency or even democracy. On
the other hand, a large number of civil society organizations could be a sign of state
weakness if such actors emerge in response to government ineﬃciencies or corruption.
Oftentimes their creation is pro-actively supported by the international community in a
context where state institutions are non-existent, ineﬀective or ineﬃcient. Thus, large
numbers of civil society organizations could also be interpreted as a consequence or sign
of state weakness. These ambiguities are eminent in the BTI Traditions of Civil Society
Indicator which includes the number of civil society organizations along other indicators
capturing traditions of civil society, the level of social trust and the existence of a culture
to participate within societies.
The validity of this and other similar measures as well as the issue of reverse causation
certainly deserve more attention and further research. It also remains to be tested
whether higher levels of state weakness still signiﬁcantly correlate with a higher risk of (a
certain kind of) internal ﬁghting if alternative explanations or intervening variables (e.g.
the organizational level of violent actors) are taken into consideration. My ﬁrst attempt
to control for this factor conﬁrms the overall outcome: Formally organized groups who
engage in non-state internal ﬁghting tend to operate in signiﬁcantly weaker states as
compared with formally organized actors who engage in state-based internal conﬂict,
only. This holds no matter how state weakness is measured. Out of all fourteen available
indicators, non-signiﬁcant diﬀerences are only obtained if the Grimes measure and the
BTI Traditions of Civil Society Indicator are used. Alternative dependent variables are
also coming to mind. For instance, higher levels of state weakness might be correlated
with a larger number of non-state/state-based internal armed conﬂicts at the country
level or a larger number of involved actors at the conﬂict or episode level. Finally, the
strength of state institutions might also impact upon the duration of internal ﬁghting
or the decision of violent actors to commit acts of one-sided violence against unarmed
civilians and therefore the kind (and scale) of violence that is observed. Some of these
thoughts shall be addressed within the ﬁnal multiple regression analysis of this study.87
87Some preliminary empirical ﬁndings on the question whether the level of state weakness and the
production of (easily accessible and lootable) conﬂict resources signiﬁcantly correlate with the number
of (non-state/state-based) armed conﬂicts/wars or with the number of country-years spent in (non-
state/state-based) armed conﬂict/warfare are presented in table G.1 on page 414.
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23. Interim Summary V: Main Results of
the Comparative Analysis
Among peace and conﬂict analysts, the concept of New Wars sparked theoretical debate
for quite a while. The methodological limitations of the concept and especially the
question whether New Wars are truly “new” in nature have been discussed up to the
point of exhaustion. Due to a lack of data, however, (large-N) empirical analyses remain
rare. Only recently, some research institutes started to collect information on non-state
or sub-state wars and conﬂicts that allow for systematic tests. I relied on these data for
an initial descriptive and a simple bivariate comparative analysis which explored some
of the global trends and theses that can be deduced from the concept of New Wars.
Overall, I found non-state internal wars, armed conﬂicts and conﬂict episodes, as well
as countries and actors who engaged in this kind of internal ﬁghting, to signiﬁcantly
diﬀer in various respects from state-based internal wars, armed conﬂicts and conﬂict
episodes and from those counties and actors who not at all engaged in this kind of
internal ﬁghting. In tendency, hypotheses on the quantity of involved actors, on their
origin (the way how they emerged) and on the kind of violence they apply ﬁnd strong
support. With some geographical and/or temporal limitations, the same applies to those
hypotheses that are specifying the role of conﬂict resources. Especially the production
of easily accessible and lootable conﬂict resources (in particular gems and drugs) relates
to non-state ﬁghting at the actor, the conﬂict, the episode and the country level. Mixed
outcomes are obtained for conﬂict resources that are diﬃcult to access and to loot. But,
in line with the respective hypothesis, the production of such resources rather associates
with state-based ﬁghting at least at the actor, the episode and the conﬂict level. Finally,
I do not ﬁnd support for the claim that diﬀerent kinds of state weakness associate with
diﬀerent kinds of internal ﬁghting. Instead, the political context of non-state ﬁghting
seems to be worse compared with the political context of state-based ﬁghting no matter
how state weakness is measured. A signiﬁcantly higher average level of state fragility
(specially a lack of state eﬀectiveness and authority) associates with non-state ﬁghting
at all levels of analysis. This also holds if state fragility is measured prior to the outbreak
of internal ﬁghting.
All of the above speaks in favor of the concept of New Wars as much as the increasing
signiﬁcance of non-state internal wars, armed conﬂicts and conﬂict episodes. Worldwide,
the total numbers of post-Cold War non-state conﬂicts and episodes even surpass the
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total numbers of their state-based counterparts. If other indicators are used, however,
non-state ﬁghting still has to give in. In any case, non-state internal wars are not the
dominant type of warfare and they are not characterized by a particularly transnational
nature of actors. Also in contrast with the concept of New Wars, non-state internal
ﬁghting is of a signiﬁcantly shorter average duration and signiﬁcantly less intense than
state-based internal ﬁghting. A theoretical explanation for the latter ﬁnding has already
been given. I have argued that very intense warfare negatively impacts on the realization
of economic interests. While severe ﬁghting might interrupt or at least complicate the
exploitation and the (illegal) black-market trading of conﬂict resources, small-scale battle
suﬃciently destabilizes states to oﬀer opportunity for private gain (Addison et al. 2001;
Buhaug et al. 2005). Thus, New War Economies might be better realized through low-
level violence. This provided ground for an alternative hypothesis which states that the
privatization of actors, the economization of motives and the establishment of New War
Economies eventually result in minor or intermediate non-state armed conﬂicts rather
than intensive and extensive warfare. At least the bivariate outcome presented above
speaks in favor of this expectation.
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By now, the issue of intervening factors and alternative explanations has been mentioned
several times. As far as the available data allow, it shall be addressed within the following
multiple regression analysis. Through this method it is possible to explore in how far
the value of a dependent variable changes when a key independent variable is varied
while other relevant independent variables are held ﬁxed. For instance, at the actor
level, this method of analysis allows to study whether worsening levels of state weakness
still correlate in a statistically signiﬁcant way with engagement in non-state ﬁghting if
other predictors (e.g. whether the violent group is operating in a country where easily
accessible and lootable conﬂict resources are produced) are controlled for. Multiple
regression analyses allow to study whether internal wars, armed conﬂicts or conﬂict
episodes are signiﬁcantly more likely to be categorized as non-state if they are happening
in weaker states, or if they are taking place in (sub-Saharan) Africa, or if they are carried
out in countries that produce easily accessible and lootable conﬂict resources while all
other independent factors are held constant at their means. At the country level, this
method of analysis can be used to explore in how far levels of state weakness, the
production of conﬂict resources or an interaction of both factors signiﬁcantly contribute
to predict the experience of non-state internal ﬁghting. Through multiple regression
analyses it is also possible to study the linkages between dimensions of internal warfare
as speciﬁed by the aforementioned associative hypothesis. Which factors explain the
number of actors involved in internal warfare, whether they are formally or informally
organized, the intensity or the duration of internal ﬁghting or the nature of applied
violence? Does the signiﬁcance of the respective coeﬃcients or the strength of eﬀects
diﬀer if certain sub-samples (e.g. state-based or non-state armed conﬂicts) are analyzed
separately? Or if the entire sample is taken into consideration: does the “type of internal
ﬁghting” signiﬁcantly correlate with the dependent variable independently of its eﬀect
through other predictors that are included in the same model? For instance, is the
number of involved actors still signiﬁcantly higher in non-state wars as opposed to state-
based wars if the duration of ﬁghting, the level of state weakness and the production
of easily accessible and lootable conﬂict resources within the war-aﬀected country are
controlled for and therefore drop out as explanatory factors? What happens to the
coeﬃcients of these other independent variables if the type of warfare is included as an
additional control factor?
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In order to answer these questions I speciﬁed baseline models for each dependent
variable. A schematic overview of the signiﬁcance of the regression results of these
basic models is given in table G.1 on page 414 which also provides information on all
dependent variables (given in the rows) and independent variables (given in the columns)
that are included in the corresponding analyses. For several of these variables alternative
measures are available. I greatly reduced their number and just included those indicators
which the above comparative analysis identiﬁed as the most promising in terms of their
temporal scope and validity. For instance, the duration of ﬁghting is measured in days
and in months (instead of years) at least at the episode level where these more precise
measures are available. The resources argument is captured by dummies indicating
the production (instead of the occurrence) of conﬂict resources or, alternatively, the
production of easily accessible and lootable conﬂict resources. To ﬁgure out whether
eﬀects are robust against changes in measurement, all models that include the level of
state weakness as an independent variable have been calculated several times using one
of the narrow measures of state fragility (the Polity Fragmentation Indicator or the BTI
Failed State Index) or one of those indicators that capture the degree of state weakness
prior to/at the outbreak of violence (the SFI sub-Index I, the SFI eﬀectiveness score, the
SFI legitimacy score, the WGI Governance Eﬀectiveness Indicator or the WGI Control
of Corruption Indicator). In order to account for regional eﬀects, I calculated each
model ﬁrst with a sub-Saharan Africa dummy and second with an all-Africa dummy. A
stepwise variation of these indicators resulted in a very large number of slightly diﬀerent
regression models representing all possible combinations of independent variables and
their diﬀerent measures. This approach (to formulate all thinkable models and see which
one best describes the data) is generally referred to as an exploratory data analysis (as
opposed to a conﬁrmatory data analysis).
Out of these various baseline models and for each dependent variable, I selected the
model(s) with the highest R-squared values (which in an ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression represents the proportion of variance in the dependent variable accounted for
by the model) or with the highest MacFadden’s pseudo-R-squared values (a likelihood-
ratio index which in a logistic regression model compares the likelihood for the intercept
only model to the likelihood for the model with the predictors). The higher the values
of these “coeﬃcients of determination”, the better the statistical model ﬁts the data.
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The selected models were then further reﬁned.1 I mean-centered all metric variables2
and afterwards included interaction terms between the respective mean-centered state
weakness measures and the dummies indicating the production of (easily accessible and
lootable) conﬂict resources. This allows to study whether the eﬀect of state weakness is
diﬀerent in a context where such resources are produced or not (i.e. in a context where
both worsening state weakness and the production of such resources can be observed).
I used likelihood-ratio tests for nested models3 to explore whether the interaction term
adds to the overall model ﬁt and also dropped other variables that did not meet this
requirement.4 This includes the “type of conﬂict” which at this stage of the analysis was
also included as an additional control factor.
I checked the level of multicolinearity5 for all models by calculating variance inﬂation
factors (vif)6 and used graphical methods7 to detect non-linear relationships between
the dependent variable and independent variables (which I then tried to account for
by transforming the respective independent variables). Dependent variables have also
been transformed if an OLS regression model turned out to suﬀer from heteroscedas-
ticity.8 These transformations happen for statistical reasons and largely go unnoticed
1This reﬁnement process and the following regression diagnostics follow Kohler and Kreuter (2001) as
well as the instructions (and rules-of-thumb for numerical tests) given at http://www.ats.ucla.
edu/stat/stata/webbooks/ (visited on 2014-08-05) (Regression with Stata, Chapter 2 and Logistic
Regression with Stata, chapter 3) and http://www.philender.com/courses/categorical/notes3/
fit.html (visited on 2014-08-03) .
2Centering a variable involves subtracting the mean (of only those observations that are included
in the respective model) from each of the scores and then using the mean-centered independent
variable instead of the original one. If interaction terms are included in the analysis, mean-centering
the involved metric variables helps to avoid collinearity problems. Oftentimes, mean-centering also
facilitates the interpretation of results.
3Nested models are models that can be obtained by restricting a parameter (in this case the interaction
term) in a more complex model to be zero.
4To decide on this matter I additionally used the ﬁtstat command in stata which computes a variety
of measures of ﬁt that can be used to compare nested and non-nested models.
5Multicolinearity occurs when two or more independent variables in a model are approximately de-
termined by a linear combination of other independent variables included in the same speciﬁcation.
The higher the level of multicolinearity, the more diﬃcult to obtain a unique estimate of regression
coeﬃcients as long as all the independent variables are part of the same model. Severe multicolin-
earity largely increases the standard errors of the estimates which themselves become unreliable or
unstable.
6Variables with a vif> 10 merit further investigation.
7Augmented-component-plus-residual plots (in the case of OLS regressions) and locally weighted mean
regressions with a locally weighted scatterplot smoother (in the case of logistic regressions)
8All OLS regression models assume that the residuals are homoscedastic (i.e. have constant variance). A
violation of this assumption (heteroscedasticity) does not cause OLS coeﬃcient estimates to be biased
but it might result in biased OLS estimates of the variance of the coeﬃcients (and therefore in biased
standard errors). Because biased standard errors lead to biased inference, the results of hypothesis
tests are possibly wrong. I tested this assumption of the linear regression model via graphical methods
(by graphing symmetry plots of the dependent variables and by plotting the residuals versus the
predicted values, so-called residual-versus-ﬁtted plots). If the assumption is met and the model is
well ﬁt, there should be no pattern to the residuals plotted against the ﬁtted values. In addition, I
computed Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg tests to detect heteroscedasticity. Because OLS regression
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though the interpretation of the respective regression outputs slightly changes.9 For
both kinds of regression models I also tried to identify observations with substantial
impact on the goodness of ﬁt of the entire model or on the parameter estimates. To
detect observations that stand out away from all the other data points I used scatterplot
matrices. For all OLS regression models, I examined the studentized residuals as a ﬁrst
means for identifying outliers.10 In addition, I looked at the leverages to identify cases
with a great inﬂuence on the regression coeﬃcient estimates.11 Leverage-versus-squared-
residual plots have been used to display observations with both, a large residual and a
great leverage. These are potentially the most inﬂuential points. Finally, I calculated
Cook’s d to identify multivariate outliers.12 For logistic regression models, similar mea-
sures are available to detect unusual and inﬂuential covariate patterns. I calculated the
standardized Pearson residuals, deviance residuals, the Pregibon leverages, Pregibon’s
dbeta (which is similar to Cook’s d in OLS regressions as it provides summary informa-
tion on the inﬂuence of a single observation on all parameter estimates) and Hosmer and
Lemeshow’s delta-Chi-squared (which measures the change in the Pearson Chi-squared
ﬁt statistic if the speciﬁc observation is excluded from the analysis) and plotted these
statistics against the predicted probabilities or simply against case numbers.
The analysis closes with tests for model speciﬁcation errors13 and some robustness
checks. I computed all ﬁnal models without multivariate outliers (i.e. observations with
Cook’s d> 4/n or delta-Chi-squared> 4) to see whether the results are sensitive to
outliers. In addition, I ran all OLS regression models with robust standard errors (a
method that can eﬀectively deal with minor problems of normality, heteroscedasticity
or unusual and inﬂuential observations) and also used the robust regression command
models also assume that the residuals are normally distributed, I graphed standardized-normal-
probability (P-P) plots of the residuals, plotted their quantiles against the quantiles of a normal
distribution (Q-Q plots), overlaid kernel density plots of the residuals with a normal distribution and
computed Shapiro-Wilk W Tests).
9For information on the interpretation of regression outputs where the dependent variable, an indepen-
dent variable(s) or both have been log-transformed see http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/sas/faq/
sas_interpret_log.htm (visited on 2014-08-19) .
10Observations with especially large residuals (r> 2 or r<  2) are identiﬁed as outliers.
11A leverage greater than (2k+2)/n should be carefully examined (where k is the number of predictors
and n the number of observations). In addition, added-variable plots (also known as partial-regression
leverage plots) helped to detect individual data points with great inﬂuence on the estimation of a
coeﬃcient. These plots show the relationship between the dependent variable and one independent
variable after both have been adjusted for all other predictors in the model.
12The conventional cut-oﬀ point for this statistic is 4/n.
13For all models I computed link tests for model speciﬁcation and, for all OLS models, in addition
regression speciﬁcation error tests for omitted variables (RESET). Both tests are based on the idea
that if a model is properly speciﬁed one should not be able to ﬁnd any additional independent
variable that is signiﬁcant except by chance. The link test creates two new variables (the variable of
prediction and the variable of squared prediction) which are then included as predictors. If the model
is speciﬁed correctly, the former should be signiﬁcant (because it is the predicted value) while the
latter should not have much explanatory power and should therefore remain insigniﬁcant. A RESET
works similarly. It also creates new variables based on the predictors and includes them in the model
to see whether they turn out to be signiﬁcant.
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(which assigns a weight to each observation with higher weights given to better behaved
observations and lower weights given to outlier cases). Finally, I explored in how far the
results of the ﬁnal models are changing if alternative measures are used, if additional
controls are included (that had previously been dropped) or if the regression is run
separately for certain sub-samples (e.g. only state-based or non-state conﬂicts).
As usual, R-squared and MacFadden’s pseudo-R-squared serve as the overall measures
of ﬁt for the ﬁnal OLS and the ﬁnal logistic regression models. In addition, I computed
(adjusted)-Count-R-squared and Hosmer-Lemeshow tests for all logistic models which
inform about the proportion of correctly classiﬁed covariate patterns (beyond that by
guessing the largest marginal).14 The regression outputs in numbers of all ﬁnal models
are given in table G.3 on page 416, table G.4 on page 417 and table G.5 on page 418
while table G.2 on page 415 provides a schematic overview of the signiﬁcance of the
results obtained by all reﬁned models (i.e. the ﬁnal models and their variations).
Through all these graphical methods and numerical tests, I checked if the basic as-
sumptions underlying the regression models are met. Otherwise the obtained results
might be misleading.15 I aimed to properly specify the models (to include all avail-
able relevant variables and to exclude all irrelevant variables), to detect unusual and
inﬂuential observations that exert undue inﬂuence on the model ﬁt and the estimated
coeﬃcients and to avoid multicolinearity. Still, the regression diagnostics as described
above and the eﬀorts to address violations of basic assumptions remain basic. Especially
the issue of non-linearity needs further attention. In several cases, inﬂuential observa-
tions and important but omitted control factors remain a matter of concern, too. Despite
the fact that there is room for further improvement of the models, some outcomes are,
however, very clear and consistent across speciﬁcations and levels of analysis. The below
summary of results rather focuses on such tendencies and patterns in outcomes instead
of discussing the results of “the” perfect and ﬁnal model. Each chapter again starts by
mentioning the associative hypothesis (or hypotheses if several were tested within the
same speciﬁcantion) that is (or are) discussed in the following.
14In a binary model it is possible to correctly categorize at least 50 percent of all cases without using any
information from the independent variables simply by choosing the outcome (0 or 1) with the largest
percentage. Adjusted-Count-R-squared takes this into account and only reports the proportion of
correct guesses beyond that by guessing the largest marginal. Hosmer-Lemeshow tests are believed
to be the more appropriate index of ﬁt (as compared with MacFadden’s pseudo-R-squared) if the
number of covariate patterns is large relative to the number of observations.
15OLS regression models assume a linear relationships between the predictors and the outcome variable,
errors should be identically and independently distributed (i.e. the errors associated with one obser-
vation are not correlated with the errors of any other observation) and the variance of errors should
be constant (Kohler and Kreuter 2001, pp. 198 sqq.). Logistic regression models assume that the
true conditional probabilities are a logistic function of the independent variables, that the model is
properly speciﬁed, that the independent variables are measured without error, that the observations
are independent and that the independent variables are not linear combinations of each other (see
http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/webbooks/ (visited on 2014-08-05) , Logistic Regression with
Stata, chapter 3).
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24.1. Multiple Regression Results Concerning the Associative
Hypotheses
Explaining the Nature of Applied Violence
H8/H9 Formally organized violent non-state actors who are operating in a coun-
try/in countries where conﬂict resources are produced are signiﬁcantly more likely to
commit acts of one-sided violence against unarmed civilians as compared with for-
mally organized violent non-state actors who are operating in a country/in countries
where no such resources are produced [H8]. In addition, the weaker the state in which
formally organized violent non-state groups are operating, the more likely they are to
commit acts of one-sided violence against unarmed civilians [H9].
I started the analysis by formulating baseline models testing both hypotheses simulta-
neously. Although these ﬁrst and simple models diﬀer in the regional dummies, the
state weakness measures and the resources variables they include, their results are very
similar: None of the independent variables exerts a signiﬁcant eﬀect that persists across
variations of the baseline models despite the variable measuring the origin of the violent
group (whether an actor had emerged by breaking away from another violent non-state
group).
During the reﬁnement process of the most promising baseline model, I added an in-
teraction term between the level of state weakness within the country/countries where
the actor is operating in and whether this country produces conﬂict resources. Because
the interaction term itself as well as the main eﬀects of both participating variables are
signiﬁcant and because a likelihood-ratio test indicates that the interaction term adds
to the overall model ﬁt, I decided to keep it in the ﬁnal model. In addition, I included
dummy variables indicating the “type of conﬂict involvement” of an actor (whether it
engaged in non-state conﬂict, in state-based conﬂict or in both types of internal ﬁghting).
If an actor’s engagement in non-state conﬂict is controlled for, the splinter group
indicator turns insigniﬁcant. I therefore conclude that involvement in non-state ﬁghting
is a decisive intervening factor that correlates with both, an actor’s likelihood of engaging
in acts of one-sided violence against civilians (the dependent variable) as much as it
relates to an actor’s origin as a splinter group (one of the independent variables). If the
model includes both independent variables (engagement in non-state ﬁghting and the
splinter group indicator), the former captures the eﬀect of the latter which for this reason
loses its signiﬁcance. “Engagement in state-based conﬂict” also increases an actor’s
chances of committing acts of one-sided violence against civilians. However, the just
mentioned eﬀect of non-state conﬂict engagement tends to be substantially larger and
more signiﬁcant: A formally organized violent actor’s chances of engaging in acts of
one-sided violence against unarmed civilians are 2.5 times greater if it engaged in non-
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state internal ﬁghting (p=0.000) but only 1.4 times greater if it belongs to the group
of actors who engaged in state-based internal ﬁghting (all else being equal). The latter
eﬀect even stays insigniﬁcant (p=0.174) if the exact same model is used.16 The by far
greatest eﬀect, however, is found for the dummy indicating engagement in both kinds of
internal ﬁghting (see the ﬁnal model presented in table G.3 on page 416). Involvement
in non-state as well as state-based internal ﬁghting turns out to be the most substantial,
signiﬁcant and stable factor in predicting formal actors’ engagement in acts of one-sided
violence. A formally organized violent non-state group’s chances of committing acts of
one-sided violence against unarmed civilians are six to seven times larger if the group
engaged in both kinds of internal armed conﬂict (as opposed to just one type of internal
ﬁghting). The eﬀect holds independently of the other explanatory variables.
On its own, the production of (easily accessible and lootable) conﬂict resources within
the country/countries where the actor is operating in is less (or even non-) signiﬁcantly
related to the dependent variable. However, there is mild support for an interaction eﬀect
between this factor and the level of state weakness (as measured by the BTI Failed State
Index). Thus, Hypothesis 8 cannot be entirely rejected.
Controlling for the type of conﬂict engagement also comes along with an increase in
the signiﬁcance of the state weakness measure. But, the stronger the state/states where
formally organized violent actors are operating in, the greater their odds to commit
acts of one-sided violence against unarmed civilians (especially if they are operating in a
country/countries where conﬂict resources are produced). Dropping the interaction eﬀect
from the ﬁnal model only reduces the size of the coeﬃcient of the state weakness variable,
which stays highly signiﬁcant. The direction of the eﬀect still contradicts Hypothesis 9,
which therefore needs to be rejected. If anything, the opposite seems to be true: formally
organized non-state armed groups are more likely to attack unarmed civilians if they are
based in relatively stronger states. The reasons behind this violent behavior remain
pure speculation. The state weakness variable is especially signiﬁcant if the analysis is
conﬁned to those actors who engaged in state-based internal conﬂict. Maybe violent non-
state armed groups who battle relatively strong government troops more often engage in
such kind of violent behavior to punish civilian collaboration with the enemy (which is
more likely in such situations), to relieve stress or to signal strength. Across variations
of the ﬁnal model, however, the results in this regard remain mixed. If alternative
state weakness measures are used the signiﬁcance of the eﬀect of this variable on the
nature of applied violence turns out to be unstable. Because it can only be observed
if state weakness is measured narrowly (through the above BTI Failed State Index, the
WGI Control of Corruption Indicator or the WGI Governance Eﬀectiveness Indicator)
table G.2 on page 415 only reports a mildly signiﬁcant eﬀect contradicting Hypothesis
9.
16These results are not reported in table G.3 on page 416 but included in the log-ﬁles. The model used
is the ﬁnal model presented in table G.3 on page 416 with either “engagement in non-state conﬂict”
or “engagement in state-based conﬂict” as the variable measuring the “type of internal ﬁghting”.
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The signiﬁcance of the regional dummies also depends on the speciﬁcation of the model.
According to the ﬁnal model, formally organized violent groups who are operating in
Africa are about twice as likely to engage in acts of one-sided violence against civilians.
However, if the level of state weakness is measured diﬀerently and/or if the sub-Saharan
Africa dummy is used, the outcome is mixed.17
Overall, even the ﬁnal model does not fully account for all relevant regional factors. In
addition, certain kinds of conﬂict engagement (in particular involvement in both types
of internal ﬁghting but also engagement in non-state conﬂict in general) systematically
relate to the kind of violence applied by formally organized violent actors. This points
to decisive but omitted explanatory factors that relate to the kind of conﬂict engage-
ment independently of those factors that are already included within the model. Most
importantly, however, the ﬁnal model entirely neglects group-level characteristics that
are certainly important in order to predict the behavior of violent actors. Indicators
on the internal structures of armed groups, their size or their (ethnic) composition are
either not available or cannot be included in the analysis because the available UCDP
data are biased. For this reason, the overall ﬁt, even of the ﬁnal model remains low.
Lastly, non-linearity remains an issue that needs to be addressed in the future.
Explaining the Duration of Fighting
H10–H13 The more fragile a state before/at the outbreak of ﬁghting, the shorter the
duration of state-based internal ﬁghting [H10] but the longer the duration of non-state
internal ﬁghting [H10a]. In addition, non-state internal conﬂicts or conﬂict episodes
are of a signiﬁcantly longer duration if they are fought amongst informally organized
groups as opposed to formally organized groups [H13]. In general, internal ﬁghting
lasts signiﬁcantly longer if at the same time conﬂict resources are produced within
the respective country [H11]. Finally, the larger the number of national armed groups
involved in internal warfare, the longer the duration [H12].
To investigate the above hypotheses I again formulated simple baseline models repre-
senting all possible combinations of independent variables and their various measures.
Out of these baseline models I selected the ones with the largest R-squared values for
further reﬁnement. This reﬁnement process resulted in the ﬁnal models given in ta-
ble G.3 on page 416. Because Hypotheses 10 and 10a assume opposing eﬀects of the
17Because the number of observations is large at this level of analysis, I calculated sub-sample analyses
of only those formally organized actors who engaged in non-state ﬁghting and of only those who did
not engage in this kind of internal ﬁghting. This allows for some interesting additional insights. For
instance, if the analysis is conﬁned to formally organized actors who did not engage in non-state
internal ﬁghting, the splinter group variable, the state weakness measures and the lootable resources
dummy are signiﬁcant more often. The above presented eﬀects of these variables seem to be mostly
driven by this sub-group of formally organized violent actors. The regional dummies turn out to be
signiﬁcant more often if only those formally organized actors are considered who engaged in non-state
internal ﬁghting.
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state weakness measure on the duration of ﬁghting for certain sub-samples of armed
conﬂict, the ﬁnal models diﬀer in their dependent variable: They predict the duration
of all kinds of internal ﬁghting, of just state-based or of just non-state internal armed
conﬂicts, episodes and wars. Although the ﬁnal models appear similar, a comparison of
eﬀects across these three sub-samples of armed conﬂict or across levels of analysis is not
possible. Even if the dependent variable concurs, the explanatory factors included at
the various levels of analysis sometimes diﬀer. Although some of the models cover the
same variables, they might rely on diﬀerent measures and therefore do not necessarily
include the same cases. In order to contrast eﬀects I therefore computed comparable
models based on the exact same model speciﬁcation. The results of these comparable
models (which are reported in the log-ﬁle) might slightly diﬀer from the outcomes of the
ﬁnal models given in table G.3 on page 416.
The following starts with presenting the episode-level results (before moving to the
conﬂict- and ﬁnally the war-level outcomes). At this level of analysis, the dependent
variable (the duration of ﬁghting) can be measured in days. Because this variable is
heavily skewed to the right, the ﬁnal episode-level models presented in table G.3 on
page 416 include the log-transformed instead of the original values of their dependent
variables to account for the existence of heteroscedasticity. The more precise duration
measures come with the advantage of higher R-squared values but lower numbers of
observations that can be included in the analyses. In addition, the indicators measuring
the level of state weakness prior to the outbreak of ﬁghting are only available for a
very limited period of time and, like the measure indicating the production of conﬂict
resources during times conﬂict, are missing for a number of cases. Because stata excludes
the entire observation if it detects a missing value on any of the variables included in
the speciﬁcation, the number of cases covered by the ﬁnal models is much smaller than
the total number of conﬂict episodes within the Master-File.
The model which explains the duration of all kinds of conﬂict episodes only covers
174 cases (105 non-state and 68 state-based episodes) but reaches an R-squared value of
0.41. Whether an episode is non-state or state-based in nature is the most reliable and
signiﬁcant predictor of the duration of ﬁghting even if the model already controls for
the level of state weakness prior to the outbreak of violence, whether ﬁghting happens
in sub-Saharan Africa and whether conﬂict resources are produced within the respective
country. Non-state conﬂict episodes are signiﬁcantly and much shorter than state-based
conﬂict episodes. Of these control variables, only the regional dummy is highly signif-
icant, too. Conﬂict episodes that happen in sub-Saharan Africa are of a signiﬁcantly
shorter duration compared with those conﬂict episodes that take place outside the re-
gion. The eﬀect holds independently of the other explanatory factors and is mostly
driven by the non-state episodes in the overall sample.18 The size of the eﬀect of the
18Across variations of the ﬁnal models, the regional dummies stay insigniﬁcant when predicting the dura-
tion of state-based episodes but are highly signiﬁcant if the duration of non-state episodes constitutes
the dependent variable.
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resources dummy is similar and also negative but less signiﬁcant. Only if the type of con-
ﬂict is dropped from the speciﬁcation does the marginal eﬀect of the resources dummy
more than double and its coeﬃcient becomes highly signiﬁcant. Obviously the two vari-
ables (non-state ﬁghting and the production of conﬂict resources) co-vary and therefore
capture each others’ eﬀects if included in the same speciﬁcation. Accordingly, the sub-
sample analysis reveals that conﬂict episodes in general and non-state conﬂict episodes
in particular which are happening in countries where at the same time (easily accessible
and lootable) conﬂict resources are produced are signiﬁcantly shorter than (non-state)
conﬂict episodes that are happening in countries where no such resources are produced.
This outcome is entirely at odds with Hypothesis 11 which expects the opposite. If alter-
native speciﬁcations are used, the direction of the eﬀect switches but the signiﬁcance also
disappears. Overall, no reliable results can be obtained in this regard. At the episode
level, I also do not ﬁnd much support for Hypothesis 13. The nature of the involved
dyad (whether the actors are formally or informally organized) failed to contribute to
the overall ﬁt of the model and is therefore absent from the ﬁnal speciﬁcation predicting
the duration of non-state ﬁghting. If this variable were included in the ﬁnal model, it
would stay insigniﬁcant. Variations, however, reveal that the signiﬁcance of the eﬀect
is sensitive to the speciﬁcation (especially to the inclusion of a regional dummy which
in the ﬁnal model probably captures parts of the eﬀect). table G.2 on page 415 which
considers the results of the ﬁnal models and their variations therefore reports a mixed
outcome in this regard. Lastly, the level of state weakness neither signiﬁcantly correlates
with the duration of all kinds of conﬂict episodes nor with the duration of state-based
conﬂict episodes. If the duration of non-state conﬂict episodes is the dependent vari-
able, the state weakness indicator (the SFI Eﬀectiveness Score measured prior to the
outbreak of ﬁghting) is only mildly signiﬁcant.19 A one-unit increase in the level of state
weakness above the average (which in this case means less state eﬀectiveness) prior to
the outbreak of a non-state conﬂict episode associates with a 76 percent decrease in the
duration of ﬁghting. Overall, these results contradict Hypothesis 10a (which predicts
the opposite, namely a signiﬁcantly longer duration of non-state ﬁghting with worsening
levels of state weakness) while also failing to support Hypothesis 10 (which expects a
signiﬁcantly shorter duration of state-based ﬁghting).
But if the analysis moves to the conﬂict level, the obtained eﬀects and their sizes
become theoretically more meaningful. At this level of analysis the duration of ﬁghting
can be measured in years, only. This, however, comes with the advantage of much larger
sample sizes. The ﬁnal model which explains the duration of all kinds of internal armed
conﬂicts covers 408 cases (248 non-state and 110 state-based armed conﬂicts) and reaches
an R-squared value of 0.35. In addition, a decisive intervening variable (the intensity
of internal ﬁghting) can be controlled for. For these reasons, the conﬂict-level analysis
probably yields the more reliable results. I include the logged values of the intensity
measure to model a non-linear relationship between this independent variable and the
19If just non-state armed conﬂicts amongst formally organized dyads are taken into consideration the
signiﬁcance of the state weakness coeﬃcient tends to increase.
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duration of ﬁghting. The highly signiﬁcant and positive coeﬃcient obtained for the
intensity measure is hardly surprising given that the direction of the relationship is not
accounted for and runs both ways: The longer the duration of internal armed conﬂicts,
the larger the number of overall battle-related deaths and vice versa. No matter if all
kinds of internal armed conﬂict are taken into account or if the duration of just non-
state or just state-based internal armed conﬂicts is predicted: a one percent increase in
the total number of battle-related deaths associates with an increase in the duration of
ﬁghting of approximately 1/100 years (i.e. about four days) if comparable models are
used.20 There is no indication of decisive but omitted regional factors and no indication
of decisive explanatory factors that are describing the type of internal ﬁghting and that
are not already covered by the control variables: Neither the duration of all kinds of
conﬂicts nor the duration of the two sub-types of internal ﬁghting diﬀer signiﬁcantly or
systematically between (sub-Saharan) African states and countries outside this region if
the other explanatory factors (the intensity of ﬁghting and the level of state weakness
prior to the outbreak of ﬁghting) are controlled for. In most cases, both regional dummies
stay insigniﬁcant even if the ﬁnal models are varied. The dummy indicating whether a
conﬂict is non-state or state-based in nature also remains insigniﬁcant and is therefore
not included in the ﬁnal conﬂict-level model predicting the duration of all kinds of
internal ﬁghting. The resources dummies (and their interaction with the state weakness
measures) tend to stay insigniﬁcant, too, especially if the analysis is conﬁned to non-
state conﬂicts. In the other cases (if all kinds of conﬂict or if just state-based conﬂicts
are taken into consideration) the eﬀects of the resources dummies on the duration of
ﬁghting remain sensitive to the speciﬁcation of the model. Therefore, Hypothesis 11 still
fails at the conﬂict level. Within the ﬁnal model that predicts the duration of all kinds of
internal armed conﬂict, the main eﬀect of the state weakness variable, however, is highly
signiﬁcant: An increase in the level of state weakness (in this case measured by the WGI
Governance Eﬀectiveness Indicator) of one unit above the average (i.e. more eﬀective
governance) prior to the outbreak of ﬁghting results in an increase in the duration of
ﬁghting of about half a year (p< 0:01). The eﬀect is clearly driven by the state-based
conﬂicts within the overall sample. If the exact same model is used to either predict the
duration of state-based or the duration of non-state internal ﬁghting, the eﬀect of the
state-weakness measure is about twice as large in the former case.21 If the WGI Control
of Corruption Indicator is used instead, the outcome is even clearer: An increase in the
WGI Control of Corruption Indicator of one unit above the average prior to the outbreak
of ﬁghting signiﬁcantly increases the duration of state-based internal ﬁghting (by more
than one year, p< 0:01) while the same change in the level of state weakness does not
20Because the dependent variable is in its original metric and the independent variable log-transformed,
the interpretation has the following format: a one percent increase in the intensity of ﬁghting increases
the duration by (coeﬃcient/100) units (i.e. years). See http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/
webbooks/ (visited on 2014-08-05) .
21An increase in the WGI Governance Eﬀectiveness Indicator of one unit above the average prior to the
outbreak of ﬁghting results in an increase in the duration of state-based conﬂicts of 0.67 years (about
eight months) and an increase in the duration of non-state conﬂicts by 0.37 years (about four and a
half months) (p-values< 0:05) given that the model also includes the number of battle-related deaths
per conﬂict and the sub-Saharan Africa dummy as control factors.
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signiﬁcantly correlate with a change in the duration of non-state internal armed conﬂicts.
The coeﬃcient is not only insigniﬁcant but again comparatively small. Within the ﬁnal
model predicting the duration of non-state ﬁghting presented in table G.3 on page 416,
the state weakness measure (the WGI Governance Eﬀectiveness Indicator) barely reaches
an acceptable level of signiﬁcance though it is still positive. All these results speak in
favor of Hypothesis 10 and the expectation that the stronger the state where ﬁghting
is taking place, the longer the duration of state-based armed conﬂicts. Unfortunately,
the eﬀect turns out to be unstable if alternative state weakness indicators (especially
the SFI measures) are used. Therefore, I only report mixed results in this regard within
table G.2 on page 415, which summarizes the outcome of all reﬁned models (i.e. of the
ﬁnal models plus their variations). For the sub-sample of non-state armed conﬂicts the
exact opposite (a negative eﬀect of improving levels of state weakness on the duration
of ﬁghting as proposed by Hypothesis 10a) can not be observed. But, the eﬀect is much
smaller and tends to be less signiﬁcant even across minor variations of the ﬁnal model.
This diﬀerence in the eﬀect between the two sub-types of armed conﬂict is still interesting
and deserves further attention. In addition, the results of the ﬁnal model presented in
table G.3 on page 416 suggest that the organizational level of the involved dyad does
not signiﬁcantly correlate with the duration of non-state internal ﬁghting if the other
explanatory variables in the model (the intensity of ﬁghting, the regional aﬃliation,
the level of state weakness and whether easily accessible and lootable conﬂict resources
are produced within the conﬂict-aﬀected state) are held constant at their means. In
other words, the level of organization does not signiﬁcantly contribute to explaining the
duration of non-state ﬁghting independently of its eﬀect through these control variables.
The following section suggests that the indirect eﬀect of the level of organization on the
duration of non-state ﬁghting especially runs through the intensity measure which in the
current case certainly captures parts of its eﬀect. It is also important to keep in mind
that the number of informally organized dyads is low amongst those non-state conﬂicts
that are included in the ﬁnal analysis. Heteroscedasticity remains an issue, too.22 Lastly,
the eﬀect of the level of organization on the duration of non-state ﬁghting at times turns
signiﬁcant and carries the expected negative sign if alternative measures – especially
alternative state-weakness measures – are used. Considering the results of all reﬁned
models once more adjusts the outcome of the selected ﬁnal model. At the conﬂict level,
table G.2 on page 415 therefore again reports mixed results in regard to Hypothesis 13
which expected non-state internal armed conﬂicts to last signiﬁcantly longer if they are
carried out amongst informally organized actors.
Hypothesis 12 can only be examined at the war level where the number of involved
groups of actors is known. The ﬁnal model which explains the duration of internal
warfare and which is presented in table G.3 on page 416 once more includes the logged-
values of the dependent variable (again measured in years). In addition, I model a
logarithmic relationship between the key independent variable (the number of involved
groups) and the dependent variable (the duration of internal warfare) to account for a
22Even a log-transformation of the dependent variable did not yield satisfactory results.
350
diminishing marginal eﬀect with larger numbers of actors. The results of the ﬁnal model
speak in favor of such an eﬀect: a one percent increase in the number of involved actors
increases the duration of internal warfare by 115 percent. This highly signiﬁcant eﬀect
still holds if a number of alternative explanations are controlled for (namely the type of
warfare, whether the war-torn country produces easily accessible and lootable conﬂict
resources and whether the war took place within a sub-Saharan African country). Two
of these alternative explanations are signiﬁcant themselves: Firstly, non-state internal
wars are of a signiﬁcantly and much shorter duration than state-based internal wars.
Changing the type of internal warfare from state-based to non-state cuts the predicted
duration of ﬁghting in half. Secondly, the production of easily accessible and lootable
conﬂict resources during times of internal warfare signiﬁcantly correlates with more
extensive ﬁghting. If a war happens within a country that produces such resources this
increases its duration by 40 percent – again if the above mentioned factors are controlled
for. The eﬀect is sensitive to the resources measure that is used23 and clearly speaks in
favor of Hypothesis 11. Given the small number of non-state wars in the sample it is,
however, reasonable to expect that the eﬀect is mainly driven by the state-based cases
of internal warfare. Three other independent variables (the level of state weakness, the
interaction between this variable and the production of lootable resources and whether
the war had seen an external military intervention) failed to contribute to the overall
ﬁt of the ﬁnal model. As soon as the type of warfare is included, the regional dummy
also turns insigniﬁcant indicating that the model then accounts for all relevant regional
eﬀects. A model speciﬁcation error cannot be detected. The above outcome is robust
against the inclusion of the alternative regional dummy, it holds across all state weakness
measures and does not change considerably if robust regression techniques are applied.
The ﬁnal model explains 41 percent of the variation in the logged duration of internal
warfare. Still, the number of observations at this level of analysis is very small (N=130).
In addition, more precise measures of the duration of warfare would be desirable as well
as information on the level of state weakness prior to the outbreak of warfare and on
the intensity of ﬁghting which at this level of analysis cannot be controlled for.
Explaining the Intensity of Fighting
H14 Non-state internal conﬂicts between informally organized groups are signiﬁ-
cantly more intense than non-state internal armed conﬂicts between formally orga-
nized groups.
Information on the intensity of internal ﬁghting is only available at the conﬂict level.
Therefore, internal armed conﬂicts are the unit of analysis within the following section.
Because the number of observations at the conﬂict level is large, I run the analysis ﬁrst
for the entire sample of all internal armed conﬂicts and secondly for the sub-samples
of state-based and of non-state internal armed conﬂicts. Only in the latter case can
23The production of conﬂict resources in general does not signiﬁcantly correlate with the duration.
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the key independent variable of Hypothesis 14 (the formal vs. informal nature of the
involved dyad) be included due to the biased nature of the data. In addition, the three
ﬁnal models predicting the intensity of internal ﬁghting use diﬀerent state weakness
measures. In order to compare eﬀects across the three sub-samples I therefore again
computed comparable models that are based on the exact same model speciﬁcation. As
mentioned previously, their results might slightly diﬀer from the outcomes of the ﬁnal
models presented in table G.3 on page 416.
As always, I started with formulating general baseline models that aim to explain the
intensity of (all kinds of) internal conﬂict as well as the intensity of just state-based
or non-state internal ﬁghting. Only the duration measures signiﬁcantly correlated with
the dependent variable across all variations of these baseline models. The eﬀects of
other explanatory variables just stabilized and turned signiﬁcant during the reﬁnement
process. To attenuate the problem of heteroscedasticity I transformed the dependent
variable.24 In addition, I included the logged values of the duration measure to model
a non-linear relationship between this independent variable and the dependent variable
(assuming that the longer the duration, the weaker this variable’s marginal positive
eﬀect on the total number of battle-deaths per conﬂict). Again, these transformations
aﬀect the interpretation of results. Controlling for the “type of conﬂict” (non-state vs.
state-based ﬁghting) signiﬁcantly improves the overall ﬁt of the reﬁned model explaining
the intensity of all kinds of internal ﬁghting. Neither the production of easily accessible
and lootable conﬂict resoures within a conﬂict-aﬀected state nor the interaction between
this variable and the level of state weakness contributed to the overall ﬁt of the models
and are therefore not included in the ﬁnal speciﬁcations.
The results presented in table G.3 on page 416 support a logarithmic relationship
between the duration of ﬁghting and the intensity of internal conﬂicts. The positive sign
of the coeﬃcients indicates that the longer the ﬁghting, the larger the total number of
battle-related deaths per conﬂict though the marginal change in the dependent variable
diminishes with an increasing duration of ﬁghting: A one percent increase in the duration
results in an increase of the total number of battle-related deaths by 120 percent. I also
ﬁnd the eﬀect of the duration measure to be larger if the analysis is run for state-based
conﬂicts only (as opposed to non-state conﬂicts only) if the exact same independent
variables and measures are used for both of these sub-samples.25 Unusual and inﬂuential
observations cannot account for this ﬁnding because the diﬀerence in the size of the eﬀect
still exists if the respective multivariate outliers are excluded.
24Because the dependent variable (UCDP’s best estimates of the number of battle-related deaths) is
heavily skewed to the right, the reﬁned models include the log-transformed values.
25A one percent increase in the duration of non-state (or state-based) ﬁghting results in an increase in the
total number of battle-related deaths by 101 (or 158) percent all else being equal. The corresponding
models are reported in the log ﬁle.
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Furthermore, the type of conﬂict matters in order to explain the intensity of internal
ﬁghting in general. A change from state-based to non-state internal ﬁghting results in
an 80 percent reduction of the overall number of battle-related deaths per conﬂict. The
eﬀect is large and highly signiﬁcant even if the duration of ﬁghting, the regional aﬃliation
of the conﬂict (whether it happens in Africa) and the level of state weakness within the
conﬂict-aﬀected country are controlled for. This outcome strongly supports the previous
(but only bivariate) ﬁnding that non-state internal armed conﬂicts are signiﬁcantly less
intense than state-based conﬂicts.
Those models predicting the intensity of (all kinds of) internal conﬂict and the intensity
of state-based internal conﬂicts also report highly signiﬁcant eﬀects for the state weakness
measures. The stronger the state (as measured by the WGI Governance Eﬀectiveness
or the WGI Control of Corruption Indicator) prior to the outbreak of ﬁghting the less
battle-related deaths per internal conﬂict and, all else being equal, even lesser battle-
related deaths per state-based internal conﬂict.26 The signiﬁcance of this eﬀect holds
across variations of the ﬁnal models and, with very few exceptions, across diﬀerent state
weakness measures. In contrary, the coeﬃcient of the state weakness variable stays
insigniﬁcant if the analysis is run for non-state conﬂicts only – no matter if the exact
same model is used or if the key independent variable of Hypothesis 14 (the formal vs.
informal nature of the involved actors) is included as an additional control factor (as
done by the ﬁnal model presented in table G.3 on page 416). The variable capturing the
nature of the involved actors is highly signiﬁcant itself. Against all odds, however, non-
state internal armed conﬂicts amongst formally organized actors are signiﬁcantly more
intense than non-state conﬂicts amongst informally organized actors. The ﬁnal model
predicts 20 percent more battle-deaths per non-state conﬂict if the ﬁghting is carried
out by formally recognized and permanently organized armed groups. The eﬀect holds
independently of the level of state weakness of the aﬀected country and independently
of the duration of ﬁghting. It also holds if alternative state weakness measures are used
but at times turns insigniﬁcant if a regional indicator (especially the sub-Saharan Africa
dummy) and/or a resources dummy is added to the model (which then simply capture
parts of the eﬀect). Overall, Hypothesis 14 needs to be rejected: Though the nature of
actors signiﬁcantly correlates with the scale of violence applied during non-state internal
ﬁghting the direction of the eﬀect runs against expectations.
26A one unit increase above the average in the WGI measures (i.e. more eﬀective governance or better
control of corruption) prior to the outbreak of ﬁghting yields a 24 to 34 percent decrease in the total
number of battle-deaths per internal conﬂict (if all kinds of ﬁghting are included in the sample) and
a 56 to 60 percent decrease in the total number of battle-deaths per state-based conﬂict (if only
this kind of internal ﬁghting is considered). The size of the eﬀect varies with the speciﬁcation of
the model (the WGI measure that is used and whether the model controls for the production of
easily accessible and lootable conﬂict resources and/or the regional aﬃliation of the conﬂict-aﬀected
country in addition to the duration of ﬁghting).
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Overall (and even if a regional dummy would be added), the ﬁnal model predicting the
intensity of non-state conﬂicts is not fully speciﬁed. The goodness-of-ﬁt is also higher in
those models explaining the intensity of (all kinds of) internal ﬁghting and the intensity of
state-based internal ﬁghting. The ﬁnal models presented in table G.3 on page 416 explain
51 and 54 percent of the variance in the transformed dependent variable. In both cases,
robust regression methods yield similar results. Speciﬁcation errors cannot be detected
either. The fact that the regional dummies mostly stay insigniﬁcant indicates that all
important regional factors are taken care of by these models. Nevertheless, future studies
might want to control for population sizes (e.g. by using the number of battle-deaths
per 10,000 population as the dependent variable) and, as the previous section suggests,
use more precise measures of the duration of armed conﬂicts.
Explaining the Quantity and Quality of the Involved Actors
H15/H16 Violent non-state groups who are ﬁghting non-state conﬂicts in a coun-
try/in countries where conﬂict resources are produced are signiﬁcantly more likely to
be informally organized as compared with violent non-state groups who are ﬁghting
non-state conﬂicts in a country/in countries where no such resources are produced. |
Likewise, non-state conﬂicts or conﬂict episodes which are happening at times when
conﬂict resources are produced are signiﬁcantly more likely to be fought amongst
informally organized dyads as compared with non-state conﬂicts or conﬂict episodes
which are happening at times when no such resources are produced within the conﬂict-
aﬀected state [H15]. And, the weaker the state where internal warfare is taking place,
the larger the number of national armed groups involved in warfare [H16].
The ﬁnal models presented in table G.4 on page 417 support Hypothesis 15 at all levels
of analysis: Of those violent actors who engage in non-state armed conﬂicts the ones
who are operating in a country/countries where conﬂict resources are produced are
signiﬁcantly less likely to be formally organized (and are therefore signiﬁcantly more
likely to be informally and non-permanently organized armed groups). Likewise, non-
state armed conﬂicts or conﬂict episodes that take place in countries where at the same
time easily accessible and lootable conﬂict resources are produced are signiﬁcantly less
likely to be carried out by formally organized violent groups. The signiﬁcance of the
eﬀect holds even if other alternative explanations or possible intervening factors (i.e.
the regional aﬃliation and the level of state weakness within the aﬀected country) are
controlled for. Although the immediate mechanism(s) between the two variables cannot
be tested, this outcome lends some support to the concept of New Wars and to the initial
steps of Weinstein’s structuralist argument that the kind of conﬂict endowments available
to rebel leaders conditions their recruitment strategy and the membership proﬁle of the
emerging violent group which then determines the group’s internal structure, e.g. its
organizational level (as proposed by Mechanism 1-3).
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At the actor level, a worsening of state weakness (as measured by the Polity Fragmen-
tation Indicator) of one unit above the average doubles the chances of those violent actors
who engage in non-state ﬁghting of being formally recognized and permanently organized
rebel groups. Obviously, the weaker the state the more easy it gets for these actors to
establish themselves as an active force and persistent source of internal instability. This
ﬁnding would repeat itself at the conﬂict and episode level if no interaction term were
included in the corresponding ﬁnal models. At both levels of analysis, however, the inter-
action eﬀect between state weakness and the production of easily accessible and lootable
conﬂict resources signiﬁcantly contributes to the overall ﬁt of the model and is therefore
carried through the analyses. The state weakness measures themselves stay insigniﬁcant
while the interaction term is (highly) signiﬁcant even across variations of the ﬁnal model,
i.e. if the alternative regional dummy and/or other state weakness indicators (the WGI
Governance Eﬀectiveness Index and the SFI Sub-Index I which are available prior to the
outbreak of violence) are included: A one unit increase above the average level of state
weakness signiﬁcantly and greatly increases the odds of a non-state conﬂict or non-state
conﬂict episode to be carried out amongst formally and permanently organized rebel
groups if the conﬂict-aﬀected country at the same time produces easily accessible and
lootable conﬂict resources. Although the size of this interaction eﬀect varies greatly with
alternative speciﬁcations of the model, its signiﬁcance pertains. Thus, the results sup-
port a signiﬁcant and larger marginal eﬀect of worsening levels of state weakness on the
nature of violent actors involved in non-state internal conﬂicts (more precisely on their
likelihood of being formally organized) in such countries that are producing this kind of
conﬂict resources.
Finally, the regional dummies are highly signiﬁcant and strong predictors of the depen-
dent variable across all levels of analysis and variations of the ﬁnal models. Actors who
engage in non-state conﬂicts in (sub-Saharan) Africa are signiﬁcantly less likely to be
formally organized. Likewise, dyadic non-state conﬂicts or conﬂict episodes happening
in this region are signiﬁcantly less likely to be carried out amongst formally recognized
and permanently organized violent groups. This outcome indicates that the models still
fail to account for some signiﬁcant regional eﬀects. In general, sensitivity to the regional
dummies that are used remains an issue. Whether “sub-Saharan Africa” or “all-Africa”
is included aﬀects the overall ﬁt of the models (which tends to be lower in the former
case) as well as the signiﬁcance and size of the resources dummy. Nevertheless, the
models investigating Hypothesis 15 at the conﬂict and episode level display relatively
high pseudo-R-squared values (up to 0.38). The proportion of correct guesses beyond
that by guessing the largest marginal (the adjusted-Count-R-squared value) is as high
as 0.50 in the case of the episode-level model.
Hypothesis 16 which expects worse levels of state weakness to signiﬁcantly correlate
with larger numbers of actors involved in internal ﬁghting can only be analyzed at the
war level where it ﬁnds strong support. In this case the outcome varies greatly between
the ﬁrst baseline models and the selected and reﬁned models due to a number of changes
during the reﬁnement process.
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The results of the ﬁnal OLS regression model presented in table G.4 on page 417
are based on an analysis that uses a transformed dependent variable to account for
heteroscedasticity27, that controls for the type of conﬂict and that models a non-linear
relationship between the dependent variable and the duration of warfare in years.28
The ﬁnal model accounts for an impressive 0.43 percent of the variance in the logged
dependent variable.
The type of warfare, the level of state weakness of the war-aﬀected country and the
duration of ﬁghting in years turn out to be signiﬁcant predictors of the number of actors
involved in internal warfare. Although the transformation of variables complicates the
interpretation of results, the direction of eﬀects and their level of signiﬁcance can easily
be derived from the regression output as presented in table G.4 on page 417. The number
of actors involved in internal warfare is signiﬁcantly larger in non-state as opposed to
state-based internal wars, it signiﬁcantly increases with a longer duration of warfare,
and it signiﬁcantly decreases with improving state strength (as measured by the BTI
Failed State Index). More precisely, the number of actors involved in non-state internal
wars is 33 percent larger than in state-based internal wars, a one percent increase in the
duration of ﬁghting increases the number of involved actors by 30 percent and a one unit
increase in the level of state weakness above the average (which in the case of the BTI
measure means a stronger state) yields a ﬁve percent decrease in the number of involved
actors. The latter eﬀect turns highly signiﬁcant if the type of warfare is controlled for and
holds independently of two other alternative explanations or possible intervening factors:
whether the internal war takes place in (sub-Saharan) Africa and whether the war-
aﬀected country produced (easily accessible and lootable) conﬂict resources during times
of warfare. Both of these variables (and the usual interaction term) remain insigniﬁcant
themselves across variations of the ﬁnal model and, because they failed to signiﬁcantly
contribute to the overall ﬁt of the model, were dropped from the ﬁnal speciﬁcation.
Lastly, robust regression methods yield very similar results. Excluding multivariate
outliers only slightly reduces the level of signiﬁcance of the variables capturing the type
of warfare and the level of state weakness. But the low number of cases at the war
level (N=135) should be kept in mind as well as the fact that the duration can only be
measured in years. Available time-series data on the level of state weakness just cover the
post-Cold War era. Measuring the level of state weakness prior to the outbreak of warfare
therefore greatly reduces the size of the sample. Thus, the above only uses national level
averages and does not account for reverse causation between the level of state weakness
and the number of involved actors. Despite the eﬀort, heteroscedasticity also remains
an issue and even the ﬁnal model is not fully speciﬁed. The persisting problem of model
speciﬁcation might be caused by omitted variables (other than regional factors) or an
improper transformation of predictor variables.
27Because the dependent variable (the number of actors involved in internal warfare) is heavily skewed
to the right, I include the log-transformed instead of the original values of the dependent variable.
28I used the logged values of the duration measure.
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24.2. Multiple Regression Results on the Incidence and Nature
of Non-State Fighting
The level of state weakness signiﬁcantly correlates with a country’s chances of experienc-
ing (any kind of) internal warfare. A worsening of state fragility (as measured by the SFI
Sub-Index 1) of one unit above the average increases the odds of a country to experience
internal warfare by a factor of 1.21, to experience state-based internal warfare by a fac-
tor of 1.24 and to experience non-state internal warfare by a factor of (just) 1.10 (if the
exact same model would be used). A further increase in the level of state weakness from
one unit to two units above the average would result in another multiplication of the
chances by these factors and so on. Slightly diﬀerent model speciﬁcations (other state
weakness measures and/or no interaction term) yield similar results as demonstrated by
the ﬁnal models predicting the experience of state-based or of non-state internal warfare
presented in table G.4 on page 417.29 In almost any case, the eﬀect of state weakness is
highly signiﬁcant even if alternative explanations (most importantly the production of
easily accessible conﬂict resources during times of warfare) are controlled for. Because
the signiﬁcance of the state weakness eﬀect also does not vanish if regional dummies
are included in the models it appears to be more than just a (sub-Saharan) Africa ef-
fect. Still, worsening levels of state weakness increase countries’ chances to experience
state-based or non-state internal warfare to about the same extent.
The regional dummies themselves are only signiﬁcant if a country’s “experience of
state-based internal warfare” and if “experience of internal warfare in general” are to
be explained. This indicates that the corresponding models do not fully account for
all relevant regional factors explaining these dependent variables. While this ﬁnding is
hardly surprising, the direction of the eﬀect (the size of the odds ratios) of the regional
dummies is unexpected: a country’s chances of experiencing internal warfare in gen-
eral and state-based internal warfare in particular are signiﬁcantly (and much) lower
for sub-Saharan African countries (as opposed to the rest of the world) if the level of
state weakness and the production of easily accessible and lootable conﬂict resource are
controlled for. Independent from these two explanatory factors, little remains from the
region’s special proneness to conventional civil warfare.
29Without the interaction term, a worsening of state fragility (as measured by the SFI Sub-Index 1) of
one unit above the average increases the odds of a country to experience state-based internal warfare
by a factor of 1.29, to experience non-state internal warfare by a factor of 1.28 and to experience
internal warfare in general by a factor of 1.28 if the exact same model would be used in all three cases.
An improvement of state fragility (as measured by the BTI State Fragility Index, again without the
interaction term included in the model) of one unit above the average decreases the odds of a country
to experience non-state internal warfare by a factor of 0.59, to experience state-based internal warfare
by a factor of 0.64 and to experience internal warfare in general by a factor of 0.64 if the exact same
model would be used.
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If a country produces lootable conﬂict resources this raises its chances of experiencing
internal warfare even by a factor of 2.33. Its chances of experiencing state-based internal
warfare almost triple (if the exact same model is used) or more than triple if the model
is slightly modiﬁed.30
I ﬁnd modest support for an interaction eﬀect between state weakness and the pro-
duction of easily accessible and lootable conﬂict resources if “experience of any kind of
internal warfare” constitutes the dependent variable. The level of signiﬁcance of this
interaction eﬀect is low but holds across variations of the ﬁnal model. The eﬀect itself
indicates that the impact of state weakness on a country’s likelihood of experiencing
internal warfare is greater (increases by an additional factor of 1.14) if the country at
the same time also produces easily accessible and lootable conﬂict resources. In other
words: if the level of state fragility worsens (i.e. increases by one unit above the average)
a country’s chances of experiencing internal warfare increase by an overall factor of 2.35
if the state also produces lootable resources while the chances of a country that expe-
riences the same change in the level of state fragility without producing such conﬂict
resources only rise by the above mentioned factor of 1.21. Using the exact same model
speciﬁcation to predict state-based internal warfare would yield an insigniﬁcant eﬀect
for the interaction term between state weakness and the production of easily accessible
conﬂict resources. At ﬁrst sight, this interaction seems to matter more if a countries’
engagement in non-state warfare is predicted. At least the coeﬃcient is slightly larger
and more signiﬁcant (than the above discussed eﬀect found by the model predicting
“experience of any kind of internal warfare”). However, the corresponding conﬁdence
intervals for the odds ratios again contain the value one. Even the main eﬀect of the re-
sources variable on a country’s chances of experiencing non-state internal warfare turns
out to be sensitive to the speciﬁcation of the model and at times stays insigniﬁcant.31
This, however, changes if low-intensity ﬁghting is taken into consideration. Now, the
results of the ﬁnal models presented in table G.5 on page 418 indicate that the produc-
tion of easily accessible and lootable conﬂict resources signiﬁcantly increases the odds of
a country to experience non-state armed conﬂict while it does not signiﬁcantly increase
a country’s chances of experiencing state-based armed conﬂict or of experiencing internal
armed conﬂict in general. Neither did it signiﬁcantly contribute to explaining countries’
experience of non-state warfare. Thus, the signiﬁcant eﬀect of lootable resources pro-
duction on a country’s chances of experiencing non-state internal ﬁghting can only be
detected if low-intensity battle is taken into consideration. The signiﬁcance of the eﬀect
holds if the exact same model is applied, but also if sub-Saharan Africa instead of Africa
is included as the regional dummy and if the level of state weakness is controlled for (by
using the BTI Failed State Index). Likelihood-ratio tests for nested models conﬁrm the
signiﬁcant contribution of the resources variable to the overall ﬁt of the model.
30For instance, if the model does not include the interaction term as done by the ﬁnal model explaining
the experience of state-based internal warfare presented in table G.4 on page 417.
31The signiﬁcance and size of the eﬀect depends on whether the interaction term is included as well as
on the state weakness measure and the regional dummy that is used.
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Again, the regional dummies themselves are insigniﬁcant if engagement in non-state
ﬁghting constitutes the dependent variable. Thus, the regional dummies neither sig-
niﬁcantly correlate with experience of non-state armed conﬂict nor with experience of
non-state internal warfare. Decisive but omitted regional factors are of no concern. At
least this outcome contrasts with the highly signiﬁcant eﬀects of the regional dummies
in those models predicting countries’ experience of state-based internal warfare or, to a
lesser extent, predicting countries’ experience of state-based internal armed conﬂict.32
Finally, the level of state weakness again signiﬁcantly correlates with internal ﬁghting.
The stronger the state the less likely it is of experiencing non-state, state-based or any
kind of internal armed conﬂict. If the same speciﬁcation is used, the eﬀects turn out
to be much larger compared with the eﬀects of state weakness on a country’s chances
of engaging in internal warfare.33 In addition, if low-intensity ﬁghting is taken into
consideration it becomes clear that an equal improvement in the level of state fragility
lowers a country’s chances of experiencing state-based internal armed conﬂict to a greater
extent.34 This contradicts the concept of New Wars. Theoretically it still makes sense
because the state constitutes one party to the conﬂict in conventional (state-based)
ﬁghting. If its strength improves this should lower its risk of being attacked by non-
state forces while an equal improvement in the level of state strength might aﬀect the
decision of non-state armed groups to battle each other comparatively less.
All ﬁnal country-level models presented in table G.5 on page 418 successfully passed
tests for model speciﬁcation errors. The models predicting countries’ experience of non-
state, state-based or any kind of armed conﬂict display remarkably high measures of
model ﬁt.35 The fact that non-state armed conﬂict is much more frequently observed at
the country level than intense non-state warfare certainly contributes to the predictive
power of these models.36 Still, the numbers of observations are low.37 In addition,
the issue of reverse causation between state weakness and internal ﬁghting cannot be
taken into account at this level of analysis. Engagement in armed battle impacts upon
countries’ levels of state weakness as much as weak statehood contributes to the outbreak
of violence in the ﬁrst place.
32In the latter case, the eﬀect of the regional dummy is less signiﬁcant and depends on the speciﬁcation
of the model.
33An improvement of state fragility (which is measured by the BTI State Fragility Index in all three of
the ﬁnal models presented in table G.5 on page 418) of one unit above the average decreases the odds
of a country to experience non-state conﬂict by a factor of 0.39.
34The respective factor is only 0.32 (or even 0.30 if sub-Saharan Africa is included) whether the model
contains the resources dummy.
35Their adjusted Count R-squared values range between 0.42 and 0.61. Their pseudo R-squared values
range between 0.36 and 0.38.
36The Count R-squared value of the model explaining experience of non-state warfare is as low as
0.13 while the Count R-squared value of the similar model explaining experience of non-state armed
conﬂict is 0.42.
37Due to several missing cases on the state weakness measures and on the dummy measuring the pro-
duction of easily accessible and lootable conﬂict resources, the ﬁnal country-level models presented
in table G.4 on page 417 and table G.5 on page 418 only cover between 129 and 164 states.
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Luckily, both of these shortcomings can be addressed by moving the analysis from the
country to the conﬂict or to the conﬂict-episode level where the degree of state weakness
can be measured prior to the outbreak of violence, where the numbers of observations
signiﬁcantly increase and where additional control factors can be included. Now, the
dependent variable is the nature of internal ﬁghting (more precisely the chances of an
internal armed conﬂict or conﬂict episode being categorized as non-state in nature).
At both levels of analysis the initial baseline models changed considerably during the
reﬁnement process. The ﬁnal models account for non-linear relationships between the
dependent and several independent variables.38 Their results, which are mostly robust
across variations, indicate that the chances of a conﬂict or conﬂict episode being non-
state in nature signiﬁcantly and greatly increase if the aﬀected country at the same time
produces easily accessible and lootable conﬂict resources and if the ﬁghting is taking
place within an African state.39
Again, worsening levels of state weakness signiﬁcantly correlate with greater chances of
being categorized as a non-state conﬂict or non-state conﬂict episode. The ﬁnal conﬂict-
level model even supports an interaction eﬀect. A worsening level of state weakness (in
this case measured by the Polity Fragmentation Indicator) of one unit above the average
increases a conﬂict’s chances of being non-state in nature by a factor of 2.28 if ﬁghting
is taking place within a country that does not produce easily accessible and lootable
conﬂict resources while an equal increase in the level of state weakness raises a conﬂict’s
chances of being non-state in nature by a factor of 2.72 (2.28 plus 0.44) if the ﬁghting
happens within a country which at the same time produces such resources. These eﬀects
hold even if the regional context, the intensity and the duration of ﬁghting are controlled
for.
The number of battle-related deaths also signiﬁcantly correlates with the dependent
variable. The direction of the eﬀect corresponds to the previous ﬁnding that non-state
ﬁghting tends to be comparatively less intense: the larger the number of overall battle-
related deaths, the lower an internal armed conﬂict’s chances of being non-state in
nature.40 The duration of ﬁghting exerts a similar decreasing eﬀect at the episode level
only. This might be due to the more precise measure of duration (in months) available
at this level of analysis (which comes with the disadvantage of a much lower number of
observations covered by the analysis) or it might be due to diﬀerent model speciﬁcations
(the additional interaction term and the inclusion of the intensity measure which is only
available at the conﬂict level).
38I used the logged duration (in months) at the episode level and the logged intensity measure as well
as the squared term of the state weakness measure (the BTI Failed State Index) at the episode level.
39The chances of a conﬂict or conﬂict episode being non-state in nature are about 2.6 times larger if the
aﬀected country at the same time produces easily accessible and lootable conﬂict resources and about
four to ﬁve times larger if it is taking place within an African state (as opposed to a non-African
state). See odds ratios given in table G.4 on page 417.
40A one unit increase in the logged number of overall battle-related deaths halfs an an internal armed
conﬂict’s chances of being categorized as non-state in nature.
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Another important control factor, the number of involved actors, can only be included
at the war level where this variable is allowed to vary. There, it turns out to be the most
signiﬁcant factor in predicting the nature of internal warfare. If the number of actors
increases by one group above the average, this raises the chances of a case of internal
warfare being categorized as non-state in nature by one-third. Again, an increase in the
duration of warfare of one year above the average signiﬁcantly decreases the chances
of an internal war being categorized as non-state. Both eﬀects are signiﬁcant even if
the model controls for the level of state weakness and whether a country produces eas-
ily accessible and lootable conﬂict resources during times of warfare. These alternative
explanations, however, stay insigniﬁcant at the war level. Interestingly, the resources
dummy would turn signiﬁcant if the number of actors were dropped from the speciﬁca-
tion. This indicates that both factors relate to each other and, if both are included in the
model, capture each others eﬀects. Models that fail to control for the number of actors
might therefore partly measure the eﬀect through their resources variable (which might
turn insigniﬁcant otherwise). Apart from this insight, the ﬁnal war-level model suﬀers
from a low number of observations and from the fact that non-state internal wars are
rare events. The pseudo R-squared value is very low. Thus, even the highly signiﬁcant
results of the ﬁnal model should be treated with caution. In many respects the above
presented conﬂict- and episode-level analyses appear to be superior.
Finally, at the actor level improving levels of state fragility (measured by the WGI
Control of Corruption Indicator) greatly and signiﬁcantly reduce an actor’s chances
of engaging in non-state ﬁghting.41 The opposite applies if the country in which the
violent group is active in, produces (any kind of) conﬂict resources or is an African
state. Both variables signiﬁcantly increase a violent actor’s chances of engaging in non-
state conﬂict. The respective odds ratios are extremely large. I nevertheless refrain from
an interpretation of eﬀect sizes because even the reﬁned model remains weak.42 In part,
this is due to measurement issues. The above presented actor-level model predicts the
behavior of violent groups (their decision to engage in a certain kind of internal ﬁghting)
at a speciﬁc location and at a certain point in time by relying on cross-sectional and
aggregate, national-level data. Political and economic context factors certainly impact
the violent behavior of armed groups. Besides the relevant context factors, however,
group characteristics need to be covered. So far, only whether a violent actors was
created by breaking away from another violent actor or by a temporary split in the
original movement has been taken into consideration. Even across various speciﬁcations
this factor never signiﬁcantly contributed to explaining an actor’s engagement in non-
41The interaction eﬀect between state weakness and the production of conﬂict resources is only mildly
signiﬁcant and unstable across variations of the ﬁnal model. For these reasons, I do not discuss this
result.
42Eﬀects are sensitive to (multiple) inﬂuential covariate patterns (outliers), the measures of model ﬁt
(pseudo R-squared and Count R-squared) are relatively low, the model fails the Hosmer-Lemeshow
goodness-of-ﬁt test and multicolinearity remains an issue if the interaction term is included (even if the
involved metric variable, the state weakness measure, is mean-centered). At least a misspeciﬁcation
of the model cannot be detected and the number of observations included in the model is large
(N=873).
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state ﬁghting. The organizational level of armed groups (whether they are formally
or informally organized) also drops out as an explanatory factor. The analysis needed
to be restricted to formally organized groups due to the biased nature of the available
UCDP data (which does not allow for any variance in the level of organization of armed
groups that engage in state-based internal ﬁghting). Because UCDP only covers acts of
one-sided violence against civilians if they are committed by formally organized actors,
data on the nature of the applied violence is equally biased. These coding rules have to
be taken into account and greatly restrict any analysis. New and more ﬁne grained data
on the internal structures of violent groups that engage in state-based as well as non-
state internal ﬁghting are only slowly emerging. The “Organizational Structure of Armed
Movement Dataset” (OSAM) is a ﬁrst and very promising step. So far, the author of this
data set collected information on 70 armed movements (on their recruitment strategies,
their level of hierarchy and the level of commitment of their active members) via an
expert survey.43 A group’s current degree of internal fragmentation also appears to be an
interesting indicator in this regard. Only recently, a new concept of group fragmentation
that spans along three dimensions (the number of organizations in the movement, the
degree of institutionalization across these organizations and the distribution of power
among them) has been put forward by Bakke et al. (2012).
43See Haer (2012) or http://www.polver.uni-konstanz.de/holzinger/team/vanderhaer/data/ (vis-
ited on 2014-08-07) .
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25. Interim Summary VI: Main Results of
the Multiple Regression Analysis
Besides the just mentioned data constraints (the general lack of group-level indicators
and the biased nature of some of the available large-N data), the above empirical anal-
yses oftentimes reached the boundaries of the available state weakness measures. The
political context of non-state and state-based internal ﬁghting not only deserves more
attention in terms of theory-building but also much better data. Because the tempo-
ral and geographical coverage of most available state fragility indices is very limited,
variance in the level of state fragility across time and space can rarely be taken into
account. Some exceptional studies in this regard have already been mentioned.1 Espe-
cially the use of nighttime light satellite imagery to capture sub-national variances in the
level of state reach or capacity is gaining ground also within peace and conﬂict research.
For instance, Camber (2010) uses such data to explore whether groups living in areas
with low levels of “state penetration” are at greater risk of experiencing armed conﬂict.
Witmer and O’Loughlin (2011) rely on nighttime light imagery to detect the eﬀects
of the war between Russia and Georgia, Shortland et al. (2013) analyze the impact of
armed conﬂict on incomes (proxied by electricity consumption and measured through
nighttime light emissions) in Somalia, and Hodler and Raschky (2014) study the eﬀects
of economic shocks (measured by nighttime light intensity and instrumented by lagged
rainfall and droughts) on civil conﬂict also at the sub-national level.2 Relying on “terres-
trial data collection” is especially tempting in this ﬁeld of research because state fragility
and armed conﬂict prevent the collection of reliable and more direct indicators on the
ground. The validity of the indicator (e.g. whether it captures the capacity or rather the
willingness of states to reach certain areas) needs further debate. In addition, data on
the exact locations of non-state and state-based armed conﬂicts are not (yet) available
on a global level and for an extended period of time. This kind of information is needed,
however, in order to match the locations of armed conﬂicts with the actual production
sites of conﬂict resources and with the local (or at least regional) levels of state weakness.
Systematic diﬀerences between types of internal ﬁghting in the availability and quality
of conﬂict-related data also remain to be discussed by future research.
1See e.g. Maedl et al. (2011); Camber and Schutte (2012); Johnson (2007).
2For an overview see Ghosh et al. (2013) who review pioneering studies using nighttime satellite imagery
as a proxy for human well-being or X. Li et al. (2013) who investigate the potential of nighttime light
images in evaluating global armed conﬂicts and for this purpose develop a nighttime light variation
index.
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But despite the fact that there is room for improvement of the data and the models,
several of the above outcomes are rather clear and consistent across speciﬁcations and
levels of analysis. Non-state internal ﬁghting signiﬁcantly diﬀers from state-based inter-
nal ﬁghting – sometimes as proposed by the concept of New Wars. At times, however,
the diﬀerences in the context and the nature of these two sub-types of internal ﬁghting
are less pronounced or even contrary to the expectations of the concept of New Wars.
Likewise, some of the concept’s expectations on the linkages between single dimensions
of internal ﬁghting ﬁnd support while others of the associative hypotheses clearly need
to be rejected. In light of the abundance of presented data and levels of analysis cov-
ered by the corresponding models, it is diﬃcult to draw a ﬁnal and overall conclusion.
The following summary of results therefore focuses on the unambiguous outcomes. A
summary of all results that can be derived from the descriptive, comparative and re-
gression analyses in support (or against) the proposed overall trend (H1 and H1a), the
comparative hypotheses (H2-H7b), the associative hypotheses (H8-H16), and the main
research question3 is provided by table H.1 on page 420 and table H.2 on page 421 in
the appendix. This schematic overview of accepted and rejected hypotheses serves as
the basis of this ﬁnal summary, and, in a condensed version, appears as follows:
3This term refers to the question of which factors predict engagement in (or categorization as) non-
state internal ﬁghting (at the actor, the episode, the conﬂict and war level) or a country’s risk of
experiencing non-state armed conﬂict and warfare.
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Bivariate Comparative Analysis:
H1 dominance of non-state internal ﬁghting mixed results
H1a increasing signiﬁcance of non-state internal ﬁghting strong support
H2 quantity of actors strong support
H3 nature of actors (external military intervention) no support
H3a nature of actors (origin as a splinter group) no support
H4 conﬂict resources strong support
H4a conﬂict resources that are easy to access and to loot strong support
H4b conﬂict resources that are diﬃcult to access and to loot mild support
H5 scale of violence strong rejection
H5a nature of violence (acts of one-sided violence against civilians) mild support
H6 duration of ﬁghting strong rejection
H7 state fragility strong support
H7a state fragility (lack of state eﬀectiveness and authority) strong support
H7b state fragility (lack of state functionality and legitimacy) no support
Multiple Regression Analysis:
H8 conﬂict resources →+ one-sided acts of violence against civilians mixed results
H9 state fragility →+ one-sided acts of violence against civilians strong rejection
H10 state fragility →+ duration of non-state ﬁghting mild support
H10a state fragility →- duration of state-based ﬁghting strong rejection
H11 conﬂict resources →+ duration of ﬁghting mixed results
H12 quantity of actors →+ duration of ﬁghting strong support
H13 informally organized actors →+ duration of non-state ﬁghting mixed results
H14 informally organized actors →+ intensity of non-state ﬁghting strong rejection
H15 conﬂict resources →+ informally organized actors in non-state ﬁghting strong support
H16 state fragility →+ number of actors involved in warfare strong support
Table 25.1.: Accepted and Rejected Hypotheses. Source: own depiction.
The results of the descriptive analysis clearly spoke in favor of an increasing signiﬁ-
cance of non-state internal ﬁghting (H1). Whether this kind of internal ﬁghting domi-
nates the picture depends on the geographical perspective, the measure that is used and
the level of analysis. At least non-state internal wars are not the dominant type of inter-
nal warfare. Secondly, the results of the bivariate comparative analysis clearly supported
Hypothesis 2: Non-state internal wars are indeed fought amongst a signiﬁcantly larger
number of actors than state-based internal wars. This eﬀect holds if alternative explana-
tions are controlled for within the multiple regression analysis. With some limitations,
the outcome of the bivariate comparative analysis further supported the hypotheses on
the role of conﬂict resources. At the actor, the episode and the conﬂict level, (engage-
ment in) non-state internal ﬁghting occurs signiﬁcantly more often in a context where
conﬂict resources in general (H4) and easily accessible and lootable conﬂict resources
in particular (H4a) occur or, even more so, where such resources are produced. In line
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with Hypothesis 4b I also found conﬂict resources that are diﬃcult to access and to
loot (primary diamonds or (oﬀshore) oil/gas) to be produced signiﬁcantly more often
prior to or during state-based internal ﬁghting. The signiﬁcance of this eﬀect (which is
mainly driven by oil/gas and by the Middle East and North African region) is, however,
less stable across levels of analysis. The multiple regression results again support these
rather clear bivariate results. Across all reﬁned regression models, the dummy variables
indicating the production of conﬂict resources tend to be more signiﬁcant if they are
conﬁned to the production of easily accessible and lootable conﬂict resources. At times,
however, signiﬁcant eﬀects are only obtained if low intensity battle is taken into account.
For instance, the production of easily accessible and lootable conﬂict resources signiﬁ-
cantly increases a country’s odds to experience non-state armed conﬂict while it does
not signiﬁcantly increase a country’s chances of experiencing state-based armed conﬂict
or internal armed conﬂict in general. Neither is there much support for an equally signif-
icant and strong eﬀect between the production of easily accessible and lootable conﬂict
resources and the experience of non-state internal warfare. I therefore concluded that
the signiﬁcant eﬀect of lootable resources production on a country’s chances of experi-
encing non-state internal ﬁghting can only be detected if low-intensity battle is taken
into consideration. In this regard the focus of the New Wars debate on New Warfare is
misleading. In addition, the changes of a violent actor to engage in non-state ﬁghting
signiﬁcantly increase if it is operating in a context where conﬂict resources are produced.
This, however, in no way means that all non-state ﬁghting is entirely or mainly predatory
in nature. Both state-based and non-state conﬂicts can be greed and/or grievance-based.
In fact, a large number of grievance-based non-state conﬂicts are fought between com-
peting sectors of society (e.g. between pastoralists and agriculturalists or ethnic groups)
around issues of land-ownership, economic inequality and ethnic aﬃliation.4 Finally,
the chances of a conﬂict or conﬂict episode being non-state in nature signiﬁcantly and
greatly increase if the ﬁghting is happening within a country which at the same time
produces easily accessible and lootable conﬂict resources. This conﬂict-level eﬀect once
more holds independently of decisive control factors (most importantly from the level
of state weakness, but also the intensity or duration of ﬁghting). I therefore agree with
Humphreys (2005, p. 508) that the “impact of natural resources on conﬂict cannot easily
be attributed entirely to the weak states mechanism, and in particular, the impact of
natural resources is independent of state strength”.
Very clear but opposed to the concept of New Wars are the bivariate as well as multi-
variate results in regard to the duration and intensity of ﬁghting (H5 and H6): Non-state
internal armed conﬂicts are signiﬁcantly and much less brutal than conventional, state-
based armed conﬂicts and they are signiﬁcantly shorter than their state-based coun-
terparts even if alternative explanations are controlled for. In addition, the bivariate
4The 2012 Human Security Report lists a number of recent quantitative studies that examine the causes
of non-state internal ﬁghting. According to these studies, non-state armed conﬂicts in sub-Saharan
Africa are especially likely to arise in places where acute soil degradation meets extreme population
density, where levels of rainfall are changing, or where people are facing unequal access to economic
beneﬁts or regime change (HSC 2012, pp. 195 sqq.).
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results as well as the multiple regression outcome indicate that non-state wars are not
characterized by a particularly transnational nature of actors. At least they are not sig-
niﬁcantly more likely to see an external military intervention which is why Hypothesis
3 also needs to be rejected. Hypothesis 3a asks whether a “history of factionalization”
is signiﬁcantly more likely amongst those formally organized groups that (exclusively)
engaged in non-state armed conﬂict as opposed to those formally organized groups that
exclusively engaged in state-based armed conﬂict. The bivariate outcome supported this
hypothesis. However, if other factors explaining actors’ engagement in non-state inter-
nal ﬁghting are controlled for, the dummy indicating whether an actor was created by
breaking away from another actor or by a temporary split in the original movement stays
insigniﬁcant. Based on the multiple regression outcome I therefore reject Hypothesis 3a.
Finally, the bivariate outcome in regard to the political context clearly spoke in favor
of Hypotheses 7 and 7a but disproved Hypothesis 7b. I did not ﬁnd any support for
the claim that diﬀerent kinds of state weakness associate with diﬀerent kinds of inter-
nal ﬁghting (H7b). Instead, the bivariate comparative analysis suggested that both the
average level of state functionality and legitimacy as well as the average level of state
eﬀectiveness and authority are signiﬁcantly worse in those countries that experience
non-state internal ﬁghting (as compared with those countries that engage in state-based
internal ﬁghting only). Almost independently of the state weakness measure that is
used, the degree of state fragility is also signiﬁcantly worse prior to the outbreak of
non-state (as compared with state-based) conﬂicts or conﬂict episodes. Finally, vio-
lent non-state actors who engaged in non-state armed conﬂict operate in signiﬁcantly
more fragile states (as compared with those violent non-state actors who engaged in
exclusively state-based armed conﬂict). Again, diﬀerences in means were especially sig-
niﬁcant if low-intensity ﬁghting was taken into consideration (i.e. at the conﬂict and
at the conﬂict episode level) and if state-weakness was narrowly deﬁned as proposed by
Hypothesis 7a. The multiple regression results mostly conﬁrm these bivariate outcomes.
At almost all levels of analysis the state weakness measures stay highly signiﬁcant even
if alternative explanations or intervening factors are controlled for: Worsening levels of
state weakness signiﬁcantly correlate with greater chances of a conﬂict or conﬂict episode
being categorized as non-state (instead of state-based) in nature. At the conﬂict level I
even ﬁnd support for an interaction eﬀect between state weakness and the production
of easily accessible and lootable conﬂict resources. Both the main state weakness eﬀect
and the interaction eﬀect are signiﬁcant even if the regional context, the intensity and
the duration of ﬁghting are controlled for. Worsening levels of state fragility also greatly
and signiﬁcantly increase the odds of an actor to engage in non-state ﬁghting. Finally,
at the country level, the multiple regression analysis conﬁrms that the weaker the state
the more likely the experience of non-state internal ﬁghting. At ﬁrst, this country-level
outcome appears to support the concept of New Wars. However, the worse the level of
state fragility the more likely is the experience of state-based internal ﬁghting, too. At
the war level worsening levels of state weakness increase countries’ chances of experi-
encing state-based or non-state internal warfare to about the same extent. However, if
low-intensity ﬁghting is taken into consideration it becomes clear that an equal worsen-
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ing in the level of state fragility increases a country’s chances of experiencing state-based
internal armed conﬂict even more than it increases its chances of experiencing non-state
internal ﬁghting. This outcome points to the usefulness of a comparison of eﬀect sizes
instead of just contemplating the direction of the eﬀects which in any case supports the
concept of New Wars – not least because of reverse causation. Measuring the level of
state weakness prior to the outbreak of ﬁghting (to rule out at least some endogeneity)
is just possible at the conﬂict, the episode and the war level.
All the above discussed models only reveal correlations amongst variables. The under-
lying causal mechanisms cannot be tested and therefore remain unknown. Nevertheless,
some mechanisms appear to be more plausible than others given the above empirical
ﬁndings. The outcome that non-state internal ﬁghting is signiﬁcantly and compara-
tively less intense indicates that an equalization of military technology and the absence
of clear front lines in non-state ﬁghting rather result in the avoidance of open and risky
battle (as proposed by Mechanism 9) instead of massive “emotional over-reactions” due
to endemic uncertainly, fear and panic which would lead to high numbers of military
deaths (as proposed by Mechanism 8). The empirical results rather speak in favor of
Mechanism 10 (which argued that opportunistic rebel groups avoid severe battle as this
would be counterproductive to their economic interests) than in favor of Mechanism 7
(which expects high numbers of military deaths in non-state ﬁghting due to identity
politics). These economic interests even appear to be strong enough to counter-balance
the positive eﬀect of weak state institutions on the intensity of ﬁghting. Mechanism 6
argued that a breakdown of political and social order associates with higher numbers of
battle-related deaths (e.g. because real and perceived impunity and/or security concerns
might justify preemptive violence or acts of retaliation which in return spur a culture of
generalized brutalization among soldiers). This does not seem to play out in non-state
ﬁghting. However, Mechanism 6 still serves to explain the diﬀerence in battle-deaths
between the two types of internal armed conﬂict because changes in the level of state
weakness appear to matter a great deal when it comes to the intensity of state-based in-
ternal ﬁghting. This already touches upon the main results of those multiple regression
models examining the linkages between single dimensions of internal ﬁghting.
Again, some of the associative hypotheses ﬁnd strong support while others clearly
need to be rejected. In line with Hypotheses 12 I ﬁnd higher numbers of involved actors
to signiﬁcantly increase the duration of internal warfare (and vice versa). This highly
signiﬁcant eﬀect holds independently of a number of alternative explanations that are
controlled for (namely the type of warfare, whether the war-torn country produces easily
accessible and lootable conﬂict resources and whether the war took place within a sub-
Saharan African country). Secondly, I ﬁnd clear support for Hypotheses 15 (especially
at the conﬂict and episode level). Non-state armed conﬂicts or conﬂict episodes that take
place in countries where at the same time easily accessible and lootable conﬂict resources
are produced are signiﬁcantly less likely to be carried out amongst formally organized
violent groups. Again, the signiﬁcance of the eﬀect holds even if other alternative expla-
nations or possible intervening factors (i.e. the regional aﬃliation and the level of state
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weakness within the aﬀected country) are controlled for. This supports the concept of
New Wars and Weinstein’s structuralist mechanism. However, if the production of such
resources goes hand in hand with a worsening of state fragility, the positive eﬀect of the
state weakness measure on the nature of the involved dyad prevails. In such a situa-
tion, non-state conﬂicts or episodes amongst formally and permanently organized rebel
groups are more likely. Obviously, the weaker the state the easier it gets for violent non-
state groups to establish themselves as active forces and persistent sources of internal
instability. This interaction eﬀect is interesting in its own right and certainly deserves
further attention. Thirdly, the multiple regression outcome clearly speaks in favor of
Hypothesis 16. The number of actors involved in internal warfare signiﬁcantly decreases
with improving state strength even if the type of warfare is controlled for alongside the
regional aﬃliation of the war-aﬀected state and whether the war-torn country produces
(easily accessible and lootable) conﬂict resources during times of warfare.
As much as the above supports the concept of New Wars, the following outcomes
are at odds with the associative hypotheses that can be derived from the concept: The
multiple regression outcome fails to support Hypothesis 9, which expects that formally
organized non-state armed groups are more likely to attack unarmed civilians if they
are based in weaker states. Instead, the opposite seems true: The stronger the state
in which such actors are operating, the more likely they are to engage in acts of one-
sided violence against unarmed civilians.5 Because the eﬀect is mainly driven by those
formally organized non-state actors who ﬁght state-based internal conﬂicts, I suggested
that they engage in such kind of violent behavior to punish civilian collaboration with
the enemy (which is more likely the stronger the state), to relieve stress or to signal
strength especially in an otherwise hopeless situation where they are facing a strong
opponent. Secondly, I ﬁnd mild support for the claim that worsening levels of state
fragility correlate with a shorter duration of state-based armed conﬂicts (H10) but no
indication of an opposing eﬀect for the sub-sample of non-state armed conﬂicts (H10a).
Instead, worsening levels of state fragility also tend to associate with a shorter duration
of non-state ﬁghting though the eﬀect is much smaller and less signiﬁcant. Finally,
the outcome in regard to Hypothesis 13 is mixed (non-state internal ﬁghting does not
necessarily last signiﬁcantly longer if it is carried out by informally organized dyads). But
the organizational level of the involved actors signiﬁcantly correlates with the scale of
violence applied during non-state internal ﬁghting. The direction of the eﬀect, however,
runs counter to the expectation of Hypothesis 14: Non-state internal armed conﬂicts
amongst formally organized actors are signiﬁcantly more intense than non-state conﬂicts
amongst informally organized actors. The eﬀect is robust but its level of signiﬁcance
varies with alternative speciﬁcations of the model. The latter also applies to the resources
measures, which co-vary with a number of other independent variables and for this reason
sometimes fail to reach an acceptable level of signiﬁcance. For instance, the results
remain very mixed when it comes to the production of easily accessible and lootable
conﬂict resources and its eﬀect on the duration of internal armed conﬂicts or conﬂict
5At least if state weakness is narrowly deﬁned.
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episodes (H11). This is surprising and runs against the commonly shared view and prior
empirical ﬁnding that the occurrence or production of conﬂict resources associates with
a longer duration of state-based internal ﬁghting.6 However, Humphreys (2005) ﬁnds
the exact opposite and provides a plausible theoretical explanation that is also in line
with the resource curse argument.7 Obviously, conﬂict resources can be theoretically
linked with both a shorter as well as longer duration of ﬁghting which might account for
the mixed outcome of the study at hand. In addition, I only ﬁnd mixed results when
it comes to the production of easily accessible and lootable conﬂict resources and its
eﬀect on the nature of applied violence (H8). There is no clear indication that formally
organized violent non-state actors who are operating in a context where conﬂict resources
are produced are signiﬁcantly more likely to commit acts of one-sided violence against
unarmed civilians. At least if taken on its own, the resources variable does not seem
to be systematically related to this kind of violent behavior. Still, I do not entirely
dismiss Hypothesis 8 because there is mild support for an interaction eﬀect (between the
production of conﬂict resources and the level of state weakness) on the nature of applied
violence.
When it comes to this speciﬁc dependent variable, “involvement in non-state inter-
nal ﬁghting” and especially “involvement in both types of internal ﬁghting” signiﬁcantly
increases a formal actor’s chances of committing acts of one-sided violence against un-
armed civilians. In fact, the second kind of conﬂict engagement is the most substantial,
signiﬁcant and stable explanatory factor within the multiple regression analysis. For-
mally organized non-state armed groups that engage in both types of internal conﬂict
are signiﬁcantly more likely to commit acts of one-sided violence against civilians as
compared with those actors that just engage in the one or the other kind of internal
ﬁghting. The signiﬁcance of the eﬀect holds even if important intervening factors (the
level of state weakness, the production of conﬂict resources, the origin of the violent
group and its regional aﬃliation) are controlled for. Some of these alternative explana-
tions have been mentioned in an earlier attempt to explain the similar bivariate outcome
(see H5a). The results of the multiple regression analysis are helpful in order to answer
the question why this sub-group of actors is especially prone to engage in such kind of vi-
olent behavior. For instance, future research might wish to explore the political context
of these actors (especially whether they tend to operate in comparatively strong states
which at the same time produce certain conﬂict resources) and how exactly the level
of state weakness in interaction with the resources variable impacts upon their violent
strategy. Maybe actors who engage in both kinds of internal ﬁghting stand out in terms
6For quantitative studies see e.g. Fearon (2004) or Collier, Hoeﬄer, and Söderbom (2004). For an
overview of the theoretical arguments and empirical ﬁndings see Hegre (2004).
7Humphreys (2005) ﬁnds that natural resources associate with shorter wars which the author attributes
to the fact that such wars are more likely to end with a military victory. In addition, this scholar
suggests that external actors have a greater incentive to bring wars to a close when natural resource
supplies are threatened. The latter argument, however, does not seem to apply well in the case of
non-state internal warfare (as external military intervention is not particularly likely in non-state
warfare).
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of their origin. They might be especially likely to have emerged by breaking away from
another armed group. Their origin as a splinter group then explains why they engage in
state-based conﬂict with the government and in non-state conﬂict with their rival parent
organization or other non-state competitors. The timing of these conﬂicts (whether they
are carried out simultaneously) and their intensity might be important in order to assess
their eﬀect on the organization’s strength and resources which might then explain the
group’s violent behavior (e.g. whether it carries out acts of one-sided violence to signal
strength in a desperate situation or as a measure to deter defection).8
Again, the dummy capturing an actor’s kind of conﬂict engagement is highly signiﬁcant
even if the above mentioned factors are controlled for. Obviously, actors that engage in
both types of internal ﬁghting (and, to a lesser extent, those that engage in non-state
internal conﬂict) share some characteristics (apart from those that are already included
in the model) that are important in order to predict their chances of committing acts
of one-sided violence against civilians. The same interpretation applies to the highly
signiﬁcant “type of conﬂict” dummies which I included within the regression models
testing the remaining associative hypotheses.9 Although these eﬀects are in line with
the concept of New Wars, they also indicate that the models are not fully speciﬁed in
the sense that some unknown characteristics of non-state internal ﬁghting exist that
are decisive in order to explain the dependent variables and that are not already taken
care of by the control variables. Otherwise, the “type of conﬂict” dummies would stay
insigniﬁcant. Decisive but omitted regional factors remain an issue, too, as indicated by
the highly signiﬁcant regional dummies in several of the models.10
8An interesting empirical study that clearly relates to this matter has recently been published by Fjelde
and Nilsson (2012). The authors claim to provide “the ﬁrst global study on the determinants of inter-
rebel violence”. They depart from the question why rebel groups that already confront the government
frequently sacriﬁce their scarce resources to become engaged in additional violent struggles with other
non-state groups. They ﬁnd that “inter-rebel conﬂict is more likely when the rebel group ﬁghts in an
area with drug cultivation, when the group is in control of territory beyond government reach, when
the group is either militarily strong or weak in relation to other rebels, and where state authority is
weak.” This outcome is partly in line with the above ﬁndings. However, the dependent variable is
diﬀerent (the authors do not examine the kind of violence applied by these actors) and they exclude
inter-rebel ﬁghting amongst groups who just battle other non-state actors (i.e. who do not ﬁght the
government).
9I found that changing the type of a conﬂict episode or war from “state-based” to “non-state” results in
a signiﬁcant decrease in the duration of ﬁghting. Likewise, changing the type of an internal conﬂict
from “state-based” to “non-state” results in a signiﬁcant decrease in the intensity of ﬁghting. Finally,
changing the type of an internal war from “state-based” to “non-state” results in a signiﬁcant increase
in the number of actors involved in ﬁghting.
10These are 1.) the models predicting the odds of an actor to engage in non-state conﬂict, 2.) the
models predicting the odds of an episode, a conﬂict or a war to be non-state in nature, 3.) the
models predicting the quality of violence applied by formally organized violent non-state groups, 4.)
the models predicting the intensity of (all kinds of) internal armed conﬂicts and the intensity of non-
state armed conﬂicts, and 5.) the models predicting the duration of (all kinds of) conﬂict episodes
and the duration of non-state conﬂict episodes.
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Overall, this study yields strong or at least weak support in favor of twelve hypotheses.
Strong rejection (highly signiﬁcant but opposing eﬀects) or non-signiﬁcant outcomes
are obtained for eight hypotheses while the outcome remains mixed in regard to four
hypotheses.11 Although the causal mechanisms underlying these hypotheses cannot be
tested directly, the empirical outcome of this study nevertheless provides some ideas on
the plausibility of a number of causal mechanisms explaining the scale and nature of
violence applied in (non-state) internal ﬁghting. In addition, the results of the above
study are giving some hints on how the single dimensions of internal ﬁghting might
possibly line up in a causal chain, i.e. whether eﬀects run both ways (e.g. between
the duration and the intensity of ﬁghting or between the number of involved actors
and the duration) and whether eﬀects are of a direct and/or more indirect nature. For
instance, the (formal vs. informal) nature of actors indirectly impacts upon the duration
of ﬁghting through its eﬀect on the intensity: Conﬂicts amongst formally organized dyads
are more intense which correlates with a longer duration. The level of state weakness
also indirectly impacts upon the duration of warfare through its eﬀect on the number of
involved actors: The weaker the state, the more actors are involved in internal warfare
which correlates with a longer duration of ﬁghting. In some cases, I modeled non-linear
relationships which signiﬁcantly improved the predictive power of the corresponding
models. For instance, I found that the longer the ﬁghting, the larger the total number
of battle-related deaths per conﬂict though the marginal change in the overall scale of
violence diminishes with an increasing duration of ﬁghting. Similarly, the larger the
number of actors involved in warfare the longer the duration (or vice versa) though
the marginal eﬀect on the duration again diminishes with larger numbers of actors.
Because non-linear relationships need to be build-in, the corresponding models changed
considerably during the reﬁnement process. This is one reason why the results of the
ﬁrst and simple baseline models at times diﬀers greatly from the outcome of the ﬁnal
or the reﬁned models (which do not only account for non-linearity but sometimes also
include interaction eﬀects and additional control variables). To enable the reader to
follow eﬀects through the entire reﬁnement process (from the simple baseline models to
the selected ﬁnal regression models), to compare the bivariate results with the outcome
of the multiple regression models, and to better judge on the robustness of eﬀects (e.g.
across levels of analysis) a number of diﬀerent tables and overviews of results are given
in the appendix.12 Even the results of the ﬁnal regression models have been put into
perspective by considering the outcome of all reﬁned models (the ﬁnal models and their
variations).
11I ﬁnd mostly strong and highly signiﬁcant eﬀects supporting H1a, H2, H4, H4a, H7, H7a, H12, H15
and H16, weaker but still mostly signiﬁcant eﬀects in support of H4b, H5a and H10, strong and
highly signiﬁcant eﬀects contradicting H5, H6, H9, H10a, H14, no support (mostly non-signiﬁcant
outcomes) for H3, H3a and H7b and mixed results for H1, H8, H11 and H13.
12An overview of the descriptive statistics on the incidence and signiﬁcance of (non-state) internal
ﬁghting, a schematic overview of the regression results of the simple baseline models and of all
reﬁned models, and the actual regression output in numbers of the ﬁnal models.
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Conclusion
No matter if they support or disprove the concept of New Wars: The above identiﬁed
diﬀerences between non-conventional (non-state) and conventional (state-based) internal
ﬁghting are real, oftentimes substantial and in a statistical sense signiﬁcant. It is precisely
because they diﬀer from state-based internal ﬁghting that non-state internal wars and
conﬂicts must be taken into account by quantitative research exploring the causes, the
context, the nature and the consequences of bilateral internal ﬁghting. So far, most
empirical analyses per deﬁnition exclude this sub-type of internal ﬁghting. This leads to
the concern that as long as non-conventional (non-state) internal armed conﬂicts are not
taken into account by these studies, their results and our understanding of contemporary
internal ﬁghting might be biased. Large-N replication analysis of existing quantitative
studies are needed to see whether the identiﬁed eﬀects and trends in internal ﬁghting
are changing or are robust against the inclusion of non-state armed conﬂicts within the
respective data sets. For instance, Harbom et al. (2008) report rising numbers of warring
parties in internal warfare since the 1970s. However, the authors only count the number
of dyads in state-based internal ﬁghting. To what extent the outcome of this study
changes if non-state armed conﬂicts are included remains to be answered. According to
Eck and Hultman (2007), non-state violent actors are more violent than state actors.
Again, the authors only consider acts of one-sided violence against civilians committed
during state-based internal armed conﬂicts within the post-Cold War era. These results
might change as well if those violent actors that engaged in non-state internal ﬁghting are
included in the analysis. Likewise, it would be interesting to know whether the results
obtained by Buhaug et al. (2009) equally apply to non-state internal ﬁghting. The
authors explain the duration of state-based internal conﬂict and for this purpose draw
on precisely dated duration data and geographically disaggregated information on the
exact location of ﬁghting. They ﬁnd that conﬂicts located at considerable distance from
the main government stronghold, along remote international borders and in regions with
valuable minerals (a description that also applies to many if not most of the non-state
conﬂicts) last substantially longer.
In order to prevent and solve non-state conﬂicts it is crucial to identify and understand
their incidence, their speciﬁc context and their nature. So far, little research has been
conducted on what works and what does not work as a solution to New Warfare. Mary
Kaldor’s idea of establishing a “new form of cosmopolitan politics” within New Wars
countries supplemented by “cosmopolitan law enforcement” at the international level
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remains more of a vision than a concrete plan for action.13 The recommendations of
others are derived from a handful of selected cases of non-state warfare (Heupel 2005;
Heupel and Zangl 2010). The few existing large-N studies dealing with non-state armed
conﬂicts focus on their causes instead of their termination and often remain limited
to non-state ﬁghting in post-Cold War sub-Saharan Africa. Some lessons learned from
ending state-based greed conﬂicts might be transferable to non-state conﬂicts14 while
other proven instruments might be of little help or even counter-productive if applied to
non-state ﬁghting.15 Even Weinstein (2007, pp. 343, 350), who pessimistically notes that
the capacity of the international community to inﬂuence the actions of violent non-state
groups is “limited” and “has seen innovation only at the margins”, agrees with Mary
Kaldor that addressing the main context factors of non-state ﬁghting (starving rebel
organizations oﬀ the resources they use to ﬁnance warfare and measures to enhance
state-building) are the only options to better protect civilians from non-state warfare.
This recommendation ﬁts well with the commonly shared view that non-state internal
conﬂict is mostly greed-based and almost necessarily associates with state failure (or
vice versa). It also matches well with the rather deterministic assertion of Robert Bates
mentioned at the very beginning of this book that violent non-state groups ﬁghting over
diamonds are simply the logical consequence of state failure. Though the results of
the above study are not at odds with this claim, they paint a more nuanced picture
which puts emphasis on the geological form of conﬂict resources (whether they are easily
accessible and lootable) and on their production status, which indicates that the level
of analysis matters and that low-intensity armed conﬂicts should be taken into account.
13Kaldor (2000) suggests focusing on the restoration of legitimate authority, the strengthening of secu-
lar, non-nationalistic, non-religious and moderate actors (e.g through their inclusion in peacemaking
eﬀorts), and on the creation of legitimate sources of employment (to increase the opportunity costs
for joining rebel movements). Instead of seeing the New Wars actors as enemies or legitimate par-
ticipants in negotiations (which gives them political status) she ﬁnds it “quite a good idea to see
them as outlaws, disturbers of the peace, and to use the methods of policing and intelligence” rather
than the methods of old warfare (Kaldor 2005: 10). This approach needs to be supplemented by
“cosmopolitan law enforcement”, i.e. humanitarian intervention aimed at stabilization, prevention,
and the protection of civilians rather than victory (Kaldor 2005, p. 9; Kaldor 2007, pp. 60 sqq.).
14A few years ago, a seven-volume book series was published which provides more than 150 peer-
reviewed case studies and analyses on post-conﬂict natural resource management successes, failures
and ongoing eﬀorts in more than 55 conﬂict-aﬀected countries. One of the books addresses the key
challenges faced by post-conﬂict countries in transforming high-value natural resources in ways that
contribute to economic recovery, reconciliation, jobs, and sustainable livelihoods (without creating
new grievances) (Lujala and Rustad 2012).
15For instance, eﬀorts of naming and shaming will not help in cases where rebel groups do not care
much about their human rights reputation or where leaders do not have the capacity to reverse the
course of behavior of their members (Weinstein 2007, pp. 344 sq.). Around sanctions, money-making
schemes are likely to grow up that might feed into New Wars Economies (e.g. the selective granting
of lucrative licenses for exports/imports) (Berdal 2003, pp. 487 sq.). According to Weinstein (2007,
pp. 346 sq.) targeted sanctions are only eﬀective if on-the-ground monitoring is available and if major
states and transnational corporations are cooperative. If such measures cut oﬀ groups from their
regular ﬂow of resources, predation might even increase, armed groups might turn even more violent,
and trade might simply shift to another, not yet targeted, rebel group.
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I emphasized the importance of a comparative perspective in order to avoid selection
bias while also pointing out that the categorization of cases that are compared with
each other is of importance. I agree with Heupel and Zangl (2010) that “the notion of
old and new wars is justiﬁed, because [. . . ] the individual criteria of the transformation
of warfare tend to travel together rather than separately from each other”. The single
dimensions of non-state ﬁghting, however, relate to each other in multiple and diverse
ways. Interaction eﬀects, non-linear and indirect linkages need to be taken into account
while it is important not to lose sight of the problems that might arise from biased and
still poor data.
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A. The New vs. the Consolidated List of
Wars
In comparison with the “New List of Wars” (v.1.3), the “Consolidated List of Wars”
(v.1.1) extended the duration of the following ongoing cases of internal warfare up to
2009: Myanmar (Ethnic Rebels) (1948-2009), Colombia (1965-2009), Philippines (New
People’s Army) (1970-2009), Philippines (Mindanao) (1972-2009), Sudan (South Sudan)
(1983-2009), Uganda (1987-2009), India (Kashmir) (1989-2009), India (Assam) (1990-
2009), India (Naxalite) (1996-2009), Russia (Chechnya) (1999-2009), Ethiopia (1999-
2009), Afghanistan (Taliban Insurgency) (2002-2009), Sudan (Darfour) (2003-2009),
Turkey (Kurds) (2004-2009), Iraq (Anti Regime) (2004-2009), Thailand (2004-2009),
Sri Lanka II (2005-2009), Somalia (1992-2009), Congo-Zaire (Factional Fighting) (1998-
2009), Nigeria (Inter-Communal Fighting) (1999-2009), Algeria (Islamic Rebels) (1991-
2009), Chad (1997-2009) and India (Manipur) (1992-2009). In the last three cases, start
dates of warfare were corrected, too. In addition, the start dates for Liberia (2000-
2003) and Nepal (Communists) (1996-2006) have been changed and end dates of warfare
where corrected in the cases of Ethiopia (1974-1995), Croatia (1991-1995), India (Gu-
jarat) (2002) and Burundi (Hutu vs. Tutsi) (1993-2008). Start and end dates were
changed in the case of Burundi (Tutsi Supremacists) (1991-1992). With the exception
of the latter case, the overall duration of these cases of warfare changed respectively.
Three cases of recent state-based internal warfare were added: Kenya (election vi-
olence) (2007-2009), Nigeria (Delta Region) (2002-2009) and Pakistan (Taliban Insur-
gency) (2006-2009). Two cases of recent non-state internal warfare were added: Pakistan
(TJP/SMP, SSP/LeJ) (2001-2009) and Tajikistan (1995-1996).
Information on the actors involved in warfare have also been updated (in 27 out of
138 cases of internal warfare) which resulted in actual changes in the minimum number
of national groups of actors involved in 17 cases (i.e. in 12 percent of all cases of
internal warfare). These are Afghanistan (2002-2009), Algeria (1991-2009), Burundi
(1993-2008), Chad (1997-2009), DRC (1996-1997), Croatia (1991-1995), Ethiopia (1976-
1991), Ethiopia (1999-2009), India (1996-2009), Iraq (1991-1998), Ivory Coast (2002-
2005), Liberia (2000-2003), Rwanda (1998-2002), Sudan (2003-2009), Tajikistan (1992-
1996), Thailand (2004-2009), Turkey (2004-2009). In the following nine cases of internal
warfare the information whether foreign military support/a foreign military intervention
took place had been changed: Algeria (1991-2009), Angola (1998-2002), Burundi (1993-
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2008), Chad (1997-2009), Croatia (1991-1995), India (1990-2009), India (1992-2009),
Liberia (2000-2003) and Sri Lanka (1983-2001). In the following cases where the numbers
and/or names of actors involved in warfare also diﬀer between the two versions of this
data set, I rely on the information given in the earlier “New List of Wars” (v.1.3) because
in these cases warfare had already started before 1990: Angola (1975-1995), Myanmar
(1948-2009), South Africa (1984-1994) and Sudan (1983-2009). In the cases of Nepal
(1996-2006) and Sri Lanka (2005-2009) the names of actors mentioned in the two versions
of the data set also diﬀers. This, however, did not result in a change in the overall number
of involved actors because the “Consolidated List of Wars” v.1.1 added as many new
actors as it deleted.
In comparison with the “New List of Wars” (v.1.3), the “Consolidated List of Wars”
(v.1.1) also clariﬁed the number of parties to several internal wars. The data set
now indicates whether there is a clear side A (with/without allies), a clear side B
(with/without allies) and a clear side C (composed of additional actors with unclear po-
sitions as to whether they support side A or B and who follow their own interests). The
changes made in regard to this variable concern the following cases of internal warfare:
Afghanistan (1992-2002; 2002-2009), Chad (1978-1993), Colombia (1965-2009), DRC
(1998-2009, 1993-1994, 1996-1997), Ethiopia (1976-1991, 1999-2009), India (1983-1993,
1990-2009, 1996-2009), Indonesia (1999-2002), Ivory Coast (2002-2005), Kenya (1991-
1993), Lebanon (1975-1990), Liberia (2000-2003), Nepal (1996-2006), Nigeria (1999-
2009), Pakistan (1994-1995), Philippines (1972-2009), Sierra Leone (1991-2000), Somalia
(1992-2009), South Africa (1984-1994) and Sudan (2003-2009, 1983-2009).
Another improvement to this study concerns an additional variables that has not been
given in earlier versions of the data set: The (minimum and maximum) total number
of (civilian and military) battle-related deaths. With the “Consolidated List of Wars”
(v.1.1) this variable is now available for at least most of the post-Cold War cases.
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B. List of Non-State Wars, 1946–2009
Location Year Actors
Cyprus 1964 EOKA vs. Türk Mukavement Teskilati & Intervention
Burundi 1972-1973 Hutu Militias vs. Tutsi Minority
Lebanon 1975-1990 Progressive Socialist Party/Lebanese National Movement, FL,
PLO, Al Fatah, AMAL, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, SLA, LCP,
PFLP/GC, SSNP, Lebanese National Resistance Front,
Popular Nasserite Organization, Lebanese Baath Party &
Intervention
Chad 1978-1993 FAN, FAT, FAP, Islamic Legion, MPS, Mosanat, CSNPD,
FARF, MDD, FNTR, CNR, FNT, MDJT & Intervention
Liberia 1990-1996 NPFL, INPFL vs. ULIMO vs. Liberia & Intervention
Kenya 1991-1993 Turkana Community vs. Borana Community
Sierra Leone 1991-2000 RUF, AFRC, Kamajors vs. Sierra Leone Army & Intervention
Bosnia-
Herzegovina
1992-1995 Bosnian Serbs, Serb Militias vs. Bosnia-Herzegovina vs.
Croatian Irregulars & Intervention
Afghanistan 1992-2002 Taliban, Hezb-i-Islami, Hezb-i-Wahdat, Jumbish-e Milli
Islami, Jamiat-i-Islami vs. Northern Alliance vs. warlord
militias & Intervention
Somalia 1992-2009 USC, UCS factions, SDM, SDA, SNA, SSNM, SNF, RRA,
SRRC, several warlord militias & Intervention
Congo/Zaire 1993-1994 Banyamulenge Militias, Tutsi FPR Guerrilla, Interahamwé
Militias
Pakistan 1994-1995 MQM, PPP, PML, SSP, TJP, MQM Haqiqi vs. Militias,
Pakistani paratroops
Pakistan 2001-2009 TJP, SMP vs. SSP, LeJ vs. Pakistan
Congo/Zaire 1998-2009 FAZ, ex-FAR, FDLR, Mai-Mai militias, Interahamwé Militias,
RCD, RCD-ML, RCD/Goma, Les mongoles, MLC, UPC,
Banyamulenge Militias, UPC, PUSIC, FNI, FAPC,
Government Leftovers & Intervention
Nigeria 1999-2009 Muslim Militias (Al Sunna Wal Jamma) vs. Christian Militias
(Igbo’s) vs. Arewa People’s Congress, Government’s Security
Forces
Indonesia 1999-2002 Laskar Jihad, Mujahedeen KOMPAK vs. FKM, Republic of
South Maluku group vs. Armed Forces of Indonesia
India 2002 Sangh Parivar (family of Hindu nationalist organizations) vs.
Muslim groups
Tajikistan 1995-1996 Tajikistan vs. UTO
Table B.1.: Non-State Wars, 1946-2009. Source: “New/Consol.List of Wars” v.1.3/1.1.
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C. Hypotheses
Bivariate Comparative Analysis:
H1 dominance of non-conventional (non-state) internal ﬁghting
H1a increasing signiﬁcance of non-conventional (non-state) internal ﬁghting
H2 quantity of actors
H3 nature of actors (external military intervention)
H3a nature of actors (origin/fractionalization)
H4 conﬂict resources
H4a conﬂict resources that are easy to access and to loot
H4b conﬂict resources that are diﬃcult to access and to loot
H5 scale of violence
H5a nature of violence (acts of one-sided violence against civilians)
H6 duration of ﬁghting
H7 state fragility
H7a state fragility (lack of state eﬀectiveness and authority)
H7b state fragility (lack of state functionality and legitimacy)
Multiple Regression Analysis:
H8 conﬂict resources →+ one-sided acts of violence against civilians
H9 state fragility →+ one-sided acts of violence against civilians
H10 state fragility →+ duration of non-conventional (non-state) ﬁghting
H10a state fragility →- duration of conventional (state-based) ﬁghting
H11 conﬂict resources →+ duration of ﬁghting
H12 quantity of actors →+ duration of ﬁghting
H13 informally organized actors →+ duration of non-state ﬁghting
H14 informally organized actors →+ intensity of non-state ﬁghting
H15 conﬂict resources →+ informally organized actors in non-state ﬁghting
H16 state fragility →+ number of actors involved in warfare
Table C.1.: Overview of Hypotheses. Source: own depiction.
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D. Codebook, Data Sources and Measures
D.1. Codebook Master-File
D.1.1. The Incidence & Signiﬁcance of Non-State/State-Based Internal
Wars (1946–2009), Conﬂicts (1989–2011), and Conﬂict Episodes
(1989–2009)
Time-Series Data/Indicators
• Worldwide no. of state-based/non-state conﬂicts or episodes, per year
Coding:
• sum sb conﬂ/sum ns conﬂ
• sum epi sb/sum epi ns
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• No. of state-based/non-state conﬂicts, per country and year (1989–2009 or –2011)
Coding:
• ns num dyads 1989 (till 2011)
• sb num dyads 1989 (till 2011)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• No. of state-based/non-state conﬂicts or episodes, per year and by region
Coding:
• sum sb conﬂ PRIO 1 (till 6)
• sum ns conﬂ PRIO 1 (till 6)
• sum sb conﬂ UCDP 1 (till 5)
• sum ns conﬂ UCDP 1 (till 5)
• sum epi sb PRIO 1 (till 6)
• sum epi ns PRIO 1 (till 6)
• sum epi sb UCDP 1 (till 5)
• sum epi ns UCDP 1 (till 5)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• Regional shares in state-based/non-state conﬂicts or episodes, per year
Coding:
• share sb conﬂ PRIO 1 (till 6)
• share ns conﬂ PRIO 1 (till 6)
• share sb conﬂ UCDP 1 (till 5)
• share ns conﬂ UCDP 1 (till 5)
• share epi sb PRIO 1 (till 6)
• share epi ns PRIO 1 (till 6)
• share epi sb UCDP 1 (till 5)
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• share epi ns UCDP 1 (till 5)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• Worldwide no. of countries aﬀected by state-based/non-state conﬂicts or episodes, per year
Coding:
• sum sb countr
• sum ns countr
• sum countr sb
• sum countr ns
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• No. of countries aﬀected by state-based/non-state conﬂicts or episodes, per year and by region
Coding:
• sum sb countr PRIO 1 (till 6)
• sum ns countr PRIO 1 (till 6)
• sum sb countr UCDP 1 (till 5)
• sum ns countr UCDP 1 (till 5)
• sum countr sb PRIO 1 (till 6)
• sum countr ns PRIO 1 (till 6)
• sum countr sb UCDP 1 (till 5)
• sum countr ns UCDP 1 (till 5)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• Regional shares in countries aﬀected by non-state/state-based conﬂicts or episodes, per year
Coding:
• share sb countr PRIO 1 (till 6)
• share ns countr PRIO 1 (till 6)
• share sb countr UCDP 1 (till 5)
• share ns countr UCDP 1 (till 5)
• share countr sb PRIO 1 (till 6)
• share countr ns PRIO 1 (till 6)
• share countr sb UCDP 1 (till 5)
• share countr ns UCDP 1 (till 5)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• Worldwide no. of countries aﬀected by (all kinds of) conﬂicts or episodes, per year
Coding:
• sum countr conﬂ
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• No. of countries aﬀected by (all kinds of) conﬂicts or episodes, per year and by region
Coding:
• sum countr conﬂ PRIO 1 (till 6)
• sum countr conﬂ UCDP 1 (till 5)
Country-Level Indicators
• Name of the country aﬀected by ﬁghting
Coding:
• country
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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• Name(s) of additional countries where ﬁghting spread to
Coding:
• country2
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• PRIO regional coding (1=Sub-Saharan Africa, 2=Americas, 3=Central and South Asia, 4=East
and Southeast Asia and Oceania, 5=Europe, 6=Middle East and North Africa)
Coding:
• region PRIO
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• UCDP regional coding (1=Europe, 2=Middle East, 3=Asia, 4=Africa, 5=Americas)
Coding:
• region UCDP
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• Dummies indicating whether a country has seen (any kind of) war or conﬂict within the entire
study period
Coding:
• Internal Warfare 46 09
• Internal Armed Conﬂict 89 11
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• No. of state-based/non-state wars within the entire study period, by country
Coding:
• No NS
• No SB
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• No. of state-based/non-state conﬂicts between 1989–2009 (or –2011), by country
Coding:
• ns sum dyads 2009 (or 2011)
• sb sum dyads 2009 (or 2011)
War-Level, Conﬂict-Level and Episode-Level Indicators
• Unique identiﬁers (name and obs. no., by war or dyad ID, by conﬂict and by episode)
Coding:
• War Name, No Obs
• dyad id, conﬂict id
• dyad id
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• Running no. of episodes, by conﬂict
Coding:
• ep count
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• Location of origin of a war, conﬂict or episode
Coding:
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• country
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• Name(s) of additional countries where the conﬂict spread to
Coding:
• country2
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• Region as deﬁned by UCDP and by PRIO where the war, conﬂict or episode happened
Coding:
• region PRIO, region UCDP
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• Dummies indicating whether ﬁghting is state-based/non-state in nature
Coding:
• NS war/SB war
• nonstate
• nonstate/statebased
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• Dummy indicating whether a state-based conﬂict is categorized as an internationalized internal
conﬂict by UCDP/PRIO
Coding:
• int statebased
D.1.2. Number & Nature of Violent Actors
War-Level, Conﬂict-Level and Episode-Level Indicators
• Dummy indicating an external military intervention
Coding:
• Military Intervention
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• No. of parties, by war
Coding:
• No Parties
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• Dummy indicating whether a clear no. of parties is identiﬁed, by war
Coding:
• No Parties Clear
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• Dummy indicating whether the government, the national army or government leftovers is/are
mentioned as one party to the conﬂict, by war
Coding:
• Gov Party
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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• Min. no. of involved national actors, by war
Coding:
• Min No Nat Fractions
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• Names of the violent actors involved in ﬁghting, by conﬂict or episode
Coding:
• side a, side b
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• Organizational level of the involved dyad, by conﬂict or episode
Coding:
• org
Actor-Level Indicators
• Dummy indicating whether a violent non-state actor was created by breaking away from another
violent non-state actor, by a temporary split in the original movement and whether he entered
into an alliance with another violent non-state actor
Coding:
• Splinter
• Split temp
• Alliance
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• Dummy indicating whether a violent non-state actor has been involved in one or several non-
state/state-based conﬂicts
Coding:
• NonStateConf
• StateBasedConf
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• Actor name and unique actor ID
Coding:
• ActorName
• ActorID
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• Organizational level, by violent actor
Coding:
• Org
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• Name(s) of the country or countries and region(s) as deﬁned by UCDP and by PRIO (see above)
where a violent non-state actor has been active
Coding:
• countries
• region PRIO
• region UCDP
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D.1.3. Scale and Nature of Applied Violence
Time-Series Data/Indicators
• Best, low and high estimates of the total no. of (military and civilian) battle-related deaths from
state-based/non-state conﬂicts (1989–2011), per year
Coding:
• sb fat best 1989 (till 2011)
• sb fat low 1989 (till 2011)
• sb fat high 1989 (till 2011)
• ns fat best 1989 (till 2011)
• ns fat low 1989 (till 2011)
• ns fat high 1989 (till 2011)
Country-Level Indicators
• Best, low and high estimates of the total no. of (military and civilian) battle-related deaths from
state-based/non-state conﬂicts between 1989–2009 (or –2011), by country
Coding:
• sb sum fat best 2009 (or 2011)
• sb sum fat low 2009 (or 2011)
• sb sum fat high 2009 (or 2011)
• ns sum fat best 2009 (or 2011)
• ns sum fat low 2009 (or 2011)
• ns sum fat high 2009 (or 2011)
War-Level and Conﬂict-Level Indicators
• Best, low and high estimates of the total no. of (military and civilian) battle-related deaths per
conﬂict (1989–2011)
Coding:
• fat best, fat low, fat high
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• Min. and max. estimates of the total no. of (civilian and military) battle-related deaths per war
(1990–2009)
Coding:
• Total Death Min, Total Deaths Max
Actor-Level Indicators
• Dummy indicating whether a violent non-state actor committed one or several acts of one-sided
violence against unarmed civilians
Coding:
• OneSidedViol
D.1.4. Duration of Internal Wars (1946–2009), Armed Conﬂicts
(1989–2011) And Conﬂict Episodes (1989–2009)
Country-level Indicators
• Start and the end year of the ﬁrst and the last war or conﬂict (of any kind) within the entire
study period, by country
Coding:
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• Start Year ﬁrst Internal War
• End year last internal war
• year ﬁrst
• year last
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• No of country-years aﬀected by warfare or conﬂict (of any kind), by country
Coding:
• Years Warfare
• af years
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• No. of country-years aﬀected by at least one non-state/state-based war or conﬂict, by country
Coding:
• Years NS/Years SB
• ns af years/sb af years
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• Cumulative no. of country-years aﬀected by non-state/state-based warfare or conﬂict between
1945–2009/1989–2009 (or –2011), by country
Coding:
• Years NS additiv
• Years SB additiv
• sb sum af years 2009 (or 2011)
• ns sum af years 2009 (or 2011)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• Dummy indicating whether a country has seen state-based and non-state warfare simultaneously
Coding:
• Overlap Dummy
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• No. of country-years with simultaneous warfare (of any kind)
Coding:
• Overlap All
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• No. of country-years with simultaneous non-state and state-based warfare
Coding:
• Overlap NS SB
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• No. of country-years with multiple state-based wars or conﬂicts ongoing
Coding:
• Overlap mutiple SB
• mult sb af years
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• No. of country-years with multiple non-state conﬂicts ongoing
Coding:
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• mult ns af years
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• No. of country-years with at least one non-state war and multiple state-based wars ongoing
Coding:
• Overlap NS multiple SB
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• No. of country-years with multiple state-based and multiple non-state conﬂict ongoing
Coding:
• mult mix af years
War-Level, Conﬂict-Level and Episode-Level Indicators
• Start and end year of a war, conﬂict or episode
Coding:
• year ﬁrst
• year last
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• Duration in years, by war
Coding:
• Duration Years
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• Precise start and end dates, by episode
Coding:
• ep start date
• ep end date
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• Duration in days, months and years, by episode
Coding:
• duration days
• duration months
• duration years
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• Level of precision of dates, by episode
Coding:
• ep start prec
• ep end prec
D.1.5. Occurence and Production of Conﬂict Resources
Country-Level Indicators
• Dummies indicating the occurrence of any kind of conﬂict resources, of diamonds, of primary
diamonds, of secondary diamonds, of gemstones other than diamonds, of oil and/or gas, of onshore
oil and/or gas or of oﬀshore oil and/or gas in a country
Coding:
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• Conﬂict Resources
• DIA, PDIA, SDIA
• Gems deposits
• OilGas, OilGas onshore, OIlGas oﬀshore
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• Dummies indicating the production of conﬂict resources (see above) plus drugs (coca bush, opium
poppy and/or cannabis) in a country
Coding:
• DIAProd, PDIAProd, SDIAProd
• Gems prod
• DrugsProd
• OilGas onshoreprod, OilGas oﬀshoreprod
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• Year of discovery of the ﬁrst deposits of conﬂict resources (see above), by country
Coding:
• SDIADisc year, PDIADisc year
• GemsDisc year
• OilGas onshoreDisc year, OilGas oﬀshoreDisc year
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• First year of production of conﬂict resources (see above, including drugs), by country
Coding:
• SDIAProd year, PDIAProd year
• GemsProd year
• DrugsProd Start year
• OilGas onshoreProd year, OilGas oﬀshoreProd year
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• Last year of large scale drug production (coca bush, opium poppy and/or cannabis), by country
Coding:
• DrugsProd End year
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• Dummies indicating whether conﬂict resources (see above) had been known to occur within a
country prior to the outbreak of (or during) the ﬁrst war or conﬂict (of any kind)
Coding:
• DIADisc wartimes, PDIADisc wartimes, SDIADisc wartimes
• GemsDisc wartimes
• OilGasDisc wartimes, OilGas onshoreDisc wartimes, OilGas oﬀshoreDisc wartimes
• DIADisc conﬂtimes, PDIADisc conﬂtimes, SDIADisc conﬂtimes
• GemsDisc conﬂtimes
• OilGasDisc conﬂtimes, OilGas onshoreDisc conﬂtimes, OilGas oﬀshoreDisc conﬂtimes
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• Dummies indicating whether conﬂict resources (see above, including drugs) had been produced
within a country prior to the outbreak of (or during) the ﬁrst war or conﬂict (of any kind)
Coding:
• DIAProd wartimes, PDIAProd wartimes, SDIAProd wartimes
• GemsProd wartimes
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• Gems and DIAProd wartimes, Gems or DIAProd wartimes
• OilGasProd wartimes, OilGas onshoreProd wartimes, OilGas oﬀshoreProd wartimes
• DrugsProd wartimes
• DIAProd conﬂtimes, PDIAProd conﬂtimes, SDIAProd conﬂtimes
• GemsProd conﬂtimes
• Gems and DIAProd conﬂtimes, Gems or DIAProd conﬂtimes
• OilGasProd conﬂtimes, OilGas onshoreProd conﬂtimes, OilGas oﬀshoreProd conﬂtimes
• DrugsProd conﬂtimes
War-Level, Conﬂict-Level and Episode-Level Indicators
• Year of discovery of the ﬁrst deposits of conﬂict resources (see above) within the country where
the war, conﬂict or episode took place
Coding:
• SDIADisc year, PDIADisc year
• GemsDisc year
• OilGas onshoreDisc year, OilGas oﬀshoreDisc year
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• First year of production of conﬂict resources (see above, including drugs) within the country where
the war, conﬂict or episode took place
Coding:
• SDIAProd year, PDIAProd year
• GemsProd year
• DrugsProd Start year
• OilGas onshoreProd year, OilGas oﬀshoreProd year
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• Last year of large scale drug production (coca bush, opium poppy and/or cannabis) within the
country where the war, conﬂict or episode took place
Coding:
• DrugsProd End year
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• Dummies indicating whether a war, conﬂict or episode happened at times when conﬂict resources
(see above) had been known to occur within a country
Coding:
• DIADisc wartimes, PDIADisc wartimes, SDIADisc wartimes
• GemsDisc wartimes
• OilGasDisc wartimes, OilGas onshoreDisc wartimes, OilGas oﬀshoreDisc wartimes
• DIADisc conﬂtimes, PDIADisc conﬂtimes, SDIADisc conﬂtimes
• GemsDisc conﬂtimes
• OilGasDisc conﬂtimes, OilGas onshoreDisc conﬂtimes, OilGas oﬀshoreDisc conﬂtimes
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• Dummies indicating whether a war, conﬂict or episode happened at times when conﬂict resources
(see above, including drugs) had been produced within a country
Coding:
• DIAProd wartimes, PDIAProd wartimes, SDIAProd wartimes
• GemsProd wartimes
• Gems and DIAProd wartimes, Gems or DIAProd wartimes
• OilGasProd wartimes, OilGas onshoreProd wartimes, OilGas oﬀshoreProd wartimes
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• DrugsProd wartimes
• DIAProd conﬂtimes, PDIAProd conﬂtimes, SDIAProd conﬂtimes
• GemsProd conﬂtimes
• Gems and DIAProd conﬂtimes, Gems or DIAProd conﬂtimes
• OilGasProd conﬂtimes, OilGas onshoreProd conﬂtimes, OilGas oﬀshoreProd conﬂtimes
• DrugsProd conﬂtimes
Actor-level Indicators
• Dummies indicating whether a violent actor was operating in a country/in countries where conﬂict
resources (see above) are known to occur
Coding:
• DIA, PDIA, SDIA
• Gems deposits
• OilGas, OilGas onshore, OilGas oﬀshore
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• Dummies indicating whether a violent actor was operating in a country/in countries where conﬂict
resources (see above, including drugs) are produced
Coding:
• DIAProd, PDIAProd, SDIAProd
• Gems prod
• DrugsProd
• OilGas onshoreprod, OilGas oﬀshoreprod
D.1.6. Political Context: Level of State Weakness/Fragility
Country-Level Indicators
• Extent to which a functioning government exists (2005–2012 average of the FH Functioning of
Government Index), by country
Coding:
• fh fog
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• Extent to which an eﬀective government exists (1996–2011 average of the WGI Government
Eﬀectiveness Indicator), by country
Coding:
• WGI Gov Eﬀ 1996 2011
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• Level of corruption (1996–2011 average of the WGI Control of Corruption Indicator and the 2012
score of the Corruption Perception Index), by country
Coding:
• WGI Control Corr 1996 2011
• cpi 2012
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• Degree of state fragility: broadly deﬁned (overall score of the State Fragility Index, SFI), in-
dependently deﬁned from armed conﬂict (overall SFI score minus the SFI security eﬀectiveness
score) and narrowly deﬁned (SFI security legitimacy score plus the SFI political eﬀectiveness and
legitimacy scores) (1995–2011 averages of the SFI measures), by country
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Coding:
• sﬁ
• sﬁ sub index 1
• sﬁ sub index 2
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• Degree of government eﬀectiveness and government legitimacy (1995–2011 averages of the SFI
measures), by country
Coding:
• sﬁ eﬀectiveness
• sﬁ legitimacy
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• Degree of polity fragmentation (2000–2012 average of the Polity IV Fragmentation Indicator), by
country
Coding:
• fragment
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• Strength of civil society (2006–2012 average of the BTI Traditions of Civil Society Indicator and
the no. of civil society organizations in 2008 as measured by Grimes(2008)), by country
Coding:
• BTI civil soc 2006 2012
• grimes cso
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• Level of state weakness (2003–2012 average of the BTI Stateness Index), by country
Coding:
• BTI Stateness 2003 2012
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• Degree of state failure (2006–2012 average of the BTI Failed State Index), by country
Coding:
• BTI failed state 2006 2012
War-Level, Conﬂict-Level and Episode-Level Indicators
• Level of state weakness/fragility (as measured above) of the country where the war, conﬂict or
episode is happening
Coding:
• fh fog
• WGI Gov Eﬀ 1996 2011, WGI Control Corr 1996 2011
• cpi 2012
• sﬁ, sﬁ sub index 1, sﬁ sub index 2, sﬁ eﬀectiveness, sﬁ legitimacy
• fragment
• BTI civil soc 2006 2012, BTI Stateness 2003 2012, BTI failed state 2006 2012
• grimes cso
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• Level of state fragility, government eﬀectiveness or legitimacy and corruption (as measured above)
within a country prior to the outbreak of the conﬂict or episode (at t-1 or -2, depending on the
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availability of data)
Coding:
• sﬁ tminus1, sﬁ sub index 1 tminus1, sﬁ sub index 2 tminus1, sﬁ eﬀectiveness tminus1, sﬁ legitimacy tminus1
• wgi gov eﬀ tminus1, wgi contr corr tminus1
Actor-Level Indicators
• Level of state weakness/fragility (as measured above) of the country/countries where a violent
actor is operating
Coding:
• fh fog
• WGI Gov Eﬀ 1996 2011, WGI Control Corr 1996 2011
• cpi 2012
• sﬁ, sﬁ sub index 1, sﬁ sub index 2, sﬁ eﬀectiveness, sﬁ legitimacy
• fragment
• BTI civil soc 2006 2012, BTI Stateness 2003 2012, BTI failed state 2006 2012
• grimes cso
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D.2. Variables and Data Sources
D.2.1. Incidence of Internal Wars (1946-2009), Conﬂicts (1989-2011) and
Conﬂict Episodes (1989-2009)
• Dummies indicating whether ﬁghting is state-based/non-state in nature (by war, conﬂict, episode)
and whether a state-based conﬂict is categorized as an internationalized internal conﬂict by
UCDP/PRIO
• Dummies indicating whether a country has seen any kind of a temporal overlap in ﬁghting (by
country)
• No. of state-based/non-state wars or conﬂicts (by country)
• No. of conﬂict episodes (by conﬂict)
• Country name(s), region(s) and unique identiﬁers (e.g. obs. no., conﬂict or dyad IDs) (by country,
war, conﬂict, episode)
Source(s) State-Based Fighting:
• New List of Wars v.1.3, 1946-2006 / Consolidated List of Wars v. 1.1., 1990-2009
• UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset, v.5-2012b, 1989-2011 (dyad version)
• UCDP Conﬂict Termination Dataset, v.2010-1, 1946-2009
• Regional coding: Lacina et al. (2005: Appendix B) and World Map at http://www.ucdp.uu.
se/gpdatabase/search.php (visited on 2014-06-19)
Source(s) Non-State Fighting:
• New List of Wars v.1.3, 1946-2006 / Consolidated List of Wars v. 1.1., 1990-2009
• UCDP Non-State Conﬂict Dataset, v. 2.4-2012, 1989-2011
• Regional coding: Lacina et al. (2005: Appendix B) and World Map at http://www.ucdp.uu.
se/gpdatabase/search.php (visited on 2014-06-19)
D.2.2. Number & Nature of Violent Actors
• Dummy indicating an external military intervention (by war)
• No. of parties (by war)
• Dummy indicating whether a clear no. of parties is identiﬁed (by war)
• Dummy indicating whether the government, the national army or government leftovers is/are
mentioned as one party to the conﬂict (by war)
• Min. no. of involved national groups of actors identiﬁed by name (by war)
• Names of violent actors on both sides (by war)
Source(s):
• New List of Wars v.1.3, 1946-2006 / Consolidated List of Wars v. 1.1., 1990-2009
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• Names of violent actors (by conﬂict, episode)
• Organizational level of involved actors (by conﬂict, episode)
Source(s) State-Based Fighting:
• UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset, v.5-2012b, 1989-2011
• UCDP Conﬂict Termination Dataset, v.2010-1, 1946-2009
Source(s) Non-State Fighting:
• UCDP Non-State Conﬂict Dataset, v. 2.4-2012, 1989-2011
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• Dummy indicating whether a violent non-state group was created by breaking away from another
violent non-state group
• Dummy indicating whether a violent non-state actor was created by a temporary split in the
original movement
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• Dummy indicating whether a violent non-state actor entered into an alliance with another violent
non-state actor
• Dummies indicating whether a violent non-state actor has been involved in one or several non-
state/state-based conﬂicts
• Actor Name, Actor ID
• Organizational level of a violent non-state actor
• Name(s) of the country/countries and region(s) where the violent actor has been active in
Source(s):
• UCDP Actor Dataset, v.2.1-2012
D.2.3. Level of Violence in Internal Wars (1990-2009) and Conﬂicts
(1989-2011)
• Best, low and high estimates of the total no. of (military and civilian) battle-related deaths (by
conﬂict, country)
Source(s) State-Based Fighting:
• UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset, v.5-2012b, 1989-2011
Source(s) Non-State Fighting:
• UCDP Non-State Conﬂict Dataset, v. 2.4-2012, 1989-2011
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• Min. and max. estimates of the total no. of (civilian and military) battle-related deaths (by war,
country)
Source(s):
• Consolidated List of Wars v. 1.1., 1990-2009
D.2.4. Nature of Applied Violence by Actors
• Dummy indicating whether a violent actor committed one or several acts of one-sided violence
against unarmed civilians
Source(s):
• UCDP Actor Dataset, v.2.1-2012
D.2.5. Duration of Internal Wars (1946-2009), Conﬂicts (1989-2011) and
Conﬂict Episodes (1989-2009)
• No. of country-years aﬀected by warfare of any kind (by country)
• No. of country-years aﬀected by non-state/state-based warfare (by country)
• Cumulative no. of country-years aﬀected by non-state/state-based warfare (by country)
• No. of country-years with multiple wars ongoing (by country)
• No. of country-years with one non-state and one state-based war ongoing (by country)
• No. of country-years with multiple state-based wars ongoing (by country)
• No. of country-years with at least one non-state and multiple state-based wars ongoing (by
country)
• Start and end year (by war)
• Duration in years (by war)
Source(s):
• New List of Wars v.1.3, 1946-2006 / Consolidated List of Wars v. 1.1., 1990-2009
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• Start and end year (by conﬂict)
• Years aﬀected by conﬂict, comma separated list (by conﬂict)
• Duration in years (by conﬂict)
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• No. of country-years aﬀected by conﬂict (by country)
• No. of country-years aﬀected by non-state/state-based conﬂict (by country)
• First year of conﬂict (by country)
• Last year of conﬂict (by country)
• No. of country-years with multiple non-state conﬂicts ongoing (by country)
• No. of country-years with multiple state-based conﬂicts ongoing (by country)
• No. of country-years with non-state and state-based conﬂicts ongoing (by country)
Source(s) State-Based Fighting:
• UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset, v.5-2012b, 1989-2011
Source(s) Non-State Fighting:
• UCDP Non-State Conﬂict Dataset, v. 2.4-2012, 1989-2011
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• Precise start date (by episode)
• Precise end date (by episode)
• Duration in days, months and years (by episode)
• Level of precision of dates (by episode)
Source(s) State-Based Fighting:
• UCDP Conﬂict Termination Dataset v.2010-1, 1946-2009
Source(s) Non-State Fighting:
• UCDP Non-State Conﬂict Dataset, v. 2.4-2012, 1989-2011
D.2.6. Occurrence and Production of Conﬂict Resources
• Dummies indicating the occurrence/production of diamonds (any kind of/lootable/non-lootable)
(by country)
• Year of discovery of the ﬁrst lootable/non-lootable diamond deposit (by country)
• First year of lootable/non-lootable diamond production (by country)
• Dummies indicating whether diamond deposits (any kind of/lootable/non-lootable) had been
known to occur/were produced prior to/during the ﬁrst war (by country)
• Dummies indicating whether diamond deposits (any kind of/lootable/non-lootable) had been
known to occur/were produced prior to/during times of ﬁghting (by war, conﬂict, episode)
• Dummies indicating whether a violent non-state actor was operating in a country where diamonds
(any kind of/lootable/non-lootable) occur/are produced (by violent actor)
Source(s):
• PRIO Diamond Dataset, 1946-2005
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• Dummies indicating the occurrence/production of gemstones other than diamonds (by country)
• Year of discovery of the ﬁrst gemstone deposit (by country)
• First year of gemstone production (by country)
• Dummies indicating whether gemstones (or gemstones and/or diamonds) had been known to
occur/were produced prior to/during the ﬁrst war (by country)
• Dummies indicating whether gemstones had been known to occur/were produced prior to/during
times of ﬁghting (by war, conﬂict, episode)
• Dummies indicating whether a violent non-state actor was operating in a country where gemstones
occur/are produced (by violent actor)
Source(s):
• Gemstone Site Dataset, 1946-2004
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• Dummy indicating the cultivation of drugs (coca bush, opium poppy and/or cannabis) (by coun-
try)
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• First year of large scale drug production (coca, opium and/or cannabis) (by country)
• Final year of large scale drug production (coca, opium and/or cannabis) (by country)
• Dummy indicating large scale production of drugs (coca bush, opium poppy and/or cannabis)
prior to/during the ﬁrst war or conﬂict (by country)
• Dummy indicating large scale production of drugs (coca bush, opium poppy and/or cannabis)
prior to/during times of ﬁghting (by war, conﬂict, episode)
• Dummies indicating whether a violent non-state actor was operating in a country where drugs
(coca, opium and/or cannabis) are produced (by violent actor)
Source(s):
• Drug Cultivation Dataset, 1946-2002
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• Dummies indicating the occurrence/production of oil or gas (any kind of/onshore/oﬀshore) (by
country)
• Year of discovery of the ﬁrst onshore/oﬀshore oil or gas deposit (by country)
• First year of onshore/oﬀshore oil or gas production (by country)
• Dummies indicating whether oil or gas deposits (any kind of/onshore/oﬀshore) had been known
to occur/were produced prior to/during the ﬁrst war (by country)
• Dummies indicating whether oil or gas deposits (any kind of/onshore/oﬀshore) had been known
to occur/were produced prior to/during times of ﬁghting (by war, conﬂict, episode)
• Dummies indicating whether a violent non-state actor was operating in a country where oil or gas
deposits (any kind of/onshore/oﬀshore) occur/are produced (by violent actor)
Source(s):
• Petroleum Dataset, v.1.2. 1946 to 2003
D.2.7. Political Context/State Fragility
• The level of state weakness (by country)
• The level of state weakness independently deﬁned from armed conﬂict (by country)
• The level of state eﬀectiveness (by country)
• The level of state legitimacy (by country)
Source(s):
• State Fragility Index (SFI) (overall score), Center for Global Policy, George Mason University
• SFI sub-Index I (SFI overall score minus SFI security eﬀectiveness score)
• SFI eﬀectiveness score minus SFI security eﬀectiveness score
• SFI legitimacy score; SFI sub-Index II (SFI security legitimacy score plus SFI political eﬀectiveness
and legitimacy scores)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• The degree of state failure (by country)
Source(s):
• Stateness Index and Failed State Index, Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI), Bertelsmann
Foundation/Center for Applied Policy Research, University of Munich
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• The functioning of government (by country)
Source(s):
• Functioning of Government Index, Freedom House (FH)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• The eﬀectiveness of government (by country)
Source(s):
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• Government Eﬀectiveness Indicator, World Governance Indicators (WGI), World Bank
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• The level of corruption (by country)
Source(s):
• Corruption Perception Index (CPI), Transparency International (TI); Control of Corruption In-
dicator,
• World Governance Indicators (WGI), World Bank
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• The degree of polity fragmentation (by country)
Source(s):
• Fragmentation Indicator, Polity IV Project Data Series, Center for Global Policy, George Mason
University
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• The strength of society/no. of civil society organizations (by country)
Source(s):
• Traditions of Civil Society Indicator, Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI), Bertelsmann
Foundation/Center for Applied Policy Research, University of Munich; Grimes (2008), available
through the Quality of Government Project (QoG), Gothenburg University)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• The level of state fragility (see above) within the country where ﬁghting took place (by war,
conﬂict, episode)
Source(s):
• All above indicators
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• The level of state weakness, government eﬀectiveness and corruption within the country where
ﬁghting took place prior to the outbreak of ﬁghting (by conﬂict, episode)
Source(s):
• All SFI and WGI measures
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• The (average) level of state fragility (see above) within the country (the countries) where a violent
non-state actor had been active (by violent actor)
Source(s):
• All above indicators
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Table D.1.: Overview of Fragility Measures. Source: own depiction.
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DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS SUPPORTING (9) OR DISPROVING (X) HYPOTHESES 1 AND 1a 
INDICATORS ON THE INCIDENCE OF INTERNAL FIGHTING 
BOTH 
KINDS 
NON‐
STATE 
STATE‐
BASED 
HYP. 
No. of internal wars (1946‐2009), worldwide 
‐ sub‐Saharan Africa 
‐ Americas 
‐ Central & South Asia 
‐ East & Southeast Asia & Oceania 
‐ Europe 
‐ Middle East & North Africa 
138
45 
15 
24 
22 
7 
25 
18 
9 
0 
5 
1 
2 
1 
120
36 
15 
19 
21 
5 
24 
H1 X
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
No. of internal armed conflicts (1989‐2011), worldwide
‐ sub‐Saharan Africa 
‐ Americas 
‐ Central & South Asia 
‐ East & Southeast Asia & Oceania 
‐ Europe 
‐ Middle East & North Africa  
690
353 
43 
102 
45 
33 
114 
419 
255 
24 
50 
15 
10 
65 
271
98 
19 
52 
30 
23 
49 
H1 9
H1 9 
H1 9 
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 9 
No. of conflict episodes (1989‐2009), worldwide 
‐ sub‐Saharan Africa 
‐ Americas 
‐ Central & South Asia 
‐ East & Southeast Asia & Oceania 
‐ Europe 
‐ Middle East & North Africa 
814
412 
46 
131 
68 
35 
122 
449 
286 
19 
48 
18 
10 
68 
365
126 
27 
83 
50 
25 
54 
H1 9
H1 9 
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 9 
No. of countries affected by internal warfare (1946‐2009), worldwide
‐ sub‐Saharan Africa 
‐ Americas 
‐ Central & South Asia 
‐ East & Southeast Asia & Oceania 
‐ Europe 
‐ Middle East & North Africa 
63
19 
12 
8 
8 
6 
10 
16 
8 
0 
4 
1 
2 
1 
60
18 
12 
8 
8 
4 
10 
H1 X
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
No. of countries affected by internal armed conflict (1989‐2011), worldwide
‐ sub‐Saharan Africa 
‐ Americas 
‐ Central & South Asia 
‐ East & Southeast Asia & Oceania 
‐ Europe 
‐ Middle East & North Africa 
88
30 
18 
10 
7 
10 
13 
53 
22 
10 
7 
4 
2 
8 
76
25 
12 
10 
7 
9 
13 
H1 X
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
No. of countries affected by conflict episodes (1989‐2009), worldwide
‐ sub‐Saharan Africa 
‐ Americas 
‐ Central & South Asia 
‐ East & Southeast Asia & Oceania 
‐ Europe 
‐ Middle East & North Africa 
84
31 
17 
10 
7 
9 
10 
48 
21 
9 
7 
4 
2 
5 
72
24 
12 
10 
7 
9 
10 
H1 X
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
No. of internal wars per country (1946‐2009), worldwide
‐ sub‐Saharan Africa 
‐ Americas 
‐ Central & South Asia 
‐ East & Southeast Asia & Oceania 
‐ Europe 
‐ Middle East & North Africa 
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0.2 
0 
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0.04 
0.05 
0.05 
0.7
0.8 
0.5 
1.3 
0.9 
0.1 
1.1 
H1 X
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
No. of internal armed conflicts per country (1989‐2011), worldwide
‐ sub‐Saharan Africa 
‐ Americas 
‐ Central & South Asia 
‐ East & Southeast Asia & Oceania 
‐ Europe 
‐ Middle East & North Africa 
3.94
7.84 
1.48 
6.8 
1.96 
0.79 
5.43 
2.39 
5.67 
0.83 
3.33 
0.65 
0.24 
3.1 
1.55
2.18 
0.66 
3.47 
1.3 
0.55 
2.33 
H1 9
H1 9 
H1 9 
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 9 
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No. of conflict episodes per country (1989‐2009), worldwide
‐ sub‐Saharan Africa 
‐ Americas 
‐ Central & South Asia 
‐ East & Southeast Asia & Oceania 
‐ Europe 
‐ Middle East & North Africa 
4.65
9.16 
1.59 
8.73 
2.96 
0.83 
5.81 
2.57 
6.36 
0.66 
3.2 
0.78 
0.24 
3.24 
2.09
2.8 
0.93 
5.53 
2.17 
0.6 
2.57 
H1 9
H1 9 
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 9 
No. of annually ongoing internal wars (1989‐2009 Ø), worldwide
‐ sub‐Saharan Africa 
‐ Americas 
‐ Central & South Asia 
‐ East & Southeast Asia & Oceania 
‐ Europe 
‐ Middle East & North Africa 
29.4
9.7 
2.1 
7.6 
4.7 
1.2 
4.0 
4.9 
3.2 
0 
1.2 
0.2 
0.2 
0.1 
23
6.5 
2.1 
6.4 
4.5 
1.0 
4.0 
H1 X
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
No. of annually ongoing internal armed conflicts (1989‐2011Ø), worldwide
‐ sub‐Saharan Africa 
‐ Americas 
‐ Central & South Asia 
‐ East & Southeast Asia & Oceania 
‐ Europe 
‐ Middle East & North Africa 
77.78
29.74 
6.26 
15.52 
8.26 
2.91 
15.09 
28.09 
16.09 
2.00 
3.52 
0.91 
0.52 
5.04 
49.7
13.65 
4.26 
12 
7.35 
2.39 
10.04 
H1 X
H1 9 
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
No. of annually ongoing conflict episodes (1989‐2009 Ø), worldwide
‐ sub‐Saharan Africa 
‐ Americas 
‐ Central & South Asia 
‐ East & Southeast Asia & Oceania 
‐ Europe 
‐ Middle East & North Africa 
88.62
31.43 
9.90 
21.62 
8.33 
3.05 
14.29 
27.67 
16.52 
1.52 
3.33 
0.95 
0.52 
4.81 
60.95
14.90 
8.38 
18.29 
7.38 
2.52 
9.48 
H1 X
H1 9 
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
No. of countries affected by internal wars per year (1989‐2009 Ø), worldwide
‐ sub‐Saharan Africa 
‐ Americas 
‐ Central & South Asia 
‐ East & Southeast Asia & Oceania 
‐ Europe 
‐ Middle East & North Africa 
24
9.2 
2.1 
4.4 
3.3 
1.2 
3.6 
4.9 
3.2 
0 
1.2 
0.2 
0.2 
0.1 
20
6.3 
2.1 
3.7 
3.3 
1.0 
3.5 
H1 X
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
No. of countries affected by internal conflicts per year (1989‐2011 Ø), worldwide
‐ sub‐Saharan Africa 
‐ Americas 
‐ Central & South Asia 
‐ East & Southeast Asia & Oceania 
‐ Europe 
‐ Middle East & North Africa 
34.13
12.96 
3.74 
5.30 
3.83 
1.74 
6.57 
13.26 
6.52 
1.26 
2.09 
0.83 
0.3 
2.26 
28.48
9.22 
3.00 
4.87 
3.74 
1.65 
6 
H1 X
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
No. of countries affected by conflict episodes per year (1989‐2009 Ø), worldwide
‐ sub‐Saharan Africa 
‐ Americas 
‐ Central & South Asia 
‐ East & Southeast Asia & Oceania 
‐ Europe 
‐ Middle East & North Africa 
34.71
13.48 
3.71 
5.48 
3.90 
1.81 
6.33 
13.33 
6.67 
1.24 
2.05 
0.86 
0.29 
2.24 
28.95
9.57 
3.05 
5.10 
3.81 
1.71 
5.71 
H1 X
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
Ø no. of country‐years spent in internal conflict (1989‐2011), worldwide
‐ sub‐Saharan Africa 
‐ Americas 
‐ Central & South Asia 
‐ East & Southeast Asia & Oceania 
‐ Europe 
‐ Middle East & North Africa 
4.5
6.6 
3.0 
8.1 
3.8 
1.0 
7.2 
1.7 
3.3 
1.0 
3.2 
0.8 
0.2 
2.5 
3.7
4.7 
2.4 
7.5 
3.7 
0.9 
6.6 
H1 X
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
Ø no. of country‐years spent in multiple internal conflicts (1989‐2011), worldwide
‐ sub‐Saharan Africa 
‐ Americas 
‐ Central & South Asia 
‐ East & Southeast Asia & Oceania 
‐ Europe 
‐ Middle East & North Africa 
1.0
1.4 
0.4 
2.5 
0.7 
0.1 
1.9 
0.8 
1.8 
0.2 
1.3 
0.1 
0.1 
1.2 
1.5
1.6 
0.9 
3.1 
1.9 
0.2 
2.5 
H1 X
H1 9 
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
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INDICATORS ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF NON‐STATE INTERNAL FIGHTING 
 
Ø  
SHARE 
HYP.  TREND  HYP. 
Share of non‐state wars in all annually ongoing internal wars (1989‐2009  Ø), 
worldwide6 
‐ sub‐Saharan Africa 
‐ Americas 
‐ Central & South Asia 
‐ East & Southeast Asia & Oceania 
‐ Europe 
‐ Middle East & North Africa 
17% 
34% 
‐ 
15% 
4% 
8% 
3% 
 
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
 
↑ 
↑ 
 
↑3 
 
 
↓ 
H1a 9 
H1a 9 
H1a X 
H1a 9 
 
 
H1a X 
Share of non‐state conflicts in all annually ongoing internal conflicts (1989‐2011 Ø), 
worldwide 
‐ sub‐Saharan Africa 
‐ Americas 
‐ Central & South Asia 
‐ East & Southeast Asia & Oceania 
‐ Europe 
‐ Middle East & North Africa 
36% 
52% 
30% 
22% 
11% 
10% 
32% 
 
H1 X 
H1 9 
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
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↑2 
↑   
↑1 
 
 
↑1 
H1a 9 
H1a 9 
H1a 9 
H1a 9 
H1a X 
H1a X 
H1a 9 
Share of non‐state episodes in all annually ongoing conflict episodes (1989‐2009  Ø), 
worldwide 
‐ sub‐Saharan Africa 
‐ Americas 
‐ Central & South Asia 
‐ East & Southeast Asia & Oceania 
‐ Europe 
‐ Middle East & North Africa 
31% 
50% 
15% 
15% 
11% 
8% 
32% 
 
H1 X 
H1 9 
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 X 
 
↑ 
↑2  
↑   
↑1 
 
 
↑1 
H1a 9 
H1a 9 
H1a 9 
H1a 9 
H1a X 
H1a X 
H1a 9 
Share of non‐state conflicts in new outbreaks of internal conflict (1990‐2011 Ø), 
worldwide4 
‐ sub‐Saharan Africa 
‐ Americas 
‐ Central & South Asia 
‐ East & Southeast Asia & Oceania 
‐ Europe 
‐ Middle East & North Africa 
66% 
72% 
55% 
56% 
34% 
8% 
62% 
 
H1 9 
H1 9 
H1 9 
H1 9 
H1 X 
H1 X 
H1 9 
 
↑ 
↑ 
 
↑ 
H1a 9 
H1a 9 
 
H1a 9 
 
 
ADDITIONAL INDICATORS 
 
Share of war‐experienced countries …  
       … that have seen more than one internal war, 1946‐2009 (33 out of 63)  52% 
       … that have seen both kinds of internal warfare, 1946‐2009 (13 out of 63) 21%
       … that have seen exclusively state‐based internal warfare, 1946‐2009 (47 out of 63) 75%
       … that have seen several but exclusively state‐based internal wars, 1946‐2009 (20 out of 63)  32%
       … that have seen exclusively non‐state internal warfare, 1946‐2009 (3 out of 63) 5%
Share of countries with non‐state internal war experience that have also seen state‐based internal warfare, 1946‐2009
Share of countries with state‐based internal war experience that have also seen non‐state internal warfare, 1946‐2009 
81%
22% 
Share of countries with non‐state conflict experience that have also seen state‐based internal conflict (1989‐2011)
Share of countries with state‐based conflict experience that have also seen non‐state internal conflict (1989‐2011) 
77%
54% 
Share of countries with several wars that have seen simultaneous warfare, 1946‐2009 (12 out of 33)  36%
Share of countries with several wars that have seen simultaneous warfare of different kinds, 1946‐2009 (7out of 13) 54%
Ø overlap (in years) of different kinds of internal warfare (non‐state and state‐based warfare), 1946‐2009  
Ø overlap (in years) of the same kind of internal warfare (multiple state‐based wars) , 1946‐2009 
3.5
10.5 
Share of non‐state wars in all annually ongoing internal wars, 1946‐1988 Ø vs. 1989‐2009 Ø  3% 17%
Regional shares in all annually ongoing non‐state internal wars, 1946‐1988 Ø  vs. 1989‐2009 Ø 5  
‐ sub‐Saharan Africa 
‐ Americas 
‐ Central & South Asia 
‐ East & Southeast Asia & Oceania 
‐ Europe 
‐ Middle East & North Africa 
17% 
‐ 
‐ 
‐ 
2% 
20% 
67% 
‐ 
23% 
3% 
3% 
4% 
408
Regional shares in all annually ongoing state‐based internal wars, 1946‐1988 Ø vs. 1989‐2009 Ø   
‐ sub‐Saharan Africa 
‐ Americas 
‐ Central & South Asia 
‐ East & Southeast Asia & Oceania 
‐ Europe 
‐ Middle East & North Africa 
17% 
20% 
5% 
39% 
2% 
15% 
28% 
9% 
28% 
19% 
5% 
17% 
Regional shares in all country‐years spent in non‐state internal warfare, 1946‐1988 Ø vs. 1989‐2009 Ø   
‐ sub‐Saharan Africa 
‐ Americas 
‐ Central & South Asia 
‐ East & Southeast Asia & Oceania 
‐ Europe 
‐ Middle East & North Africa 
46% 
‐ 
‐ 
‐ 
4% 
50% 
66% 
‐ 
24% 
4% 
4% 
2% 
Regional Shares in new outbreaks of non‐state internal warfare, 1946‐1988 Ø  vs. 1989‐2009 Ø   
‐ sub‐Saharan Africa 
‐ Americas 
‐ Central & South Asia 
‐ East & Southeast Asia & Oceania 
‐ Europe 
‐ Middle East & North Africa 
50% 
‐ 
‐ 
‐ 
25% 
25% 
50% 
‐ 
36% 
7% 
7% 
‐ 
 
1 Since 2000/2001. 2 Up to 2005, dropped in 2007 but increased again afterwards. 3 Since 1991. 4 If country years without any new 
outbreak of internal armed conflict would be excluded from this calculation, the shares of non‐state conflicts in all new outbreaks of 
internal armed conflict within the Americas and within Europe would increase significantly (from 55 to 71 percent and from 8 to 19 
percent) while in Central & South Asia and East & Southeast Asia and Oceania they would increase only modestly (from 56 to 59 
percent and from 34 to 44 percent). 5 If country years without non‐state internal warfare would be excluded from this calculation, 
the regional shares of sub‐Saharan Africa, Europe and the Middle East & North Africa in all annually ongoing non‐state internal wars 
within the 1946 to 1988 period would increase from 17 to 44 percent, from 2 to 6 percent and from 20 to 50 percent. 6 If country 
years without internal warfare would be excluded from this calculation, the post‐Cold War average share of non‐state wars in all 
annually ongoing internal wars in Europe would increase from 8 to 9 percent. 9= supporting Hypotheses 1/1a; X= disproving 
Hypotheses 1/1a. 
Table E.1.: Descriptive Statistics on the Incidence and Signiﬁcance of (Non-State) In-
ternal Fighting. Source: own depiction.
409

F. Pairwise Correlation Matrix of State
Weakness Measures
Table F.1.: Pairwise Correlation Matrix of State Weakness Measures. Source: own
calculation.
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G. Signiﬁcance of Regression Results
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G. Signiﬁcance of Regression Results
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DEP. VAR.: NATURE OF VIOLENCE APPLIED BY FORMALLY ORG. GROUPS (H8, H9) 
  actor level  X  X  X  ‐  ‐  ‐  9  ‐  ‐  ⁄  ⁄ 
DEP. VAR.: DURATION OF FIGHTING|NON‐STATE FIGHTING|STATE‐BASED FIGHTING (H10, H10a, H11, H12, H13)
  episode level     ⁄|X|X   9|X|X   9|X|X      ‐|‐|‐     ‐| ‐ |‐   ‐|⁄|‐   ‐|‐|‐     ‐|‐|‐   ‐|‐|‐  9|9|X  9| ⁄ |X 
  conflict level     ⁄|X|⁄    X|X|X    X|X|⁄      ‐|‐|‐  9|9|9   ‐|⁄|‐   ‐|‐|‐     ‐|‐|‐   ‐|‐|‐    X|X|X   X| X|X 
  war level    X|‐ | ‐    X|‐ |‐    X|‐ |‐      ‐|‐|‐     ‐| ‐ |‐   ‐|‐|‐   ‐|‐|‐  9|‐|‐  X|‐|‐    X| ‐ |‐   X| ‐ |‐ 
DEP. VAR.: INTENSITY OF INTERNAL FIGHTING|NON‐STATE FIGHTING|STATE‐BASED FIGHTING (H14) 
  conflict level     ⁄|X|⁄    X|X|X    X|X|X  9|9|9      ‐|‐|‐  ‐|X|‐   ‐|‐|‐    ‐|‐|‐   ‐|‐|‐     ⁄|X|⁄    ⁄|X|⁄ 
DEP. VAR.: QUALITY OF ACTORS IN NON‐STATE FIGHTING / FORMALLY VS. INFORMALLY ORG. (H15) 
  actor level  ⁄  X  ⁄  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  9  9 
  episode level   9  ⁄  ⁄  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  9  9 
  conflict level   9  ⁄  ⁄  ‐  X  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  9  9 
DEP. VAR.: NUMBER OF ACTORS (H16) 
  war level   X  X  X  9  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  X  X 
DEP. VAR.: ENGAGEMNENT IN / CATEGORIZATION AS NON‐STATE FIGHTING (Overall Research Question, ORQ) 
  actor level   9  9  9  ‐  ‐  ‐  X  ‐  ‐  9  9 
  episode level   ⁄  9  ⁄  9  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ⁄  9 
  conflict level   X  9  9  X  9  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  9  9 
  war level   X  X  X  9  ‐  ‐  ‐  9  X  X  X 
DEP. VAR.: EXPERIENCE OF INTERNAL WARFARE|NON‐STATE WARFARE|STATE‐BASED WARFARE (ORQ) 
  country level   9|9|9   9|X|9  9|9|9  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐     ⁄|X|⁄     ⁄|X|⁄ 
DEP. VAR.: EXPERIENCE OF INTERNAL CONFLICT|NON‐STATE CONFLICT|STATE‐BASED CONFLICT (ORQ) 
  country level  9|9|9  9|9|X  9|9|9  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐     ⁄|X|⁄     ⁄|X|⁄ 
DEP.VAR.:  NUMBER OF INTERNAL CONFLICTS | NON‐STATE CONFLICTS | STATE‐BASED CONFLICTS (ORQ) 
  country level  9|9|9  9|9|X  9| ⁄ | ⁄  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐     X|X|⁄     ⁄|⁄|X 
DEP.VAR.:  YEARS SPENT IN INTERNAL WARFARE | NON‐STATE WARFARE | STATE‐BASED WARFARE (ORQ) 
  country level  9|9|9  9|X|9  9|9|9  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐     ⁄|X|⁄    ⁄|X|⁄ 
DEP.VAR.:  YEARS SPENT IN INTERNAL CONFLICT | NON‐STATE CONFLICT | STATE‐BASED CONFLICT (ORQ) 
  country level  9|9|9  9|9|9  9|9|9  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐     ⁄|X|⁄     ⁄|⁄|⁄ 
 
Independent variables marked as missing (‐) are either not included for theoretical or statistical reasons (e.g. due to colinearity issues), are 
unavailable at the respective level of analysis or constitute the dependent variable in the respective specification. Independent variables 
separated by dotted lines are alternative measures and as such never simultaneously included within the same model. Key independent 
variables are surrounded by bold lines. 9= mostly highly significant effects, 9= weaker but mostly significant effects, ⁄ = mixed results, X = 
mostly non‐significant effects. 1 Dummies indicating the kind of conflict engagement of a violent non‐state actor: non‐state (0/1), state‐
based (0/1) or both types of conflict engagement (0/1). 2 Without interaction term highly significant. 
Table G.1.: Overview of the Signiﬁcance of the Regression Results of all Baseline Models.
Source: own depiction.
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DEP. VAR.: NATURE OF VIOLENCE APPLIED BY FORMALLY ORG. GROUPS (H8, H9) 
  actor level  9  X   X  9  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  9  ‐  ‐  ⁄  9  91 
DEP. VAR.: DURATION OF FIGHTING|NON‐STATE FIGHTING|STATE‐BASED FIGHTING (H10, H10a, H11, H12, H13) 
  episode level     X|9|X    X|X|X    ⁄ |⁄ |X      X|‐|‐    ‐ |X|‐      ‐|‐|‐   ‐  | ‐ |‐     ‐| ⁄ |‐    ‐|‐|‐    ‐ |‐|‐    ‐ |‐|‐  9|9|X 9|9|X  9|‐|‐ 
  conflict level      ⁄|X |⁄      ⁄|X|⁄     ⁄ |X|⁄      ‐ |‐|‐    X|‐ |‐  ‐|‐|‐  9|9|9     ‐| ⁄ |‐    ‐|‐|‐    ‐ |‐|‐    ‐ |‐|‐     ⁄ |X |X   ⁄  |X |X   ⁄  |‐|‐ 
  war level     X| ‐ | ‐    X| ‐|‐   9|‐ |‐      ‐ |‐|‐    X|‐ |‐  ‐|‐|‐   ‐  | ‐ |‐     ‐| ‐ |‐    ‐|‐|‐   9|‐|‐   X |‐|‐    X| ‐ |‐   X | ‐ |‐   9|‐|‐ 
DEP. VAR.: INTENSITY OF INTERNAL FIGHTING | NON‐STATE FIGHTING | STATE‐BASED FIGHTING (H14) 
  conflict level  9|X|9  X|X|X    ⁄ |X|X  ‐|‐|‐  X|X|X   9|9|9 ‐|‐|‐  ‐|9|‐  ‐|‐|‐  ‐|‐|‐  ‐|‐|‐  9|9|X  X|X|X   9|‐|‐ 
DEP. VAR.: QUALITY OF ACTORS IN NON‐STATE FIGHTING / FORMALLY VS. INFORMALLY ORG. (H15) 
  actor level  ⁄  ⁄  ⁄  9  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  9  9  ‐ 
  episode level    ⁄ 2   ‐  9  ‐  9  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  9  9  ‐ 
  conflict level    ⁄ 2  ‐  9  ‐  9  ‐  X  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  9  9  ‐ 
DEP. VAR.: NUMBER OF ACTORS (H16) 
  war level   9  X  X  ‐  X  9  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  X  X  9 
DEP. VAR.: ENGAGEMNENT IN / CATEGORIZATION AS NON‐STATE FIGHTING (Overall Research Question) 
  actor level   9  9  ‐  ⁄  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  X  ‐  ‐  ‐  9  ‐ 
  episode level   9  9  9  X  ⁄  9  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  9  ‐ 
  conflict level   9  ‐  9  ‐  9  X  9  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  9  ‐ 
  war level   X  X  X  ‐  X  9  ‐  ‐  ‐  9  X  X  X  ‐ 
DEP. VAR.: EXPERIENCE OF INTERNAL WARFARE|NON‐STATE WARFARE|STATE‐BASED WARFARE (Overall Research Question) 
  country level   9|9|9  ‐ |X|9  9|9|9  ‐|‐|‐  X|X|X  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐      ⁄|X|⁄       ⁄|X|⁄  ‐  
DEP. VAR.: EXPERIENCE OF INTERNAL CONFLICT|NON‐STATE CONFLICT|STATE‐BASED CONFLICT (Overall Research Question) 
  country level  9|9|9  ‐|9|X  X|9|‐  ‐|‐|X    ‐ |X| ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐   ⁄|X|9   ⁄|X|⁄  ‐ 
 
Independent variables marked as missing (‐) are either not included for theoretical or statistical reasons (e.g. due to colinearity issues), are 
unavailable at the respective level of analysis or constitute the dependent variable in the respective specification. Independent variables 
separated by dotted lines are alternative measures and as such never simultaneously included within the same model. Key independent 
variables are surrounded by bold lines. 9= mostly highly significant effects, 9= weaker but mostly significant effects, ⁄ = mixed results, X = 
mostly non‐significant effects. 1 Dummies indicating the kind of conflict engagement of a violent non‐state actor: non‐state (0/1), state‐
based (0/1) or both types of conflict engagement (0/1). 2 Without interaction term highly significant. 
 
 Table G.2.: Overview of the Signiﬁcance of the Regression Results of all Reﬁned Models.
Source: own depiction.
415
G. Signiﬁcance of Regression Results
Table G.3.: Regression Results in Numbers of the Final Models. Source: own calculation.
416
Table G.4.: Regression Results in Numbers of the Final Models. Source: own calculation.
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G. Signiﬁcance of Regression Results
Table G.5.: Regression Results in Numbers of the Final Models. Source: own calculation.
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H. Hypotheses, Tests and Overall Outcome
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H. Hypotheses, Tests and Overall Outcome
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Table H.2.: Overview of Hypotheses, Tests and Results. Source: own depiction.
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Glossary
ACLED Armed Conﬂict Location and Event Dataset
AIDS Acquired Immunodeﬁciency Syndrome
AKUF Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kriegsursachenforschung
ANC African National Congress
ANOVA Analysis of Variance
AUC United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia
BBC British Broadcasting Corporation
BTI Bertelsmann Tranformation Index
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CIFP Country Indicators for Foreign Policy
COW Correlates of War
CPI Corruption Perception Index
CPIA/IRAI Country Policy & Institutional Assessment/IDA Res. Allocation Index
CSI Child Soldiers International (former CSUCS)
CSUCS Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers
DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECOMOG Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
EDACS Event Data Project on Conﬂict and Security
EIU Economist Intelligence Unit
ELI Environmental Law Institute
ERPAC Colombian Popular Revolutionary Antiterrorist Army
EU European Union
FARC Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People’s Army
FSI Failed States Index
GDP Gross domestic product
GED Georeferenced Event Dataset
GIS Geographic information system
GNI Gross national income
HIV Human Immunodeﬁciency Virus
ICG International Crisis Group
ICRG International Country Risk Guide
IDMC Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
IDP Internally displaced person
IFP Inkatha Freedom Party
IISS International Institute for Strategic Studies
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Glossary
IMF International Monetary Fund
IO International Organization
KOF Konjunkturforschungsstelle
KOSVED Konstanz One-Sided Violence Event Dataset
LRA Lord’s Resistance Army
LURD Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
MHS Mutually Hurting Stalemate
MIFFS Middle-income but Failed or Fragile States
MIPT Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism
MODEL Movement for Democracy in Liberia
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO Non-governmental organization
NPFL National Patriotic Front of Liberia
NRA National Resistance Army (Uganda)
NSA Non-State Armed Group
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OLS Ordinary least squares
OSAM Organizational Structure of Armed Movement Dataset
PITF Political Instability Task Force
PKOLED Peacekeeping Operations Location and Event Dataset
PMF Private military company
PRIO Peace Research Institute Oslo
PRS Political Risk Services Group
RAND Research ANd Development corporation
RUF Revolutionary United Front (Sierra Leone)
SDA Serbian Defence Army
SFI State Fragility Index
SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SPLM Sudan People’s Liberation Movement
START National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
TI Transparency International
TO Territorial Defense Unit
UCDP Uppsala Conﬂict Data Program
ULIMO-J United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy – Johnson faction
ULIMO-K United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy – Kromah faction
UN United Nations
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNITA National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
US United States of America
USCRI United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants
WB World Bank
WGI World Governance Indicators
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